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Abstract
In this thesis we propose a design for a ubiquitous and interoperable device based on the
smart card architecture to meet the challenges of privacy, trust, and security for traditional
and emerging technologies like personal computers, smart phones and tablets. Such a de-
vice is referred a User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD). To support the smart
card architecture for the UCTD initiative, we propose the delegation of smart card owner-
ship from a centralised authority (i.e. the card issuer) to users. This delegation mandated
a review of existing smart card mechanisms and their proposals for modications/improve-
ments to their operation.
Since the inception of smart card technology, the dominant ownership model in the smart
card industry has been refer to as the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM).
The ICOM has no doubt played a pivotal role in the proliferation of the technology into
various segments of modern life. However, it has been a barrier to the convergence of
dierent services on a smart card. In addition, it might be considered as a hurdle to the
adaption of smart card technology into a general-purpose security device.
To avoid these issues, we propose citizen ownership of smart cards, referred as the User
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM). Contrary to the ICOM, it gives the power
of decision to install or delete an application on a smart card to its user. The ownership of
corresponding applications remains with their respective application providers along with
the choice to lease their application to a card or not. In addition, based on the UCOM
framework, we also proposed the Coopetitive Architecture for Smart Cards (CASC) that
merges the centralised control of card issuers with the provision of application choice to
the card user.
In the core of the thesis, we analyse the suitability of the existing smart card architectures
for the UCOM. This leads to the proposal of three major contributions spanning the smart
card architecture, the application management framework, and the execution environment.
Furthermore, we propose protocols for the application installation mechanism and the
application sharing mechanism (i.e. smart card rewall). In addition to this, we propose
a framework for backing-up, migrating, and restoring the smart card contents.
Finally, we provide the test implementation results of the proposed protocols along with
their performance measures. The protocols are then compared in terms of features and
performance with existing smart cards and internet protocols. In order to provide a more
detailed analysis of proposed protocols and for the sake of completeness, we performed
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1.1 Setting the Scene
1.1 Setting the Scene
We open the discussion in this chapter by exploring the evolution of the smart card from
its beginnings to the present. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons for having
a user centric approach to the management of a security-critical device like a smart card
and the challenges this approach involves. We then discuss the contributions of the thesis,
and outline its structure.
1.2 A Brief History of Smart Cards
Card-based transactions originated in the USA, starting with a system which came to be
known as metal money. This was a metal card issued by Western Union1 as part of a
deferred payment scheme [2]. In 1946, John Biggins, a banker at Flatbush National Bank
of Brooklyn, issued a banking card to his customers called Charg-It [3]. Customers used
their Charg-It cards to pay for groceries at local shops. In 1951, New York's Franklin
National Bank issued the rst credit cards [4] to gain a competitive advantage over rival
banks. During the same period, an exclusive club known as the Diners Club issued the rst
plastic cards [5]. These cards reected the high status of the individuals who used them.
Instead of using cash, cardholders would use these cards to pay for services at selected hotels
and restaurants. This was the beginning of plastic money as we know it; however, the rapid
proliferation of plastic cards came when Visa2 and MasterCard3 entered the eld [5].
These early cards spread from the USA to Europe and within a few years to the rest of
the world. They had a very simple mechanism to store user-specic data and secure it
against forgery. These cards carried the name of the cardholder and a unique card number
printed or embossed on the card along with the card issuer's logo and a signature panel.
The signature panel was used as a security mechanism to link the card to its cardholder.
When used at a merchant's premises, the merchant had to verify the printed/embossed
features of the card and ask the cardholder to sign the receipt. To verify the cardholder's
right to use the card, the merchant could then match the signature on the receipt with the
one on the signature panel [5]. The system relied heavily on the competence of the person
at the Point of Sale (POS). This system worked for a while on a limited scale, but as the
use of plastic cards increased, banks soon realised that a machine-readable and automated
system would benet all parties including cardholders, merchants, and banks [6].
1Western Union is a US-based nancial company that provides person-to-person money transfer, busi-
ness and commercial services.
2Visa: Trademark of Visa Inc, San Francisco, California, USA. A global payment technology and
transaction management company that provides nancial services to banks.
3MasterCard: Trademark of the MasterCard Worldwide that provides technology and architecture to
support the relationship between nancial institutions, merchants, and consumers for monetary transac-
tions.
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The next big innovation in the plastic card's evolution was the introduction of magnetic
stripe cards. The magnetic stripe was used by banks to store digital information regarding
the card and its cardholder that supplemented the visual features of the card. The storage
of data on the magnetic stripe, along with the introduction of magnetic stripe readers at
each merchant's site, automated the payment process and eliminated the tiresome handling
of paper receipts. A feature of this innovation that outlived the magnetic stripe initiative
and superseded the cardholder's signature is referred as a Personal Identication Number
(PIN), which was used to identify the cardholder [6]. At a POS, a cardholder had to provide
her card along with the PIN. If the card-issuing bank veried the PIN, the transaction
would go ahead [5, 7]. These cards are still used in many places around the world, especially
as student cards, hotel room keys, and rail tickets.
In subsequent years, the use of magnetic stripe cards started to strain the banking infras-
tructure. There were two reasons for this: rst, a malicious user with suitable equipment
could copy, modify, or write new data values onto the magnetic stripe; second, the early use
of magnetic stripe cards used online connections to connect to the card-issuing bank's com-
puter system (back-oce system). This incurred substantial costs for data transmission,
which in most cases were paid by merchants. In addition, requiring an online connection
with the back oce system put extra demands on the availability of the payment-by-card
service. Remote areas and international call dialling rates soon decentralised the payment
processing systems managed by two big American nancial services companies, VISA and
MasterCard. However, even the introduction of local points of clearance for payments did
not make things much easier for merchants, and they still had to bear the burden of calling
the transaction clearance server of the bank that issued the card.
A minor improvement to the magnetic stripe cards came in the shape of optical-storage
(holographic) cards that provided a much larger storage capacity. However, the costs of
manufacturing and writing or reading data from the optical-storage cards were higher and
they still had the same shortcomings as magnetic stripe cards [8], so there was no particular
incentive to change over to them.
The next breakthrough in the card-based services sector came in the 1970s, not from the
USA but from Germany and France. This breakthrough was fuelled mainly by progress in
microelectronics, which led to the ability to build a single silicon chip with dierent logical
components to store and process logic data, revolutionising the card industry.
Nevertheless, it took a decade before chip-based cards were widely deployed; the French
Postes, télégraphes et téléphones (PTT) rst used them as telephone cards [5]. German
telephone cards soon followed. These deployments provided a testing ground for the new
technology, which was later exported to other industries, as chip-based cards provided much
greater reliability and security than the magnetic stripe or holographic cards. Initially,
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chip cards known as memory cards were based on xed logic and limited storage capacity.
However, later in the 1990s microprocessor cards emerged on the scene. These cards
can store and dynamically process information without relying on hard-wired xed logic,
as was the case in early chip cards. The German Post Oce conducted initial trials
of chip cards for their analogue mobile telephone network. The success of these trials
resulted in the deployment of the microprocessor cards in the GSM4 networks. At the time,
telecommunication companies all over the world were rapidly adopting microprocessor
cards, mainly to prevent phone cloning. However, the banking networks of the time did
not embrace the new technology as quickly.
The development of smart cards coincided with another revolution in the eld of system
security. The discipline of cryptography was emerging from government and military se-
crecy. The security provided by sophisticated (cryptographic) mathematical concepts, and
improved designs in hardware and software programming paved the way for the use of
cryptography in new technologies such as smart cards. This gave smart cards an edge
over magnetic stripe cards in the banking sector, and this was soon acknowledged [5].
As in the case of the initial innovation of chip card technology, French banks pioneered
the adoption of the smart cards as payment cards. After long negotiations and develop-
ment, the widespread adoption of smart cards in the banking sector came in 1994, when
Europay, MasterCard and Visa published their payment card specication (i.e. the EMV
specication [9]).
The initial attempts to have multiple functionality on a smart card were made in 1996 in
Austria with the introduction of a smart card, which allowed banking (e.g. POS services),
an electronic purse and optional value-added services [5]. However, this initiative cannot
be considered a true multi-application smart card, because it was a multi-functional smart
card [10] that had a single application with multiple functionality.
At the same time, another concept termed the generic soft mask [5] was taking centre
stage. In generic soft mask a card manufacturer implements a Smart Card Operating
System (SCOS) on a non-mutable memory of the smart card. This operating system is
independent of applications like banking or transport. To support these applications, the
card manufacturer implements the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to facilitate
individual application. These APIs were stored on the mutable memory rather than on a
non-mutable memory where traditionally the bulk of the SCOS was stored. This innovation
simplied the development of smart card applications: card manufacturers proposed using
generic soft masks for dierent types of applications. Implementing the concept of the
generic soft mask requires a minimum operating system and some customized Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) for any particular application. The application developers
utilised these APIs to develop their applications.
4Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) is a standard for the mobile Telecom industry that
is developed and promoted by the GSM Association (GSMA).
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The introduction of the soft mask also enabled the smart card developers to have a sin-
gle smart card which had multiple application. These were fundamentally dierent from
multi-functional smart cards because each of the functionalities/services had a separate
application in the smart card. One example of an initial soft mask-based multiple applica-
tion smart card is the French banking card. It had the old B0' application [11], EMV [9]
banking application and a French (electronic) purse called Moneo [12, 13]. When a smart
card user presented his/her smart card at a terminal, the card rst checked whether or not
the terminal supported EMV. If it did not, then it could opt for the B0' French banking
application. Although these smart cards had separate functional applications, we can-
not term them true multi-application smart cards because of the rigidity of the smart
card architecture. Once these smart cards were issued, not even the card issuers could
update them or install new applications on them. Therefore, how can we dene a true
multi-application smart card?
A multi-application smart card is one that supports the features listed below [5, 6, 14, 15]:
1. A separate context for each application on the card (e.g. storage and execution iso-
lation), ensuring a secure and reliable application segregation mechanism.
2. Post-issuance application installation, deletion, and management (update/modica-
tion).
3. The ability for terminals to select an application directly and independently of other
on-card applications.
4. The management, updating, modication, and deletion of each application without
aecting other applications.
5. Delegation of the management of an application to an entity, which is not necessarily
the card issuer. If an application is managed by such an entity, then the card issuer
cannot access the application context. The only possible authority a card issuer
might have is to block and/or remove the application without accessing its contents.
6. Secure and reliable inter-application communication.
A large number of smart cards deployed today are single task devices which can only execute
one application at a time, and do not support the simultaneous execution of multiple
applications. However, innovation in the hardware design and in the SCOS/platforms
have begun to explore the concept of multi-threading [16]. These developments will surely
make smart cards into powerful and secure computing devices which can support dierent
tasks concurrently.
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Over the last ten years, smart card technology has rapidly moved out of its traditional
businesses such as banking and telecommunication. It has spread to transport, health care,
identity cards, travel cards, access control, leisure passes, and other elds. Smart cards
are becoming synonymous with everyday activities and they are deployed in almost every
aspect of modern life. In the smart card industry the technology has changed its shape
regularly. It has moved from plastic cards to magnetic stripes to chip cards and from single
application to multi-application smart cards. Each innovation has taken approximately ten
years to arrive and become commercially viable. With each new step, the emphasis has
been on greater exibility, operability, security and reliability, and on the value that smart
cards bring to customers and businesses.
1.3 Motivation and Challenges
A wide range of computing devices are being introduced that can perform the same tasks.
For example, traditionally mobile phones were only for voice communication and later, for
text messaging. However, when it comes to Internet access the advent of smart phones has
blurred the line between a desktop computer and hand-held devices. In addition, comput-
ing devices like tablets are making headway in market; thus general-purpose computers,
mobile phones, and tablets are providing similar services. This multiplies the potential
for customers to become victims of security breaches or privacy violations as their data
is on multiple computing devices with dierent platforms and varying levels of security
safeguards.
At the same time, the smart card industry, that until the start of the 21st century was
reluctant to adopt the multi-application smart card initiative, is considering a convergence
of dierent services on to a single device. The idea of multi-application smart cards has been
well known since the late 1990s but after its initial advocacy, it did not gain any momentum.
However, recent innovations such as the Near Field Communication (NFC) [17] technology
and secure elements5 in mobile phones have set o a renewed interest in multi-application
smart cards. The NFC enables a contactless data exchange between a chip (i.e. a smart
card) and a terminal. It is also extended to enable mobile phones to emulate contactless
smart cards. As a result, an NFC-enabled mobile phone can use the existing infrastructures
of dierent industries (i.e. banking, transport and access control) that support contactless
smart cards.
The security and privacy concerns are increasing with the increasing number of dierent
portals (i.e. devices) through which users are accessing associated data/functions. There
5A secure element is an electronic chip which can securely store and execute programs. Examples are
the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), the Embedded Secure Element, and Secure Memory Cards.
Throughout this thesis, the terms secure element and smart card are used interchangeably.
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are several proposals to provide a hardware-based security and privacy protection, and
they dier in operation and capability from one computing device to another. What we
mean by this is that the proposal becomes specic to the target computing device for
which the trust, security, or privacy architecture is proposed. For example, the dierence
between the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [18] and Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) [19]
is that they target two dierent computing devices, namely general-purpose computers and
mobile phones respectively. Similarly, to provide protection to mobile devices including
mobile phones and tablets, architectures like AEGIS [20], ARM TrustZone [21], M-Shield
[22], GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [23] are proposed. These
proposals, along with the TPM and MTM, have created a wide range of options that
provide the same services namely trust, security, and privacy.
Having a wide range of choices is encouraging, but it also means that a Service Provider
(SP) that oers a service that requires trust, security and privacy support has to implement
or support a wide range of technologies. For example, an internet identity application could
be on a desktop computer and mobile phone. For a desktop computer, the protection
technology might use TPM and for a mobile phone, it might depend on MTM or M-Shield.
This diversity could not only create complexity for the SP to manage and provision its
services but also for the consumer to use dierent architectures on individual devices.
Furthermore, most of the proposed architectures like TPM or MTM are physically bound
to the computing devices, thus reducing the ubiquity and inter-operability of the same
services on dierent devices. The same is true if a user has an identity application as part
of her smart card. Therefore, a user that has a computer, a mobile phone, a tablet and
smart cards, will be using the same service on each device in isolation.
A possible solution might be to have a device that can support a unied, ubiquitous, and
interoperable architecture for security and privacy services incorporated across dierent
computing environments (e.g. desktop computers, embedded devices, tablets, and mobile
phones etc.). We refer to such a device as a User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD).
Application developers, whether they are targeting smart cards, hand-held devices and/or
traditional computing devices, can utilise the UCTD architecture that provides a single
unied framework. The reason we focus on having a user centric architecture is to pro-
vide maximum interoperability, exibility, and integration between dierent services and
operational architectures.
The UCTD provides hardware level security coupled with a robust software platform that
will enable an SP to design their services for a single platform (i.e. a UCTD) so that
consumers can use the service seamlessly on any of their computing devices. For example,
a banking application on a UCTD can provide a secure online payment scheme for a
computer, mobile phone or tablet along with provision to pay at a POS or withdraw money
at an Automated Teller Machine (ATM). The bank does not need to worry about which
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computing device the consumer is using. The user and the bank get security and privacy
protection from the UCTD regardless of the device (e.g. computer, mobile phone, tablet,
and POS, etc.) from wherever they are connecting to the payment network. Therefore,
feature-rich computing devices can have applications that rely on the services provided by
the UCTD to enable a security- and privacy-preserving framework.
For such a device, we consider that smart cards oer the most promising architecture.
In our opinion, the rigorous design and analysis constituted in the smart card industry
can benet other computing environments by providing security, privacy, and reliability
services. If we port the smart card architecture as a generic tamper-resistant device that
can interface with dierent computing environments then it can provide a ubiquitous,
interoperable, exible, dynamic, secure, and reliable architecture that can store and execute
security- and privacy-sensitive applications. In this thesis, we use the term smart card as
inclusive of the technology (both hardware and software architecture) and without any
restriction on form factors. The smart card architecture can only be realised as a UCTD
if the associated ownership issues are resolved.
The most prominent ownership model in the smart card industry is centred on the or-
ganisation, which acquires smart cards from card manufacturers and issues them to the
customers. Such organisations are referred to as card issuers and in this thesis this owner-
ship model is called the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM). This model
provided much needed momentum in the smart card industry, driving the technological and
infrastructural improvements to provide better, more secure and reliable services to cus-
tomers. It also enabled the initial motivation for standardising the smart card technology
(e.g. ISO 7816 [24], ISO 14443 [25]) and its applications for specic elds (e.g. GSM [26],
EMV [9] and ITSO [27], etc.).
The ICOM architecture is restrictive and might not be suitable for smart cards if they are
to be adapted as UCTDs. Therefore, we propose a model that provides a more exible,
and dynamic platform which also gives control of the smart card to its users. This model is
referred to as the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM). The term ownership
(control) in the proposed model means freedom of choice that gives a UCTD owner the
privilege of installing or deleting any application as they desire. However, this does not
mean that they have the ownership of individual applications installed on the device [10].
The application(s) installed on the smart card will always be under the total control of
the application issuers (i.e. the SPs) and the user will be entitled to use these applications
under sanction from their respective SPs. Furthermore, the choice about whether to lease
an application to a card (user) resides solely with the relevant SP. Therefore, we can dene




The challenges presented to the UCOM proposal are rooted in the history of the smart
card technology. Any architecture or framework proposed in the smart card industry was
designed with the underlying requirement of supporting centralised control (i.e. ICOM).
Most notable examples are Java Card [28], Multos [29], and GlobalPlatform [30]. The
design of these technologies is based on the strong assumption that the smart cards will
always be under the control of a trusted centralised authority.
When we move the smart card ownership to its users, the traditional notion of trust does
not hold. Therefore, most of the ICOM-based architectures did not provide the same level
of security and reliability that compelled us to choose smart cards for the UCTD proposal.
However, we do not propose that existing well-established architectures like Java Card and
GlobalPlatform are incapable of supporting a user centric approach. What we propose is
that they require some modications that will enable them to support an architecture that
supports the user ownership of the smart cards. In this way, UCOM not only makes a
smart card into a general-purpose security device (i.e. UCTD) [31] but also resolves the
ownership issues in the smart card industry that are hindering the adoption of having
multiple services from dierent organisation on a single smart card [32].
Furthermore, for the UCTDs, to support feature rich environments (e.g. desktop comput-
ers) while supporting only a single user might not be sucient. Some of these environments
might include administrative oversight as part of the corporate administration, or parental
control. Therefore, we extended the UCOM architecture to enable administrative man-
agement while strictly adhering to the user ownership, platform security, and reliability
requirements. This extension is referred as the Coopetitive6 Architecture for Smart Cards
(CASC).
In the rest of the thesis, the terms UCTD, smart card, and secure element will be used
interchangeably unless specied otherwise.
1.4 Contributions
In this thesis, we set out to analyse whether user ownership is technically and operationally
possible for a tamper-resistant device based on the smart card architecture. After showing
that it is possible, we consider what changes must be made to traditional smart card
architecture and service infrastructure. These questions are the focus of this thesis.
The contributions of this thesis are spread over dierent stages of the UCTD lifecycle, from
6The term coopetitive is borrowed from game theory [33][35]; where it stands for arrangements in
which competitors collaborate with each other to share the common cost and compete where they see that
they might have competitive advantage.
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the UCTD manufacturing, to the application download and execution, to decommissioning
at the end of the UCTD's lifetime. The main contribution of the thesis is the development
of a user centric framework for tamper-resistant security-sensitive devices. To accomplish
this, we propose several changes to existing smart card architecture, including changes to
the application management framework, the application download protocols, the smart
card rewall mechanism, and nally the application execution environment.
We propose a new architecture for the smart card platform, including the remote attes-
tation and security assurance mechanism. These changes will enable an SP to ascertain
whether the current state of a platform is trustworthy. Furthermore, we propose a frame-
work to securely backup the contents of a smart card and restore them (when required)
to any other smart card. This latter mechanism allows a rapid recovery if the existing
smart card is stolen or corrupted (i.e. cannot work), and also facilitates migration from












Figure 1.1: Life cycle of UCTDs in relation to a user and an application
The life cycle stages of a UCTD in relation to its provision of dierent functionality or
features to the respective user or SP are shown in gure 1.1. Each depicted stage of the
UCTD also has a corresponding chapter or chapters in the thesis.
The rst stage in the life cycle of a UCTD is the issuance phase that includes manufacturing
and issuance of the UCTDs along with the ownership acquisition by the users.
In the second stage referred as Application Acquisition, the user requests an SP to lease its
application(s) to the acquired UCTD. This process encompasses the dynamic establishment
of a trust relationship between the SP and the UCTD along with the downloading of the
(requested) application.
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The next stage is the Localisation stage, in which the downloaded application registers its
services with the UCTD. In addition, if the downloaded application shares resources with
other (installed) applications then it will also establish an application sharing relationship
with them.
Once an application is localised, it will utilise the runtime environment to execute its
services. This phase of the UCTD in relation to an application is termed as the Execution
phase.
Finally, at the end of the life cycle of a UCTD, an application retires from service, which
might be due to damage to the device, loss, theft, or to the user acquiring a more feature-
rich UCTD. This phase is termed as Decommission and it requires the inclusion of ar-
chitecture which can take a backup of the existing contents of a UCTD and transfer it to
another UCTD.
During the course of this thesis, the term UCTD is used to indicate a tamper-resistant de-
vice, whereas, UCOM refers to the ownership model that we have proposed for the UCTDs.
Furthermore, when we refer to an honest user we use third-person singular pronoun she
and for a malicious user we use he.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
In chapter 2, we begin the discussion by emphasising that tamper-resistant devices can
provide a secure, reliable, and trusted execution environment even when the device is in
the possession of an adversary. With the ever-growing use of dierent computing devices
(i.e. mobile phones, tablets, and embedded devices), the potential for compromising the
security and privacy of an individual is increased. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
is restricted to integrity measurement and cryptographic operations, which is crucial in
its own right. On the other hand, smart cards provide a general-purpose execution envi-
ronment, but traditionally they are under centralised control, which if extended to generic
tamper-resistant devices may not be appropriate. Therefore, in this chapter we analyse
the rationale for a general-purpose user centric tamper-resistant device based on the smart
card architecture, and its applications in dierent computing environments.
Chapter 3, opens the discussion with the ICOM and extends it to include the security and
operational assumptions adopted in this model. Next, we provide a succinct description of
the widely deployed smart card frameworks that support the ICOM. After discussing the
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traditional smart card ownership model and associated architectures, we move on to discuss
the concept of giving control of application selection to cardholders. We then discuss the
major components of the UCOM framework.
To provide a secure and reliable architecture for the UCTD we need to make adequate
modications to the smart card platform. Therefore, in chapter 4, we discuss the security
and operational architecture of the UCOM-supported platform, termed as the User Cen-
tric Smart Card (UCSC). We detail the reasons behind the architectural changes to the
traditional smart card which are needed to accommodate the philosophy of the UCOM.
Subsequently, we discuss the mechanism that provides security assurance of the UCOM
platform to the requesting entity. We also describe the ownership acquisition process
through which a user takes ownership of an UCSC and how she can verify the claims
articulated (e.g. assurances about security and reliability) by the UCSC.
After describing the smart card platform architecture, we move to a description of the
framework that supports the application acquisition and management. Hence, in chapter
5, we discuss the card management architectures that are widely accepted and deployed in
the smart card industry: GlobalPlatform and Multos. We explain why these architectures
are not fully compatible with the user centric architecture. Subsequently, we describe the
card management architecture for the UCOM. Finally, we discuss two new issues raised by
the proposed architecture.
Chapter 6, begins with a discussion on the secure channel protocols that are used for entity
authentication and key establishment. We discuss the security and operational goals that
a secure channel protocol has to accomplish in the UCTD environment. Subsequently, we
discuss dierent protocols which have been proposed for Internet and smart card environ-
ments, and these protocols are used to provide a comparison to the ones we propose. We
propose two protocols that closely adhere to the UCOM philosophy and a protocol related
to the CASC model. An informal analysis is provided of all proposed protocols. For the
sake of completeness, we subject the proposed protocols to mechanical formal analysis us-
ing CasperFDR. Finally, we discuss the test implementation and performance measures of
the proposed protocols.
After an application is installed on a smart card, it might want to communicate with other
applications or services available on the card. To do so, an application will utilise the
provision of an application sharing mechanism. In chapter 7, we begin the discussion with
a description of the two contrasting frameworks for application sharing deployed by Java
Card and Multos, followed by an explanation for why we need to extend the existing tech-
niques for the UCOM framework. Subsequently, we discuss the architectural framework
of an application sharing mechanism for the UCTD. Later, we extend the proposed ap-
plication sharing mechanism between applications installed on dierent UCTDs, referring
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to it as Cross-Device Application Sharing (CDAS). The application sharing mechanism
for UCTD requires entity authentication and trust validation, along with key generation
to secure the sharing of resources between applications. To do so, we propose adequate
protocols that accomplish the listed goals of the UCTD application sharing mechanism.
Furthermore, we provide an informal analysis of the protocols along with a comparison with
existing protocols. Subsequently, mechanical formal analysis based on the CasperFDR, and
the test implementation experience, is presented.
Once an application is installed, and has registered itself with dierent applications and
platform services, it will execute to provide services to the user. Therefore, chapter 8 dis-
cusses the UCTD execution environment in which the downloaded applications will execute.
We articulate the threat model for the execution environment in the ICOM architecture.
We then examine the potential aggravation of the threat model to the proposed UCOM
because of its openness. Subsequently, we look at countermeasures that can be deployed
to provide a secure and reliable execution platform. The discussed countermeasures are
then analysed in terms of their suitability and performance.
In chapter 9, we analyse the content backup and restoration mechanism that allows a user
to securely backup her smart card. This mechanism enables a user to retain the same set
of applications if she loses her smart card or wants to move to a new one. Subsequently, we
detail the application deletion process that ensures that an application is removed without
aecting the reliability of the UCTD platform.
Finally, in chapter 10, we conclude the thesis by summarising its contributions and pro-
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In this chapter, we begin by discussing the notion that tamper-resistant devices can provide
a secure, reliable, and trusted execution environment even when they are in the possession
of an adversary. We survey security and privacy issues in dierent computing environments
including smart cards, mobile devices, and traditional computers. Subsequently, we analyse
the rationale for a general-purpose user centric tamper-resistant device based on smart card




The adoption of mobile phones and tablet-based computing platforms (e.g. iPads) is in-
creasing. To some extent, the security and privacy issues of personal computers, including
insecure execution environments, also apply to hand-held devices. As reliance on these
devices increases, so will threats to the security and privacy of the platform and its users.
For example, a healthcare mobile application, if it is badly designed and gets compromised,
it may reveal user's sensitive medical information.
A possible solution is to have a tamper-resistant execution environment that executes
a program in a trusted, secure, reliable, and fault-tolerant environment. Among widely
deployed tamper-resistant devices, two are most prominent: Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) [36], and smart cards [5].
The TPM provides a platform's integrity measurement with cryptographic protection in
contrast to smart cards that provide a generic execution environment, in which an ap-
plication can execute and store application code and data. This landscape maps from
smart cards, mobile phones, tablets and general-purpose computers through to Machine-
to-Machine communication and the Internet of Things [37]. It would be benecial to have
an interoperable unied architecture that provides a secure and reliable execution and
storage environment for dierent computing devices.
Structure of the Chapter: In section 2.2, we discuss the rationale for having a secure,
reliable, trusted, dynamic, and ubiquitous architecture for a generic tamper-resistant device
that is under the user's control. Such a device is referred as a User Centric Tamper-
Resistant Device (UCTD). Section 2.3 briey surveys the proposals that provide secure
and trusted services to dierent computing devices. In this section, we also compare the
discussed devices for their suitability as UCTDs. Subsequently, in section 2.4 we discuss the
reasoning behind the choice of smart card architecture for a proposed unied architecture
based on UCTDs. Finally, section 2.5 provides three case studies based on the adoption
of the UCTD in dierent computing environments.
2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
The motivation for having a generic tamper-resistant device that is under the control of
its user rather than a centralised authority comes from three distinct but interrelated
computing elds, discussed individually in subsequent sections.
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2.2.1 Smart Card Environment
As pointed out by Porter [38], the crucial elements that stimulate competition and inno-
vation in an industry can be: a) the threat of new entrants, b) the threat of substitute
products or devices, and c) consumer power (culture). For the smart card industry, these
elements are present in a multitude of forms. The provision of having applications on a
mobile phone has enabled new entrants to venture into the traditionally monopolised in-
dustries like the payment sector. Companies like PayPal, Google or any other third party
can oer a mobile payment service. In addition smart phones, with inclusion of Near Field
Communication (NFC) functionality, can provide a substitute for traditional smart card
applications like transport ticketing and access control [39]. Technology savvy consumers
require more features on a device, a need [40], which is successfully fullled by high-end
smart phones (e.g. the iPhone). Smart cards are lagging behind in providing such possi-
bilities. Nevertheless, the NFC technology provides an opportunity for the convergence of
dierent services on a single smart card.
In NFC trials around the world [41], the prominent framework that is deployed is an
extension of the ICOM model and is referred as the Trusted Service Manager (TSM) [42].
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Figure 2.1: Trusted Service Manager (TSM) architecture
The TSM architecture is illustrated in gure 2.1 in which we have two TSM networks:
namely TSM-1 and TSM-2. Each network has a Mobile Network Operator (MNO), a Card
Issuing Bank (CIB), a Transport Service Operator (TSO) and a Leisure Centre (LC).
A customer CA receives a smart card (SCA) from the TSM-1. The customer CA would
only be able to have applications on the SCA from the MNO1, CIB1, TSO1, and LC1.
However, if CA does banking with the CIB2 that is associated with TSM-2 then she has to
either acquire a new smart card from TSM-2 or change banks, eectively creating market
segmentation.
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Figure 2.2: Possible interaction between TSMs for scalability
One possible option to reduce market segmentation is to have all application providers
maintain a relationship with all or most of the TSMs. However, this option might not be
practically feasible. We propose to resolve market segmentation by introducing a syndi-
cated scheme, which can be termed as the Dynamic Contractual Syndicated TSM (DCS-
TSM) in which multiple TSMs participate to provide services to their customers. In this
model, a user (CA) can request to install an application from an application provider (e.g.
MNO, CIB, TSO, and LC) that is a member of any TSM, which participates in the DCS-
TSM. The application installation is still authorised by the scheme manager  for example,
TSM-1 in gure 2.2 is the scheme manager for the SCA as it has issued the smart card
to the customer CA. It could be argued that this scenario is workable, but the DCS-TSM
framework also suers from limited scalability, exibility, and ubiquitousness.
The limited scalability arises because a) not all application providers can establish or
manage a relationship with every possible TSM and b) not all TSMs will be part of the
same DCS-TSM. In addition, to be part of a collaborative scheme oered by a TSM,
application providers might be required to pay a subscription fee. Therefore, small or
medium scale organisations like local libraries, universities, and health centres may not be
able to aord to be associated with a TSM. We consider that such a barrier would reduce a
scheme's exibility. Furthermore, it lacks true ubiquitousness as dierent countries might
opt for having their own independent TSMs. Therefore, tourists or business travellers
would face diculties in acquiring applications (i.e. applications from a TSO) in a foreign
country. Other issues include ownership privileges, customer loyalty, customer relationship
management, card surface marketing, and potential revenue generation opportunities that
are discussed in [11, 32, 45, 46].
Innovation and success in a competitive environment is dependent on the core competence
of an organisation [47] in a particular eld (e.g. business, technology and culture). There
is no universally accepted concession on who should be taking the role of the TSM from
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possible contenders such as smart card manufacturers (SCMs), MNOs, CIBs, mobile phone
manufacturers (MPMs) and independent/trusted third parties (e.g. post oce). With
reference to trust and brand awareness, SCMs do not have a market presence, as since
the inception of the smart card technology their brand has seldom been part of the nal
product. Whereas, the core competence of MNOs or CIBs is not chip manufacturing,
but a strong branding and an existing customer base. The MPMs can extend their core
competence to secure-element designing/manufacturing, and they also have a strong brand
and customer base. Nevertheless, no one has a clear competitive advantage. There is an
underlying fear that this entire process might be the repeat of the multi-application smart
card initiative, which inspired an initial fervour that later died down due to the conicting
business objectives of dierent organisations. In this entire process, one stakeholder that is
crucial to the survival of all other entities in the ecosystem is missing: the users (consumers)
of the system, which we consider might be a gross oversight. An amicable solution to all
stakeholders could be the UCOM initiative.
2.2.2 Hand-held Devices
In this thesis, we use the term hand-held devices to refer to mobile phones and tablets.
The reason for grouping them together is the similarity in the application lifecycles of these
devices and a growing convergence between their form-factors and underlying platforms.
The mobile phone platform has come a long way from being just a medium of commu-
nication. It has developed into a social construct that has aliations and emotional at-
tachments for individual users along with being an entertainment hub, and a medium
to connect with the world through social media sites [48, 49]. With the ever-increasing
trend of convergence of dierent technologies/services in smart phones, they are becom-
ing attractive targets for adversaries who want to compromise the security and privacy of
users.
The so-called App Culture promoted by Apple Inc., which enables users to seamlessly
download any application they desire has opened up the mobile phone application market
to a wide range of companies [40]. New ideas are being tested; for example, Starbucks cus-
tomers can pay for coees using a Starbucks' Card Mobile App on their iPhones. This
indicates that there can be additional services/organisations which develop mobile applica-
tions that perform sensitive processing like banking or healthcare, which have traditionally
required a strong security and privacy architecture. Predominantly, mobile phone plat-
forms are not extensively evaluated for their security and privacy services, as is normal in
high-end smart cards. In addition, most of the smart phones do not have a tamper-resistant
execution environment [50] (except for the secure element). In addition, lack of Mobile
Trusted Module (MTM) adoption leaves application developers with no choice but to de-
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velop the applications that will run on a non-evaluated and possibly insecure/compromised
device.
If we analyse the mobile phone environment, the application download concept resembles
the ICOM model. For example, on an iPhone an application cannot be installed unless it is
in conformance with the Apple's stated regulations1 that are enforced by mandatory review
by the Apple's App Store. However, it has been possible to write malicious applications
that can bypass the Apple's App Store review [51]. Therefore, a conservative view of hand-
held devices will see them as potential military, corporate espionage, and civilian attack
targets. UCTDs will enable an application developer for handheld devices to store and
execute security- and privacy-related code and data on a secure and trusted device.
Likewise, tablet devices are gaining market share and have a similar product lifecycle to
a mobile phone. Therefore, the possibilities and issues we discussed above regarding the
mobile phone platform are also true for the tablet platform.
2.2.3 Traditional Computing Devices
These computing platforms are used in personal and corporate spheres, and they provide
access to a wide range of services. Most of these services require the security and privacy of
the user, and SPs (i.e. banks, and corporate servers, etc.) need to be able to authenticate
the user who is accessing their services. It can be argued that the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) provides an adequate security and privacy service. We are not contesting
this notion  we are suggesting that by having a tamper-resistant device that can store
applications and execute them within its bounds, can go a step further and provide a secure
execution environment that individual applications can utilise for their security sensitive
code. The problem with this proposal is that most of the tamper-resistant devices capable
of executing applications are under centralised control (as in the smart card industry) [11,
32], or they are stripped down to cryptographic services [18, 20, 21, 52, 53]. A UCTD
avoids such issues while providing an open and dynamic execution environment.
2.3 Candidates for User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
In hand-held and traditional computer devices, proposals like TPM [36], MTM [19], AEGIS
[20], ARM TrustZone [21] and GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
[54, 55], already exist. Most of these devices: a) are limited to a particular computing
1There are other ways of installing applications on a smart phone (e.g. iPhone) and most of them are
referred as jailbreaking [51]
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environment (e.g. TPM [18] and MTM [19]), b) only provide execution protection (e.g.
AEGIS), c) have limited application execution without user control (i.e. TEE), d) have
limited scalability regarding the support for dierent application and platform scenarios,
e) do not provide dynamic trust validation and assurance [56] and require an implicit
trust, f) do not require third party (security) evaluation, and g) do not provide user
ownership/control (e.g. smart cards [32]). We discuss these technologies individually below
and analyse their suitability for the UCTD architecture in table 2.1.
2.3.1 Trusted Platform Module
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [36] started an initiative for providing a tamper-
resistant device referred as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [18]. The mission state-
ment of the TCG commits it to providing authentication, data protection, network security,
and disaster recovery services [36]. A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) will measure the
integrity matrixes referred to as Platform Conguration Registers (PCRs) that are se-
curely sealed with cryptographic keys. If the TPM nds any discrepancies in the future
integrity-measurements then it will ag the problem. A TPM does not decide whether this
discrepancy is authorised by the user or whether it is due to a malicious entity.
A TPM is a tamper-resistant device with a low footprint that is utilised as a root of
trust to support the trusted computing platform. The concept of trust as dened by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the evaluation of platform results as expected by the
requesting entity [36]. A TPM is not concerned with whether the evaluated state is secure
or not as long as the evaluation result is trusted by the requesting hall. Therefore, we can
say that a TPM is specically designed (or restricted) to be a trusted component, which
will be physically bound (soldered) to a platform. The fundamental function of a TPM is
to provide secure, trusted, and tamper-resistant root of (trusted) measurements on which
the integrity measurement of the rest of the platform is dependent. A TPM is typically
under the control of the platform user, and it has a secure and reliable software/hardware
platform. However, it is not a general-purpose execution environment in which an arbitrary
code can be executed and neither is it portable, unless a smart card is used to behave like
a TPM [57][59]. In this chapter, we treat TPM and MTM together even though there are
subtle dierences between them.
2.3.2 AEGIS
AEGIS is a single-chip secure processor that is designed to build trusted systems and is
secure against physical and software attacks [20]. Therefore, we can consider AEGIS as
a processor with a limited memory that stores processor identication information along
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with possible cryptographic parameters (i.e. private key of the public key pair). AEGIS
has two processing modes: Tamper-Evident Processing (TE) and Private Tamper-Resistant
Processing (PTR). In the TE environment, AEGIS ensures the integrity of an executing
program whereas in PTR it also protects the privacy of the code or data. One fundamental
dierence between TPM and AEGIS is that TPM relies on static integrity measurements
whereas AEGIS provides a dynamic mechanism that measures an application's integrity
at dierent stages of execution. It is apparent that TPM has better performance than
AEGIS, and it can be argued that static integrity measurement is good enough for the
job. Another distinguishing feature of the AEGIS is that it uses a Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) [60] to securely store the cryptographic keys inside the AEGIS processor
chip [61].
2.3.3 ARM TrustZone
Similar to the MTM, the ARM TrustZone also provides an architecture for a trusted
platform specically for mobile devices. The underlying concept is the provision of two
virtual processors with hardware-level segregation and access control [21, 62]. This enables
the ARM TrustZone to dene two execution environments termed as Secure world and
Normal world. The Secure world executes the security and privacy sensitive components
of applications and normal execution takes place in the Normal world. The ARM processor
manages the switch between the two worlds. The ARM TrustZone is implemented as a
security extension to the ARM processors (e.g. ARM1176JZ(F)-S, Cortes-A8, and Cortex-
A9 MPCore) [21], which a developer can opt to utilise if required.
2.3.4 M-Shield
Texas Instruments has designed the M-Shield as a secure execution environment for the
mobile phone market [22]. Unlike ARM TrustZone, the M-Shield is a standalone secure
chip, and it provides a secure execution and limited non-volatile memory. Furthermore,
it has internal memory to store runtime execution data [63] and this makes it less sus-
ceptible to attacks on o-chip memory or communication buses [64]. The memory and
communication buses that we mention here are part of the platform, main memory and
communication buses between a TPM and other components on a motherboard, rather
than the on-chip memory and communication buses.
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2.3.5 GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
The TEE is GlobalPlatform's initiative [23, 54, 65] for mobile phones, set-top boxes, utility
meters, and payphones. GlobalPlatform denes a specication for interoperable secure
hardware, which is based on the GlobalPlatform's experience in the smart card industry.
It does not dene any particular hardware, which can be based on either a typical secure
element or any of the previously discussed tamper-resistant devices. The rationale for
discussing the TEE as part of the candidate devices is to provide a complete picture.
The underlying ownership of the TEE device still predominantly resides with the issuing
authority, which is similar to the GlobalPlatform's specication for the smart card industry
[30].
2.3.6 Trusted Personal Devices
The term Trusted Personal Devices (TPD) was coined by the Integrated secure platform
for the interactive Trusted Personal Devices (InspireD) project [66]. Similar to our pro-
posal, the architecture for the TPD is based on smart card technology. The architecture
of the TPD is similar to that of the smart card, with the exception that is has dierent
form factors that include SIM cards, Secure Digital (SD) cards, and Universal Serial Bus
(USB) memory sticks [66]. However, the InspireD project recommended that the TPD
to be under the ownership of a centralised authority (i.e. card issuer) and users get the
privilege of choosing whether to use the device or not. Users cannot request installation
or deletion of an application. Therefore, we can say that TPD was in conformance with
the ICOM framework.
2.3.7 Comparative Analysis
In this section, we analyse three questions: i) why use a tamper-resistant device?, ii) why
have a user centric ownership architecture?, and nally iii) why do we not just opt for the
TPM (or other devices discussed above)?
In most of the scenarios, a tamper-resistant device is assumed to be in the possession of
a malicious user [5, 6]. This assumption is natural for banking, transport, and healthcare
cards. Therefore, a tamper-resistant device has a physical protection layer to avoid any
intrusion attacks. In addition, these devices require an adequate hardware protection and
self-protect mechanism to safeguard them from accidental or intentional damage. There-
fore, a tamper-resistant device provides a secure and reliable platform that can remain
trustworthy even in the possession of a malicious user. However, just focusing on the tam-
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per resistance is not the complete picture when we discuss the UCTD and other measures
related to application and platform design are also required to complement the hardware
level protection [67].
The rationale for emphasising the user ownership of the UCTD is: a) to enable an open,
dynamic, and ubiquitous system, b) individual developers (application providers) do not
need to convince the scheme managers (as is required, for example, in the ICOM- or TSM-
based models for smart cards [32, 68]) to gain permission to install their applications onto
a UCTD, c) UCTD users (owners) will get the choice to install or delete an application,
and nally d) to facilitate the interoperability and scalability of the UCTD framework (i.e.
users can use their UCTDs in conjunction with any of their devices like mobile phones,
tablets, and computers, etc.).
Finally, why not just use TPM? After all it is already in the user's control, the TPM
specications [18] require tamper-resistance and the TPM acts as a root-of-trust in hand-
held and traditional computing devices. The rationale behind not choosing the TPM is:
a) the TPM is designed to support the trusted computing platform initiative [18] that is
focused on the integrity of the platform, rather than on an execution platform on which a
general application code can execute, b) the design of the TPM is specic to a particular
platform as there are two dierent specications for traditional computers and mobile
phones: TPM [18] and MTM [19] respectively, c) the basic functionalities of a TPM are
protected capabilities, integrity measurement and reporting; it does not make decisions but
merely reports the integrity measurements to the requesting entity, and nally d) TPM is
required to be bound to the relevant platform.
Below is the list of requirements for the UCTD architecture that we use to compare dierent
candidate technologies in table 2.1.
1. Execution protection: Dened commands related to security and privacy sensitive
processing are executed in a secure and reliable environment.
2. Storage protection (Volatile): The device has a secure volatile memory on the chip
to store temporary data and code related to the executing application.
3. Storage protection (Non-Volatile): The device provides non-volatile storage on the
chip.
4. Tamper-resistant: The device provides tamper-resistant protection that is based on
hardware techniques.
5. Tamper-evident: The device has the capability to detect potential tampering with
the hardware and respond in a pre-dened manner.
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6. Scalability: The architecture of the device is scalable so that it can provide services
to any application or application provider, and does not require authorisation/au-
thentication from a centralised authority.
7. Interoperable architecture: The architecture deals with the idea that the candidate
device (e.g. TPM, smart card, etc.) can be interoperable with dierent computing
devices (i.e. mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers).
8. Dynamic relation: A third party can establish a direct relationship based on the se-
curity and reliability of the device. The dynamic relation requires that an application
provider can trust a device without requiring it to be part of a syndicated scheme
(i.e. TSM or one adopted by Apple App Store, etc.) and vice versa.
9. User ownership: The device is in the control of its user and she can install, delete,
and execute any application she desires.
10. Administrative architecture: The device also provides for administrative controls as
might be required in a corporate network or in the case of parental control. This
option is to accommodate dierent deployment scenarios. For example, an MNO can
subsidise (locked) mobile phones under contract to a user; in this case, the MNO
is an administrative authority that gives the user the privilege of using the mobile
devices. The administrative architecture by no means restricts the user's freedom of
choice; therefore, it is an extension of the UCOM (section 3.6).
11. Open design: The design should not be proprietary; it should be in the public domain.
12. Secure execution platform: The device allows the execution of an application code
(from third parties) in a secure and reliable manner as long as it complies with its
requirements.
13. Independent security evaluation: As part of the design, the device is subjected to a
third party (e.g. the Common Criteria [69]) security and reliability analysis.
In table 2.1, the term smart card refers to one that supports the UCOM. Therefore, based
on the comparisons shown in table 2.1, it is easy to see that the UCOM-based smart card
architecture is suitable for UCTDs. Obviously, smart card technology requires suitable
modication if it is to be used as part of the UCOM framework. Whereas, the TPM as
expected to display support for most of the UCTD requirements listed above except for
requirements twelve and thirteen, which unfortunately are the cornerstones of the UCTD
framework. Likewise, AEGIS supports seven requirements out of thirteen.
The GlobalPlatform TEE, ARM TrustZone, and M-Shield meet an equal number of re-
quirements, as their design focuses on the mobile platform that imposes requirements
similar to those of the UCTD framework. The TPD design base was the traditional smart
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card that supported the ICOM; therefore, it does not support as many requirements as a
UCOM-based smart card. We can say that table 2.1 also provides a comparison between
UCOM- and ICOM-based smart cards and their suitability for the UCTD initiative.
2.4 The User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
As is apparent from the comparison in table 2.1, a multi-application smart card architecture
has the potential to serve as the underlying framework for the UCTD. The crucial point
that has to be taken into account is that smart card architecture is traditionally under
a stringent centralised control, whereas the UCTD requires a more diverse architecture
which also accommodates the user's ownership. Therefore, the concept of the User Centric
Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) becomes synonymous with the UCTD. In addition
to the UCOM framework for smart cards, for the UCTD initiative the form factor of smart




































































Figure 2.3: Illustration of UCTD form factors, application areas, and industry sectors
Figure 2.3 shows dierent possible form factors for the UCTD, various applications that
it can host, and dierent industries that can use the provided functionality. In subse-
quent sections, we briey introduce multiple application smart cards along with dierent
management architectures. This discussion serves as a foundation for the concept of multi-
application smart cards, their management architecture, and potential issues with them.
Before we dive into the UCOM proposal in chapter 3, in subsequent sections we briey
survey dierent management initiatives in the smart card industry and also discuss some
earlier attempts at user centric smart card management.
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2.4.1 Smart Card Management Initiatives
Since the beginning of the multi-application smart card initiative, there has been a debate
over dierent possible business models. With each proposed business model, new opportu-
nities and issues have emerged. However, for the most part the business model for smart
card-based services has not changed. Nevertheless, one of the main reasons behind the
failure to welcome the evolution of business models is the primary purpose of a smart card:
to be a security token. However, we postpone this discussion until the next chapter and in
this section, we concentrate on the initial proposals for dierent business models.
When the multi-application smart card initiative was proposed, the predominant belief was
that continuing the previously successful business model would be the key to its success.
It was envisaged that, like single-application smart cards, multi-application smart cards
would also be entirely under the control of the card issuer [14]. The card issuers would
have supervisory authority over their smart cards and would decide which applications
should be installed or deleted. Other companies (e.g. application providers) wishing to
share the platform with the card issuer would have to negotiate and agree on their terms
and conditions. This might be suitable for certain business models and industries, but the
failure of such architecture to achieve wide-scale deployment suggests that in the past it
did not enjoy overwhelming support from the business community.
An alternative ownership model could be to allow smart card users to purchase a smart
card. They could then contact the dierent service providers (companies which used smart
card-based applications for the services they oered), acquire their applications and install
them on their smart cards. However, some issues [14, 45] were anticipated a decade ago for
this possible ownership model, and to some extent most of them are valid concerns [11].
One such issue is whether the card issuers (application providers) will be willing to give
their applications to a platform for which they had no operational or security assurance.
This proposal can be referred to as the open card initiative discussed in section 2.4.2.1.
In addition, Deville et al. [14] suggest the possibility of having a dual scheme in which
users can install non-security critical applications onto their smart cards but the card is
issued/controlled by a centralised authority, the card issuer.
Another scheme proposed by Deville et al. is to have a certication authority, which
evaluates and guarantees the security and reliability of the card platform and the installed
applications. This model is to some extent deployed by the Multos [29] architecture and
it has the potential to be incorporated in the TSM-based architecture discussed in 2.2.1.
Since the multi-application smart card initiative was rst proposed, the only surviving and
successful model has been the issuer control model, which we term the ICOM. However,
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recently a substantial number of trials [41] have been made of the ownership model that
includes a certication authority (similar to the model proposed by Deville et al. above),
which is in fact an extension of the ICOM. The certication authority in these trials is
termed the TSM (section 2.2.1). The second proposed model (i.e. open card) was always
considered highly insecure, unreliable, problematic, and not feasible from a commercial
standpoint [11, 14, 45, 46, 70]. Nevertheless, the open card proposal was the rst concrete
eort to introduce user centricity in the smart card industry, later on which we based the
UCOM architecture.
2.4.2 User Centricity in the Smart Card Industry
In this section, we discuss the open card and virtual smart card initiative that (to some
extent) gave control of the smart card to its user.
2.4.2.1 Open Card Initiative
It is dicult to give an exact denition of open cards. In general, however, the term
open card is used to refer to blank smart cards that a user can purchase from a supplier.
After purchasing the smart card, the user can perform the role previously performed by
the card issuer and either accept or buy applications from dierent application providers.
These applications can be installed onto the user's card and used to access any associated
services. The whole card is under the user's control similar to the card issuer in the ICOM.
Therefore, we can say that the open card initiative is an ICOM framework with the user
replacing the card issuer.
Traditional smart card frameworks like Java Card, Multos, and GlobalPlatform were con-
sidered suitable for such a usage scenario. Most of these frameworks were built to support
the ICOM, and by making the user an issuer, they did not require any substantial changes.
However, as implied by Pierre Girard [46], such a mechanism would require an application
provider to issue their application to users to install on their smart card. This would require
the application provider to trust user not to reverse engineer or corrupt the application.
Such a scenario does not ensure the security, protection of intellectual property, and re-
liability of an application, as an application provider does not have any control on the
destination smart card that hosts its application. The main reason for this lack of control
on the part of the application provider was the unavailability of any guarantees regarding
the security and operational behaviour of the smart cards. Similar security issues are raised
by Chaumette and Sauveron in [70] and they make the open card initiative in its current
form unsuitable for the user centric framework.
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2.4.2.2 Virtual Smart Cards
One of our proposals concerning the smart card ownership architecture proposes a Virtual
Smart Card (VSC). The VSC enables a user to utilise a service by connecting to an
associated remote application, based on her location information [68]. The VSC does not
require the installation of an application onto a secure element, and this removes the need
for implicit trust and ownership of the platform. The remote application is hosted on a
Remote Application Server (RAS) that is in total control of a Service Provider (SP) such as
a bank or transport operator. The secure element supports the VSC model independently
of its owner (cardholder or user). The security of the secure element is ensured by the
manufacturer, making the ownership issues irrelevant in the VSC model.
The secure element only has a secure binding with an RAS that enables the mobile phone
to connect with it and use the associated services. The mobile phone connects through the
internet provided by the mobile operators, as soon as the user enters the associated service
zone. The service zone is identied with the aid of the Global Positing System (GPS) [71],
in conjunction with the published Service Access Points (SAPs).
The customers are only required to carry their mobile phones, and access to services (i.e.
banking, and transport, etc.) would be made available on demand. The location of a user
plays an important role in this model. The secure element decides whether to connect with
an RAS, depending upon the services available in close vicinity. The VSC framework is
















































Service Access Point (SAP)
Figure 2.4: Location based virtual smart card architecture
The mobile phone provides an interface that enables a user to enter an SP's registration
credentials. The SP's registration credentials are issued by the relevant SP after the user is
registered with them. From the SP's registration credentials, the secure element will initiate
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an enrolment process with the Remote Application Enrolment Server (RAES). The RAES
enables the secure element to establish a secure binding for the Remote Application Server
(RAS). The secure binding will be used in future to establish a connection with the RAS
to access the remote application(s).
As a user enters the vicinity of a SAP, the event-triggering software sends an alert to
the behaviour analyser. The behaviour analyser calculates the probability of the user
accessing the service. If the user is predicted to use the service, the behaviour analyser
requests the Smart Card Web Server (SCWS) to establish a connection over the internet
with the corresponding RAS and act as a bridge between the terminal and the remote
application(s).
When the user waves the mobile phone near the SAP to access service(s), the SAP might
challenge the mobile phone to authenticate the user (application). The challenge is sent to
the remote application by the secure element. Once the remote application has authenti-
cated the user, the terminal will provide the requested service(s).
2.5 Case Studies
In this section, we discuss a non-exhaustive list of case studies where UCTD can provide
exibility, and ubiquity to the existing security and privacy architectures.
2.5.1 One Card - All Services
User ownership enables a user to establish relationships with SPs ubiquitously, which is
referred as dynamism. Consider a scenario in the proposed TSM model in which a user who
travels extensively around the world (for business or pleasure) acquires a smart card from
a TSM in her country of origin. When she travels, she wants to access services that are
specic to the visiting country, but she cannot download them onto her smart card. The
reasons behind this might be that the services in the visiting country are not associated
with (i.e. are not part of) the TSM from which she acquired the smart card. To further
explain the scenario, consider Oyster Card [72], which a user can use in London to access
local transport services but at the time of writing, it cannot be used as an e-purse. In
contrast, the Octopus Card [73], which a user can use in Hong Kong for local transport
services, can also be used at groceries, confectioneries, and restaurants. Our user from
London would still have to queue to get the Octopus Card when she reached Hong Kong.
As we pointed out, she travels extensively around the world and she may not derive a great
deal of benet from the TSM architecture [42, 74].
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In summary, in the UCTD framework the user does not have to acquire a new smart card
to gain access to new services. The open and dynamic nature of the UCTD allows a user
to install or delete any application to which she is entitled, enabling her to download any
application when she reaches the visiting country and to continue using the same device.
This dynamism is a cornerstone of the UCTD design philosophy, enabling users to match
the product to their requirements rather than adapt their requirements to the product.
2.5.2 Authentication Gateway (Single Sign On)
An authentication gateway provider (e.g. Microsoft Passport, Liberty Alliance) can issue
an application to its registered users. The application is downloaded onto the user's UCTD.
In subsequent sessions, the user can utilise the UCTD to provide an entity authentication
service while accessing the gateway provider's services. In addition to the authentication
data, the installed application on the UCTD can also provide secure storage for the user's
related digital identiers (i.e. unique data items to identify the user), privacy, and secu-
rity policies. In such a scenario, the authentication gateway provider does not have to
store user-related sensitive data, as this data can be decentralised and stored on the ap-
propriate UCTD. Furthermore, authentication gateways can be implemented to use the
biometric data of the user. The biometric data can be stored and matching processes
can be performed on the UCTD, thus providing a decentralised architecture for biometric
identication.
2.5.3 E-Commerce
The UCTD can be used to provide a dynamic, robust, secure, and reliable authentication
mechanism for e-commerce transactions. The model currently propagated for e-commerce
by Visa and MasterCard is referred as 3D secure [75], and is a gloried single-sign-on
(SSO). In this model, a user registers with a bank that in return issues her a smart card.
The user then opts-in for the 3D secure by setting up her credentials (i.e. password or
pass-phrase). During online shopping, merchants can authenticate the user by opting for
the 3D secure that enables the card issuer to verify the user (i.e. user's consent) for the
concerned transaction.
In place of using passwords or pass-phrases, a bank can issue its e-commerce application
that is designed as a SSO application (similar to the one discussed in the previous section)
and issue it to individual customers. During e-commerce transactions (and for online
banking), the user plugs the UCTD into her intended platform (as discussed before, a
UCTD can be in any form-factor and pluggable to any computing device). The merchant
can then facilitate the communication between the user's UCTD and the bank (that has
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issued the application). The bank can opt for certain user credentials (e.g. PIN, password,
or biometric) that the bank's application on the UCTD can ask the user to authenticate
herself. Therefore, authentication details do not need to be communicated over the internet.
The UCTD then provides dynamic authentication and if required can provide a transaction
certicate to the merchant as is done in POS transactions [9], eectively avoiding poor
technical-security and security-usability along with privacy issues discussed in [76][78].
2.5.4 Online Gaming
In April 2011, the security breach of the Sony PlayStation Network and Qriocity services
that revealed private information regarding an estimated 70 million users [79] was in the
news. This breach has shown that big networks that store user's private data are the
prime targets for malicious users. In this section, we are not going to provide a solution to
the problems faced by Sony in this security breach but look at how a UCTD can reduce
the clustering of large data at one point (i.e. on SP's servers) which provides a potential
motivation for attack (i.e. economics of attack2) [80].
Therefore, for this case study, we consider a Company A that oers an online gaming
platform, and games store to its customers. The objectives of Company A are: (1) to
ensure that customers can be uniquely identied and their credentials can be validated,
(2) to ensure customers get the services for which they are authorised, and nally (3) to
ensure that customers can make purchases while being logged onto the games store or
online-gaming platform.
Company A oers an application that a user can download onto her UCTD. The down-
load application is personalised to the user. It has the user's name, email address, and
postal address (if necessary). The user identity at Company A's server is identied by a
unique user identity (i.e. it is a pseudo-identity that does not have any obvious link to
the user). The user has her password stored on her UCTD rather than on Company A's
server; therefore, when the user tries to access Company A's resources, she provides her
password to the UCTD. We do not delve into the details of how the user identication and
authentication will be carried out using a UCTD in our case study, but similar mechanisms
are already in operation, for example the EMV Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) or
Combined DDA (CDA) mechanisms [9] (i.e. card transactions at a POS). This will allow
Company A to identify and authenticate their customer. In addition, the service privileges
associated with the user are also stored in the application. Therefore, Company A does
not have to store any of these details at a centralised location as they are already stored
on a tamper-resistant device as part of the Company A's application.
2Cost-benet comparison of a potential attacks and outcome from it is referred as economics of attack.
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Furthermore, to perform online monetary transactions the user does not have to register her
credit card with Company A which would then have to invest a huge amount to safeguard
its security. In our case study, the user also has a banking application (issued by her bank)
installed on the UCTD. When a user makes a purchase online, the UCTD application of
Company A will communicate the purchase request to the banking application that will
then process the transaction (e.g. 3D-Secure [75] but it asks the user to enter her password,
not at the bank's website, but to the UCTD application). This removes any need to register
the card on Company A's website.
In this case study, we have decentralised the data storage that is related to the user's
identication and online payment (i.e. credit card details). It is comparatively easy to
embed a (small) secure application and get it certied by an independent third party
rather than having to implement and secure a large database of user's credit card details.
We do not suggest that in our proposed case study all attacks are eliminated. Adversaries
can perform attacks, but the nancial rewards of such attacks are limited and in comparison
less attractive than the invasion of a centralised database (in the breach of Sony's Servers
in April 2011, data related to approximately 70 million users was compromised).
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the motivation behind the User Centric Tamper-Resistant
Device (UCTD). The motivation came from three distinct but continuously converging
technologies: smart cards, hand-held devices, and general purpose computing platforms.
We briey discussed dierent architectures for tamper-resistant devices that can be con-
sidered as possible candidates for the UCTD architecture. We then compared these archi-
tectures with the smart card technology in dierent stated aspects of the UCTD. Finally,
we discussed the UCTD and its requirements that compel modication to certain aspects
of smart card technology. We briey introduced the concept of multi-application smart
cards, its related management models, and its issues. This was followed by a description of
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In this chapter, we open the discussion with a description of the ICOM framework and the
security and operational assumptions adopted in the ICOM, along with a short introduction
to the widely deployed smart card frameworks which support the ICOM. We then provide an
overview of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) and its major stake-
holders. The discussion then moves to the security and operational requirements of UCOM
stakeholders. We then extend the UCOM model to include an administrative authority that
manages the UCTD while providing the user with freedom of choice. This model is referred




The ICOM has played a major role in the spread of smart card technology to every aspect
of modern life. Card issuers see smart cards as a conduit for customer loyalty, rather than
as a mere electronic device used to access services. Smart cards have become a market
presence, a means of customer outreach and even in certain circumstances a status symbol
(i.e. privilege cards). Given all the above, it is obvious why surrendering control of smart
cards is a dicult decision for any organisation to contemplate. In this chapter, we describe
the ICOM architecture along with prominent platforms that support it.
The aim of a UCTD is to provide security, trust, and privacy services while being in-
teroperable with diverse computing devices (e.g. computers, mobile phones, and tablets).
The ownership model for the UCTD has to strike a balance between the user's freedom
of choice and the SP's requirements of security, intellectual property protection, control,
and reliability of their application. For this purpose, we propose the UCOM because it
takes into account the ownership requirements of the UCTD framework. Therefore, in this
chapter we discuss the UCOM architecture, its main stakeholders, and their requirements.
In some cases, there is a need to have an administrative authority that manages a com-
puting platform. Two examples of such an authority can be parents and MNOs. On a
computing platform used by children, the respective parents would like to manage the
overall platform while giving the children the right to install or delete any application
that does not violate the policy dened by the parents. Similarly, an MNO might provide
a mobile handset to a customer in return for signing a xed term contract. During the
contract period, the MNO might be involved with the UCTD that came with the mobile
handset and they might want to have the administrative rights to it. We propose a model
that accommodates the requirement of administrative authority on a UCTD (smart card),
while adhering to the UCOM. Such a model will protect the security and privacy of the
user, while implementing the usage policy dened by the administrative authority. We
refer to this model as Coopetitive Architecture for Smart Cards (CASC), which is also
discussed in this chapter.
Structure of the Chapter: Section 3.2 discusses the ICOM and its advantages and disad-
vantages. In section 3.3, we briey introduce prominent platforms that support the ICOM
framework. In section 3.4, we describe the ICOM and its major components. The security
and operational requirements of individual UCOM stakeholders are discussed in section
3.5. The extension to the UCOM framework to include provision for an administrative
authority is described in section 3.6. Finally, we conclude the chapter in section 3.7.
Before diving into the chapter, we want to explain that the discussion of dierent man-
agement models in the previous chapter and in this chapter is necessary to appreciate our
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM)
contribution. Dierent business, management, and ownership models in the smart card
industry have shaped how the technical mechanisms are implemented. We have to consider
the changes in perceptions about control and ownership of smart cards in the smart card
industry to justify the modications that we propose in this dissertation.
3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM)
In gure 3.1, smart card issuers are companies (e.g. in the banking, transport and telecom
sectors), which use smart cards to provide services to their customers. The card issuers
order smart cards from a card manufacturer. The card manufacturer delivers them to the
card issuer, which in turn issues them to individual cardholders. A cardholder presents
her smart card at a Service Access Point (SAP) to use the services provided by the card
issuer. A SAP can be an ATM (Automated Teller Machine), a mobile phone or a simple
card reader; it acts as a gateway to a card issuer's services.
In this framework, the control of the issued smart cards lies with the card issuer, who
decides what application(s) will be installed on the cards. If a card issuer has a business
agreement with any other company, then the cardholder may get a smart card with multiple
applications, as in the case of the Barclaycard's OnePulse card [81]. Barclaycard1 is the
card issuer and it has an established business relationship with Transport for London2
(issuer of Oyster cards [72]). Therefore, with its bankcard, Barclays provides the Oyster
card functionality.
1Barclaycard: Barclaycard is a trading name for the banking card sector of Barclays Bank PLC, United
Kingdom. Web address: http://www.barclaycard.co.uk
2Transport for London (TfL) is a publicly owned company that provides transport services to Greater
London, United Kingdom. Web address: http://www.tfl.gov.uk
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The ICOM requires a trusted centralised authority to be set up which will have supervisory
authority over smart cards. This centralised authority can be either the card issuer or a
certifying authority. For convenience, we use the term card issuer to refer to any centralised
authority in regard to the ICOM. The role of the authority is to enforce the security policy,
which enables all the applications on a smart card to behave in a predened manner. The
predened manner is negotiated between the application provider concerned and the card
issuer. This agreement denes the parameters under which the application provider may
access dierent services on the card issuer's smart cards. Furthermore, the card issuer will
have the authority to grant or deny access to any particular application provider.
Smart cards in the ICOM are acquired by the card issuer, which is in a position to choose
their operational and security functionality. This gives assurance to the purchasing com-
pany (the card issuer) that the smart cards that carry its applications are secure to their
required standard. If the card issuer required a third party evaluation of the smart card
product, the card manufacturer might provide the Common Criteria [69] evaluation cer-
ticate (a paper based certicate) as a means of assurance.
To summarise the ICOM framework, the privileges or rights that a card issuer receives as
part of the ICOM are listed below:
1. Privilege to install an application.
2. Privilege to delete an application.
3. Control over card issuance to individual users. This enables the issuers to decide
who receives their smart cards (and eectively control their application).
4. Power to dene the security and operational requirements for the smart cards.
5. Enforcement of the security policy.
6. Control over who can access their services using the issued smart cards.
The security and operational assumptions discussed above are the cornerstones of the
ICOM. These assumptions have given a strong impetus to the ICOM framework, partic-
ularly in the business community. Later in section 3.4, we discuss what privileges the
UCOM takes from the card issuer and gives to individual users. This will give an indica-
tion of the dierence between the ICOM and UCOM, and provide the rationale for suitable
modications to the ICOM platforms discussed in section 3.3.
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3.2.1 Advantages of the ICOM
Since the inception of smart card technology, issuers have adopted the ICOM as their
model of preference for smart card based services. The advantages of this approach are
presented below:
Issuance Control. Only a legitimate issuer (organisation) can oer smart cards to its
customers. The card issuer controls the availability of the cards and the card/application
management lifecycle. The centralised control of applications and the card management
lifecycle stand out as crucial elements in the acceptability of the ICOM. Centralised control
has meant that the card issuer treats smart cards in a way similar to the way business
assets are treated. Therefore, issuers preferred smart cards to be under their control and the
ICOM tted well with such commercial attitudes. In theory, by ensuring centralised control
an issuer can increase the revenue streams by renting out space in a multi-application smart
card. However, although such ideas are considered workable to some extent, the adoption
of this model is not widespread.
Security Control. A smart card is often deployed as a security token, which provides
secure and reliable access to certain services. Most organisations prefer to retain control of
the security mechanisms for access to their services, which are implemented on a smart card.
This ensures that only the applications installed on their (issued) smart cards can access
sanctioned services, which maintains the provided services. As the installed applications
are designed by the card issuer, it is considered safe to connect with the services provided
by the card issuer. Any compromise of the smart card's security will result in loss for
an organisation whose application is installed on the smart card, both nancially and in
relation to the brand image. To remain secure and condent that the smart cards meet
an organisation's security requirements, the organisation will prefer that the cards remains
under its control as provided by the ICOM.
Modication Control. Once a smart card is issued, only its issuer or trusted partners
may modify the installed applications. Therefore, a malicious user can neither install a new
application nor modify existing applications. As the installation, modication or updating
of an application is under control of either the card issuer or their trusted partners, it
can be assumed with condence that no application on the smart cards will be malicious.
This assumption that centralised control guarantees security led to a realistic but simple
approach to numerous smart card security mechanisms; such as the smart card rewall
[82], application installation mechanism/protocol [83], virtual machine [84] and platform
assurance [56, 85, 86].
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Communication Control. A smart card can communicate on dierent interfaces (e.g.
contact, contactless) and protocols as web enabling protocols [87], T1, T2 [88], and NFC-
WI [89]. The issuer can regulate the mechanism through which an application on their
smart card can communicate with o-card entities. For example, the Oyster application
on the Barclaycard OnePulse card will not communicate with any o-card entity through
a contact based interface. However, it does communicate via a contactless interface.
Marketing and Customer Loyalty. The plastic card surface is considered to be mar-
keting real estate by the card issuers. For most deployments, the card surface is used to
print the company names and logos. In the banking industry for example, a typical smart
card will have the issuer bank's name and logo. It might also have the insignia of the
payment clearing system (i.e. VISA, MasterCard or American Express, etc.). In addition,
the concept that having a smart card with a particular brand translates into the customer
loyalty to the organisation has its roots in the initial smart card deployment (i.e. Dinner's
Club card). Encouraging customer loyalty denitely had its benets in some industries like
banking, but it might be less benecial in industries like mobile telecom here the smart
card module is hidden inside the mobile phone.
3.2.2 Drawbacks of the ICOM
The ICOM has been successfully deployed over the past decade, but it has minor drawbacks
that are listed below:
Card Handling. Usually, an individual will require a number of smart cards3 [91] for:
train or bus journeys, mobile phones, oce building access, internet/oce-network access,
banking/shopping and health services, and other purposes. With increasing numbers of
industries relying on smart cards to provide their services to customers, the customer's
wallet is becoming crowded with smart cards. Users of smart card-based services already
have to carry a large number of smart cards and with each new service they enrol for,
they get more. To maintain and manage these cards sometimes becomes troublesome to
cardholders who have to use diverse services.
Stringent Model. The concept of the smart card as a medium for promoting customer
loyalty and as a marketing avenue took centre stage in business strategy; dierent card
issuers started to consolidate their customer base and this in turn created a situation in
3A Survey [90] conducted in 2008 by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston showed that an average American
consumer has 5.4 banking cards (i.e. prepaid, credit, and debit cards).
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which it was dicult to bring dierent organisations to share the same smart card platform.
The change from perceiving the smart card as a security token to seeing it as a loyalty and
marketing medium imposed additional restrictions on it. Therefore, users cannot choose
to put an application on their smart cards; the privilege of an installing applications was
zealously and solely retained by the card issuers, leaving users with a restricted use of the
smart card platform.
Service Roll-out. With the ICOM, a card issuer has to acquire smart cards from a
card manufacturer and then either develop application(s) itself or acquire them from the
card manufacture or a third party. Once the cards are acquired and they have the card
issuer's application, they are posted to individual customers. This process is cyclic: the
card issuer may have to reissue new smart cards because of expiry of old ones or it may
want to introduce new services or meet new regulatory/legal requirements. Furthermore,
it takes a long time to oer new services in the ICOM, since an issuer has to order new
smart cards and install new applications on them and then has to issue these smart cards
to individual customers. Generally, new services are issued gradually at the time when the
issued smart cards are nearing the end of their lifecycle.
Costly. With the ICOM the cost for card issuers is incurred in two ways. The rst
is acquiring smart cards and getting them certied4 (third party evaluation of security)
to meet any regulatory, standardisation or legal requirements. The second is the loss of
possible revenue in the service roll-out period or in the process of issuing a replacement
smart card. For example, if a cardholder loses a smart card and requests a new card it
usually takes from three days to a week (or sometimes more) in the case of the banking
industry before he/she receives it. In industries like telecom and transport the user might
acquire the card immediately from designated outlets. However, smart cards deployed in
the health sector or national identity cards might have longer re-issue waiting periods.
During this period, the customer cannot use the service(s) of the particular card issuer,
and this might result in loss of revenue and inconvenience for the user.
3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM
In this thesis, we analyse in some detail the dierent components of the ICOM frameworks
as required, to contrast them with those of the UCOM. For articulation of our arguments,
we are not going to dive into the technical details of each ICOM framework in subse-
4Security Certication: For certain industries like banking, smart cards oered by the card manufac-
turers have third party security evaluation as a standard product requirement. However, other industries
like telecom and transport often does not require such evaluations.
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quent sections. We leave in-depth analysis to later chapters where they are discussed and
compared alongside the UCOM-based proposals. Therefore, in this section we will briey
introduce the best-known ICOM-based smart card architectures.
3.3.1 Multos
In 1997, a consortium of companies (MAOSCO) supported the development of a Smart
Card Operating System (SCOS) called Multos [29], with one aim: to provide a high level
of security and reliability. They required a single operating system which could be imple-
mented on any silicon chip and which had an application written for it that was independent
of the underlying hardware. Their vision anticipated the creation of a multi-application
smart card. From the beginning, Multos was developed as a secure multi-application
SCOS that achieved ITSEC5 Assurance Level E6 [93](comparable to the Common Criteria
EAL7 [69, 94]), which is the highest level attained by any SCOS [6].
The MAOSCO Consortium denes the Multos specications, and is the license issuer and
operator of the certication service for Multos. It has made most of its specications avail-
able to the SCOS developers provided they sign an NDA (Non Disclosure Agreement), and
pay licence and royalty fees. A restriction in the Multos specication is its inexibility with
respect to adding new Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). The license agreement
with Multos restricts smart card manufacturers from enhancing their product by including
new APIs to the specication.
With the advent of the Java Card technology, a Multos card division called StepNexus [95]
has made available the Multos SmartDeck environment free of charge [96]. The Multos
SmartDeck is a complete high-level development environment which enables application
developers to design applications easily for Multos-based cards.
The Multos card architecture is illustrated in gure 3.2. At the top in gure 3.2 is the
application layer that contains three applications (namely A, B, and C); each application
has its own space, which is protected by the card's rewall mechanism. The next layer is
the Application Abstract Machine (AAM), which also includes dierent APIs. The Multos
operating system presides over the hardware and provides services such as communication,
memory management, the handling of loading and deleting of applications, together with
APDU commands and responses. At the bottom of the gure is the hardware, which
supports the SCOS. Functions that access this layer are written in native language, but
are accessed by a fully specied virtual machine, which is the same no matter what the
hardware.
5Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) is an international security assurance
evaluation criteria [92].
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Figure 3.2: Generic representation of the Multos card architecture
The application installation and deletion mechanism proposed by the Multos specication
has stringent centralised architecture [97]. Every time an application is to be installed, an
application provider will request an Application Load Certicate from the Multos Cer-
tication Authority through the appropriate card issuer. Because it has such a stringent
architecture and a mandatory requirement for a crypto co-processor, this highest security
evaluation level smart card platform is not considered the industry's leading specication.
This title goes to the Java Card technology, which has proliferated in the smart card indus-
try because of its exibility and robustness, and its readily available pool of experienced
developers.
3.3.2 Java Card
By 1990, Sun Microsystems had started a project to develop a language that generated
a program once that could then be executed on any micro-controller. Their only consid-
eration was the micro-controllers used in electronic appliances (i.e. toasters, washing and
coee machines, etc.). However, with the emergence of the internet came an increasing
need to deliver rich contents on the heterogeneous devices connected to the internet. The
Java language that accommodated these changes was invented by Sun Microsystems and
it can be adapted to the ever-growing personal computer market. Soon Java became a de
facto standard language for internet applications.
In 1996, engineers at the IT technology provider Schlumberger at Austin (TX, USA) de-
veloped the Java Card, which is a smart card that supports a subset of Java language [98].
When this idea was made public, the smart card industry immediately became interested.
Later, Sun Microsystems arranged a meeting to gather input and explore the dynamics
of the smart card industry. All the major smart card manufacturers attended this meet-
ing. This was the beginning of the Java Card forum, which is an independent forum for
collaboration between dierent industrial players. Membership of the Java Card forum
59
3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM
includes smart card manufacturers and application/solution providers. This is another im-
portant aspect of Java Card technology, which dierentiates it from Multos in its constant
consultation with the industrial players.
Due to these consultations, the Java Card technology has changed considerably. The Java
Card has progressed from the initial release which supported only limited functionality (i.e.
primitive data types such as boolean, byte and short) to the more recently released Java
Card specication 3.0 [16] which includes the TCP/IP stack [99] along with SSL/TLS [100]
and HTTP [101] /HTTPS [16, 87, 102]. The Java Card can behave as an internet device
in either a server or client capacity. The architecture of a Java Card is illustrated in the
following gure 3.3 and is described below:
Smart Card Hardware
Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE)
Java Card Firewall




Smart Card Operating System (SCOS) Native Code
Servlet APIs
Java Card Classic APIs
























Java Card Connected Framework Java Card Classic Framework
Application A Application BApplication C Application DWeb Application E Web Application F
Figure 3.3: Generic representation of the Java Card 3 architecture
In comparison to Multos, Java Card is better termed a platform rather than an operating
system. Due to this distinction, above the smart card hardware layer, Java Card Virtual
Machine (JCVM) and native methods are all available. The native methods section can
also be considered a native operating system developed by each card manufacturer to sup-
port its implementation of the JCVM. Furthermore, as Java will take longer to execute
than the native code, the native method segment is also the crucial point for implementing
the cryptographic algorithms. Above this layer, we have the Java Card Runtime Envi-
ronment (JCRE), which provides dierent services in the shape of Application Program-
ming Interfaces (APIs) and System Classes to the residing applications. The Java Card
APIs provide a well-structured framework to access the system-level services in a secure
and reliable manner. The segregation on a Java Card between platform-application and
application-application is enforced by the Java Card rewall.
The Java Card specication leaves decisions regarding the mechanism for installing, delet-
ing, updating, and managing multiple applications on a smart card to the card manufac-
turer. The industry appreciated this move, as it allowed greater exibility than Multos
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which is rigid in comparison. However, it was soon realised that for application manage-
ment tasks it would be benecial for all the players in the smart card industry to have a
unied specication. Sun Microsystems did not get involved in dening such a specication
but gave space to the industry's players to decide on a specication. The proposed appli-
cation management framework came in the form of the GlobalPlatform card specication,
which is the topic of the next section.
3.3.3 GlobalPlatform
Towards the end of the 1990s, the smart card technology was being adopted on a large scale.
It was soon realised by card manufacturers, card issuers, and application providers that to
manage such a complex and technically complicated infrastructure, it would be benecial to
share a unied and universal card management system which freed them from the demands
of the smart card hardware, platform, application service and card issuer's requirements.
Visa gave the impetus to this idea by transferring their Open Platform initiative to a
consortium of card issuers, application providers, and smart card manufacturers, later
known as GlobalPlatform.
GlobalPlatform is a non-prot organisation which provides a vendor-neutral specication
of dierent components of smart card-based business operations. The GlobalPlatform card
specication provides a standardised view of smart cards, card terminals, and smart card-
based infrastructure management systems. The specication which is of most relevance
to this thesis is the GlobalPlatform card architecture. We provide detailed descriptions of
the dierent components of the GlobalPlatform card specication as required throughout
the thesis to clarify our discussion.
The GlobalPlatform card specication is a card architecture-neutral specication which
does not require/specify any particular Runtime Environment (RTE). However, at present
most smart cards which support the GlobalPlatform specications actually call for a Java
Card Runtime Environment (JCRE). Technically, it is possible to have GlobalPlatform
architecture on a Multos card, but at the time of writing this thesis, the author was not
aware of any such implementation in the public domain. Nevertheless, as the Multos card
already has a well-dened application management framework, there is no particular need
to complement a Multos card with the GlobalPlatform implementation.
The architecture illustrated in gure 3.4 has applications from the card issuer, application
providers (partners of the card issuer) and a global service application, which provides ser-
vices to all the applications installed on the smart card. The applications are managed and
controlled by the mechanism of security domains. A security domain has an association
with one of the application(s) which it manages and enforces the security policies of the
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Figure 3.4: Generic representation of the GlobalPlatform card architecture
owner of the domain. The security domain also provides separate cryptographic keys to
the card issuer and the application providers to manage their respective domains/appli-
cations. The security domain also manages key handling, encryption, decryption, digital
signature, and the verication of (hosted) applications (i.e. only at the time of installa-
tion [30, 103]). The card issuer generates the security domain (application domain) on
the card and then gives control of the application domains to the card issuer's partners
(application providers). These application providers can then manage their applications
independently of the card issuer's involvement.
The OPEN framework dened in the GlobalPlatform specication handles/controls the
downloading and installation of applications. The Trusted framework enables dierent
services such as inter-application communications; however, the GlobalPlatform Card
Security Requirement Specication [1] states that GlobalPlatform relies on the underlying
platform's (e.g. Java Card, and Multos) implementation of the rewall mechanism..
The crucial component of the GlobalPlatform card specication is termed the Card Man-
ager. This is a generic term used for such services as OPEN, the issuer security domain and
Cardholder verication method services. The Card Manager actively controls the smart
card environment. Furthermore, the smart card issuer cannot access any of the application
domains because they are protected by the cryptographic keys (access keys) and these keys
are shared only between an application domain and an application provider. However, if
a particular application provider violates the agreement with the card issuer, or they no
longer have a partnership to provide services, then the card issuer can block or delete the
application provider's application.
In this section, we have provided a short description of the GlobalPlatform card specica-
tion which in no way denes all the functions of the specication. However, we continue to
refer to the GlobalPlatform card specication in subsequent chapters and give detailed de-
scriptions of its components as required. It is noteworthy that GlobalPlatform has shown
the capacity and willingness to adapt to the industry's trends. It has published Glob-
alPlatform Card Remote Application Management over HTTP Card Specication v2.2
in response to Java Card 3 and GlobalPlatform's Proposition for NFC Mobile: Secure
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Element Management and Messaging [104]; both of these specications accommodate the
current trend towards the NFC mobile phone-based services.
3.3.3.1 Why not GlobalPlatform for UCTD?
This question comes to mind, as the GlobalPlatform card specication provides an accepted
and reliable way to manage applications on smart cards in pre- or post-issuance stages,
so why not just have a GlobalPlatform-based smart card whose ownership is with the
cardholder?
This option is workable in a limited scenario where the applications are less critical. The
cardholder would have the same rights as the card issuer in the ICOM. However, the
security issues raised due to the delegation of the ownership that are discussed in the
rest of this thesis are not adequately addressed in the GlobalPlatform card specication.
The reason for this is the underlying assumption in the card specication  that the card
issuer (or in user centric cards, the cardholder) is a trusted entity and any other application
provider has to trust them. The security mechanisms implemented on smart cards are also
based on the similar assumption that there is a trusted entity which we can term as the
root of trust. In the smart card industry, the root of trust is usually an organisation that
acts as a smart card issuer. If we give the smart card ownership to the user under the
traditional framework, then the root of trust would be the individual user. The assumption
that each user is trustworthy, might not be easy to ascertain. Therefore, GlobalPlatform,
along with other frameworks of the ICOM, are not only useful in the ICOM but also in the
UCOM. However, they require modication so that they can securely support the UCOM's
requirements.
Similarly, there is an argument that having a TSM-based architecture can provide user
control by making the user the TSM. All application providers are connected with the user
who then installs their applications onto her smart card(s). In reality, this idea is similar to
the open card initiative discussed in section 2.4.2.1. The user-based TSM concept suers
from the same issues, including trusting the user, application provider inability to control
the destination smart card, assurance of security and reliability of the application.
3.3.4 Other Proposals
In this section, we discuss initiatives that were not taken up as enthusiastically as were
those in the previous sections.
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3.3.4.1 Windows for Smart Cards
At the time Java Card was proposed, Microsoft also ventured into the smart card business
[105]. They took the same sort of approach as they took in the PC domain and developed
the whole architecture of the smart card operating system without any consultation with
the smart card industry.
The Windows for Smart Cards (WfSC) was an ISO7816 [24] compliant smart card with a
FAT le-system [106, 107] and rule-based Access Control [108]. The design of the virtual
machines was rooted in Intel 8048 and the associated APIs were compact versions of the
Windows (Win32) APIs [105]. As noted by Jurgensen and Guthery [105], the WfSC has
one of the best-designed Virtual Machine architectures, similar to the Multos. Applications
for the WfSC can be written in Visual Basic and Visual C++.
Due to Microsoft's design-in-isolation approach, the WfSC was not adopted as quickly as
other frameworks from the beginning and Microsoft soon had to shelve the project [6]. In
contrast the Java Card took the approach of consultation and open specication, which
give it enough of an advantage to outdo powerful initiatives such as Multos and WfSC.
3.3.4.2 Smartcard .Net
Although Microsoft's own attempt to enter the smart card market did not pay o, Hive-
Minded Inc. (since 2006 owned by StepNexus Inc.) later developed a smart card framework
based on Microsoft's .NET. Its main aim was to allow its developers the freedom to choose
any programming language (i.e. C#, VB.NET, J#, and Jscript.NET, etc.). Like Java
Card, it supported all data types except oating point and 64-bit integers.
The later acquisition of Hive-Minded by the Multos manufacturer Step-Nexus put an end
to the smart card .Net initiative. However another smart card manufacturer, Gemalto,
has since oered .Net products [109] with the caveat that these smart cards are natively
supported by Microsoft Windows Vista and Windows 7. However, it is yet to be seen how
far the smart card .Net framework will spread.
3.3.4.3 Multi-application BasicCard
BasicCards were available even before the Java Card was proposed [110]. Initially they
supported only single applications but since 2004, the BasicCard manufacturer ZeitCon-
trol has started to issue multi-application BasicCards (e.g. MultiApplication BasicCard
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ZC6.5). Like WfSC, they also support the FAT le system, but unlike any other smart
card framework, they support oating-point numbers natively [6]. Although these are less
expensive than other options available to customers, they have not seen an exponential
growth such as Java Card.
3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM)
The UCOM provides to dierent entities the architectural, operational, and security frame-
work needed to support the delegation of smart card ownership to its users. In this section,
a detailed description of the UCOM is provided, dening the basic working principles of
the UCOM along with a description of the UCOM components. Figure 3.5 illustrates the



















































Figure 3.5: Overview of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM)
In the UCOM, a card issuer is denoted as a Service Provider (SP). An SP and a card
issuer represent the same entity in dierent contexts of UCOM and ICOM, respectively.
The main dierence between an issuer and an SP is that a card issuer provides a smart
card's hardware and application(s) to their customers, whereas an SP only oers smart
card application(s) that can be downloaded to a customer's smart card on request.
The aim of the UCOM is not to replace users with card issuers as the open card initia-
tive (see section 2.4.2.1) does. The UCOM ensures that the same level of security and
application control is provided to an SP as in the ICOM, while provisioning the freedom
of choice to individual cardholders. Going back to the list of privileges for ICOM (section
3.2), the UCOM transfers the privileges (rights) one, two and four to the smart card users.
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of the UCOM components and their interactions
Therefore, the role of security policy enforcer is taken up by the smart card itself and
cardholders only have the privilege to install and delete applications. The ICOM enables a
card issuer to control the issuance of its smart card to individual users, which is translated
as the privilege to lease its application in the UCOM, whereas installed applications will
always be in total control of the SPs, and users will be entitled to use them under the lease
policy of their respective SPs.
The architecture of a UCOM consists of seven main components, as shown in gure 3.6:
the User Centric Smart Card (UCSC) supplier, the cardholder, the UCSC, the Card Ap-
plication Management Software (CAMS), the host devices, the Service Provider (SP) and
the Service Access Points (SAPs). A smart card that supports a user's ownership is called
a UCSC and we use this term only in this chapter to dierentiate between ICOM-based
smart cards and cards that support the UCOM.
A cardholder acquires a UCSC from a UCSC supplier. After acquiring the UCSC, the card-
holder requests an SP to lease their application. The cardholder presents her card to a host
device. The host device then enables the cardholder to use Card Application Management
Software (CAMS) that establishes an interface between UCSC and the SP's Application
Management Server (AMS). After authentication of the cardholder and security validation
of the UCSC, the AMS leases the application(s).
Once the application is installed, the cardholder can present her card to a SAP to access
services. The SAP will establish a connection between UCSC and the SP's Application
Services Authentication Server (ASAS). After being authenticated by ASAS, the user can
use the designated service. The architecture of the application lease and usage is explained
in section 3.4.6.2. In subsequent sections, we discuss the UCOM components shown in
gure 3.6.
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3.4.1 Supplier
A supplier is an organisation that sells UCSCs. A smart card manufacturer, an SP, or a
third party vendor can be the supplier. The suppliers ensure that the UCSCs supplied
to a user have a reliable and secure platform that supports the UCOM and fulls the
requirements of a UCSC, as stipulated in section 3.5.3.
3.4.2 Cardholder
A cardholder is not just a user of the UCSC, but she is also the owner of the card.
Cardholders would have the ability to install and delete any application they require. A
cardholder would also be a registered customer of the respective SPs. The cardholder could
install an application on the UCSC after being authorised by the corresponding SP. After
installation, the cardholder could use the application to access associated services.
From a UCOM's perspective, cardholders do not have to be technically literate (about the
underlying architecture of the platform) and do not have to be trusted users. In subsequent
chapters, it will be shown that we adopt the default assumption that the cardholder may
be malicious.
3.4.3 User Centric Smart Card (UCSC)
The UCSC is the cornerstone of the UCOM proposal. It provides a seamless framework
for application installation, management, and deletion to the cardholder. The ownership
management and delegation (i.e. the transfer of ownership between dierent users) is also
provided by the UCSC while preserving the integrity and security of the platform, and the
privacy of the cardholder. Furthermore, the UCSC manages secure communication with
the respective SP to request the lease of the application. An SP does not have to trust the
cardholder, but they need to trust the smart cards. The UCSC supports mechanisms that
can provide dynamic and ubiquitous security assurance and validation to the requesting
entity. It ensures that during the lifetime of the smart card, the entire platform along with
the installed applications will be secure and reliable.
Henceforth, we will be using the term UCSC and smart card interchangeably, unless oth-
erwise specied.
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3.4.4 Card Application Management Software (CAMS)
The CAMS acts as an interface between a smart card, an SP's Application Management
Server (AMS), and a cardholder, as illustrated by gure 3.6. The cardholder uses this
interface to authenticate with the SP's AMS and to perform smart card management
tasks (e.g. application installation, deletion and state change) [10]. In addition, it can
also provide protocol translation services to avoid any incompatibilities between the smart
card capability and the respective SP's AMS (e.g. in a scenario where a smart card does
not support the TCP/IP protocol [111]. Therefore, the CAMS will translate the TCP/IP
protocol to one supported by the smart card). The CAMS communicates directly with a
smart card, but it is hosted on the host devices that are discussed in the next section.
3.4.5 Host Device
Host devices are electronic devices that hold the smart card and facilitate it in establishing
a secure channel to an SP's AMS for application management tasks. These devices can
be categorised into mobile phones, kiosks, and computer-based host devices. There is no
specic security requirement on the host device. It is advisable to consider the host device
as insecure while implementing a solution supporting UCOM.
3.4.6 Service Provider (SP)
An SP is an organisation that oers smart card-based services. It develops applications that
support dierent smart card platforms (e.g. Java Card [28], and Multos [29]). A cardholder
can easily download the chosen application, and use it to access the SP's services.
To install an application and access the services provided by an SP, users have to register
with the SP. This registration mechanism is already in place in dierent industrial sectors
(such as banking, and telecom, etc.). After the successful completion of the registration,
an SP will send the account details to the user. The user will use these account details
to gain access to a server that provides the functionality to maintain the SP's application.
This server is called the Application Management Server (AMS). After an application is
installed, the user can access the services provided by the SP. To access these services, the
application on the smart card has to be authenticated by the SP's Application Services
Authentication Server (ASAS).
68
3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM)
3.4.6.1 Application Management Server (AMS)
An AMS is implemented and maintained by an SP to support the UCOM. The AMS's main
function is to facilitate authorised cardholders to ubiquitously manage the SP's applications
on their cards.
The account details provided by the SP to its customers contain the AMS access credentials.
Using these credentials, the user can access and install the SP's application(s). The exact
mechanism of the user registration and credential issuance, and the usage mechanism which
controls how a user's credential will be veried (authenticated) are specic to each SP.
The main function of an AMS is to maintain the SP's application(s) and to ensure that the
application is only leased to a smart card if it satises the SP's Application Lease Policy
(ALP).
3.4.6.2 Application Lease Policy (ALP)
An ALP denes the minimum requirement of an SP that a smart card has to satisfy before
the SP will lease its application. The ALP is dened by an SP, and it could have the
following requirements.
1. Minimum smart card hardware requirement.
2. Minimum Smart Card Operating System (SCOS) or platform (e.g. Java Card) re-
quirements.
3. Minimum application memory requirement.
4. Minimum Common Criteria Security Evaluation Level [69].
5. Maximum number of smart cards that can hold the lease of the application.
6. Cryptographic key generation requirements.
7. Secure communication channel requirements.
8. Application lease limits and restrictions (if applicable).
In addition to the abovementioned points in the ALP, an SP can dene some additional
criteria for its application. During the application installation process [10], a smart card
tries to satisfy the SP's requirements, and if it succeeds, the SP will lease the application
to the smart card; otherwise the request will be declined.
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3.4.6.3 Application Services Authentication Server (ASAS)
An ASAS authenticates the valid lease of an application that the requesting card holds. In
the UCOM, multiple smart cards of a single user may have an SP's application, depending
on the particular SP's ALP. If the ALP allows multiple smart cards to have a valid lease
of its applications, an ASAS is necessary to verify the validity of the lease to the smart
card. Once a smart card is authenticated as holding the valid leased application, it can
access services oered by the SP, subject to successful authentication by the user (user's
application).
The ASAS is already implemented in the ICOM, and is referred as a back-oce or trans-
action clearance system. Each industry has its unique way of implementing the ASAS and
part of the design philosophy of the UCOM is that we do not require a modication (in
most cases) to the existing architecture of the ASAS in the ICOM.
3.4.7 Service Access Point (SAP)
Any device that a cardholder can use to access services provided by an SP is called a
Service Access Point (SAP). A SAP can be a mobile phone, a kiosk, a computer, or an
access panel. The main function of all these devices is to connect with the SP through a
smart card and provide services to the cardholder. We consider that SAPs do not have
to be secure; therefore, during the course of this thesis SAPs will be treated as insecure
terminals.
3.5 Security and Operational Requirements of the UCOM
The UCOM delegates control of the smart card to its user. This scenario introduces unique
requirements that were not present in the ICOM.
3.5.1 General Requirements
In this section, we discuss the requirements that are not specic to a particular entity in
the UCOM but are instead common to the overall architecture.
GR1. Control: The UCOM should provide a mechanism(s) that enables cardholders to
manage applications on their smart cards. It should also ensure that only the autho-
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rised cardholder can execute any privileged commands. These privileged commands
can change the state of the smart card (e.g. alter the application installation and
deletion commands).
GR2. Security: This requirement stipulates the need to provide protection against at-
tacks that can violate the security requirements of each of the UCOM components.
Therefore, the UCOM should provide an adequate security mechanism to protect all
the components and their communications.
GR3. Privacy: The privacy requirement is essential in the UCOM, since smart cards
are used as a secure token to access some personal information or monetary services.
Therefore, the UCOM should provide privacy services to those components that
require it.
GR4. Interoperability: The UCOM should not prefer any particular platform, SCOS,
or hardware conguration. The aim is to provide an unrestricted scalability to the
overall UCOM model. A smart card would present the list of supported functional-
ities to the requesting SP and then it would be up to the SP's discretion whether it
leased its application or not. From the point of view of the smart card, the SP and
the UCOM architecture, there should be no preference. If a smart card supports an
SP's requirements and supports the security and operational functionality required
by the SP's ALP, then the SP would lease its application on request, unless there
is some genuine reason not to do so. In the event of a valid reason, the SP should
inform the requesting cardholder of the main reason for not leasing the application.
GR5. Ease of Maintenance: The framework should be simple to use and maintain for
SPs. In addition, it should not require any extensive modication to the existing
infrastructure.
GR6. Impartiality: The smart card supplier could be a smart card manufacturer, an
SP, or a third party vendor. Regardless of the supplier, the smart card should not
favour any particular application or set of applications. This would be possible if
an SP supplies the smart cards, and then they might be tempted to give additional
privileges to its own application. Therefore, the UCOM should provide guarantees
that all applications will have the equivalent privileges to suit their operations.
The major components of the UCOM are cardholders, smart cards, and SPs. In subse-
quent sections, the operational and security requirements of these major components are
discussed.
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3.5.2 Cardholder's Requirements
A cardholder is an entity that uses a smart card to access authorised services. In the
UCOM, the control of a smart card is with its user. Therefore, cardholders have complete
control over the choice of applications on their smart cards. They will have the exibility
to change the installed applications on their smart cards. Furthermore, they could install
or delete any applications they are entitled to at their convenience. The framework will
provide the mechanism that ensures the secure control and the ubiquitous management of
applications on smart cards. A cardholder's requirements in UCOM are listed below:
CR1. Security: If a smart card is inherently insecure, or if it becomes vulnerable to new
threats, it can aect the security of applications installed on the card. We cannot
expect that each cardholder is technically capable of ensuring and managing the
security of the smart card; therefore, a cardholder would require an assurance that
the card platform will be secure and reliable even if it is in the possession of an
illiterate or malicious user.
CR2. Privacy: Applications installed on a smart card represent the identities of the
cardholder in dierent contexts. For example a college card, a health card and a
credit card represent a cardholder's identity as a student, a patient, and a consumer
respectively. These identities are in the form of applications that have some unique
characteristics (e.g. student ID, patient ID, and Primary Account Number: PAN)
to identify a particular user. Therefore, applications on a smart card can be treated
as the identities of the cardholder. In the ICOM, these identities may not have any
connections with each other. However, in the UCOM, any or all of these identities
could be on the same card, creating a privacy issue if one application becomes aware
of the existence of others on a smart card. Therefore, the identities on a particular
card should not have any links between them. For example, a college application
should not be able to nd out about a medical application(s) installed on the same
card.
CR3. Least Interaction (Seamless Framework): Most users do not understand the
technology behind a particular product (i.e. mobile phone applications). Therefore,
the framework should not be based on the assumption that an average user can
perform technically challenging tasks. The UCOM should be seamless and should
perform all necessary tasks by itself, and only involve the user when required.
CR4. Interoperability: The smart card user will not want to buy a separate smart card
for each application. Smart card suppliers should provide cards that support most
of the available functionalities and SPs should oer applications in many formats to
support as many dierent execution environments as possible.
72
3.5 Security and Operational Requirements of the UCOM
CR5. Ownership Mechanism: A mechanism is required that securely authenticates the
owner of the smart card and facilitates the exercise of her privileges (i.e. installing
and deleting applications).
3.5.3 User Centric Smart Card's Requirements
The security and operational requirements of smart cards are listed below, and most of
these requirements should be implemented by smart card suppliers:
SCR1. Security Assurance: A smart card should have a mechanism(s) that will provide
assurance to a requesting SP that adequate security and privacy measures have been
implemented to ensure the security and privacy requirements of the application(s).
SCR2. Security Evaluation: A smart card should be able to evaluate the downloaded
applications and verify that they do not pose any threat to the safe execution of the
other application(s) on the card.
SCR3. Interoperability: A smart card should have the capability to support a wide
range of applications and communication interfaces/channels.
SCR4. Runtime Environment Fairness: A smart card should require that no appli-
cation installed on it tries to monopolise the runtime environment.
SCR5. Application Management: A smart card should have mechanisms to securely
manage the applications. The management of the applications includes application
downloading, installation, and deletion.
SCR6. Application Lease Management: A smart card should require adequate mech-
anisms to manage an application lease. The lease of an application may have certain
limits or restrictions that a smart card has to satisfy over the lifetime of the applica-
tion. For instance, the limit could be an expiry date or the number of times used, and
restrictions may be the runtime environment's conguration. The mechanism should
be able to provide assurance to the SP that their application will be deleted if the
limit is reached, or cease to execute if lease restrictions are violated. The application
leased from the SP is governed by an application lease policy described in section
3.4.6.2.
SCR7. Ownership Validation: A smart card should support a mechanism to authenti-
cate its owner using some security parameters (i.e. Personal Identication Numbers:
PIN, password, pass-phrase, or biometric, etc.). There should be the functionality
to reset these values securely.
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SCR8. Feature Interaction Problem Avoidance: The smart card needs to have a
mechanism that prevents any possible feature interaction problems. Feature inter-
action problems are caused by dependencies between the software and hardware.
The mechanism will record any dependencies of an application before it is installed.
Therefore, when there is a change that aects the dependencies of the application,
it can either be deleted or cease its execution.
SCR9. Malicious Application/User Problem: The smart card should implement ef-
fective security and privacy measures to counter a malicious user or application. The
smart card platform should be able to resist the introduction of malicious appli-
cations or hardware-based intrusions to breach security. To avoid application-level
breaches, the card should have the capability to perform application code verica-
tions on the card. In addition it should have a conservative execution environment
(i.e. a defensive virtual machine [112]) that ceases execution of an application if there
is a violation of the card's security.
SCR10. Application Scanning Attack: Each application on a smart card acts as an
identity of the card owner in some context, as discussed in the previous section.
Each application on a smart card has unique Application Identier (AID) [24]. A
malicious user can use the application identier to scan the applications installed
on a particular card. It will not only violate the privacy requirement of the user,
but may also enable the attacker to create/modify the attack. A malicious user may
choose the weakest application in the smart card to initiate an attack. The smart
card should have a security mechanism to avoid such an attack.
3.5.4 Service Provider's Requirements
Service providers use smart cards as secure tokens to oer their services, in a secure manner,
to their customers. If this secure token is compromised, they have to bear both nancial
and brand losses. Therefore, from a business point of view, SPs have even more at stake
than card issuers, both nancially and in relation to brand image, and they would be
reluctant to adopt the UCOM, if they had doubts about its security. The requirements of
SPs in the UCOM are listed below:
SPR1. Transmission Security: SPs will lease their applications to a smart card through
the internet or a third party intranet. It is essential that applications are not tam-
pered with during the transmission.
SPR2. Installation Security: After an application is downloaded to a smart card, it
will be decrypted. During this process, no on-card or o-card entity should be able
to gain access to the application code or data.
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SPR3. Maintenance Security: SPs require access privileges for their applications to
update application data les or to update the applications themselves. This access
to the application should be secure, and it should not involve cardholders. However,
if the SP desires, the cardholder's consent can also be requested for application
update/modication processes.
SPR4. Intellectual Property Protection: In the UCOM, SPs lease their applications
to the user's smart card. A malicious user can simulate a smart card on a device
(e.g. computer) and then request the application from an SP. If the SP leases the
application to a simulated environment, the malicious user can reverse engineer the
application. This could reveal the secret information (e.g. cryptographic keys, and
algorithms) contained in the application. Therefore, SPs require that adequate se-
curity protection is implemented to safeguard their condentiality and integrity of
their applications.
SPR5. Application Code Condentiality: The applications from SPs would need to
comply with certain standards. However, these standards will not prevent them from
using proprietary algorithms. The SPs would require that the code of their appli-
cations and its inner workings should remain condential. The smart card provides
adequate security to prevent an adversary from gaining knowledge of the SP's ap-
plication. Application Code Condentiality will be jointly provided by mechanisms
that satisfy the abovementioned requirements.
SPR6. Application Control: In the UCOM, although users own the smart cards, the
ownership of the application still resides with the SP. SPs only lease applications to
their customers (UCSCs). The SP has the power to revoke the application lease, or
to block or modify the application. The lease of an application is governed by the
ALP. In addition, the SP controls all operations that a cardholder can request on
its smart card. These operations are application installation, application deletion,
and state change (i.e. application block and unblock operations), and they cannot be
performed unless authorised by the relevant application's SP.
SPR7. Protection Against Monopolies: In the UCOM, multiple applications may be
installed on a smart card from dierent SPs. They all share and use the same smart
card hardware and card operating system. There is a possibility that a smart card
operating system can favour certain applications. As a result, these applications can
monopolise the card. Therefore, SPs will require assurances that such scenarios will
not be possible.
SPR8. Ease of Implementation: SPs have made substantial investments to their ex-
isting infrastructure that provides services to their customers. Therefore, the UCOM
should not impose unnecessary changes to the existing infrastructure. The basic idea
is to implement the UCOM as another layer on top of the existing infrastructure,
which implements UCOM without extensive modication.
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SPR9. Feature Interaction Management: The SPs require that any changes to the
smart card platform that can aect their application's execution should be avoided.
In the best-case scenario, the smart card platform follows the SP's delegated process
that removes the interdependencies between applications in such situations. However,
if this does not solve the problem, then the card should simply block the application
or possibly delete it (with the card owner's consent).
SPR10. Protection from Malicious Users: The SPs would like to have their appli-
cations protected by the underlying smart card platform. Therefore, even if the
application were issued to the malicious user, he would not be able to obtain any
sensitive information about the application.
3.6 Coopetitive Architecture
A UCTD can be a single-user, and/or a multi-user device, depending upon its deployment
architecture. In a multi-user architecture, a device (e.g. a computer or tablet) might be used
by multiple users. Furthermore, a UCTD might be part of a corporate network, as in the
case of a mobile phone issued to employees by an organisation. The organisation (referred
as an administrative authority) would like to retain the control of the UCTD issued as
part of the mobile phone, while giving freedom to the user to have/manage the UCTD
independently of the organisation. It is necessary to consider these deployment scenarios
in order to achieve true scalability that will enable small to medium-sized organisations
like leisure facilities, local libraries, schools, surgeries and colleges, as well as large-scale
organisations like banks, MNOs and transport operators, to provide their services through
a UCTD to a user without any restrictions from a centralised authority (e.g. card issuer).
To accommodate the role of an administrative authority on a UCTD, we extend the UCOM
architecture and propose the Coopetitive Architecture for Smart Cards (CASC). In the
CASC a cardholder retains the application choice but under the provision of an admin-
istrative authority (e.g. TSM). Nevertheless, the baseline architecture of the UCTD is
based the UCOM, as the CASC is an extension of the UCOM architecture that provides
centralised ownership of the device while preserving the user's freedom of choice.
The CASC combines the TSM architecture with the openness, scalability, and exibility
of the UCOM architecture. In this architecture, users get their choice of selecting which
application they want on their smart cards, and administrative authorities (or the TSM, the
administrator of the corporate network) have a permanent presence on the cards along with
possibly being part of the revenue loop. The CASC requires all the necessary modications
to the existing smart card architecture (i.e. deployed in the ICOM) to achieve its goals.
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Figure 3.7: Ecosystem of the Coopetitive Architecture for Smart Cards (CASC)
requirements of the CASC.
The ecosystem of the CASC is illustrated in gure 3.7, and at its centre there are three
main entities: the administrative authority (the card issuer, TSM, and corporate authority
etc.), cardholder, and the smart card. The administrative authority issues the smart cards
to its customers. The cardholder would have the choice to install or delete any application
they would require. The management of the smart card application installation, deletion,
and application/card lifecycle management is handled by the Platform Manager (PM)
(discussed in section 4.2). The PM facilitates both the administrative authority and the
cardholder to perform their sanctioned tasks.
As an example, consider a scenario in which a user enrols into the multi-application smart
card service architecture through a Mobile Network Operator (MNO). In this scenario, the
MNO plays the role of an administrative authority. As the customer of the MNO, the
user can receive an NFC-enabled mobile phone (possibly under a xed period contract)
and UCTDs. In certain cases, MNOs subsidise the mobile phone in return for a xed
period contract with their customers. The phone is under MNO lock and it can only
be used on the issuing MNO's network. At the end of the contract, the customer can
request the MNO to unlock the mobile phone. The acquired secure element(s) would have
the MNO's application installed by default. In addition, if the user is a customer of any
other organisations that are associated partners of the MNO in the TSM scheme, then she
may get their applications pre-installed on the secure element. This secure element would
enable the user to request installation or deletion of any application she chooses, except
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for the MNO's application. At the end of the contract, the MNO would not only unlock
the mobile phone but also the TSM. From this point forward, the user can either use the
secure element under UCOM architecture or register their secure element with any other
TSM (or continue with the original MNO).
Similarly, other entities like card issuing banks, transport service operators, smart card
and mobile phone manufacturers, or independent third parties, can participate by oering
competitive products that adhere to the CASC. The security and reliability of the coopet-
itive smart cards would be a key issue, which is dealt with separately in the ICOM and
UCOM scenarios.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model along
with dierent smart card frameworks that have been proposed to support the ICOM. In
addition, this chapter serves as a basic introduction to the UCOM framework and its
main stakeholders. We have also dened the roles of each of these stakeholders along with
their security and operational requirements. Furthermore, we have extended the UCOM
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In this chapter, we discuss the security and operational architecture of the UCOM sup-
ported platform, termed the User Centric Smart Card (UCSC). Subsequently, we detail
the inclusion of a trusted computing platform for smart cards that we refer as the Trusted
Environment & Execution Manager (TEM). This is followed by the rationale behind the
changes to the traditional smart card architecture to accommodate the remote security as-
surance and validation mechanism. We propose an attestation protocol that provides an
online security validation of a smart card by its manufacturer. Finally, the attestation pro-




The ecosystem of the UCOM is centred around smart cards that have to implement ade-
quate security and operational functionality to support a) enforcement of security policies
stipulated by the card platform and individual SPs for their respective applications, and
b) operational functionality that enables an SP to manage its application(s), and a card-
holder to manage her ownership privileges. The smart card architecture has to represent
this change in ownership architecture. For this purpose, we require a trusted module as
part of the smart card architecture. The module would validate the current state of the
platform to requesting entities in order to establish the trustworthiness of a smart card in
the UCOM architecture.
In the UCOM, the card manufacturers make sure that smart cards have adequate secu-
rity and operational functionality to support user ownership. In addition, the cardholder
manages her relationship with individual SPs. These relationships enable her to request
installation of their applications. Before leasing an application, SPs will require an assur-
ance of the smart card's security and reliability. This assurance will be achieved through
a third party security evaluation of the smart cards before they are issued to individual
users. Furthermore, to provide a dynamic security validation, the evaluated smart cards
implement an attestation mechanism. The attestation mechanism should accommodate
remote validation, as in the UCOM an SP will not always have physical access to the
smart card. In addition, the attestation mechanism will certify that the current state of
the smart card is as evaluated by the independent third party. Therefore, the trust ar-
chitecture in the UCOM is based on the adequacy of the third party evaluation, and the
security and reliability of the remote attestation mechanism.
Structure of the Chapter: Section 4.2, discusses the UCTD architecture and its major
components. To provide security and reliability assurance to remote entities we dene the
role of the Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM) in section 4.3. Subsequently,
we extend the discussion to the security evaluation in section 4.4, followed by the remote
attestation mechanism in section 4.5. In section 4.6, we discuss dierent types of UCTD
ownership and how an o-card entity can acquire them. In section 4.7 we propose an
attestation protocol; in section 4.8 we detail an informal analysis and test implementation
results of the attestation protocol.
4.2 Platform Architecture
The proposed architecture for a UCTD is depicted in gure 4.1 and this architecture
satises the requirements of the UCOM discussed in section 3.5.3.
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Figure 4.1: User Centric Smart Card (UCSC) architecture
Most of the components shown in gure 4.1 are either an improvement to the existing
framework or an addition to the GlobalPlatform architecture. We use GlobalPlatform as
the base architecture for the components in this section. These components modify the
GlobalPlatform card specication to accommodate the UCOM philosophy. Please note that
in this section, we make repeated references to the security and operational requirements
discussed in section 3.5.
Furthermore, certain components that are shown as part of the UCTD architecture in
gure 4.1 are discussed in later chapters where they are described in detail. These com-
ponents include the application installation & deletion manager (chapters 5 and 9), the
backup & restoration mechanism (chapter 9), the cross-device manager and smart card
rewall (chapter 7), and the Smart Card Runtime Environment (chapter 8). We delay
their discussion to later chapters for the sake of argument ow and logical placement as
we compare them with the existing smart card architectures (e.g. Java Card, Multos and
GlobalPlatform).
4.2.1 Spaces
A space is a memory container that holds collections of services or applications (i.e.
domains). As depicted in gure 4.1 there are two spaces: platform space and application
space. The platform space is owned by the smart card platform itself so that users do not
have any control over the services installed in the platform space. The application space
can be under the control of an o-card entity that may be a centralised authority (i.e.
TSM or card issuer) or the smart card user. In addition, there can be multiple application
spaces on a smart card accommodating a centralised authority and the respective card
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user (section 3.6). The owner of an application space has the right to install or delete any
application they choose within their respective space. With the concept of spaces, we can
even extend the smart card's capability to accommodate multiple users. An example is a
home personal computer used by family members where each member of the family has her
or his own prole (account) on the computer. In such a scenario, applications on a UCTD
belonging to individual family members should also be securely segregated, and this can
be accomplished by creating an application space for each individual user.
A logical set of memory locations, associated with a single SP, is called a domain and it
is under the complete and independent control of that SP. The domain provides a simple
mechanism in which each application has a secure compartment that is independently man-
aged by the SP. Domain ownership is delegated independently of any o-card entity (e.g.
card manufacturer) to the SP during the application installation process that is discussed
in chapter 6. A point to note is that the concept of domains is widely deployed by the
GlobalPlatform card specication [30] and we simply adapt it to the UCOM architecture.
The managers shown in the platform space of gure 4.1 are collectively represented by the
term Platform Manager (PM), illustrated in gure 3.7.
4.2.2 Card Security Manager
The card security manager is the hub for the dierent security and operational services
that a smart card provides.
During the application installation process, the card security manager will facilitate the
generation of an SP's domain and oversee the transfer of control of the domain to the
appropriate SP. For each application belonging to an SP, there will be a separate domain
allocated to the SP that will only have one application in it. This is to allow an SP to
manage its individual applications on a smart card individually. Furthermore, this also
simplies the deletion, and blocking/disabling of applications. The card security manager
can delete entire domain and any associated privileges to applications installed in the
domain  without aecting other applications in the domain. The card security manager
facilitates the transfer of domain control to the appropriate SP. This transfer includes
the generation of cryptographic keys that the SP will use them to authenticate itself to
the domain and perform related management tasks (e.g. application installation, deletion,
blocking, unblocking and update). The card security manager would also ensure that the
keys generated during the application installation process are not revealed to any third
party (e.g. card manufacturer or cardholder).
If an installed application violates the security policy of a smart card, the card security
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manager can take action and restrict the application by either blocking it so it cannot
execute, or by deleting it. In the GlobalPlatform card specication, such a mechanism
requires the card issuer's permission whereas in the UCOM the card security manager
wants to delete an application it only requires permission from the cardholder.
In addition, when the ownership of a smart card is changed or if the card is decommis-
sioned, the card security manager is responsible for resetting the smart card conguration.
This process includes the deletion of all installed applications and any data related to
applications/users. The resetting operation will set the smart card to the default factory
setting, as a blank card. Such a mechanism does not exist in the GlobalPlatform card
specication and it is discussed as part of the decommissioning of the UCTD in chapter 9.
The card security manager provides functionality that ensures the platform is in confor-
mance with the requirements CR1, CR2, CR5, SCR5, SCR6, SPR1, SPR2, and SPR6 that
are listed in section 3.5.
4.2.3 Card Services Manager
Services provided by the smart card platform are under the control of the card services
manager. The services include the o-card interface, the runtime Application Programming
Interface (API), and default applications. The access rights to these services are designated
(requested) by the respective application's SP and the card services manager enforces them.
This functionality enables an SP to manage the behaviour of its application(s) on a smart
card.
Furthermore, a smart card might have multiple applications from dierent SPs that provide
the same service, like banking applications from distinct banks. In such a situation, the
user would have the option of making one application the default application of the group
to which it belongs. The card services manager deals with a list of default applications
when a smart card is presented at a Services Access Point (SAP). If the SAP only requests
an application that belongs to a particular group (e.g. transport, banking, telecom or access
control) without specifying a particular member of that group, the card services manager
selects the default application for the group. However, if the SAP wants to select a specic
application, which may not be the default application of its group the SAP has to request
that application explicitly.
The card services manager ensures that the platform satises requirements CR3, CR4,
SCR5, SPR6, and SPR7 (dened in section 3.5).
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4.2.4 Cardholder's Security Manager
The cardholder's security manager maintains services that facilitate an eective and secure
management of the smart card contents by its user (cardholder).
At the time a UCTD is delivered to a user, it might be a blank card, which is under
the default ownership of the smart card manufacturer. The cardholder's security manager
facilitates a cardholder to acquire the control of the smart card (section 4.6), which will
enable her to install or delete any application she desires.
Furthermore, when a user requests any privilege services (e.g. application installation,
application deletion, a list of installed applications), she has to authenticate herself to
the cardholder's security manager. On successful authentication, the cardholder's security
manager will proceed with the requested service.
When a user takes the ownership of a smart card, the card contents (e.g. cryptographic keys
and certicates) are specic to the user. Therefore, when the ownership changes hands,
the cardholder's security manager requests the card security manager (section 4.2.2) to
initiate the clean-up command that deletes all applications and data, returning the smart
card to the default ownership (card manufacturer's ownership). This process is referred to
as decommissioning and is discussed in chapter 9.
The cardholder's security manager provides functionality to satisfy requirements CR1,
CR2, SCR1, and SCR7.
4.2.5 Subscription Manager
The subscription manager handles the registration of a smart card with an administrative
authority. The authority can be a corporate and home-network administrator and/or a
centralised scheme manager like a card issuer or TSM. These entities might be registered
before the card was issued or the user might choose to register her smart card to a particular
authority to get better services.
The subscription manager facilitates the registered administrative authority to manage
their application space on the UCTD. In addition, if a user is allowed to evict the admin-
istrative authority then the subscription manager will proceed with the removal process.
This process will include deleting the associated space and all applications (domains) in
the respective space, along with revoking any privileges delegated to the administrative
authority on the UCTD. In carrying out this process, the subscription manager is similar
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to the cardholder's security manager except that the cardholder's security manager caters
to a user's requirements whereas the subscription manager caters to an administrative au-
thority. The subscription manager is an optional manager and is only required if a user
wants to be part of an administrative authority or if the UCOM platform is issued by
an organisation that wants to keep control of its interests for example, a mobile network
operator that subsidises UCTDs to its customers.
4.3 Trusted Environment & Execution Manager
On a typical smart card, several mechanisms are in place to test and verify the state of
the platform (both software and hardware). At the software level, GlobalPlatform card
specication has proposed the controlling authority (termed CA in the GlobalPlatform
card specication) [74] and the Mandated Data Authentication Pattern (Mandated DAP)
mechanism [30, 74]. In the DAP mechanism, an o-card entity (controlling authority) signs
applications that are being loaded onto a smart card, and this approval of the applications
is veried by an oncard entity referred to as the GlobalPlatform card manager [30]. At
the hardware level, the Known Answer Test (KAT) for cryptographic modules mandated
by FIPS [113] and similar mechanism are deployed by the smart card manufacturer (i.e.
RAM test, and checking checksum of non-volatile memory, etc.) [5].
At the time of writing (September 2011), the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) was ini-
tiating a working group to devise specications for a trusted module for embedded de-
vices [114]. The working group has not released any specications regarding the trusted
module for embedded devices. We propose the Trusted Environment & Execution Manager
(TEM) as a trusted module for embedded devices like smart cards. The TEM is fundamen-
tally dierent from the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [18] and Mobile Trusted Module
(MTM) [19] in two respects. Firstly, the TEM implements a self-test mechanism that in-
cludes hardware parameters to provide remote attestation and a dynamically congurable
integrity measurement mechanism that is based on a challenge-response framework. Sec-
ondly, the TEM is not based on a static architecture; in fact, it enforces platform security
policies during the application execution rather than just generating the hash (once) at
the start of the application execution. The architecture of the TEM is illustrated in gure
4.2.
The concept of TEM is to group/provide similar and enhanced functionality that provides
assurance and validation of the platform to requesting on-card or o-card entities. The
TEM is independent of the platform conguration that is mainly concerned with the smart
card runtime environment, which can be based on a technology such as Java Card or
Multos. A TEM does not have to be implemented in hardware; it can be software-based
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Figure 4.2: Architecture for the Trusted Environment & Execution Manager
and utilise the smart card's cryptographic hardware (the crypto co-processor). The TEM
requires access to the crypto co-processor for encryption/decryption, signature generation
and verication, and random number generation.
4.3.1 Interface
The TEM interface manages the communication between the TEM and on-card entities
(e.g. platform services and applications) or o-card entities (e.g. SPs). The TEM interface
does not replace the o-card interface discussed in section 4.2.3, it only implements the
communication service that a TEM uses to communicate with on-card applications and
(o-card) SPs.
The TEM interface implements the attestation protocol discussed in section 4.7. Further-
more, it also provides a state validation service (section 4.4.3) to installed applications
during the application sharing process. The state validation of an application can only be
performed by the TEM if it is explicitly requested to do so by that application. Therefore,
for state validation, the TEM establishes a shared secret with an application (at the time
of application installation). When the installed application (refer to it as AppA) needs to
provide state validation to another application (refer to it as AppB), for example during
the application sharing process, the TEM will only provide the state valuation of AppA
to AppB if AppA explicitly requests the TEM with AppB identity using the shared secret
(for a more detailed discussion, please see section 7.3.2).
4.3.2 Backup Token Handler
The backup token handler acts as a repository that stores the restoration tokens of in-
dividual applications (if sanctioned by their respective SPs) on a smart card. When a
user registers with a backup server or wants to transfer the installed applications from
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one smart card to another, the backup & restoration manager retrieves these tokens from
the backup token handler, encrypts them, and communicates to the intended entity (e.g.
backup server or new smart card). The details of this mechanism are further elaborated
in chapter 9.
4.3.3 Runtime Security Manager
The runtime security manager deals with the enforcement of the platform policies regard-
ing the smart card runtime environment. These policies may deal with the security and
reliability of an application execution, and they ensure that an application executes in a
trustworthy manner. The runtime security manager is discussed in detail in chapter 8
where we examine the threats to the smart card runtime environment and related coun-
termeasures.
4.3.4 Attestation Handler
The attestation handler and the self-test manager are part of the security assurance and
validation mechanism discussed in section 4.4. The dierence between these two modules
(i.e. the attestation handler and the self-test manager) of the TEM is that one focuses
on the software and the other on the hardware. However, in the proposed attestation
mechanism (section 4.5) they complement each other to provide proof that a smart card
is secure, reliable and trustworthy.
During the application installation process, the attestation handler will verify the current
state of the platform runtime environment (e.g. security and operationally sensitive parts of
the SCOS) and arm to the appropriate SP that the platform is as secure and reliable as it
is claimed to be the evaluation certicate discussed in section 4.4. Once the application is
installed the relevant SP can ask the TEM to generate the state validation of an application
(e.g. signed hash of the application), ensuring that the application is downloaded without
any errors onto the platform. This function of the TEM is similar to the DAP [30, 74].
Furthermore, SPs can request the state validation of their applications at any time during
the lifetime of the applications on a smart card. In addition, as part of the application
sharing mechanism the TEM also provides application state validation to the applications
that share each other's resources (discussed in chapter 7).
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4.3.5 Self-test Manager
The self-test mechanism checks whether the smart card is tamper-resistant as certied by
a trusted third party evaluation. The aim of the self-test mechanism is to provide a remote
hardware validation framework in a way that enables a requesting entity (e.g. an SP) to
independently verify it. As our focus and expertise is not the hardware end of the smart
card, we do not propose any hardware-based mechanism in this thesis, which is one of the
possible directions for future research.
A self-test mechanism in the UCTD should provide the properties that are listed below:
1. Robustness: On input of certain data, it should always produce associated output.
2. Independence: When the same data is input to a self-test mechanism implemented
on two dierent devices, they should output dierent (random) values.
3. Pseudo-randomness: The generated output should be computationally dicult to
distinguish from a pseudo-random function.
4. Tamper-evidence: Any attack aiming to access the function should cause irreversible
changes which render the device dead.
5. Unforgeable: It should be computationally dicult to simulate the self-test mecha-
nism and mimic the actual deployed function on a device.
6. Assurance: the function should provide assurance (either implicitly or explicitly) to
independent veriers. It should not require an active connection with the device
manufacturer to provide the assurance.
There are several possibilities for a self-test mechanism in a UCTD including using active
(intelligent) shield/mesh [115], the Known Answer Test (KAT) [113], and the Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF) [116].
To provide protection against invasive attacks, smart card manufacturers implement an
active shield/mesh around the chip. If a malicious user removes the active shield then the
chip will be disabled. The self-test mechanism can be associated with this shield to provide
a limited assurance that the protective measures of the chip are still in place and active.
Furthermore, Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) can be deployed with a
hard-wired key that would be used to generate a checksum of randomly selected memory
addresses that have non-mutable code related to the SCOS. This mechanism requires the
involvement of the device manufacturer, as the knowledge of the correct HMAC key would
be a secret known only to the manufacturer and its smart cards.
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Another potential protection strategy is to utilise Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
[116] to provide hardware validation. It is dicult to nd a single and consistent de-
nition of PUF in the literature [117]. However, a property description denition of the
PUF is provided by Gassend et al. in [116]. Usual applications of the PUF described
in the literature are in anti-counterfeiting [118], Intellectual Property protection [119]
[121], tamper-evident hardware [122], hardware based cryptography [60, 123][125] and
secure/trusted processors [126].
Based on the above listed features, table 4.1 shows the comparison between dierent pos-
sible functions that can act as the self-test mechanism. Although the debate regarding the
viability, security, and reliability of the PUFs is still open in both academic circles and
industry [127]; for completeness, we use them as a self-test mechanism in our proposals
because they meet most of the requirements listed in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Comparison of dierent proposals for self-test mechanism
Features Active-Shield Keyed-HMAC PRNG PUF
Robustness Yes Yes Yes Yes
Independence No No Yes Yes
Pseudo-randomness No Yes Yes Yes
Tamper-evidence Yes  Yes* Yes
Unforgeable No Yes Yes* Yes
Assurance Yes No Yes Yes*
Note. Yes means that the mechanism supports the feature. No indicates that the mechanism does
not support the required feature. The entry Yes* means that it can supports this feature if adequately
catered for during the design.
If a manufacturer maintains separate keys for individual smart cards that support the
HMAC then it can provide the independence feature. However the HMAC key is hard-
wired and this makes it dicult for it to be dierent on individual smart cards of the same
batch. Furthermore, it requires other features to provide tamper evidence, like active-
shield. On the other hand, PUFs and adequately designed Pseudo-Random Number Gen-
erators (PRNGs) can provide assurance that the platform state and the tamper-resistant
protections of a UCTD are still active.
Before we discuss how a self-test manager and an attestation handler can be implemented
based on PUF and/or PRNG, we rst discuss the overall framework that is responsible for
providing security assurance and validation of a smart card.
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4.4 Security Assurance and Validation Mechanism
The UCOM requires a mechanism that supports a dynamic and remote security assurance
and validation process which is based on the TEM coupled with a third party evaluation.
The third party evaluation certicate provides a security assurance and TEM provides the
validation that the assurance is correct at the time of request. However, in the UCOM
environment, applications are not required to be evaluated by third parties, and so evalua-
tions can be costly, and may discourage small and medium-scale organisations from opting
for the UCTD-based architecture. To verify the security and reliability of an application,
a smart card can employ on-card verication mechanisms like bytecode verication [128].
In this thesis, we refer to the Common Criteria (CC) evaluators for third party evaluation
as it is one of the most accepted and deployed evaluation mechanisms in the smart card
industry.
4.4.1 Common Criteria
In late 1990s, the Common Criteria (CC) was released, and they were later adopted as
a multi-part ISO/IEC standard (ISO/IEC 15408 [129]), that is internationally accepted
under the Common Criteria Recognition Agreement (CCRA) [69].
The CC scheme denes the methodology for expressing the security requirements, confor-
mance claims, evaluations process, and nally, certication of the product. The security
requirements for a product at an abstract level are stipulated by Protection Proles (PPs).
A Security Target (ST) details these security requirements and makes the conformance
claims for a product or its sub-component(s), generally referred to as Target of Evaluation
(TOE).
The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) are predened assurance packages that have a set
of security requirements. There are seven packages dened in the Common Methodology
for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM) [130] that are referred as EAL
1 to EAL 7 with level seven being the most comprehensive security evaluation. The CC
proposes an evaluation methodology, which denes the procedures that an evaluator should
follow when processing conformance claims regarding a TOE under a particular ST, PP
and desired EAL. This evaluation methodology is published in the CEM [130].
In the literature, some reservations are expressed regarding the validity and the process ef-
ciency of the CC [67, 86, 131]. However, the CC has taken a strong hold in the smart card
industry, especially in high-security areas like banking and IDS/passports, as the security
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evaluation-standard of choice. CC evaluation has a well-established security requirement
specication [69] and evaluation methodology [130]. Furthermore, card issuers, applica-
tion providers, and most smart card manufacturers have extensive experience of the CC
evaluation scheme.
In subsequent sections, we discuss how CC plays the role of trusted third party (evaluator)
in the UCOM security assurance and validation process.
4.4.2 Assurance Phase
This section describes the pre-issuance security evaluation. It is divided into two subsec-
tions: smart card evaluation and application evaluation.
4.4.2.1 Smart Card Evaluation
In this phase, the card manufacturer would get their smart cards evaluated to the dened
EAL. If the evaluation of the smart card is successful, the CC Certication Body (CB)
would issue a cryptographic certicate [132], referred to as the Platform Assurance Cer-
ticate (PAC). The main components of the certicate include a PAC identier, a unique
reference to the product's ST, PP, and list of hardware security mechanisms and a hash of
the immutable (security and reliability critical) part of the SCOS.
Smart cards could be subjected to extensive evaluation by the manufacturer, evaluation
labs, or the academic community even after the issuance of the card's PAC; therefore, if
such evaluations discover vulnerabilities in a particular product, SPs can disable their ap-
plication leases to them, preventing the smart cards from accessing the sanctioned services.
Furthermore, the CB may downgrade their PAC assurance level or include the card on a
certication revocation list, prohibiting such smart cards from downloading applications
in the future.
In addition, a PAC can also have the manufacturer's ID, the evaluator's (Commercial
Licensed Evaluation Facility: CLEF) ID, the manufacturer's signature verication key
[132], and the validity period. The validity period is determined by the CC evaluators
and it represents an estimated period that a given product is expected to remain secure.
The manufacturer's ID uniquely identies the smart card manufacturer, and similarly the
CLEF ID identies the evaluation body that has carried out the evaluation. Finally, the
certicate would also certify the manufacturer's signature key pair.
The manufacturer would use the signature key certied by the PAC to issue certicates to
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the individual smart cards that have the same validity as the associated PAC.
4.4.2.2 Application Evaluation Phase.
An SP would create an ST according to its security requirements and get it evaluated
by the CLEF. If the SP's application is approved, the CB would issue a cryptographically
signed Application Assurance Certicate (AAC) that would contain the EAL level achieved
by the SP's application and the hash of its immutable application code.
The structure of the AAC is similar to the PAC, except for few changes. Details of data
elds included in the AAC are: the SP's ID, the evaluator's (CLEF) ID, reference to the
evaluation target documents (PPs and ST), a digest of immutable application code, the
SP's signature key, and the certicate's validity period.
The certicate chain traversal and verication of the individual certicates in the chain
are comparatively easy for the SPs as they have more computational power than a smart
card and independent access to an external network (i.e. the internet). To perform such
tasks would no doubt be challenging for a smart card; therefore, it would request the SP
to provide the certicate hierarchy that leads back either to the smart card manufacturer
or the third party evaluator of the smart card (i.e. to an entity that is considered trusted
by the smart card). In this way, the smart card can easily verify the certicate as the root
of the certicate chain provided the SP's certicate chain has entities (certicate issuers)
that the smart card trusts.
4.4.3 Validation Phase
This phase deals with the process that provides a dynamic and remote attestation of the
current state of the smart card or applications. The attestation mechanism combines the
self-test manager and attestation handler of the TEM to provide the state validation of
the UCTD. For validation of applications the TEM attestation handler only generates the
hash of the application in question, but the attestation mechanism for UCTD validation
has two modes of operation: oine and online. In the oine mode, the validation process
is independent of the card manufacturer and the smart card provides a security validation
message to the requesting entity. In the online mode the card manufacturer provides the





In this section, we discuss the two attestation mechanisms based on non-simulatable PUFs
and pseudorandom number generators that combine the functionality attestation handler
and self-test manager discussed in section 4.3.
4.5.1 Non-simulatable PUFs
A non-simulatable PUF is a PUF that is computationally dicult to simulate by either the
device manufacturer or a malicious entity. This property has made non-simulatable PUFs
a candidate for true/pseudo random number and secret key generators [123, 133, 134].
Based on non-simulatable PUFs, we describe two algorithms 4.1 and 4.2 that take into
account the oine and online modes of the attestation mechanism.
Algorithm 4.1: Self-test algorithm for oine attestation based on a PUF
Input : l; list (array) of selected memory addresses.
Output : S; signature key of the smart card.
Data: seed; temporary seed value for the PRNG set to zero.
n; number of memory addresses in the list l.
i; counter set to zero.
a; memory address.
k; secret key used to encrypt the signature key of the smart card.
Se; encrypted signature key using a symmetric algorithm with key k.
Notation:
x ←− y+z: rst the operation on the right of the arrow will be performed and the
result will be stored in x. This notation is common for all algorithms in this thesis.
1 SelfTestOffline (l) begin
2 while i < n do
3 a←− ReadAddressList (l,i)
4 seed ←− Hash (ReadMemoryContents (a), seed)
5 i ←− i+1
6 if seed 6= ∅ then
7 k ←− nmPUF (seed)
8 else
9 return testfailed
10 S ←− DecryptionFunction (k, Se)
11 return S
The oine algorithm is based on the function SelfTestOffline that takes a list of selected
memory addresses (l) stored on the card by the card manufacturer. This list has memory
addresses of security and reliability critical components of the smart card platform. The
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function SelfTestOffline iterates through the l and generates a hash of the contents of
the given memory location. The generated hash value is then stored as a seed. After
traversing through the l, the SelfTestOffline checks the value of the seed. If the value
is zero then throw test fail exception; otherwise, proceed. The generated seed value is
then input to the PUF that produces a sequence referred as k in algorithm 4.1. Using the
generated k, the SelfTestOffline will decrypt the signature key for the given device, then
return the signature key to the attestation handler. The handler will generate a signature
and send it to the requesting entity (e.g. the SP) along with the relevant cryptographic
certicate. If the signature veries then the smart card state is in conformance to the
evaluation state.
Algorithm 4.2: Self-test algorithm for online attestation based on a PUF
Input :
c; challenge sent by the card manufacturer.
n; random number send by the card manufacturer.
Output :
r; hash value generated on selected memory addresses, set at zero.
p; response part of the CRP for the implemented PUF.
Data:
seedfile; seed le that has a list of non-zero values.
seed; temporary seed value for the PRNG set to zero.
ns; number of entries in a seedfile.
s; unique reference to an entry in the seedfile.
nc; number of bytes in the n.
i; counter set to zero.
l; upper limit of memory address dened by the card manufacturer.
m; memory address.
mK; shared secret between a smart card and respective card manufacturer.
Notation:
x % y: represents x modulo y. This notation is common for all algorithms in this
thesis.
1 SelfTestOnline (c, n) begin
2 mK ←− nmPUF(c)
3 while i < nc do
4 s←− ReadSingleByte(n, i) % ns
5 seed←− ReadSeedFile(seedfile, s)
6 m←− GenPRNG(seed) % l
7 r ←− Hash(ReadMemoryContents(m), r,mK)
8 if (nc− i) = 1 then
9 p←− nmPUF(r)
10 i ←− i+1
11 return r, p
For online attestation, the card manufacturers will have to generate (limited) Challenge-
Response Pairs (CRPs) discussed in section 4.5.3, which will be unique to a device. The
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rationale behind this is based on the design of a non-simulatable PUF in which the designer
tries make the CRP space suciently large to make it dicult for an adversary to simulate
the PUF [123, 135]. This design decision even makes it dicult for the card manufacturer to
simulate the PUF. The limited set of generated CRPs will lead to a limited number of device
validations (before they start to repeat), which is not a desirable situation. Therefore, we
use a rolling update mechanism in which at the end of each successful device validation
(section 4.7) a new CRP will be generated for future use. A valid CRP response can also
help the card manufacturer ascertain that the device is not counterfeit as only the issued
device's CRPs are registered in its CRP database.
The PUF-based online attestation mechanism represented in algorithm 4.2 implements a
function SelfTestOnline that takes two parameters: a challenge `c' and random number
`n' from the respective card manufacturer. The challenge `c' is input to the PUF at line
two and a response is generated, which is the response to the challenge `c' and we treat it
as a shared secret (mK). The function SelfTestOnline then treats the random number
`n' as a collection of bytes, reading one byte at a time and taking modulus of the byte with
the length of the seedfile. By doing so, we generate an index to the seedfile and in the
next step we read a seed value from that index. The seed value is used to generate a new
random number, whose modulus with upper memory limit (l) dened by the manufacturer
gives us a memory location. In the next step (line seven), we read and hash the memory
contents from the memory location, and the result is stored in r. This process is repeated
for the number of bytes the random number `n' has, which is represented by the nc. At
nc− 1 iteration, the r is input to the PUF again to generate a new CRP.
In function SelfTestOnline, the generated `r' and `p' are then securely communicated
back to the smart card manufacturer, which can verify the generated `r' and stores the
CRP. The card manufacturer can verify the `r' by executing instructions from lines three
to seven of the algorithm 4.2. Similarly, the function SelfTestOnline does not send the
challenge which was used to generate the response `p' because the card manufacturer can
also generate the value of `r' at iteration ns− 1.
4.5.2 Pseudorandom Number Generator
In the second option, we propose the use of a Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG)
to provide the device authentication, validation, and implicit anti-counterfeit functional-
ity. Unlike non-simulatable PUFs, PRNGs are emulatable and their security relies on the
protection of their internal state (e.g. input seed values, and/or secret keys, etc.).
Unlike PUFs, the PRNGs implemented in one device will be the same as they are in
other devices and given the same input, they will produce the same output. Therefore, the
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manufacturer will populate the PRNG seed le with unique values in each smart card. The
seed le is a collection of inputs that is fed to the PRNG to produce a random number,
and it is updated constantly by the PRNG [136]. This will enable a card manufacturer to
emulate the PRNG and generate valid CRPs for a particular device. The PRNGmechanism
is not tamper-evident and it relies on the tamper-resistant mechanisms of the smart card
to provide physical security.
Based on the PRNG, algorithms 4.3 and 4.4 show the oine and online attestation mech-
anism, respectively.
Algorithm 4.3: Self-test algorithm for oine attestation based on a PRNG
Input : l; list of selected memory addresses.
Output: S; signature key of the smart card.
Data:
seed; temporary seed value for the PRNG set to zero.
n; number of memory addresses in the list l.
i; counter set to zero.
a; memory address.
k; secret key used to encrypt the signature key of the smart card.
Se; encrypted signature key using a symmetric algorithm with key k.
1 SelfTestOffline (l) begin
2 while i < n do
3 a←− ReadAddressList (l,i)
4 seed ←− Hash (ReadMemoryContents (a), seed)
5 i ←− i+1
6 if seed 6= ∅ then
7 k ←− GenPRNG (seed)
8 else
9 return testfailed
10 S ←− DecryptionFunction (k, Se)
11 return S
The SelfTestOffline takes a list of selected memory addresses l that is illustrated in
algorithm 4.1. The function iterates through the l reading one memory address at a time,
and then generating a hash of the contents stored at the given memory address. In the
next step at line six, the function SelfTestOffline checks the value of seed and if it is
not zero it will proceed; otherwise, it will throw a test fail exception. If the seed value is
not zero then the seed is input to the PRNG and a sequence k is generated. The k is used
to encrypt the smart card signature key, and if the input to the PRNG at line seven is as
expected the signature key will be correctly decrypted.
The algorithm returns the signature key, which is used by the attestation handler to sign
a message. The requesting entity will verify the signed message and if the state of the
platform is in conformance with the evaluated state then the signature will be veried;
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otherwise, it will fail. The signature verication will fail because the decrypted signature
key will be dierent as the input to the PRNG at line seven of the algorithm was dierent.
Therefore, we can assume that if the state is changed, signature key will change, and the
generated signature will not verify.
Algorithm 4.4: Self-test algorithm for online attestation based on a PRNG
Input : c; randomly generated challenge sent by the card manufacturer.
Output: r; hash value generated on selected memory addresses.
Data:
seedfile; seed le that has a list of non-zero values.
seed; temporary seed value for the PRNG set to zero.
ns; number of entries in a seed le.
s; unique reference to an entry in the seedfile.
nc; number of bytes in the c.
i; counter set to zero.
l; upper limit of memory address dened by the card manufacturer.
m; memory address.
mK; HMAC key shared between a smart card and respective card manufacturer
1 SelfTestOnline (c) begin
2 while i < nc do
3 s←− ReadChallenge(c, i) % ns
4 seed←− ReadSeedFile(seedfile, s)
5 m←− GenPRNG(seed) % l
6 r ←− r ⊕ Hash(ReadMemoryContents(m),mK)
7 i←− i+ 1
8 return r
The PRNG-based online attestation mechanism is illustrated in algorithm 4.4. The func-
tion SelfTestOnline takes the challenge c from the card manufacturer as input. The
received challenge is treated as a collection of bytes and individual bytes of the challenge c
are used to generate indexes to seedfile; values stored on these indexes are used to generate
memory addresses (within the range specied by the card manufacturer). The contents of
generated memory addresses are then HMACed and the result is securely sent to the card
manufacturer. The SP can use the same process described in algorithm 4.4 to generate
the HMAC result and if the result matches with the one sent by the smart card, then the
card manufacturer can ascertain that the current state of the card is trustworthy. At line
six of the algorithm 4.4, we update the seedfile with the value stored in `m'. This update
is necessary to avoid generation of the same `r' if the card manufacturer sends the same
challenge `c'.
In the implementation of the attestation protocol (section 4.7), we only use the PRNGs
as we have neither the technical expertise to design a PUF nor adequate means to do so.
However, in section 4.8.3, we emulate a PUF to provide the test performance measurements.
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4.5.3 Challenge-Response Pair Generation
In the case of the mechanism based exclusively on the PRNG as depicted in algorithm 4.4,
the card manufacturer will provide a set of seed values that is referred as the seed le. The
seed le has a limited set of seeds and with the PRNG designed to update, the seed le
will keep the internal state of the PRNG dicult to emulate by an adversary.
On the other hand, if the online attestation mechanism is based on PUFs then the card
manufacturer requests the smart card to generate a limited set of CRPs. A new CRP is
generated on every successful online attestation; therefore, the card manufacturer does not
need to maintain an exhaustive set of CRPs for individual smart cards.
4.6 Device Ownership
An o-card entity can have one of two types of ownerships on a UCTD. These are discussed
in subsequent sections.
4.6.1 Administrative Ownership
This ownership privilege is enabled in the UCTD to accommodate the requirements of an
IT infrastructure in a corporate, government or public institution (i.e. schools, library, etc.)
to manage hand-held and traditional computing platforms. In addition, the administrative
ownership enables the scheme in which an organisation that is referred as administrative
authority (i.e. MNOs, CIBs, TSOs, SCMs, and MPMs, etc.) can issue smart cards to its
customers and may charge either the application provider or the user on each application
download (section 3.6).
An entity with administrative privileges can install an application in the administrator
space on a UCTD. The administrator space is an application space (section 4.2.1) on a
UCTD that is under the control of the administrative authority. The user of the UCTD
will not have any privilege to install or delete an application from the administrator space;
the user only has the right to use these applications to acquire sanctioned services. The
administrator space can enable the administrative authority to install certain protection
applications (i.e. applications related to network/system user policy, rewall and antivirus
denitions, and content lters, etc.). Furthermore, administrative ownership does not give
the administrative authority the privilege to install, delete or use/access any application




User ownership is associated with individual users that acquire a smart card either from
a supplier or an administrative authority. This ownership gives the privilege to a user
to install, delete, and use applications installed in her application space. There are two
scenarios in user ownership: 1) the UCTD is subscribed with an administrative authority
(discussed in the previous section), and 2) there is no administrative authority on the
UCTD, as in UCOM initiative [32].
In the rst case, the user has to abide by the terms and conditions of the administrative
authority. However, in the second case, there is no administrative authority and the user
has complete freedom on the UCTD. Therefore, in the second case we can say that the
user is the administrator and user at the same time.
4.6.3 Ownership Acquisition & Delegation
A UCTD in its pre-issuance state is under the default ownership of the UCTD manufac-
turer. When an entity, whether an administrative authority or a user takes control of the
smart card, it will initiate an ownership acquisition process. The rst step of the acquisi-
tion is to select whether the UCTD will be under administrative control or not. If it will
be, then the administrative authority takes the administrative ownership and then issues
the smart cards to individual users. Whether the UCTD is under administrative control or
not, the user will then acquire the ownership privileges. The ownership acquisition process
is same whether it is initiated by an administrator or a normal user; therefore, we will use
the term user to indicate administrator and normal user during this section. The process
is described below:
1. The user initiates the ownership acquisition process through the Card Application
Management Software (CAMS). At this stage, the user will indicate the type of own-
ership (e.g. administrative or user) and CAMS will select the appropriate manager of
the UCTD. For administrative ownership, it will select subscription manager (section
4.2.5) and for user ownership, it will select cardholder's security manager (section
4.2.4). In case, the UCTD will only have one owner then the smart card will dis-
able the administrative ownership, Unless explicitly instructed not to do so by the
cardholder.
2. The UCTD requests the default ownership credentials, which are communicated to




3. On verication of the credentials, the UCTD checks the mode of platform assurance
and validation selected by the user. The supported modes are oine and online
attestation (section 4.3.5). Depending upon the user's choice the UCTD proceeds
with the security attestation process.
4. Once the assurance validation is communicated to the CAMS, the user can compare
the smart card features with those stated by the card manufacturer at the time
of purchase. If satised, the user will provide her credentials and they are used
to authenticate the user to the UCTD for management operations (e.g. application
installation, deletion, and registration with an administrative authority) discussed in
chapter 5. The credentials can be based on a Personal Identication Number (PIN),
a password, a pass-phrase, or biometric data [137][139] depending upon the card
manufacturer, and user's requirements.
The ownership delegation process is used when a user relinquished control of a UCTD to
re-sell or scrap the device. The process is similar to ownership acquisition but this time the
user requests ownership delegation that will delete the user's space and any applications
she has installed in it.
4.6.4 Key Generation
Individual smart cards have a unique set of cryptographic keys that the card uses for
dierent protocols/mechanisms during its lifetime. Therefore, after the hardware fabrica-
tion and masking of the SCOS is completed [5] the card manufacturer initiates the key
generation process.
Each smart card will generate a signature key pair that does not change for the lifetime of
the smart card. The smart card signature key pair is certied by the card manufacturer,
and it is used to provide oine attestation (section 4.5). Furthermore, in the certicate
hierarchy shown in gure 4.3, the smart card signature key pair is linked with the PAC via
the card manufacturer's certicate. The reason for this is that a malicious user might copy
a PAC that belongs to a genuine device and put it on his tampered device and when an SP
requests security assurance from the tampered device, it provides the (copied) PAC of a
(trusted) genuine device. By ensuring the PAC is tied to genuine devices by the certicate
hierarchy shown in gure 4.3 we can avert such scenarios.
As discussed in section 4.4.2.1, the evaluation authority issues a certicate (e.g. a PAC)
which certies that the signature key of the card manufacturer is valid only for the evaluated
product. If an adversary can get hold of the manufacturer's signature key pairs then he
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can successfully masquerade as the smart card; either as a dumb device or by simulating





Smart Card Signature 
Key Pair Certificate
Smart Card Encryption 
Key Pair Certificate
Smart Card User Signature 
Key Pair Certificate
Figure 4.3: Certicate hierarchy in the UCOM
The smart card will also generate a public encryption key pair that is certied by the smart
card signature key. The smart card user signature key pair is used to identify the owner
of the device and to provide proof of ownership (see chapter 6). This signature key is
unique to the individual user and it is generated on the successful completion of ownership
acquisition process (section 4.6.3).
Finally, the smart card and card manufacturer share an encryption key for symmetric
algorithms (e.g. TDES, AES) and a MAC key. These keys will be used to encrypt and for
MAC communication messages between the smart card and the card manufacturer.
4.7 Attestation Protocol
The attestation protocol, referred as Attestation Protocol (ATP), involves the card manu-
facturer in the security assurance and validation framework by using the online attestation
mechanisms. The aim of the protocol is to provide an assurance to a remote SP that the
current state of the smart card is not only secure but also dynamically attested by the card
manufacturer. The card manufacturer generates a security validation message that testi-
es to the requesting SP that its product is safe and still in compliance with the security
evaluation indicated by the associated PAC.
4.7.1 Protocol Prerequisites
Before the execution of the attestation protocol, the prerequisites for the proposed protocol
are listed below:
PPR-1 Third Party Evaluation: The smart card is independently evaluated by a third
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party that certies the security and reliability features of the device.
PPR-2 Attestation Mechanism: An attestation mechanism is implemented that provides
an eective assurance of the tamper-evidence and conformance with the evaluated
state of the smart card.
PPR-3 Authenticated & Valid CRP: To provide online device authentication and vali-
dation, the card manufacturer maintains a valid CRP database corresponding to
individual smart cards.
PPR-4 Unique Identier: Each smart card has a unique identier that it can use to au-
thenticate itself to the card manufacturer.
PPR-5 Pseudo Public Identier: Each smart card has a dynamic pseudo public identier
that it uses to connect with the card manufacturer. Before issuing the smart cards
to individual users, the card manufacturer will generate a unique pseudo identity
for each card that will be updated on each successful execution of the attestation
protocol.
PPR-6 Smart Card Signature Key Pair: Each smart card will have a unique signature key
pair that is bound to the attestation mechanism.
PPR-7 Encryption &MACKeys: The smart card manufacturer shares a unique encryption
and MAC key with each of their individual smart cards. These keys are used to
encrypt and MAC the communication messages between the smart card and its
manufacturer.
4.7.2 Protocol Goals
The goals for the attestation protocol are listed as below:
PG-1 Secrecy: During the attestation protocol, the communication messages are ade-
quately protected.
PG-2 Privacy: In the attestation protocol, the identity smart card owner (user) should
not be revealed to any eavesdropper or the card manufacturer.
4.7.3 Intruder's Capabilities
The aim of an adversary A could be to retrieve enough information to enable him to
successfully masquerade as a card manufacturer or as a smart card. Therefore, we assume
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an adversary A is able to intercept all messages communicated between a smart card and
its manufacturer. In addition, A can modify, change, replay, and delay the intercepted
messages.
If A is able to masquerade as a card manufacturer then A can issue fake attestation
certicates to individual smart cards, which might compromise the security and privacy of
the user and related SPs. On the other hand, if A is able to compromise the smart card
then he can eectively simulate the smart card environment (discussed in detail in section
5.5.1). This will enable him to reverse engineer the downloaded applications and retrieve
sensitive data related to the user and application (e.g. intellectual property of the SP).
4.7.4 Protocol Notation and Terminology
Table 4.2 summarises the notation used in the proposed attestation protocol.
Table 4.2: Protocol notation and terminology
Notation Description
SC Denotes a smart card.
SP Denotes a Service Provider.
CM Denotes the respective card manufacturer of the SC .
CC Denotes the respective Common Criteria evaluation laboratory that eval-
uates the SC.
SID Session identier that is used as an authentication credential and to avoid
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The SID generated during the protocol
run 'n' is used in the subsequent protocol run (i.e. n+1).
Xi Indicates the identity of an entity X.
NX Random number generated by entity X.
h(Z) The result of applying a hash algorithm (e.g. SHA-256) on data Z.
KX−Y Long term encryption key shared between entities X and Y.
mKX−Y Long term MAC key shared between entities X and Y.
BX Private decryption key associated with an entity X.
VX Public encryption key associated with an entity X.
eK(Z) Result of encipherment of data Z with symmetric key K.
fK(Z) Result of applying MAC algorithm on data Z with key K.
SignX(Z) Is the signature on data Z with the signature key belonging to an entity
X using a signature algorithm like DSA or based on the RSA function. In
this thesis the message SignX(Z) can be interpreted as either signature
with appendix [140] or signature with message recovery [141]. The





CertSX←Y Is the certicate for the signature key belonging to an entity X, issued
by an entity Y.
CertEX←Y Certicate for the public encryption key belonging to an entity X, issued
by an entity Y.
VM The Validation Message (VM) issued by the respective CM to a SC
representing that the current state of the SC is as secure as at the time of
third party evaluation, which is evidenced by the PAC (section 4.4.2.1).
X → Y : C Entity X sends a message to entity Y with contents C.
X||Y Represents the concatenation of data items X and Y.
4.7.5 Protocol Description
In this section, we describe the attestation protocol, and each message is represented by
ATP-n, where n represents the message number. We use the same representation to
describe each message of proposed protocols in this thesis. The structure of this represen-
tation would be the protocol acronym (i.e. ATP for attestation protocol) followed by the
message number.
ATP-1. SC : mE = ekSC−CM (SCi||N ′SC ||CMi||ReqV al)
SC → CM : SCi′ ||mE||fmkSC−CM (mE)||SID
Before issuing the smart card to the user, the SC and CM will establish two long term
secret keys; encryption key KSC−CM and MAC key mKSC−CM . The SC and CM can use
these long-term shared keys to generate the session encryption key kSC−CM and the MAC
key mkSC−CM . The method deployed to generate session keys is left to the sole discretion
of the card manufacturer. Each SC has a unique identier SCi that is the identity of the
smart card. To provide privacy to each smart card (and its user) the identity of the SC is
not communicated in plaintext. Therefore, the pseudo-identier SCi′ is used in the ATP-1,
which is generated by the SC and corresponding CM on the successful completion of the
previous run of the attestation protocol. We will discuss the generation of SCi′ and SID
in subsequent messages, as the generated SCi′ and SID during this message will be used
in the next execution of the attestation protocol. A point to note is that for the very rst
execution of the attestation protocol, the smart card uses the pseudo-identier (SCi′) that
was generated by the card manufacturer and stored on the smart card before the card
was issued to the user. The SID is used for two purposes: rstly to authenticate the SC
and secondly, to prevent a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the attestation server. The
ReqV al is the request for attestation process.
On receipt of the rst message, the CM will check whether it has the correct values of
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SCi′ and SID. If these values are correct, it will then proceed with verifying the MAC. If
satised, it will then decrypt the encrypted part of the message.
ATP-2. CM : mE = ekSC−CM (CMi||N ′SC ||NCM ||Challenge)
CM→ SC : mE||fmkSC−CM (mE)||SID
The CM generates a random number NCM and a Challenge. In case of the PRNG-based
attestation mechanism, the Challenge would also be a random number; however, in case
of PUF-based attestation mechanism it would be the pre-calculated challenge part of the
CRP.
ATP-3. SC : mE = ekSC−CM (N ′SC ||NCM ||NSP ||NSC ||Response||Optional)
SC → CM : mE||fmkSC−CM (mE)||SID
After generating the Response using the PRNG- or PUF-based algorithms discussed in
section 4.5, the SC will proceed with message three. It will concatenate the random num-
bers generated by the SC, CM, and SP, with the Response. The rationale for including
the random number from the SP in message three is to request CM to generate a val-
idation message that can be independently checked by the SP to ensure it is fresh and
valid. The function of the Optional element is to accommodate the CRP updates if the
CM implements a PUF-based attestation process.
While the SC was generating the Response based on the Challenge, the CM also calculates
the correct attestation response. When the CM receives message three, it will check the
values and if they match then it will issue the validation message. Otherwise the attestation
process has failed and CM does not issue any validation message (VM).
ATP-4. CM : VM = SignCM (CMi||SCi||NSP ||NSC ||PAC)




CM→ SC : mE||fmkSC−CM (mE)||SID
If the attestation response is successful then the CM will take the random numbers gener-
ated by the SP and the SC (e.g. NSP and NSP ) during the Secure and Trusted Channel
Protocols (STCPs) discussed in chapter 6 and include the identities of the SC and CM.
All of these items are then concatenated with the SC's evaluation certicate PAC and then
signed by the CM. The signed message is then communicated to the SC.
In the ATP-4, the CM will also generate a SID and SCi′ that will used in the subsequent
execution of the attestation protocol between the SC and CM. The SID and SCi′ for the
subsequent run of the attestation protocol is represented as SID+ and SC+i′ . The SID
+ is
basically a (new) random number that is associated with the pseudo-identier of the smart
card that it will use to authenticate in the subsequent attestation protocol. Furthermore,
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the SC+i′ is generated as SC
+
i′ = fmKCM (CMi||NSC ||NCM ||SID), where mKCM is the
MAC key that the CM does not share
4.8 Protocol Analysis
In this section, we analyse the proposed attestation protocol for given goals and provide
details of the test performance results.
4.8.1 Informal Analysis
In order to meet the goals PG-1 and PG-2, all messages communicated between the SC
and CM are encrypted and MACed using long term secret encryption and MAC keys;
KSC−CM and mKSC−CM , respectively. The A has to compromise these keys in order
to violate the PG-1. If we consider that the symmetric algorithm used (e.g. AES) is
suciently strong to avert any exhaustive key search and robust enough to thwart any
cryptanalysis then it is dicult for the A to break the protocol by attacking the used
symmetric algorithms. A possibility can be to perform side-channel analysis of the smart
card and attempt to retrieve the cryptographic keys; however, most modern smart cards
have adequate security to prevent this attack, and third party evaluation will endorse and
evaluate these mechanisms. Nevertheless, these assurances can only be against the state-of-
the-art attack methodologies at the time of manufacturing/evaluation. Any attacks which
surface after manufacture and evaluation will render both the assurance and validation
mechanisms useless.
The smart card identity is not used as plaintext during the communication between the SC
and the CM. Instead of using the SCi, the SC uses a pseudo-identity SCi′ which changes
on every successful completion of communication with the respective CM. Therefore, a
particular SC will only use SCi′ once during its lifetime.
4.8.2 Protocol Verication by CasperFDR
The CasperFDR approach is adopted to test the soundness of the proposed protocol un-
der the dened security properties. In this approach, the Casper compiler [142] takes
a high-level description of the protocol, together with its security requirements. It then
translates the description into the process algebra of Communicating Sequential Processes
(CSP) [143]. The CSP description of the protocol can be machine veried using the
Failures-Divergence Renement (FDR) model checker [144]. A short introduction to the
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CasperFDR approach to mechanical formal analysis is provided in appendix B.1. The in-
truder's capability modelled in the Casper script (appendix B.2) for the proposed protocol
is as below:
1. An intruder can masquerade as any entity in the network.
2. It can read the messages transmitted by each entity in the network.
3. An intruder cannot inuence the internal process of an agent in the network.
The security specications for which the CasperFDR evaluates the network are as shown
below. The listed specications are dened in the # Specication section of appendix B.2:
1. The protocol run is fresh and both applications are alive.
2. The key generated by a smart card is known only to the card manufacturer.
3. Entities mutually authenticate each other and have mutual key assurance at the
conclusion of the protocol.
4. Long term keys of communicating entities are not compromised.
The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocol and did not nd any attack(s). A point to
note is that in this thesis, we provide mechanical formal analysis using CasperFDR for the
sake of completeness and we do not claim expertise in the mathematical base of the formal
analysis.
4.8.3 Implementation Results & Performance Measurements
The test protocol implementation and performance measurement environment in this thesis
consists of a laptop with a 1.83 GHz processor, 2 GB of RAM running on Windows XP.
The o-card entities execute on the laptop and for on-card entities, we have selected two
distinct 16bit Java Cards referred as C1 and C2. Each implemented protocol is executed
for 1000 iterations to adequately take into account the standard deviation between dierent
protocol runs, and the time taken to complete an iteration of protocol was recorded. The
test Java Cards (e.g. C1 and C2) were tested with dierent numbers of iterations to nd out
a range, which we could use as a common denominator for performance measurements in
this thesis. As a result, the gure of 1000 iterations was used because after 1000 iterations,
the standard deviation becomes approximately uniform.
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Regarding the choice of cryptographic algorithms we have selected Advance Encryption
Standard (AES) [145] 128-bit key symmetric encryption with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
[146] without padding for both encryption and MAC operations. The signature algorithm
is based on the Rivest-Shamir-Aldeman (RSA) [146] 512-bit key. We use SHA-256 [147]
for hash generation. For Die-Hellman key generation we used a 2058-bit group with a
256-bit prime order subgroup specied in the RFC-5114 [148]. The average performance
measurements in this thesis is rounded up to the nearest natural number.
The attestation mechanism implemented for emulating the practical performance is based
on the PRNG design. The PRNG for our experiments was based on the HMAC-SHA256
[149] and it has been implemented such that it allows us to input the seed le. For com-
pleteness, we have taken the measurement of PUF-based algorithms in which all other
instructions were executed on a Java Card and PUF execution time from [135] was added
later. The performance measures taken from two dierent 16-bit Java Cards are listed in
table 4.3. The oine attestation mechanism based on PRNG and PUF take in total (ex-
cluding PRNG seed le) 2084 and 2292 bytes respectively. Similarly, the online attestation
mechanism and associated attestation protocol based on PRNG and PUF take in total
(excluding PRNG seed le) 5922 and 6392 bytes respectively.
Table 4.3: Test performance measurement (milliseconds) for the attestation protocol
Measures
Oine Attestation Attestation Protocol
PRNG PUF PRNG PUF
Card Specication C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
Average 408.63 484.55 532 584 1008 1284 1128 1284
Best time 367 395 506 495 930 1075 992 1075
Worse time 532 638 749 838 1493 1638 1312 1638
Standard Deviation 41.82 59.43 53.22 83.31 87.68 92.29 103.62 112.72
4.8.4 Related Work
The basic concept of remote attestation and ownership acquisition came from the TCG's
specications [36]. The user takes the ownership of the TPM and in return, the TPM
generates a unique set of keys that are associated with the respective user. The remote
attestation mechanism described in the TPM specication [18] provides a remote system
attestation (only software). The attestation mechanism is designed so that if the software
state is modied, the TPM cannot generate a valid report.
The TPM does not provide an attestation that includes the hardware state. Furthermore,
the attestation dened in the TPM specication is more like the oine attestation. How-
ever, the oine attestation mechanism (algorithm 4.3) is dierent to the one used by TPM,
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whereas the online attestation is not part of the TPM specications.
Similarly, other proposals concentrate on the software attestation without binding it to
a particular hardware. Such proposals include SCUBA [150], SBAP [151], and SWATT
[152]. These protocols utilise execution time as a parameter in the attestation process.
This is dicult to guarantee remotely, even with the delegation of time measurement to
neighbouring trustworthy nodes [150]. Other mechanisms that use trusted hardware are
proposed by Schellekens et al. [153] and PUF-based protocols [123, 135, 154].
There is no such proposal for remote attestation in smart card frameworks like Java Card,
Multos, or GlobalPlatform. The nearest thing is the Data Authentication Pattern (DAP)
in the GlobalPlatform card specication that checks the signature on the downloaded
application (if the application provider chooses this option). Furthermore, we have opted
out of having execution measurement as part of the attestation process as it is dicult to
ascertain the trustworthiness of the remote device that measures it. However, unlike other
proposed protocols we have an explicit requirement that third party evaluation is used to
provide an implicit trust in the attestation process. Furthermore, our proposal binds the
software attestation with the hardware protection (tamper-evident) mechanism to provide
added assurance.
4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the overall architecture of the UCTD and its components and
the ways in which the UCTD is dierent from mainstream smart card proposals. We also
extended the discussion to the security assurance and validation framework that requires
a third party evaluation and an attestation process. The attestation process includes
hardware validation with the traditional software attestation. We proposed two modes
for the attestation process: oine and online attestation. In designing the attestation
processes, we based our proposal on two dierent architectures. First proposal is based on
the PRNG and the second approach includes the PUFs in the device attestation process. To
have an online attestation, we proposed the attestation protocol that communicates with
the card manufacturer to get a dynamic certicate of assurance (a signed message from
the card manufacturer) that the smart card is still secure and reliable. We implemented
oine and online attestation mechanisms, along with an attestation protocol on 16-bit Java
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In this chapter, we discuss two of the most widely accepted and deployed smart card man-
agement architectures in the smart card industry, namely GlobalPlatform and Multos. We
explain how these architectures do not fully comply with the UCOM. We then describe our
novel card management architecture designed for the UCTD framework. Finally, we discuss




Existing multi-application smart card platforms (e.g. Java [7], Multos [8]) support the in-
stallation of applications remotely (after issuance of the card). Standardisation eorts to
manage an application remotely like GlobalPlatform [9] have been eective in the ICOM.
The advent of NFC technology and the growing convergence of dierent services to mobile
phones has prompted GlobalPlatform and the GSMA1 to propose new management archi-
tectures (e.g. TSM) [43, 50, 155, 156]. Similarly, Multos has a strong card and application
management architecture that is heavily issuer centric and it can be argued that it can
easily be adapted to the TSM architecture.
The GlobalPlatform and Multos card and application management architectures provide
two contrasting views of the smart card industry. We limit our discussion of traditional
card management architectures with these two examples. As for the Java Card, it does
not have any associated management architecture and in most commercial deployments it
is coupled with the GlobalPlatform management architecture.
The device management architecture in the UCTD framework has to consider the contrast-
ing needs of the administrative authority and cardholder. It must determine the ownership
requirements of each of these entities and then articulate how a UCTD framework will man-
age them. In addition, the management architecture proposed in this chapter deals with
application issuance (lease), application domain provision on the smart card, installation,
deletion, and application/domain management. This chapter serves as the framework to
the proposed protocols in the subsequent chapter.
As the UCTD management architecture brings dierent views on smart card manage-
ment, it also brings new security issues. These issues concern the device and its owner.
They include the simulator problem, the user ownership issue, and the parasite application
problem.
Structure of the Chapter: The GlobalPlatform card management framework is dis-
cussed in section 5.2 followed by the Multos card management framework in section 5.3.
The proposed framework of UCTD management is described in section 5.4, along with
various types of relationships a user and an SP can have in the UCOM. In section 5.5, we
discuss the issues that are raised due to the proposed UCTD management framework and
related countermeasures.
1The GSM Association (GSMA) is an association that represents the interest of mobile operators
worldwide along with developing and prompting the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM)
specication.
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5.2 GlobalPlatform Card Management Framework
In this section we discuss the GlobalPlatform card management framework along with how
it supports TSM-based card management.
5.2.1 Architecture Overview
The GlobalPlatform card security requirement specication [1], species nine entities that
perform various tasks in the overall card management architecture. The overall architecture
is depicted in gure 5.1, which is a simplistic representation of the architecture described
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Figure 5.1: GlobalPlatform card management architecture [1]
The shaded entities in gure 5.1 have dierent titles and roles, but together they form
the card issuer as dened in this thesis. The term card issuer as dened by GlobalPlat-
form in [1] is restrictive, so that they only have the responsibility to acquire the smart
cards, set security policy, and issue them to individual cardholders. The card administra-
tor then manages the cards once they are issued to individual customers. If application
providers want to issue their applications, they rst have to get the applications veried
by the verication authority. The verication authority performs an o-card application
code verication to ascertain whether the given code conforms to the security policy set by
the card issuer. Once the verication is performed, the application provider requests the
controlling authority to give permission to load the application. The controlling authority
checks the verication authority's verication and issues the permission to load the appli-
cation. Now, if the application is going to be loaded at the pre-issuance stage then the
domain keys and data will be sent to the card issuer [157] through the card enabler. Oth-
erwise, the domain keys and data will be sent to the application loader. In gure 5.1, we
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opt for the pre-issuance model. Finally, the application provider will send its application
to the application loader, which will load it onto the smart cards of individual customers.
In gure 5.1 the security domain keys that are used by the application provider to manage
its domain are loaded onto the smart card through the card enabler (i.e. card issuer) [30].
However, a later addendum to the GlobalPlatform card specication [30] permitted the
generation and loading of keys without the active involvement of a card issuer [158]. This
extends the role of the Controlling Authority (GP-CA)2 by giving it an on-card controlling
entity (i.e. Controlling Authority Security Domain: CASD) that will be responsible for
generating and/or loading the application provider's cryptographic keys. The GlobalPlat-
form specication supports two models: the push model in which the cryptographic keys
are sent to the CASD by the application provider, and the pull model that generates the
cryptographic keys on the card and then sends them to the application provider. The Glob-
alPlatform card specication [30] and its amendment [158] provides a secure and reliable
way to load the application provider's keys onto a smart card in a condential way. In all
fairness, the proposal of CASD did not make any dierence to the original GlobalPlatform
card specication where the card enabler was loading the keys (pre-issuance loading) or in
the GlobalPlatform card specication amendment A [158]. It is the CASD (post-issuance
loading) that is under the control of the GP-CA. Both roles, card enabler and GP-CA, are
predominantly played by the card issuer. Nevertheless, the amendment provides a base to
accommodate the TSM architecture.
5.2.2 Support for Trusted Service Manager Architecture
To provide a standardised architecture and facilitate the adoption of NFC-enabled mobile
phones for various services, GlobalPlatform proposed a framework for the management of
secure elements in NFC mobile phones [155].
The role dened for the TSM by GlobalPlatform [50, 155] is to manage relationships
between various actors in the ecosystem. It does not handle any key management or
provide any trusted services [155]. GlobalPlatform proposes a new entity termed as the
Condential Key Loading Authority (CKLA) that will provide the initial key set in the
smart cards in a condential way. It does not specify who will take the role of the CKLA.
Additionally, it breaks down the role of GP-CA so it can be performed by two dierent
(independent) actors. This role includes managing the CKLA and enabling the Mandated
Data Authentication Pattern (Mandated DAP) Authority. The CKLA will facilitate the
generation and loading of keys through Over-the-Air (OTA) architecture. The DAP allows
2A Controlling Authority is an o-card entity (e.g. card issuer) that has a security domain on the
GlobalPlatform smart card. Its role as dened in the GlobalPlatform card specication [30] is to enforce
the card issuer's security policy. In the GlobalPlatform card specication, the GP-CA has the power to
sanction or evict any application from a smart card.
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the application provider to sign their applications before they are loaded onto the smart
card. The Mandated DAP Authority will verify the signature and notify the application
provider.
One thing to note is that in any framework, whether it is pre-issuance or post-issuance
application loading in the GlobalPlatform card specication [30] or application loading
via OTA in the NFC mobile phone [155], the loading of cryptographic keys is dependent
on an entity (e.g. GP-CA or CKLA). The application provider has to trust these entities
and their aim is to provide the key material for application loading and management to
the respective application provider without revealing it to any malicious entity. Therefore,
such entities (e.g. GP-CA or CKLA) which in most cases belongs to an o-card actor (i.e.
card issuer), cannot be entertained in the UCOM proposal.
5.3 Multos Card Management Framework
In this section, we discuss Multos architecture for card management operations along with
the possibility that the architecture can be accommodated into the TSM-based framework
for NFC mobile phones.
5.3.1 Architecture Overview
The card management architecture for Multos is more straightforward than GlobalPlatform
(section 5.2.1). An overview of the Multos card management architecture is illustrated in


























Figure 5.2: Multos card management architecture
The shaded entities in gure 5.2 represent various roles, but traditionally they reside with
a single entity, for example the card issuer [97, 159]. An application provider will generate
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a signature key pair and application code; the private key of the application provider along
with the application code is securely communicated to the application load unit generator.
The signature key is used to generate a cryptographically protected application load unit
(i.e. downloadable application). The application provider will also send its signature veri-
cation key and application to the card issuer, which forwards it to the Multos Certication
Authority (M-CA). The application header is a data structure that contains information
regarding the respective application, which includes the application identity, hash of the
application code, and code and data size [159]. The M-CA can be either the card manu-
facturer, or an authorised entity of the Multos consortium [29]. The role of the M-CA is to
issue an application load or delete certicate to the card issuer for the application. In ad-
dition, the M-CA also provides the list of public keys for individual Multos cards that the
card issuer has issued to its customers. This list of public keys is stored by the application
load unit generator as the keys are used to encrypt individual applications. This transfer
of public keys is marked as user personalisation data in gure 5.2. The application load
unit generator will create individual application load units for individual smart cards, if
the load unit has to be encrypted. Finally the load unit will have a signed digest of the
application, using the application provider's signature key and if required the application
encrypted by the respective smart card's public key. The application load facility now
has the application load units and associated M-CA's issued certicates that it will use to
download the application to individual smart cards.
As it is apparent from gure 5.2 that application providers have to communicate their
application (in plaintext) and private key to the application load unit generator (i.e. card
issuer). Furthermore, the application management tasks (i.e. installation, deletion, and
updating etc.) have to be performed through the card issuer and/or M-CA. Unlike the
GlobalPlatform, Multos specications do not provide independent application management
architecture. To delete an application, the process is similar to the Multos application
installation except there is no need to generate the application load unit  only an appli-
cation delete certicate that is similar to application load certicate is required from the
M-CA.
5.3.2 Support for Trusted Service Manager Architecture
To date we have not seen any ocial proposal on how to incorporate Multos into the
proposed TSM architecture for NFC mobile phones. However, in a centralised environment
a TSM can take the role of the M-CA and application load unit generator.
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In the UCTD proposal, the management framework is divided into two categories based on
whether the device is under administrative control or not. Therefore, these two categories
are referred as administrative and user management, where administrative management
corresponds to the CASC architecture and user management corresponds to the UCOM
architecture.
5.4.1 Administrative Management Architecture
In the administrative management architecture, a smart card is under the shared ownership
of an administrative authority and the respective cardholder (section 3.6). The framework










































Figure 5.3: Administrative card management framework (CASC: section 3.6)
The card manufacturer gets its product evaluated by a third party that issues an evaluation
certicate. The smart cards are then acquired by the administrative authority that takes
administrative control and issues the cards to individual cardholders. The cardholder then
has ownership, which is delegated to the cardholder under certain terms and conditions.
The cardholder has to register with the relevant SP to gain access to their application. The
registration process generates customer credentials that are issued by the SP and used by
cardholders to download the application(s) onto their smart cards. The cardholder then
provides these credentials to the smart card along with the details of the SP's application
server (section 3.4.6.1). Before the SP leases its application, it requests the smart card to
provide a security assurance, which is furnished by providing the evaluation certicate and
a validation proof (section 4.4.3). The SP then sends the application identity to the smart
card, which will check whether the application belongs to the administrative authority's
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partner: partners are referred to as syndicated members. The smart card has the list of
syndicated members that is provided by the administrative authority. If the SP is registered
as a syndicated member of the administrative authority, then it will reveal the identity of
the administrative authority. Under the scenario in which the SP is a syndicated member,
the SP will then contact the administrative authority to authorise the installation. On
successful authorisation, the application is leased to the smart card and installed in the
administrative authority's space (section 4.2.1). If the SP is not a syndicated member,
then the application is installed under the authorisation of the cardholder and she might
be charged for it, which is represented by a use charge message sent from the smart card
to the administrative authority. Subsequently, the administrative authority processes the
request and issues an application installation authorisation message to the smart card.
On receipt of this message, the smart card will allow the application to execute. It will
generate an application download certicate that acts as a contract between the smart
card and the SP. The contract signies that the application was downloaded properly onto
the smart card and it is activated to communicate with the SP.
The administrative management architecture can easily be adapted into the TSM archi-
tecture by replacing the administrative authority with the TSM. However, the shared
ownership principle has to be accommodated by the TSM architecture to comply with the
CASC.
In chapter 6, the Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Protocol is based on
the administrative management architecture.
5.4.2 User Management Architecture
In the user management architecture there is no administrative authority. The user man-


























Figure 5.4: User card management framework (UCOM: section 3.4)
The smart card establishes a connection with the SP and this is a secure communication
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channel, to provide smart card security and reliability assurance to the SP, facilitate in
generating domain management credentials, and download the application.
In the UCTD, whether it is in administrative or user management, each SP gets its own
domain. The SP's domain management credentials are mutually generated by the SP and
smart card without involving any o-card entity (e.g. including the card manufacturer).
Applications are directly downloaded to the SP's domain using the cryptographic keys
mutually generated by the smart card and the SP, in contrast to GlobalPlatform that uses
either a push or pull model for key sharing (section 5.2.1), or Multos that requires an
application provider to reveal its application code and signature key (section 5.3.1).
In chapter 6, the two variants of the Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (STCP) referred
as STCPSP and STCPSC are based on the user management architecture.
5.4.3 Types of Application Leases
An application lease refers to issuance of an application to the requesting smart card under
some terms and conditions that are stipulated by the Application Lease Policy (section
3.4.6.2). In this section, we discuss the various types of application leases that an SP can
issue.
1. Card Bound Application Lease: In this lease, an SP issues its application to a specic
smart card and that instance of lease is bound to it. Therefore, an SP will only issue
one lease per user, which she can have on any of her smart cards; examples of such
a lease may be credit card and (U)SIM card applications.
2. User Bound Application Lease: This lease is bound to the user, not to her smart card.
She can install the given application on any number of her smart cards. Examples
of such a lease may be Internet Identity applications [77, 160].
3. Open Application Lease: The open application lease does not bind the lease to either
a user or a smart card. Any smart card, and any user can download this application.
Examples of such applications may be pre-paid mobile telephone usage, pre-paid
calling cards, hotel room access cards, and transport cards. One thing to note is that
the examples are only valid if they do not require any registration of the user before
and after issuance of the application.
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5.4.4 Possible Relationships between a Cardholder and an SP
The lease issued to a cardholder discussed in the previous section would be based on
a relationship that an SP has with a particular cardholder. In this section, we discuss
various possible relationships that can exist between an SP and a cardholder.
1. Pre-Registration: This scenario deals with applications that are only issued to reg-
istered and pre-authorised customers. Such applications can be for banking, health
centre, identity, travel documents, and telecom (e.g. post-pay accounts) that require
proof that the requesting user is actually the current owner of the smart card. This
relationship is valid for the card- and user-bound application leases discussed in the
previous section.
2. Post-Registration: The post-registration relationship allows a cardholder to down-
load an application without being a registered customer. However, the application
does not go into service unless the user registers herself with the application (or
its respective SP). This type of relationship can be valid for all three types of the
application leases.
There are two possible cases: a) the SP is only concerned with the security assurance
and validation of the smart card platform and does not require user registration (any-
body can download and use their application) or b) at least during the application
lease process, the SP is not concerned with the user registration. However, once the
application is downloaded the SP can initiate the user registration process. Option
`b' is like a user registering for a service for the rst time. Examples of applica-
tions that can be downloaded in this scenario include pre-paid telecom applications,
transport, and hotel room access applications.
3. No-Registration: This option does not require any registration, before or after the
application is issued. It is suitable for the open application lease category. Examples
include hotel room access cards, xed pre-paid calling cards, and pre-paid gift cards.
5.4.5 Application Installation
In this section, the processes that support the secure transmission and installation of
an application are discussed. The installation process discussed in this section builds
additional checks around the application installation protocols (discussed in chapter 6).
The installation request will initiate the process of acquiring an application from an SP's
application server (AMS discussed in section 3.4.6) and installing it on a smart card. The
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entire process can be divided into three sub-processes: 1) Downloading, 2) Localisation,
and 3) Application Registration. These sub-processes are explained as below.
1. Downloading: The downloading of an application is initiated by the smart card,
through a secure channel protocol (chapter 6). At the conclusion of the secure channel
protocol, both entities generate a set of keys for application download and domain
management. The smart card then generates an SP's domain, provided it has enough
space to accommodate it. The SP and smart card will then start the application
downloading process. The SP will rst generate a signature on the application, then
encrypt and MAC it before sending it to the smart card.
The smart card checks the generated MAC, decrypts the application, and veries
the signature. A decrypted application is not a fully installed application  it is the
equivalent of copying an application to a memory location.
The next step is to verify whether the application complies with the smart card's
operational and security policy. For this purpose an on-card byte code verication
is performed [161], which is already mandated by the Java Card 3 [16]; this can be
based on the well-dened on-card byte code verication proposals [128, 161][163].
Furthermore, additional runtime checks are performed that are discussed in chapter
8.
The UCTD does not mandate the security evaluation of an application. However,
certain applications require evaluation due to government or industry regulations
(e.g. EMV applications). In these cases, an SP's application(s) provides an evaluation
certicate (e.g. AAC). To verify the certicate the smart card would have to calculate
the hash of the downloaded application and compare it with the AAC.
2. Localisation: First, the application will be personalised by the SP. Depending upon
the relationship between the cardholder and the SP, with the SP's discretion the per-
sonalisation can include acquiring user details (in post and no-registration scenarios),
and cryptographic key generation. Furthermore, if the SP is issuing a card-bound
lease then it will make sense to generate the on-card cryptographic keys as they
will automatically become device identiers because each lease of the application
will have a various set of keys. After personalisation, the downloaded application
establishes connection with various on-card services (i.e. shareable resources) that
are provided by partner applications. To access a partner's application services,
the downloaded application will establish an application sharing relationship that is
discussed in detail in chapter 7.
3. Application Registration: The nal stage of an application installation is the appli-
cation registration by the SP. The registration will allow the particular instance of
the application to access sanctioned services. Once the SP registers (sanctions) the
downloaded application, the smart card will also make it selectable to an o-card
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entity. By making an application selectable, the smart card allows the application
to execute, access on-card services and communicate with o-card entities.
5.4.6 Application Deletion
The application deletion process has similar steps to the application installation but they
are taken in the opposite direction. The installed application will rst establish a connec-
tion with the SP and signal the deletion. It will initiate the de-registration process that will
restrict the leased application's access to the SP's services. The smart card will also make
it un-selectable for o-card entities; in addition, any interdependencies will be resolved.
As most of the interdependencies that the deleted application might have are the result
of the application sharing mechanism, the smart card rewall mechanism will cascade the
deletion event to the related (partner) applications (chapter 7). The interdependencies
that might exist between various applications on a smart card may end up creating the
feature interaction problem that is discussed later in section 9.3. Finally, the SP's domain
key material, and registration with various card services are deleted by the Card Security
Manager (section 4.2.2).
5.5 Card Management-Related Issues
In this section, we discuss the potential issues related to card management architecture
introduced by the UCTD framework.
5.5.1 Simulator Problem
In the context of the UCTD framework, the simulator problem refers to a possible scenario
in which a malicious user could remotely install an application onto a smart card simulator.
One thing to note is that the simulator problem is only related to remote installation and
not to on-site installation. In remote installation, a smart card is not present at an SP's
site, and the application is downloaded over the internet. Therefore, an SP needs a way of
making sure that its application is not installed on a simulated device.
It can be asserted that simulators are used in a number of dierent environments, espe-
cially mobile application development, and do not present a substantial security issue in
the mobile application environment. Nevertheless, the nature of an application installed
on a smart card is dierent to an application on a mobile phone. The smart card appli-
cation might represent the identity of the user, along with serving as a security token to
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access some services (including nancial services). Furthermore, the service or business
environment that a smart card application deals with is substantially dierent from that
of a mobile phone application.
In the ICOM, the simulator problem is not relevant, as applications are predominantly in-
stalled by the card issuer before the smart cards are issued to individual users. This stage
in the smart card lifecycle is also referred as the pre-issuance stage. The GlobalPlatform
card specication provides the framework for application installation under the applica-
tion provider's control, after the smart cards are issued to customers. GlobalPlatform
denes a secure entity on the smart card referred to as the Card Manager, along with
associated domains [30]. The SP requires symmetric keys in order to gain access to the
domains (application domains) and install applications. The assumption in the ICOM is
that malicious users cannot access or retrieve these keys. The basis of this assumption
is the tamper-resistance properties of the smart card hardware  that is, the assump-
tion is based on trust in the card manufacturer or a third party evaluator (e.g. Common
Criteria [69] evaluation laboratory).
In the UCOM, the problem is not only verifying the existence of a smart card, but also
validating that it is in a secure and reliable state. In a simulator attack, a malicious user
has a stand-alone simulator that enables him to simulate the UCTD environment. To
do so, the adversary has to have knowledge of the cryptographic keys (section 4.6.4) and
any related attestation mechanism (regardless of whether it is based on PRNGs or PUFs:
section 4.5). If the attestation mechanism is based on PUFs then the adversary should be
able to emulate the PUF for a genuine smart card. He can then try to acquire an application
from an SP, install on the simulator, and attack it; that may include reverse engineering
the application, retrieving the sensitive user and application data (e.g. cryptographic keys).
5.5.1.1 Countermeasure to the Simulator Problem
The countermeasure to the simulator problem has to deal with physical and side-channel
attacks along with the risk of compromising the communication protocol(s). The counter-
measure is based on three aspects of the UCTD architecture that are listed as below:
1. Security evaluation of the smart card platform, which certies that the smart card
is tamper-resistant, and eective against state-of-the-art attacks (section 4.4.2).
2. Self and remote attestation mechanism (section 4.4.3).
3. A secure and reliable entity authentication and key sharing protocol (chapter 6).
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The evaluation and validation of the smart card provides (time limited) assurance against
simulator attack. If during the lifetime of the smart card, an attack vector is discovered that
can compromise the card's security and make the simulator attack feasible, the evaluation
authority (and the card manufacturer) can revoke the certicates, and the SP can blacklist
the aected smart cards. Because of such attacks, smart cards can be rendered useless.
Therefore, card manufacturers, even today, are compelled to build a strong product or
otherwise security issues would damage the reputation of their brand and the same would
be true in the case of the UCTDs. Finally, the secure channel protocol should be designed
in a way that would make it impossible for an adversary to retrieve the shared keys between
a smart card and an SP.
To provide protection against simulator attacks, SPs can request for device attestation as
described in section 4.7. The device attestation is based on a protocol, which involves
the card manufacturer at the time of application lease attesting that its smart card is
secure and reliable as stated by the evaluation certicate (section 4.4). Therefore, an
evaluation certicate from an independent third party will conrm that the smart card
is secure against complete and partial simulations. The online attestation mechanism
provides a validation that the smart card is still in conformance with the state in which it
was evaluated. Finally, by integrating the smart card assurance and validation mechanism
into the secure channel protocols, the UCTD can avoid simulator problems.
5.5.2 User Ownership Issues
In this section, we discuss an issue that is related to the identity of the smart card owner
and the authorised user that can download an application from an SP.
This issue arises in the pre-registration relationship (section 5.4.4) between an SP and a
cardholder. During an application installation, a cardholder will provide her credentials to
the SP that leases the application. In this situation, the SP requires that the application
can only be downloaded to a smart card that is under the ownership of the authorised
user.
The aim of an adversary may be to acquire the credentials of an authorised user for a
particular SP to use them to download the application onto his smart card. If the SP
does not issue card-bound leases (section 5.4.3), both entities (the authorised user and the
adversary) can download the application.
To avoid this situation, the SP could require proof of ownership to be produced by the
smart card for the given user during the application download process. The proof of
ownership can be based on a signature key pair belonging to the user, which is certied by
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the smart card itself or by its card manufacturer. The issue is that a similar certicate can
also be requested by an adversary for the given authorised user if he knows enough personal
information relating to the genuine user. Having the smart card sign the certicate is easy,
and it also allows the user independence to sell/give her smart card to other users. On
the other hand, including the card manufacturer in the user identication and issuance of
certicates to individual users provides similar protection as the previous proposal, without
eectively increasing the overall security. Therefore, we prefer the smart card to sign the
certicate rather than the card manufacturer, and this approach is adopted in this thesis.
Another possibility is that the smart card user can register her smart card physically
(oine) with the SP. The smart card can later access the SP server through the internet to
download the application. If there are no adequate checks during the oine registration,
an adversary could perform the same process and then use the credentials associated with
the user and request the application lease. Furthermore, this solution also complicates the
relationship between the user and the SP as there may not always be a possibility to have
physical access to the SP's oce (e.g. online gaming website).
An optimum solution can be based on one-time credentials issued by SPs. We assume that
an SP issues a one-time credential (e.g. password) to a user to download its application to
her smart card. Therefore, even if an adversary was to gain access to the credentials, he
cannot use them to download the application. Furthermore, if an application is already
leased to a user, an SP can reject any subsequent requests for an application lease unless
the user either deletes the previous lease or loses the smart card. Therefore, in the case
that the application is deleted and the user wants to install the application on her new
smart card. The SP will issue a new one-time credential to the user, to download the
respective application.
A malicious user cannot fake the deletion of the application, as in the UCOM deletion
process (section 9.3) an application communicates with the SP in order to notify it of
the deletion and also to perform any required housekeeping tasks. Therefore, the SP
knows beforehand that the application is deleted so for a malicious user it is dicult to
fake application deletion. Furthermore, if a user loses her smart card then she can use
the authorisation token (issued by the SP and discussed in section 9.2) to acquire the
application. An authorisation token is a short encrypted structure issued by an SP and
it acts as a authorisation credential to download an application. If she does not have the
authorisation token, then the user can contact the SP and request the issuance of new
credentials. This is similar to the process after a user loses her smart card in the ICOM,
where she has to contact the card issuer to get a new smart card.
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5.5.3 Parasite Application Problem
In the parasite application problem, an installed application masquerades as the UCTD
on which it is installed. This is possible because a UCTD allows an installed application
to request the platform/application state validation from the TEM (section 4.3).
User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
Smart Card Runtime Environment






















Figure 5.5: Illustration of parasite application problem
In this attack as shown in gure 5.5, an adversary (A) installs his malicious application
(AppMalicious) on a UCTD. The AppMalicious implements the application download proto-
cols that are discussed in chapter 6. The A then requests the installation of an application
from its SP through the AppMalicious, represented by message one in the gure 5.5. In
response, the SP asks the UCTD of security validation to avoid a simulator attack and this
request is sent to the AppMalicious. The AppMalicious then asks the TEM for the security
validation (section 4.4.3). At the successful conclusion of the security validation process,
the card manufacturer produces a certicate that for privacy reasons does not include
the identity of the requesting SP as described in the online attestation protocol (section
4.7). Therefore, the AppMalicious can communicate this certicate to the requesting SP
as validation in message ve (gure 5.5) and may be able to start the application down-
load process. The A might have designed the application as if it will communicate the
downloaded application o-card, which will enable A to retrieve the application code and
data.
To avoid this problem, there are four possible solutions: 1) restrict the security assurance
validation request to o-card entities and any installed applications should not be allowed
to request it, 2) include the identity of the requesting SP in the security assurance val-
idation certicate during the application installation process, 3) include the identity of
the application requesting the security assurance validation during the application instal-
lation, the request is initiated by the card security manager discussed in section 4.2.2, or
4) avoid generating the signature as part of the security validation if it is requested by an
application, but use the shared keys between the TEM and the application.
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From the above listed options, we consider that option four is appropriate for the UCTD
environment to prevent the parasite application problem. In option four, the TEM will
only sign the security validation proof if it is requested by the card security manager and
not by an application. Therefore, an application installed on a UCTD cannot request a
signed security validation proof that would have enabled the application to masquerade as
the respective UCTD.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the card management architectures for two contrasting frame-
works: GlobalPlatform and Multos. GlobalPlatform is more open to independent applica-
tion management by application providers, whereas Multos is a hardcore ICOM architec-
ture that requires an authorisation from a centralised authority (i.e. Multos Certication
Authority) before an application can be installed or deleted. Furthermore, Multos also
requires that application providers should reveal their application codes to the Multos
application load unit generator.
We then described the card management architecture for the UCTD followed by the appli-
cation lease types, and the various kinds of relationships a user can have with an SP. Next,
we discussed the application installation and deletion approach. Finally, we discussed new
security issues including simulator, user ownership, and parasite application problems.
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In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of secure channel protocols that are used for
entity authentication and key establishment for internet services. We discuss the security
and operational goals that a secure channel protocol has to accomplish in the UCTD en-
vironment. We propose two protocols that closely adhere to the UCOM philosophy and
a protocol related to the CASC that involves an administrative authority (e.g. TSM). An
informal analysis is provided for the proposed protocols followed by a mechanical formal
analysis using CasperFDR. Finally, we describe a prototype implementation of the pro-




Secure Channel Protocols (SCPs) are designed to provide a secure communications chan-
nel. They typically start by providing entity authentication and authenticated key es-
tablishment. There are many dierent protocols proposed for internet and smart card
environments that satisfy dierent (pre-dened) design goals. Not all protocols can be
used for every possible scenario; if this was possible, we would not have the diversity of
SCPs that we have today.
The UCTD architecture has its own set of security and operational goals for an SCP has
to satisfy. These goals range from traditional SCP ones like entity authentication and
mutual key generation, to UCOM-specic requirements like smart card state validation.
In this chapter, we examine a non-exhaustive list of security and operational goals for the
UCTD environment. The dened list is considered adequate to gauge the basic security
requirements of the UCTD and related stakeholders (section 3.5).
An SCP in the UCTD can take many dierent forms, and we discuss three possible variants.
The rst two variants are based on the UCOM architecture and the dierences between
them is determined by who initiates the protocol, and whether it is a smart card or an
SP. The third protocol caters to the CASC environment and involves an administrative
authority during the protocol execution.
The proposed protocols are informally analysed, based on the pre-dened security and
operational requirements. We also provide a comparison between the proposed protocols
and a set of protocols ranging from the internet and smart card environments. We also
provide a formal-mechanical proof for the proposed protocols using the CasperFDR tool,
along with test implementation and performance measurements.
Structure of the Chapter: The chapter begins with a discussion of the rationale behind
the SCPs in section 6.2. In this section we also discuss minimum security and operational
requirements stipulated for the UCTD environment. Section 6.3, discusses the proposed
SCP that is initiated by an SP, and section 6.4 details the SCP initiated by a smart
card. The SCP that focuses on the administrative management architecture of the UCTD
(section 5.4.1) is described in section 6.5. Section 6.6 provides the informal analysis,
mechanical formal analysis and test implementations of the proposed protocols.
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In this section we explore the rationale behind SCPs for the UCTD, and then discuss the
relevant work in the eld of SCPs. This discussion forms the basis for work later in this
thesis.
6.2.1 Rationale
By denition, an SCP provides either (or both) entity authentication or key exchange be-
tween communicating parties, referred to as end points. The SCP preserves the conden-
tiality and integrity of the messages communicated on the channel but does not necessarily
assure the same security at the end points after the messages are received. Despite this,
there can be implicit condence in the integrity and security of the end points in the ICOM
as articulated by ETSI TS 102 412 [164, section 4.5.2]. This states that the smart cards
are a secure end point under the assumption that it is a tamper-resistant device.
This implicit assumption is valid for the traditional smart card environment because smart
cards are issued by a trusted card issuer. This became the fundamental assumption in
most of the smart card-based SCPs. For the ICOM, this assumption makes sense as the
strict control of application installation on a smart card will eectively restrict the SCP to
only execute with an entity that: a) has prior authorisation from the card issuer, or b) is
initiated by an on-card authorised entity (e.g. installed application).
In the ICOM, there is a centralised authority that controls issued smart cards and their
application management, enabling an implicit assurance attainable for the smart card
security and reliability. However, in the UCOM, there is no such authority, hence the
assumption of implicit assurance is no longer valid. The UCTD is required to provide an
explicit assurance of its integrity and security to the requesting SP to satisfy requirements
GR2, CR1, SCR1, SCR6, and SPR15 (section 3.5).
A trusted channel is a secure channel that is cryptographically bound to the current state
of the communicating parties [165]. This state can be a hardware and/or software cong-
uration, and ideally, it will require a trustworthy component to validate that it is the same
as claimed. Such a component is in most instances a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [18]
as demonstrated by Zhou and Zhang [166], and Armknecht et al. [167].
The SP will probably not have any prior trust relationship with a smart card in the UCTD
environment (an exception might exist in the CASC framework when the SP is a syndicated
member of the administrative authority). Therefore, the traditional smart card SCPs will
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fail to provide: a) assurance that an SP is communicating with a genuine smart card
platform and not a simulator, b) assurance that the smart card security and operational
environment is certied by a reputed third party evaluation, c) assurance that the security
and operational environment state is still valid, as it was at the time of evaluation, and
d) assurance that the smart card is owned by the user who is requesting the application
download (user/card-platform binding authentication).
We dene the Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (STCP) in the context of the UCTD
environment as a protocol providing a secure and reliable communication channel between
a smart card and an SP, coupled with an assurance of security and integrity concerning
the communicating smart card. The STCP can be used during: a) application installa-
tion/deletion processes, and b) when the application communicates with its respective SP,
and vice versa.
6.2.2 Related Work
In this section, we restrict ourselves to a discussion of the protocols that are specically
proposed for the smart card environment and/or are being used as points of comparison in
later discussions. Detailed descriptions of the discussed protocols is provided in appendix
A, and this section will introduce these protocols.
Ever since the possibility arose that two computing devices could communicate with each
other, there has been research work on SCPs. An early discussion on various proposed
protocols can be found in [146]. A detailed comparison of authentication protocols for the
mobile network environment is presented in [168].
Early smart card protocols were based on the symmetric key crypto-system like SCP01 of
the GlobalPlatform specication [30] (this protocol is deprecated in the GlobalPlatform
card specication version 2.2). Other protocols specied by the GlobalPlatform speci-
cation are: SCP02 (based on Triple-DES), SCP10 (based on asymmetric key crypto-
system) [30], SCP81 (based on SSL/TLS) [169], SCP03 (based on AES) [170], and SCP80
for the mobile telecom industry (based on symmetric key crypto-system) [171]. In addition
to this, entity authentication, key exchange, and application download protocols for the
smart card environment are proposed by [83, 172, 173].
The concept of trusted channel protocols was put forward by Gasmi et al. [165] along
with the adaptation of the TLS protocol [100] to meet the trusted channel requirements.
Armknecht et al. [167] propose another adaptation of OpenSSL to accommodate the con-
cept of the trusted channel, as do Zhou and Zhang [166]. However, at the time of writing
we were unable to nd any work that relates to the concept of the trusted channels for the
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smart card environment.
In section 6.6, we compare the proposed STCP with the existing protocols. These protocols
include the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol [174], the Aziz-Die (AD) protocol [175],
the ASPeCT protocol [176, 177], Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) [178], trusted TLS (T2LS) [165],
SCP81 [169], Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) protocol [83], and the Sirett-Mayes (SM) pro-
tocol [173].
For brevity and clarity, details of these protocols are provided in appendix A except for
the GlobalPlatform SCP10. A point to note is that GlobalPlatform SCP10 provides the
guidelines on how to implement a public key-based SCP for smart cards and not the
actual protocol. The guidelines stipulated by the GlobalPlatform SCP10 are the core
design requirement of the MM protocol and for this reason we have chosen this protocol.
The selection of the listed protocols is intentionally kept broad to include well-established
protocols like STS, Aziz-Die (AD) and JFK. Also included is the ASPeCT protocol,
which is designed specically for the mobile network's value-added services. The T2LS
is based on the concept of trusted channels, whereas SCP81, SM, and MM protocols are
specic to smart cards. As a common criterion, we have only selected protocols whose
design is rooted in asymmetric crypto-systems.
6.2.3 Minimum Security and Operational Goals
For a protocol to support the UCTD framework, it should meet at minimum the security
and operational requirements listed below:
SOG-1. Mutual Entity Authentication: A smart card and an SP authenticate to each other
to avoid masquerading by a malicious entity.
SOG-2. Exchange of certied public keys between the entities to facilitate the key gener-
ation and entity authentication process.
SOG-3. Mutual Key Agreement: Communicating parties will agree on the generation of a
key during the protocol run.
SOG-4. Joint Key Control: Communicating parties will mutually control the generation
of new keys to avoid one party choosing weak keys or predetermining any portion
of the session key.
SOG-5. Key Freshness: The generated key will be fresh to the protocol session to protect
replay attacks.
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SOG-6. Mutual Key Conrmation: Communicating parties will provide implicit or explicit
conrmation that they have generated the same keys during a protocol run.
SOG-7. Known-Key Security: If a malicious user is able to obtain the session key of a
particular protocol run, it should not enable him to retrieve long-term secrets
(private keys) or session keys (future and past).
SOG-8. Unknown Key Share Resilience: In the event of an unknown key share attack, an
entity X believes that it has shared a key with Y, where the entity Y mistakenly
believes that it has shared the key with entity Z 6= X . Proposed protocols should
adequately protect against this attack.
SOG-9. Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience: If a malicious user retrieves the
long-term key of an entity Y, it will enable him to impersonate Y. Nevertheless,
key compromise should not enable him to impersonate other entities to Y [179].
SOG-10. Perfect Forward Secrecy: If the long-term keys of communicating entities are
compromised, this will not enable a malicious user to compromise previously gen-
erated session keys.
SOG-11. Mutual Non-Repudiation: Communicating entities will not be able to deny that
they have executed a protocol run with each other.
SOG-12. Partial Chosen Key (PCK) Attack Resilience: Protocols that claim to provide
joint key control are susceptible to this type of attack [180]. In this type of attack,
if two entities provide separate values to the key generation function then one
entity has to communicate its contribution value to the other. The second entity
can then compute the value of its contribution in such a way that it can dictate
its strength (i.e. it is able to generate a partially weak key). However, this attack
depends upon the computational capabilities of the second entity. Therefore,
proposed protocols should adequately prevent PCK attack.
SOG-13. Trust Assurance (Trustworthiness): The communicating parties not only provide
security and operation assurance but also validation proofs that are dynamically
generated during the protocol execution [56].
SOG-14. Denial-of-Service (DoS) Prevention: The protocol should not require the server
(in our case the SP's application server) to allocate the resources before authenti-
cating and validating the state of the requesting entity (a smart card) or verifying
the credentials of the authorised user.
SOG-15. Privacy: A third party should not be able to know the identities of the user or her
smart card, over either the internet or Over-the-Air (OTA). In addition, during
the trust validation and assurance process, the requesting SP should not be able
to gain any additional information about the platform (e.g. applications installed
on a smart card).
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SOG-16. Simulator Attack Resilience: This attack discussed in [85] allows a malicious user
to masquerade as a smart card platform on a computer (as a simulation). Such
a possibility would enable the malicious user to download an application onto
a simulated platform and then perform reverse engineering on the downloaded
application, revealing proprietary and sensitive data of the application. Therefore,
the proposed protocols should take into account the simulator attack and support
countermeasures.
SOG-17. Platform & Application User Separation (PAU) Attack Resilience: This attack is
discussed in [85]. A malicious user provides the access credentials of a genuine user
to an SP and downloads an application onto his or her smart card. Any protocol
should tie a platform with its card-owner (user) to avoid platform & application
user separation attack.
SOG-18. Contractual Agreement: On the successful execution of the protocol, the com-
municating entities will mutually sign a contractual agreement. This will act as
proof that a particular application was installed on a smart card.
SOG-19. Proof of Transaction: The smart card will notify the TSM about the application
installation. Depending upon the TSM's policy, it will charge the user's account
and notify the smart card to activate the application so it can execute.
For a formal denition of the terms (italicised) used in the above list, readers are advised
to refer to [146]. The requirements listed above are later used as a point of reference to
compare the proposed protocols in table 6.2 (section 6.6.3). From an operational point
of view, an STCP for the user management architecture (section 5.4.2) for the UCTD
environment has two variants: STCPSP and STCPSC discussed in sections 6.3 and 6.4,
respectively. On the other hand, in an STCP for the CASC, the administrative manage-
ment architecture (section 5.4.1) requires the inclusion of an administrative authority and
to accommodate this, we propose an Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement
STCP (STCPACA) in section 6.5.
6.2.4 Protocol Notation and Terminology
The notation used in the protocol description is listed in table 6.1 below. This notation is
an extension of the notation described in table 4.2.
Table 6.1: Protocol notation and terminology
Notation Description
U Denotes a smart card owner (user).
AD Denotes the administrative authority (section 5.4.1).
133
6.2 Secure Channel Protocols
Notation Description
grX Denotes the Die-Hellman exponential generated by the entity X with
random number rX . We use this notation to represent the grX mod p,
where g and p are system parameters that are represented by the Die-
Hellman group selected by the entity X. For further discussion please
refer to [132, 146, 181]
K Denotes the shared secret generated by the communicating entities using
the Die-Hellman scheme. Keys for application download and session
keys are generated from this shared secret.
ekX−Y Denotes the session encryption key shared between entities X and Y to
be used with a symmetric algorithm.
mkX−Y Denotes the session MAC key shared between entities X and Y.
h(Z) Represents the result of generating a hash of data Z by a hash function
(e.g. SHA256 [147]).
UCre User authentication credential (e.g. login and password) associated with
a particular SP.
XSup Denotes the supported features of entity X that include Die-Hellman
groups [148], user authentication mechanisms (i.e. login/password), sym-
metric and signature algorithms.
AUX A signed message from an entity X that authenticates it to other entities.
SI Session cookie generated by the respective SP. It indicates the session
information and facilitates protection against DoS attacks, possibly along
with providing the facility of protocol session resumption.
V R Validation request sent by an SP to a smart card. In response, the smart
card provides the security and reliability assurance to the SP.
ADP The Application Download Protocol (ADP) will include appropriate pa-
rameters for the application download protocol, which in the context of
this thesis is the GlobalPlatform application download process based on
the symmetric key cryptosystem (e.g. SCP03) [170].
ALP The Application Lease Policy (ALP) species the minimum security, re-
liability and operational requirements imposed by the SP on a smart
card. The ALP also includes the relevant application's details that in-
clude application size and functionality support requirements.
hs & hp hs is a hash message generated by the SC on data including its identity,
generated Die-Hellman exponentials and random numbers. Similarly,
hp is generated by the SP . Both these messages aim to avoid a man-in-
the-middle attack on the proposed protocols.
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A smart card user can initiate a protocol in two ways depending upon how an SP makes
its applications available to users. As depicted in gure 3.6, an SP can oer its application
through dierent computing devices including dedicated kiosk machines. For example, a
transport application can be acquired through kiosk machines installed on train stations
or bus stops. The user can connect directly to an SP's Application Management Server
(AMS: discussed in section 3.4.6) through the kiosk and request the application download.
Another option is that an SP oers the application download through the internet and for
this, the SP will provide the AMS details (e.g. Universal Resource Locator: URL).
On another note, it is dicult to protect the user's credentials if the host device is com-
promised. The aim of the STCPs is to provide security assurance to the smart card, not
to the host device (e.g. mobile phone, desktop computer). From an SP's point of view,
it can choose dierent ways to protect the credentials that it has issued to its customers
 for example, by using one-time passwords for application download. Once a user has
downloaded the application, the password expires. A new one-time password will only be
issued to the user once she deletes the previously leased application. In addition, certain
measures can be taken to protect the host device but that will require additional hardware
and software support from the host device, which is beyond the scope of the STCPs.
6.2.6 Protocol Assumptions
The assumptions which apply during the execution of the proposed protocols between
entity SC and SP that generates a session key KSC−SP are listed below.
PrA-1 Attestation Mechanism: The SC provides a valid and trusted attestation mecha-
nism, both oine and online depending upon the requirement of the SP (section
4.4).
PrA-2 Pseudorandomness: Random numbers generated by SC and SP are indistinguish-
able from truly random numbers to all parties (except for the SC and SP) and the
malicious entity that has compromised either the session between SC and SP or
one of the communicating entities (e.g. SC and SP).
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PrA-3 Secure Cryptographic Algorithms: The cryptographic algorithms used in the proto-
col that include symmetric, asymmetric, and signature algorithms are secure against
a computationally bound adversary.
6.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol  Service Provider
In this section, we begin the discussion with a description of the proposed STCPSP along
with the rejection messages.
6.3.1 Protocol Prerequisites
The prerequisites to the STCPSP are listed below. This is an extension to the prerequisite
list in section 4.7.1.
PPR-8 User Signature Key Pair: When a user has taken ownership of a smart card and on
the successful conclusion of this process, the smart card generates a user signature
key pair. This key pair is used to provide proof of ownership during the STCPSP.
PPR-9 Authorised Customer: The user is a registered customer of the SP, which means
that the SP has sanctioned the user to download (lease) their application.
PPR-10 Established Connection: The user has the knowledge of the respective SP's appli-
cation server (AMS: gure 3.6) that the SP has provided to the smart card. The
smart card in return connects with the SP. Furthermore, the SP has knowledge of
the smart card's Internet Protocol (IP) address.
6.3.2 Protocol Description
In this protocol, the SP takes the role of the protocol initiator. The design of this STCP
variant is inspired by the requirements of user authentication as discussed in section 5.4.4.
STCPSP-1. SP : SI = fkSP (g
rSP ||NSP ||SCIP )
SP → SC : SPi||V R||NSP ||grSP ||SPSup||SPSel||SI
SC : K = (grSP )rSC mod p
SC : ekSC−SP = HK(NSP ||NSC ||′1′)
SC : mkSC−SP = HK(NSP ||NSC ||′2′)
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The SP generates a random number NSP and computes the Die-Hellman exponential
grSP . The SPSup deals with the capabilities of the SP along with the details of how it
will authenticate the user (e.g. password, biometric, or token based authentication, etc.).
These details communicate to the smart card the way the SP would like to perform the user
authentication. The MAC fkSP (g
rSP ||NSP ||SCIP ) serves as a session cookie (SI), and it
is appended with each subsequent message sent by the smart card. It indicates the session
information and facilitates protection against DoS attacks. Finally, the SP will request the
smart card to provide an assurance that its current state is the same as it was at the time
of third party evaluation by sending the V R. The V R indicates whether the SP requires
an oine or online attestation (section 4.5) to be performed by the smart card.
If the smart card does not support the Die-Hellman group selected by the SP (SPSel),
then it will send a rejection message, including a list of groups supported by the smart card
(SCSup). If the smart card supports the selected group (i.e. SPSel), then it will proceed
with the second message. The SC generates a random number, and a Die-Hellman
exponential grSC . It can then calculate the K which is the shared secret from which the
rest of session keys (kSC−SP and mkSC−SP ) will be generated. Furthermore, in a similar
manner, we can generate more session keys for the application download protocol [170].
STCPSP-2. SC : hs = h(SCi||SPi||grSC ||grSP ||NSP ||NSC)
SC : AUSC = SignSC(SCi||SPi||VM ||hs)
SC : mE = ekSC−SP (AUSC ||CertSC)
SC → SP : grSC ||NSC ||SCConfig||mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
The type of validation mechanism the TEM executes will depend upon the choice of the
SP , which will generate a (valid) signed message if the attestation is successful. In the case
of online attestation, the SC receives a validation message (VM) from the respective CM ,
and it will include VM in the AUSC message. If the SP selects oine attestation, then
the VM will not be included. Beside VM, the signed message also includes the identities
of the smart card and the SP, along with the hs. The hs includes the identities of the
communicating entities, the generated Die-Hellman exponentials and random numbers.
The hs veries to the SP that SC has used the same values (e.g. Die-Hellman expo-
nentials and random numbers) as the SP , thereby avoiding potential man-in-the-middle
attacks. The signed message AUSC will be dierent if the state of the platform is modied;
therefore, by verifying the signature the SP can ascertain the current state of the platform
(in oine attestation mode). In the case of online attestation, the CM will not issue VM
to the SC and the SC will not be able to proceed with the protocol. In the message, the
SC includes SCconfig that provides the SP with the conguration of the SC including
supported cryptographic algorithms and APIs.
On receipt of message two, the SP will check the hs to avoid main-in-the-middle and replay
attacks, and it will then check whether the SCConfig satises SP 's ALP. Subsequently, it
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will generate the session keys, verify the MAC and decrypt the message, and then verify
the smart card certicate. The smart card certicate gives the required assurance that
the smart card platform has had a third party evaluation, and the SP will then proceed
with verifying the signature. The assumption here is that if the third party evaluation
has concluded that the smart card is a tamper-resistant device with an eective validation
mechanism, then it will be dicult for a malicious user to obtain the TEM keys. Hence,
in the presence of a tamper-evidence mechanism only a genuine TEM can generate the
correct signature. However, if the SP cannot verify the signature, then the current state
of the SC has been modied and it is dierent to the one for which it was evaluated.
As a next step, the SP ascertains whether it has already issued an application lease to the
stated smart card. If there is an application lease to the SC for the requested application,
the protocol will terminate. Otherwise, the SP will proceed to the next step.
STCPSP-3. SP : hp = h(SPi||SCi||grSP ||grSC ||NSP ||NSC)
SP : AUSP = SignSP (SPi||SCi||hp||ALP )
SP : mE = ekSC−SP (AUSP ||ADP ||CertSSP )
SP → SC : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
The SP will then sign the identities of both the SC and SP along with the ALP and
hp. The hp is similar to the hs but it is generated by the SP and provides the necessary
evidence to the SC that the message is not a replay or mirror message while at the same
time avoiding man-in-the-middle attack. The signed message is appended to the ADP and
SP 's certicate.
On receipt, the SC will verify whether it can support the listed requirements in the ALP.
The most important requirement is whether the SC has enough memory space to ac-
commodate the SP's application. Furthermore, the SC will also check the hp to prevent
man-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
STCPSP-4. SC : AUU = SignU (SCi||SPi||Ui||hp||hs)
SC : mE = ekSC−SP (UCre||AUU ||CertSU )
SC → SP : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
The SC requests the cardholder to provide the SP 's authentication credentials as requested
by the SP in the SPSup. After the user provides those credentials they are packaged as
UCre and are concatenated with a signed message (AUU ) containing the identities of the
SC, SP and user along with the hp and hs. The reason behind including the hp and
hs in the signature is to provide a proof, signed by the user's signature key pair, that
she initiated the protocol session. The signed message along with the certicate and the
user's credentials are then encrypted and MACed. The MAC is generated on the encrypted
message.
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The SP veries the UCre and if the user is authenticated then the SP will proceed with the
protocol. Otherwise, it terminates after a limited number of user authentication retries.
Subsequently, it will verify whether the user (owner) identity referred in the CertSU is
the identity of an authorised and authenticated user. If so, then the SP will verify the
signature. Furthermore, the UCre will provide the SP with an assurance that the user is
cryptographically bound with the smart card (i.e. has the ownership of the smart card).
6.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol  Smart Card
In this section, STCPSC is described along with the rejection messages. Before we provide
a description of the STCPSC, a point to consider is that we adopt the protocol prerequisites
discussed in section 6.3.1 and 4.7.1 with the exception of PPR-8, and PPR-9. The STCPSC
does not require PPR-9. However, if an SP needs to authenticate a user, the SP can
implement the user authentication into their application and execute once the application
is installed and active on the smart card. Based on this user authentication, the SP
can then personalise the application with respective user's data. Furthermore, as the SC
initiates the protocol a connection is not necessary between the SC and SP before the SC
sends the rst message as required by the PPR-10.
6.4.1 Protocol Description
In this protocol, an SC takes the initiator's role, with the respective SP as a responder.
The protocol details and a description of the messages involved are presented below:
STCPSC-1. SC : cm = fNSC (g
rSC ||NSC)
SC → SP : cm||SCSup
An SC generates a Die-Hellman exponential (grSC ) and a random number (NSC). Sub-
sequently, it generates the MAC of the grSC ||NSC using the generated random number as
the MAC key. The reason for generating the MAC and sending it instead of the random
number and Die-Hellman exponential is to avoid a partial chosen key attack by only pro-
viding a commitment to the SP . The SCSup lists the Die-Hellman groups, cryptographic
algorithms and attestation mechanism supported by the SC.
On receipt of the rst message, the SP will verify the features listed in the SCSup. If they
satisfy the SP 's requirements then it will proceed with the protocol.
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STCPSC-2. SP : SI = fkSP (g
rSP ||NSP ||cm||SCIP )
SP → SC : V R||grSP ||SPi||NSP ||ALP ||SPSel||SI
SC : K = (grSP )rSC mod p
SC : ekSC−SP = HK(NSP ||NSC ||′1′)
SC : mkSC−SP = HK(NSP ||NSC ||′2′)
The SP will also generate a Die-Hellman exponential and a random number. Finally, it
will calculate the SI which includes similar elements to those discussed in STCPSP except
for the inclusion of the commitment cm from the SC. The entire message is then appended
with the V R.
On receipt of this message, the SC veries the ALP. If the SC can accommodate the
requirements then it will proceed with the protocol. The SC can now generate the shared
secret K, which is used to generate the session encryption and MAC keys. Furthermore,
depending upon the decision of the SP as to whether it requests for an oine or online
attestation, the SC will proceed with the appropriate attestation mechanism.
STCPSC-3. SC : hs = (SCi||SPi||grSC ||grSP ||NSC ||NSP )
SC : AUSC = SignSC(SCi||SPi||hs||VM)
SC : mE = ekSC−SP (AUSC ||CertSSC)
SC → SP : grSC ||NSC ||SCConfig||mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
SP : cmc = fNSC (g
rSC ||NSC)
The SC will reveal the grSC andNSC , which is appended by a message that is encrypted and
MACed using the session keys. The encrypted and MACed message contains a signature
generated on the identities of SC and SP , hs, along with VM . If the SP requests the online
attestation then the AUSC will contain VM generated by the respective card manufacturer;
whereas, in case of oine attestation the AUSC will not include VM .
On receipt of the STCPSC-3, the SP will generate a commitment similar to the SC in
message one, which we term as cmc. If the cmc is equal to the cm, then the SP will
generate the shared secret, along with session encryption and MAC keys. The SP veries
the MAC and decrypts the message. It validates the CertSSC , and then veries the
signature. If the SP accepts the current state of the smart card as secure then it will
proceed with the next message.
STCPSC-4. SP : hp = (SPi||SCi||grSP ||grSC ||NSP ||NSC)
SP : AUSP = SignSP (SPi||SCi||hp||ADP )
SP : mE = ekSC−SP (AUSP ||CertSSP )
SP → SC : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
The SP will generate an authentication message AUSP that contains the identities of the
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SP and SC, hp, and the ADP. On receipt of this message the SC rst veries the signature
and ADP. Subsequently, the SC will initiate the application download process using the
application download protocols (e.g. SCP03 [170]).
6.5 Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Pro-
tocol
In this section, we detail the STCP that, unlike the two protocols discussed above, includes
the administrative authority (section 5.4.1). We begin the discussion with the enrolment
phase that enables an administrative authority to be part of the architecture. Later we
describe the STCPACA and discuss rejection messages.
6.5.1 Enrolment Phase
The enrolment phase deals with the inclusion (registration) of an administrative authority
with the respective smart card. The registration can be either pre-acquisition or post-
acquisition of the smart card by its user. In both cases, the process will generate a crypto-
graphic certicate issued by the respective administrative authority to the registered smart
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Figure 6.1: Certicate Hierarchy in the CASC
There are two roots in this hierarchy as illustrated by chain one and chain two in gure
6.1: the CC certicate authority, and the administrative authority. The reasons for having
two separate roots are: a) to provide privacy protection to users who do not want to
reveal the identity of their administrative authorities, and b) some smart cards may not
be permanently bound with a particular administrative authority. If the administrative
authority was the only root, then it would be dicult to satisfy the second and fourth
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requirements listed in section 3.6 as they require a mechanism that is independent of the
administrative authority.
During the STCPACA, depending upon the relationship between an SP and the administra-
tive authority of a smart card, the appropriate chain of certicate will be used. Therefore,
if the SP is not an associate of the administrative authority then the certicate chain (chain
1 in gure 6.1) with the CC certication body as a root will be used; otherwise, chain 2 of
the gure 6.1 will be used.
6.5.2 Protocol Prerequisites
In this section, we extend the protocol prerequisites for the STCPACA from the ones
discussed in section 6.3.1 and 4.7.1.
PPR-11 Administrative Authority Registration: The smart card is registered with an ad-
ministrative authority.
PPR-12 Long Term Keys: Both the smart card and the associated administrative authority
share long-term encryption and MAC keys. These keys are generated at the time
of the smart card's registration with an administrative authority.
PPR-13 List of Syndicated Members: When a card registers with an administrative au-
thority, the authority may provide the smart card two lists: a list of subscription
charges and a list of associated SPs. The rst list contains details on how the
user will be charged on installation of the individual applications. For example,
charging mechanisms can either be based on xed charges per installation or ac-
cording to the size of the application. The associated SPs list includes the details
of individual SPs that are associated with the administrative authority. If a user
requests installation of any of these applications, the installation goes through the
administrative authority and user may not be charged.
6.5.3 Protocol Description
In the STCPACA, an SP takes the initiator's role so it can be considered as an extension
of the STCPSP. The protocol details and message description are as follows:
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STCPACA-1. SP : SI = fkSP (g
rSP ||NSP ||SCIP )
SP → SC : SPi||NSP ||grSP ||SPSup||V R||ALP ||SI
SC : K = (grSP )rSC mod p
SC : kSC−SP = HK(NSP ||NSC ||′1′)
SC : mkSC−SP = HK(NSP ||NSC ||′2′)
The SP will initiate the STCPACA by generating a random number (NSP ) and Die-
Hellman exponential (grSP ). It appends the generated values with the SPSup and associated
ALP.
When the SC receives the message, it check whether it can meet the SP 's ALP and support
features from the SPSup list. The SC will then generate the shared secret and required
session encryption and MAC keys.
STCPACA-2. SC : hs = h(SCi||SPi||grSC ||grSP ||NSC ||NSP )
SC : AUSC = SignSC(VM ||SCi||SPi||hs)
SC : mE = ekSC−SP (AUSC ||OP ||CertSSC)
SC → SP : NSC ||grSC ||SCConfig||mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
The SC will generate a random number (NSC) and Die-Hellman exponential (grSC ).
Subsequently, the SC will proceed with generating the AUSC and may include VM de-
pending upon the SP 's requirement (e.g. online or oine attestation) pointed out in the
SPSup. If the SP is a member of the AD syndicate, the SC will include an OP containing
the certicate issued to the SC by the AD. Each SC has a list of members associated
with the respective AD, which can be regularly updated by the AD.
On receipt of the STCPACA-2, the SP will rst verify the session cookie and the SC's
capabilities listed in SCConfig. The SP will then generate the shared secret and session
keys similar to the SC. Subsequently, it will verify the MAC and decrypt the message.
The SP then veries the generated signature and VM (if required); if successful the SP
will proceed with the protocol.
STCPACA-3. SP : hp = h(SPi||SCi||grSC ||grSP ||NSC ||NSP )
SP : AUSP = SignSP (SPi||SCi||Appi||hp)
SP : mE = ekSC−SP (AUSP ||CertSSP ||OC)
SP → SC : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
The SP will generate an encrypted and MACed message that contains AUSP , SP 's certi-
cate, and an optional certicate OC. The optional certicate eld is used by the SP if its
application also has a third party evaluation certicate (AAC: section 4.4.2). The AUSP
includes the identities of the SP and the respective application along with hp.
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On receipt of the STCPACA-3, the SC will check whether the SP 's identity is included
in the associated SP's list (section 6.5.1). If the SP 's identity is in the list then the
response message the SC will include the administrative authority's identity as an optional
parameter (OP ).
STCPACA-4. SC : AUU = SignU (SCi||SPi||Ui||hs)
SC : mE = ekSC−SP (UCre||AUU ||CertSU ||OP ||ADP )
SC → SP : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
The SC will generate a user authentication message AUU , which contains the identities of
the SC, SP and user along with hs . The AUU is appended with the user's certicate and
then encrypted and MACed using the generated session keys.
After receiving message four, the SP will check whether the UCre belongs to an authorised
user or not. If it does, then it will verify the signature, which will act as proof of ownership
from the user. If user is authenticated then the SP will initiate the application download.
Once the application download is completed, the STCPACA will proceed with the next
message.
STCPACA-5. SC : sca = SignU (h(App)||SPi||Appi||ALP ||SCi||Ui||hp)
SC : mE = ekSC−SP (sca)
SC → SP : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
Once the application download is completed, the SC will generate a message that acts as
an SC to SP contract. This message contains the hash of the downloaded application,
identities of the SP , SC, user, and the application along with the ALP under which the
application was leased.
The SP will verify the signature and generated digest on its leased application. This will
ensure that the application is downloaded properly on to the SC.
STCPACA-6. SP : amE = ekSP−AD(SPi||SCi||Ui||Appi||hs||hp)
SP → AD : amE||fmkSP−AD(amE)
AD : ActApp = ekSC−AD(ADi||SCi||Ui||SPi||Appi||hs)
AD → SP : OP = SignAD(ADi||SPi||ActApp||hp)||CertSAD
SP : spc = SignSP (SCi||Ui||SPi||hs||hp||OP )
SP : mE = ekSC−SP (spc||CertSSP )
SP → SC : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SI
To activate an application, the SC requires the AD's authorisation. If the SP is associated
with the AD then it will send the identities of the SC, the user, and the hs and the
downloaded application to the respective AD. The AD in reply will generate the ActApp.
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The ActApp acts as an application activation message and it will be included in message six
as an optional parameter (OP ). In this scenario, the last two messages will be redundant
and will not be executed. The session keys kSP−AD and mkSP−AD are generated from
long terms keys shared between the SP and AD. Similarly, the session key kSC−AD is also
generated from the long term key shared between the SC and AD
The SP will generate the contract message (spc) that certies to the SC that the SP is
satised with the current state of the SC and the downloaded application.
The SC will verify the spc. Subsequently, if the SP is a member of the AD syndicate,
then it will verify the OP . If the SP is not a member of the AD syndicate then the SC
will proceed with the following messages.
STCPACA-7. SC : mE = ekSC−AD(ADi||SCi||Ui||AppDoD||N ′SC)
SC → AD : SCi′ ||mE||fmkSC−AD(mE)||SIDAD−SC
When the SP is not a member of the AD, the user requires the AD to issue the ActApp.
The SC will request the AD to issue ActApp by sending message seven. The SC will use a
one-time pseudo card identity (SCi) so that an eavesdropper would not be able to retrieve
the SCi. The SC will encrypt the message containing the identities of AD, SC, and user.
It then appends the application details (AppDoD) and a new random number generated
by the SC. The AppDoD will not have any details of the application that can help the AD
to uniquely identify either the SP or the application. It will include the memory occupied
by the application along with a pseudo identity, and if the AD charges the user according
to the space usage then this data will be used to calculate the charge. Finally, the SC
uses the one-time SIDAD−SC that is generated in previous protocol runs with the AD,
to provide authentication credentials and possibly avoid a DoS attack on the AD's server.
The SID is an abbreviation for session identier and we have discussed it in section 4.7.5.
On receipt, the AD veries the SCi′ and associated SIDAD−SC . After verication, it will
retrieve the long-term shared keys, verify the MAC, and decrypt the message. Depending
upon the AD's policy, it will proceed with the charge that might include billing the user's
account or credit/debit card.
STCPACA-8. AD : ActApp = AppDoD||ADi||SCi||Ui||NAD||N ′SC
AD : pd = chm||chv||pm
AD : tc = SignAD(pd||ActApp)
AD : SCi′ = h(ADi||SCi||N ′SC ||NAD)
AD : SID′SC−AD = fkAD(SCi′ ||ADi||SCi)
AD : mE = ekSC−AD(tc||CertSAD||SCi′ ||SID′AD−SC)
AD → SC : mE||fmkSC−AD(mE)||SIDAD−SC
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The AD will sign the message that includes the transaction certicate of the charge applied
by the AD. The payment details (pd) includes the charge method (chm), charge value (chv)
and payment method (pm). Finally, the AD also generate the SID (SID′AD−SC) and SCi′
to be used in the subsequent session.
After the SC receives the ActApp, it will activate the application and notify the cardholder
about the successful outcome of the application installation, and any charge that was
incurred by the AD. The charging mechanism for the individual transactions is at the sole
discretion of the AD. This message also acts as proof of the transaction.
6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
In this section, we discuss the proposed protocols in terms of informal, and formal mechan-
ical analysis using CasperFDR. Later, we detail the test implementations and experimental
results.
6.6.1 Informal Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
In this section, we informally discuss the requirements for the STCPs namely STCPSP,
STCPSC and STCPACA.
6.6.1.1 One to Twelve
In this section, we consistently refer to the protocol requirements and goals in section 6.2.3
with their respective numbers as listed in the same section. Therefore, from here onward,
any reference to a goal or requirement number refers to the listed item in section 6.2.3.
During the STCP protocols, the message AUX where X = SC, SP and U , authenticates
communicating entities satisfying the SOG-1. To satisfy the SOG-2, all communicating
entities exchange cryptographic certicates that also facilitate in entity authentication pro-
cess.
The proposed STCPs satisfy requirements SOG35 and SOG12 by rst requiring the SP to
generate the Die-Hellman exponentials as it is computationally more powerful than the
smart card. If the smart card generates the exponential before the SP then it can choose
a weak key; however, as smart cards are computationally restricted devices they cannot
perform such tasks. After generation of session keys, communicating entities use them to
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securely communicate with each other. One exception to this is the STCPSC. The SC gen-
erates the Die-Hellman exponential before the SP but it does not reveal the values until
it receives the Die-Hellman exponential from the SP. In this way, they satisfy require-
ments SOG-3 to SOG-5 and SOG-12 like the other two STCPs; because generating the
Die-Hellman exponential before SP is not a problem as long as it is not revealed to the SP.
All communicating parties in the STCPs use the generated session keys to securely com-
municate with each other, which gives an implicit mutual key conrmation, satisfying the
SOG-6.
In the STCPs, session keys generated in one session have no link with the session keys
generated in other sessions, even when a session is established between the same entities.
This enables the protocol to provide resilience against the known-key security (SOG-7).
This unlinkability of session keys is because each entity not only generates a new Die-
Hellman exponential but also a random number, both of which are used during the STCP
to generate new session keys. Therefore, even if an adversary A nds out about the
exponentials and random numbers of a session, it would not enable him to generate past
or future session keys.
Furthermore, to provide unknown key share resilience (SOG8) the STCPs include the
Die-Hellman exponentials and random numbers along with identities of individual entities
in a message (e.g. hs and hp) that is then signed by all communicating entities. Therefore,
the receiving entity can then ascertain the identity of the entity with which it has shared
the key by verifying the signature and parameters used to generate the session keys (e.g.
Die-Hellman exponentials and random numbers).
The STCPs can be considered KCI-resilient (SOG9) protocols, as the protection against
the KCI is based on the digital signatures. In addition, the cryptographic certicates of
each signature key include its association with a particular SP or smart card. Therefore, if
A has the knowledge of the signature key of a smart card (or an SP) then it can masquerade
the smart card to other entities but not other entities to the smart card. Another point to
note is that during the STCPs, all signed messages and certicates are encrypted using the
session key. This facilitates the STCPs in meeting the requirements SOG-8 and SOG-9,
as an adversary cannot substitute the certicate or signature.
The STCPs also meet the perfect forward secrecy (SOG10) by making the key generation
process independent of any long-term keys. The session keys are generated using fresh
values of Die-Hellman exponentials and random numbers, regardless of the long-term
keys like the smart card, user, and SP signature keys. Therefore, even if A nds out the
signature key of any entity, this knowledge will not enable him to nd out past session
keys.
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Communicating entities in the STCPs share signed messages with each other that include
the session information, thus providing mutual non-repudiation (SOG-11).
6.6.1.2 Trust Assurance (Trustworthiness)
One of the requirements was to establish a trusted channel between a smart card and
an SP. It is apparent that the required and proposed trusted channel is unidirectional in
relation to the trust assurance and validation. Only smart cards provide the assurance that
their current state is secure and trustworthy to SPs, not the other way around. The reason
behind this is the deployment environment of the UCTD where smart cards are considered
inherently untrustworthy, SPs are not. In the UCOM, a UCTD assumes that an SP can
be malicious but it will result in the lease of a malicious application(s). Therefore, security
and reliability analysis (e.g. bytecode verication [128, 161]) of the downloaded application
and not of the SP which supplied it is adequate to protect the UCTD. Furthermore, an
adequate protection mechanism implemented by the UCTD runtime environment avoids
malicious runtime activities (discussed in chapter 8)
Establishing a trusted channel between a smart card and an SP is based on the security
and trustworthiness of the SC (section 4.4). The trust in the established protocol session
comes from the assurance that the smart card complies with the evaluated state, which is
certied to be secure and trustworthy by a third party evaluation. The respective SP has
implicit or explicit trust in the third party evaluation.
6.6.1.3 Denial-of-Service Protection
The aim of DoS protection is to provide a level of assurance that the proposed protocols
cannot be used to mount a DoS attack against an SP. This is achieved by a) adding a
session cookie to the protocol messages that serve as the session identier, which includes
the smart card's IP address, and b) by not requiring the SP to perform any public key
operations unless it receives user or platform authentication.
The session cookie is generated by the SP and it is the smart card's responsibility to include
the cookie in every message. On receiving a message from a smart card, the SP veries the
session cookie and if it belongs to an active session, then it can ascertain that the message
came from a genuine host and not from an entity that is trying to mount a DoS attack.
The second feature requires that the smart card has to provide a signed message (with
either the user- or platform-key) before the SP has to perform any heavy computations.
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This is necessary to avoid the SP committing memory and computational resources, unless
the communicating smart card is authenticated to the SP.
6.6.1.4 Privacy
The privacy preservation goal (SOG-15) requires that the privacy of the user is protected.
This requirement does not include privacy for the SP as part of their business model is to
advertise their presence and identity (i.e. web servers). Therefore, the privacy requirement
is restricted to the preservation of the user's identity and her smart card's identity. The
smart card's identity is protected to avoid traceability. By traceability, we mean that if a
user acquires an application from a malicious SP then the malicious SP knows the identity
of the smart card and the user. In the future, if the user tries to acquire an application
from another SP using the same smart card, the malicious SP can trace ownership of the
card back to the user. In the proposed protocol, we do not send any information that can
be uniquely attached to a particular user or a smart card in plaintext. All communications
that include the identities and cryptographic certicates are encrypted.
However, if a user always gets online through a permanent connection (i.e. a xed Internet
Protocol address) then a malicious user can trace the communication to a user, but only
if the malicious user has previously recorded the association of the IP address with the
respective user. In such a scenario, privacy preservation is dicult to maintain in the
restricted framework of the secure channel protocol; therefore, the proposed STCP does
not provide protection against traceability under xed, uniquely associated IP addresses
to users.
6.6.1.5 Simulator Attack Resilience
The proposed protocols provide protection in relation to the simulator attack by relying
on the smart card attestation (section 4.4.3), trustworthiness, and eectiveness of the eval-
uation laboratory. The certication ensures that the smart card is tamper-resistant, and
it is highly unlikely that a malicious user can retrieve the smart card signature key pair.
Therefore, the validation proof cannot be generated by a simulated environment, and so
if an SP receives a genuine validation proof then it can be certain that it is generated by
a genuine smart card. Furthermore, in the online attestation mechanism the card manu-
facturer dynamically veries the current state of the smart card and issues a compliance
certicate that the smart card sends to the respective SP.
This will in theory give the assurance to the SP that the smart card with which it is
communicating is not a simulator, and that the current state of the smart card is as it
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was at the time of evaluation. This does not mean that it will always be secure or that a
malicious user is not able to simulate the environment with a genuine signature key pair.
It only gives the assurance that the smart card is secure against attacks as evaluated by
the third party and stated in the issued certicate [56], and that it is a state-of-the-art
tamper-resistant device at the time of evaluation. Therefore, if the evaluation certicate
does not meet the SPs requirements or it out-dates the current attacker capability then the
SP should decline the application lease. As stated earlier, granting an application lease is
at the sole discretion of the SP, so if they are not satised with a smart card, they should
not lease the application to it.
6.6.1.6 Platform & Application User Separation Attack
In this attack, as discussed in section 6.2.3 and 5.5.2, a malicious user tries to install an
application that belongs to some other user on his smart card. Therefore, the identity of
the card owner and the leaseholder of the application are dierent.
Among the proposed protocols in this chapter, only the STCPSP and STCPACA provide as-
surances against this attack as they include the smart card owner's identity and ownership
proof (i.e. Ui and signed message with a certicate) in the message. The ownership proof
comes from the signature generated using the smart card owner's signature key pair. This
signature and the certicate are associated with the smart card, providing a cryptographic
binding between the smart card and its current owner.
In the STCPSC, we intentionally omitted the inclusion of the user specic details in the
protocol. The rationale behind it is that in this protocol, the respective SP does not require
the user identication and the user wants to keep his or her privacy. This is necessary when
a user downloads applications that normally do not require user details.
6.6.1.7 Contractual Agreement
In the STCPACA, the smart card generates and sends a contractual agreement to the SP.
Therefore, the smart card commits to the SP that it has downloaded the application but
this does not mean that the application is in the active state. The smart card will wait for
the SP to verify the contract message sent by the smart card and to check the hash value
of the downloaded application to correctly corresponds to the SP's application. Once the
SP veries these parameters, it generates the contractual agreement message to the smart
card that includes the validation message (VM) of the smart card (if online attestation
was requested by the SP) and/or hash of the downloaded application. The SP will proceed
150
6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
with the activation of the downloaded application only after this message is received by
the smart card.
The SP will only register the leased application to access the SP's services once it is
activated by the smart card. On activation, the application dials back to the SP's server.
On receipt of the conrmation that the application is active, the SP will sanction the
application to access the provided services. The contractual agreement messages provide
the assurance that a smart card and an SP have communicated with each other through
the STCPACA. During this protocol, the smart card assures the SP about its security
and reliability mechanisms, and they are accepted by the SP. The SP has then leased its
application, which was downloaded onto the smart card without any error.
6.6.2 CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
The intruder's capability modelled in the Casper scripts (appendices B3, B4, and B5) for
the proposed protocol is as below:
1. An intruder can masquerade as any application's identity in the network.
2. An intruder is not allowed to masquerade as an SP or TEM.
3. An intruder application has a trust relationship with the TEM.
4. An intruder can read the messages transmitted by each entity in the network.
5. An intruder cannot inuence the internal processes of a communicating entity (agent)
in the network.
The security specication for which the CasperFDR evaluates the network is as shown
below. The listed specications are dened in the #Specication section of appendices B3,
B4, and B5:
1. The protocol run is fresh and both applications were alive.
2. The key generated by the SP and SC is not known to the intruder.
3. Entities undergo mutual authentication and key assurance at the conclusion of the
protocol.
4. The long term keys of communicating entities are not compromised.
5. The user's identity is not revealed to the intruder.
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The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocols and did not nd any feasible attack(s).
6.6.3 Revisiting the Requirements and Goals
In this section, we take the security goals and requirements stipulated in section 6.2.3 and
provide a comparison of the proposed protocols with the selected protocols 6.2.2.
As shown in the table 6.2, the STS protocol meets the rst 11 goals along with goal 15.
The remaining goals are not met by the STS because of the design architecture and the
deployment environment, which did not require these goals. Similarly, the AD protocol
does not meet goals 6, 10 and 1319. In the AD protocol, the user reveals her identity by
sending the user certicate as plaintext along with the no mutual key conrmation.
The most promising results were from the ASPeCT and JFK protocols that meet a large
set of goals. Both of these protocols can be easily modied to provide the trust assurance
(requiring additional signature). However, both of these protocols are vulnerable to partial
chosen key attacks, but in the table 7.3 we opt for the possibility that the JFK can be
modied to overcome this problem. The reason behind this is based on the entity that
takes the initiator's role. Therefore, if in the JFK we opt for the assumption that an SP
will always take the initiator's role then this goal is met by the JKF.
The T2LS protocol meets the trust assurance goal by default. However, because it is based
on the TLS protocol, which does not meet most of the requirements of the STCP, the T2LS
also does not meet them. A note in favour of the SCP81, MM, and SM protocols is that
they were designed with the assumption that an application provider has a prior trusted
relationship with the smart card issuer; thus, they implicitly trust the respective smart
card. This assumption, which is fundamentally incompatible with the UCOM, is why
these protocols fail to support a large number of the listed goals. Most of these protocols
to some extent have an architecture similar to the one with which a server generates the key
and then communicates that key to the client (i.e. read smart card). They do not provide
non-repudiation because they do not use signatures in the protocol run. Nevertheless, the
proposed STCPACA protocol meets all the listed goals. Table 6.2 provides a comparison
between the listed protocols in section 6.2.2 with the proposed protocols under the required
goals (see section 6.2.3).
In table 6.2, we show that STCPSC does not meet the goal 17 beside the fact that SPs
in STCPSC does not require user identication. Therefore, a malicious user can install
an application that does not belong to him. On the other hand, if the SP does require
the user's identication during the application personalisation (after the application is
installed) then the personalisation process [10] should take into account the platform &
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6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
application user separation attack.
As is apparent from the table 6.2, the proposed STCPs satises all goals that were de-
scribed in section 6.2.3. The protocols that are proposed specically for the smart card
environment (i.e. ICOM) only meet half of the stated goals because the security require-
ments for the UCOM are more stringent than for the ICOM [32]. Nevertheless, we still
consider that the proposed STCP should be deployed even in the ICOM and especially
with any future ownership model that supports multi-applications on a smart card under
the Trusted Service Manager (TSM) architecture.
6.6.4 Implementation Results and Performance Measurements
For comparison, we have selected the performance of SSL [182], TLS [183], and public
key-based Kerberos [184] implemented on 32-bit smart cards. We selected the SSL and
TLS because they form the bases of the GlobalPlatform SCP81. Kerberos closely relates
to the card management architecture of Multos (section 5.3). The Multos Certication
Authority acts as a Trusted Third Party (TTP), and the public key-based Kerberos can
be implemented to accommodate the Multos card management framework. The Kerberos
discussed in the performance measures is also implemented on 32bit smart cards [184].
Table 6.3: Protocol performance measurement (milliseconds)
Measures SSL TLS Kerberos
STCPSC STCPSP STCPACA
C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
Average 4200 4300 4240 2998 3091 3395 3532 5843 6098
Best Run NA NA NA 2906 3031 3343 3359 5485 5688
Worse Run NA NA NA 3922 4344 3875 6797 9734 7329
Std Deviation NA NA NA 117.54 96.28 69.82 134.91 191.62 171.13
Note: the above mentioned measurement values for SSL are taken from [182], TLS [183] and
Kerberos [184]. C1 and C2 are 16bit Java Cards. We have rounded up the values to the nearest natural
number except for the standard deviation.
t
For performance measurements, we use the same test bed conguration described in section
4.8.3. For the STCPSC and STCPSP we implement two entities: a smart card and an SP.
For the STCPACA we implement an additional entity of administrative authority. Both an
SP and an administrative authority are implemented on a laptop with 1.83 GHz, and 2GB
RAM running on Windows XP. The Java Card implementation of the STCPSP, STCPSC,
and STCPACA took 11102, 10382, and 13364 bytes, respectively. The performance mea-




For the STCPACA, we need to provide the digest of the downloaded application. To do this
we emulated the performance measure by monitoring the time it took to generate hash on
a 256 bytes array. The hash generation on the 256 bytes took 31 milliseconds on the test
smart cards. The performance measures of hash generation on the test smart cards with
























Figure 6.2: Performance measurements of hash generation on test smart cards
The STCPACA can be divided in to three distinct phases that are listed in the table 6.4
along with the breakdown of the performance measure. The breakdown provides a rough
guide how much extra time these protocols will take if the protocols STCPSC and STCPSP
are extended to provide SOG-18 and SOG-19.




AKA Phase (STCPACA-1  4) Average 3182 3334
Contract Phase (STCPACA-5  6) Average 1253 1294
Charge Phase (STCPACA-7  8) Average 1407 1470
Total (STCPACA-1 8) Average 5843 6098
The performance measures are only for the reference of our implementation, as the actual
performance will vary depending the attestation process, the application size, and the
communication speed (i.e. Internet bandwidth).
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed Secure Channel Protocols (SCPs) and their role in the UCTD.
In addition, we provided the rationale behind proposing new SCPs. This was followed by
an account of the related work in the eld. We discussed security and operational goals
for the proposed protocols. We then proposed three protocols that satisfy varying levels
of security and operational goals, along with the user's and SP's requirements. These
protocols were then analysed informally for a limited set of security goals and compared
with a set of selected protocols. We subjected the proposed protocols to mechanical formal
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analysis using the CasperFDR, which they passed without any evidence of feasible attack.
Finally, we discussed the test implementation and their performance measures, comparing
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In this chapter, we describe two contrasting frameworks for application sharing, namely
those deployed by Java Card and Multos; followed by an explanation of our reasoning for
deciding that we need to extend the existing techniques for UCTDs. We then discuss the
rationale behind our proposal for the application sharing mechanism in the UCTD envi-
ronment. This sharing mechanism requires entity authentication, trust validation, and key
generation to securely share resources between applications. To do so, we propose protocols
that achieve the listed goals of the UCTD application sharing mechanism. Furthermore, we
provide an informal analysis of the protocol along with a comparison with existing protocols.
Subsequently, we present a mechanical formal analysis the based on the CasperFDR, and





Multi-application smart cards enable the co-existence of interrelated and cooperative ap-
plications that augment each other's functionality. This enables applications to share their
data as well as their functionality with other applications, achieving optimised memory
usage, and data and service sharing between applications [14].
A major concern arising from application sharing mechanisms is the possibility of unautho-
rised inter-application communication. A framework that ensures that application sharing
is secure and reliable even in adverse conditions (i.e. malicious applications, developer's
mistakes, or design oversight, etc.) is referred as a smart card rewall [185]. In this chapter,
the terms rewall and smart card rewall are used interchangeably.
The dynamic and decentralised nature of the UCOM may lead to unauthorised application
communication and the associated privacy concerns. Existing techniques deployed by the
smart card industry are not adequate to provide security and reliability to the application
sharing mechanism on a user centric device. The issues involved are: a) an inability to
dynamically authenticate an application on a smart card, b) diculty in ascertaining the
security and reliability of the current state of an application, c) an inability to verify and
restrict application sharing (privilege-based access), d) no provision for privacy preservation
for cardholders, and e) no cryptographic binding between applications. Therefore, in this
chapter, we discuss the proposed rewall mechanism [186] that provides an extension to
the traditional mechanisms deployed in Multos and Java Card, in order to deal with the
listed issues.
There may also be a requirement to allow applications executing on dierent UCTDs to
intercommunicate. Thereby, we further extend the architecture of the proposed rewall
[186] to accommodate application sharing among applications that are installed on dierent
UCTDs. This extension is referred as the Cross-Device Application Sharing Mechanism
(CDAM).
To meet the requirements for a UCOM rewall mechanism, we propose three protocols,
analyse them against a predened set of stated goals, validate them using mechanical
formal analysis using CasperFDR, and nally describe a prototype implementation and
performance measurements.
Structure of the Chapter: Section 7.2 discusses the application sharing mechanisms
deployed by Java Card and Multos, along with the rationale behind the proposal for a
UCOM rewall mechanism. In section 7.3, we describe the architecture of the proposed
rewall mechanism. To provide entity authentication, application state assurance, and
secure application binding we propose an Application Binding Protocol (ABP) in section
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7.4. We then propose two protocols for the CDAM framework in section 7.5 and 7.6. In
section 7.7, the proposed protocols are analysed for their security and performance.
7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism
In this section, we describe the application sharing mechanism implemented in Java Card
and Multos. The reason for choosing Java Card and Multos is twofold: a) they represent
two contrasting architectures to implement the rewall mechanism, and b) they are the two
most deployed smart card platforms. Furthermore, the rewall mechanisms deployed in
the ICOM are mature [28, 29, 185, 187, 188] and have been extensively studied [189][192],
which cannot be claimed for the UCOM.
7.2.1 Firewall Mechanism in Java Card
The generic architecture of a Java Card is shown in gure 7.1. The Java Card Runtime
Environment (JCRE) sits on top of the smart card hardware and manages the on-card
resources, applet execution, and applet security [28]. The JCRE has APIs (e.g. APDU, Util
and Shareable) that an application can use to access JCRE services. The JCRE also
has system classes that are integral to its functions and these classes are not visible to
applets. The rewall mechanism separates individual applications from each other and
from the JCRE. In Java Card, an application is a collection of applets grouped together
as a package  for example, packages A and B in gure 7.1;
Smart Card Hardware
Java Card Runtime Environment
Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) Native Methods
System Classes
Application Programming Interface (APIs)
Java Card Firewall
JCRE Entry Point 
Objects


















Figure 7.1: The Java Card rewall mechanism
Each instance of an applet has a unique Application Identier (AID) [28]. An instantiated
representation of an applet is termed an object. Each object is associated with a context,
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including the JCRE objects (System Context). The Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
only allows an object to execute if the current Active context is the one to which it
belongs. In gure 7.1 an object of AppletB1 will only execute if the Active context is
context B. The rewall restricts all cross context communication except for object shar-
ing mechanisms that include JCRE Entry Point Objects and Shareable Interface Objects
(SIOs). All applets in a package have the same context so there is no rewall between
them.
The JCRE Entry Point Objects are instances of the Java Card APIs that can be used by
applications to access platform services. These objects are accessible to all applets, and
they enable non-privileged (applets) applications to execute privileged commands. The
JCRE Entry Point Objects are implemented by the Java Card manufacturer, which is
responsible for their security and reliability.
An SIO enables an application to share its resources with other authorised application(s).
To utilise an SIO functionality, an application should implement the shareable interface
(javacard.framework.Shareable)  the implemented functionality as part of the class
that implements the shareable interface will be shareable with other applets.
When an object requests either an SIO or JCRE Entry Point Object, the JCVM saves
the current Active context and invokes the requested object along with the associated
context. Therefore, a shareable object always executes in its own context, enabling it to
access any applet from the package it belongs to. By taking into account gure 7.1 when
AppletA1 calls an SIO of AppletB1, the JCVM saves context A and invokes context B and
also initiates the execution of an SIO. An SIO can then call any method in package B.
Furthermore, it can also call any JCRE Entry Point Objects. When an SIO completes its
execution, the JCVM restores the previous context (context A).
7.2.2 Firewall Mechanism in Multos
Multos [29] takes a dierent approach to Java Card in implementing a smart card rewall.
The Multos Card Operating System (COS) resides over the smart card hardware as illus-
trated in gure 3.2. The Multos COS administers communication, resource management,
and the virtual machine [29]. Applications do not have direct access to the Multos COS
services; instead they utilise the Application Abstract Machine that is a set of standard
APIs consisting of instructions and built-in functions. These APIs are used by applica-
tions to communicate with the COS and request privileged services. The top layer is the
application space, and similar to Java Card the application segregation is implemented by
the Multos rewall.
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In Multos, application delegation is implemented to enable application resource sharing.
The application that initiates the process is called the delegator and the application that
is initiated is called the delegate. The process of delegation works as described below and
























































Figure 7.2: The Multos card rewall mechanism
1. Application A (delegator) creates an APDU in the public memory and invokes the
delegate command. The APDU consists of application B's AID, requested data or
function and the delegator's AID.
2. The Multos COS initiates the execution of B that looks for the APDU in the public
memory. It reads the APDU and processes it.
3. On completion, B creates a response APDU within the public memory.
4. The Multos COS switches back to A that then retrieves B's APDU.
7.2.3 Rationale for User Centric Smart Card Firewall
Traditional smart card rewall mechanisms are t-for-purpose in the ICOM environment
but they do not provide adequate security to the UCTD environment. The operational
and security requirements a UCOM rewall has to satisfy are:
FiR-1 No O-card Security Assumption: The rewall mechanisms discussed in previous
sections are designed with the implicit assumption that the smart card will be under
the card issuer's control. The security of the platform is ensured not only by the on-
card mechanisms but most importantly by the o-card agreements, which prevent
installation of a malicious application and prevent unauthorised application access.
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FiR-2 Application Authentication: In both Java Card and Multos, applications rely on
the AID to locate, request and access shareable resources/data. The AID is a 516
byte identier that consists of two components: a Registered Identier (RID) and
a Proprietary Application Identier Extension (PIX). The RID is 5 bytes long and
compulsory; on the other hand the PIX can be 09 bytes long and it is optional. If
you are developing an application that will be used either nationally or internation-
ally, you need to get a RID from designated authorities (i.e. national standardisation
authorities). AIDs are issued by a designated authority but there is no enforcement
mechanism that prevents an adversary from masquerading as an application on a
smart card. In the ICOM, this situation does not arise because application instal-
lation is only authorised by the card issuer and even this is to a restricted group of
trusted application providers. However, in the UCTD environment such a measure
is dicult.
FiR-3 Application State Validation: An application AppA might be modied either in-
tentionally or accidentally. This might have a malign aect on applications that
share resources with, or use the resources of AppA. Therefore, before establishing
sharing it would be benecial to ascertain the current state of AppA. In addition,
the rewall should also notify the server application if the client application is mod-
ied (i.e. if there have been application updates), so if the client application wants,
it can revoke the sharing, and vice versa.
FiR-4 Access Control: The rewall should facilitate a exible mechanism that enables a
server application to implement a hierarchical access-level rewall. In such a rewall,
a server application assigns shareable resources according to dierent access levels.
In addition, it can also revoke, upgrade, or demote the existing privileges of a client
application.
FiR-5 Application Binding: Two applications that share each other's resources should
be able to bind the sharing instance (cryptographic binding) in order to provide
authentication, condentiality and reliability to all future communication.
FiR-6 Application-Platform Communication. This requirement deals with bi-directional
communication between an application and a smart card platform and it is sub-
divided into two sections as listed below.
(a) Application to Platform Communication: Platforms make their services avail-
able to applications either through Entry Point Objects [28] or standard APIs
[29]. In both cases, applications may have access to more platform services
than required. That would not be desirable in the UCTD [10]. In the UCTD,
applications are only given access to those platform services that are autho-
rised by their SPs. The rewall ensures that an application cannot have access
to any other services from the platform for which it is not authorised. This
162
7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism
allows the SPs to control their applications' behaviours, especially in terms of
on-card and o-card communication.
(b) Platform to Application Communication: Java Card (like other multi-application
smart cards) provides global access rights to the platform. The global access
rights mean that an object of the JCRE System Context can access any method
(object) in any of the application contexts. However, the Java Card speci-
cation explicitly notes that the platform should only access certain methods
(select, process, deselect, or getShareableInterfaceObject) from an ap-
plet context [28]. In the UCOM, the rewall should ensure that a platform
cannot have access to methods that are not sanctioned by the application SPs.
Furthermore, it should enable an object or method to verify the requesting
source. For example if the source is the platform, and it is trying to access
an object or method not sanctioned by the corresponding SP, then it should
throw a security exception.
FiR-7 Sharing Revocation: A server (or client) application can revoke a privilege, even
after the server and the client have established a sharing relationship with each
other. In Multos and Java Card, the only way to revoke privileges is to modify the
server and/or client-application code. If a server application does not want to share
resource with the client application, then the server application has to implement
adequate checks to throw an error or exception when the client application accesses
the resources. From the client application's point of view, the SP has to modify the
client application so that it cannot use the shareable resources.
FiR-8 User's Privacy: The rewall mechanism should not allow an application to discover
the existence of other applications, because such a privilege could be used to prole
a user, perhaps for marketing or fraudulent purposes. In Java Card, public static
AID lookupAID can be used to list the installed applications. It is not an issue in
the ICOM as there is a central authority (card issuer) that has prior knowledge
of installed applications and (to some extent)their functionality. However, it is a
potential privacy threat in the UCTD environment.
The comparison between Java Card, Multos and the proposed rewall mechanism is illus-
trated in table 7.1.
7.2.3.1 Why Cross-Device Application Sharing?
With increasing interconnectivity between dierent computing environments, applications
installed on dierent UCTDs can enable new service models by having a secure and reliable
resource sharing mechanism. These are referred to as Cross-Device Application Sharing
Mechanism (CDAM). Some of the possible applications of CDAM are listed below:
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Table 7.1: Comparison between dierent rewall mechanisms
FiR Multos Java Card UCTD
1. No O-card Security Assumption No No Yes
2. Application Authentication Yes* Yes* Yes
3. Application State Validation No No Yes
4. Access Control No No Yes
5. Application Binding No No Yes
6. Application-Platform Communication No No Yes
7. Sharing Revocation Yes* Yes* Yes
8. User's Privacy No No Yes
Note. Yes means that it totally supports the given requirement, Yes* stands for limited support, and
No means that it does not support the given requirement.
1. A mobile handset may have multiple UCTDs, which under the CDAM architecture
behave as a single virtual device. Removing the need for a user to install applications
that share each other's resources on the same UCTD makes the management of the
multiple UCTDs exible and user-friendly.
2. The CDAM can facilitate the installation of an internet identity application [193] on
a UCTD that can be accessible to other UCTDs and the host platform. For example,
if a user installs an internet identity application (i.e. which may act as a single sign
on) on a UCTD then it may be used to authenticate the user when visiting online
services (e.g. online gaming, social and network sites, etc.) or by applications (e.g.
network access, online banking, and online ticketing, etc.) on (other) UCTDs.
3. An accounting application on a UCTD may opt for automated receipt collections and
updates to the user's accounting software. For example, a user might have a nan-
cial system on her Personal Computer (PC) that she uses to track her expenditure.
To enhance the mobile payment scheme, the mobile payment SP may collaborate
with an accounting software developer in a way that means the payment application
might record the transaction details that are later synchronised with the accounting
software. The user would have the accounting software installed on her PC, with an
associated application installed on the UCTD. Afterwards, the user synchronises the
transaction details to her nancial software. The synchronisation would be carried
out by means of the UCTD of the mobile phone and the UCTD of the PC. Thereby,
the CDAM provides security, reliability, and privacy to this system.
4. Internet of Things [37, 160] is an internet-like structure comprising a set of smart
physical devices (e.g. toys, healthcare products, thermostats, and environment sen-
sors, etc.) that communicate with each other. As an individual device may not have
enough computational and storage resources, they would not have a complex or large
set of services. However, the CDAM can enable comparatively complex and rich fea-
tured systems in an Internet of Things. Individual devices may either have a unique
service in the set or even a subset of a particular service. Each connected device then
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utilises CDAM to create a single virtual device comprising heterogeneous devices and
a UCTD-based architecture will enable the ecient replacement of a service if the
host device goes out of the network, by requesting installation of the service on an
alternative available device.
7.3 UCTD Firewall
In this section, we discuss the architecture of the proposed rewall mechanism for UCTDs.
7.3.1 Firewall Architecture
The proposed rewall mechanism is based on the Java Card rewall mechanism as illus-
trated in gure 7.3 that is discussed subsequently.
ACL: Access Control List.   SIO: Shareable Interface Object.   ARM: Application Resource Manager
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Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) Native Methods
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Figure 7.3: Architecture of the UCTD rewall mechanism
The request for an application's shareable resource is handled by the application's Appli-
cation Resource Manager (ARM) and the Runtime Resource Manager (RRM) handles the
access to the platform's resources (APIs): see gure 7.3.
The RRM controls the access to the entry point objects that are used to access platform
services. The resource manager will enforce the security policy for applications as dened
by the respective SPs, limiting access to the platform resources as stipulated by the policy.
For each application (package), an Application Resource Manager (ARM) is introduced.
This component will act as the authentication and resource allocation point. A client
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application will request a server application's ARM to enable the sharing of resources.
The ARM will decide whether to grant the request based upon the client's credentials
(associated privileges). At the time of application installation, the ARM also establishes
a shareable interface connection with the platform, enabling the application to access
methods that are essential for the application execution. The platform can access any
method in the application context only after authorisation from the application's SP. The
ARM also receives information regarding the requesting application. If the request is from
the system context for a method that is not allowed to be accessed by the platform, then
the ARM will throw a security exception.
An Access Control List (ACL) is a private list and it is used to facilitate the implementa-
tion of a hierarchical access mechanism and privilege revocation. An ACL can be updated
remotely by its corresponding SP (when the application connects with the SP's servers, the
SP can update the ACL), changing the behaviour of its application's sharing mechanism.
The ACL holds lists of granted permissions, received permissions (permissions to access
other application's resources) and a cryptographic certicate revocation list of client ap-
plications. The structure of an ACL is under the sole discretion of its SP and it is stored
as part of the ARM.
The operations of the rewall can be sub-divided into two distinctive phases. In phase
one, a binding is established between the client and the server applications. This pro-
cess includes authentication of the client's credentials and access privileges by the server's
ARM. In the second phase, the client application requests resources in line with the priv-
ileges sanctioned by the ARM. In both these phases, the rewall mechanism facilitates
individual authorised applications to accomplish the application sharing, while prohibiting
unauthorised applications from accessing the resources of an application.
7.3.2 Application Binding
In the UCTD-based rewall mechanism, a client application (AppC) establishes a secure
connection with the relevant server application (AppS) to authenticate and verify the
current state of the AppS, and to establish a secure binding with the AppS for future
communications. Similarly, AppS can also authenticate and verify the current state of the
AppC. Therefore, an application binding indicates that a client and server application have
authenticated each other and trust each other's state to be secure (and trustworthy).
When a client application requests shareable resources, the rewall invokes the ARM of the
server application. The ARM then veries and validates the client application's credentials,
and current state as secure for sanctioning the application sharing (as part of the ABP).
If the request is successful, the ARM issues the shareable resources to the requesting
166
7.3 UCTD Firewall
application. There are two ways the current state of individual applications might be
veried: both of the SPs can opt for a third party evaluation of their respective applications,
or they can issue a certicate to each other's application that contains the hash of the
application. In both of these cases, the certied state of the application is treated as a
trusted state by the other entity.
The state validation of individual applications is carried out by the Trusted Environ-
ment & Execution Manager (TEM), requesting the application and issued certicates.
Consider the scenario of application sharing between AppC and AppS. When AppC is
installed onto a smart card, the relevant TEM establishes a secure relationship (shared
key: KAppC−TEM ) with the installed application. The TEM does not calculate the ap-
plication state validation message (i.e. hash of the application), unless it is authorised
to do so by the application itself, or by the application's SP. When an application au-
thorises the TEM to generate its hash value, it generates a message encrypted with the
shared symmetric key. The authorisation message generated by an application is referred
to as an Integrity Measurement Authorisation (IMA) message. The IMA sent by the
client application will be EAppC−TEM (AppC ||AppS ||RandomNumberAppS ). The contents
of the messages are the identity of the client and server application, along with a ran-
dom number generated by the server application. The state validation message would be
EAppS−TEM (AppC ||AppS ||RandomNumberAppS ||hash(AppC)) that is encrypted with the
TEM and the server application's shared key as this message is intended for the server
application. The server application can match the hash calculated by the TEM with the
one in the client application's certicate that is issued either by a third party evaluator or
by the server application's SP. If they match, the server application can securely ascertain
that the state of the client application is secure. A similar process can be performed in the
opposite direction where a client application veries the state of the server application.
After applications authenticate and validate their states to each other, they generate a
cryptographic key that is referred to as the application binding key. This key is used in all
future communications between the applications.
7.3.3 Using Shareable Resources
A client application can request to use the server application's shareable resources if re-
quired (subject to valid access permissions) as illustrated by gure 7.4.
The request message sent to the corresponding ARM consists of a ClientAID, an au-
thenticator (message encrypted with the application binding key), access permission, the
required resource and a random number to provide freshness [132]. By verifying the au-



















Figure 7.4: Application shareable resource access request process
Subsequently it checks the access permission for the client application (from the server ap-
plication's ACL). If the client application is authorised to access the requested resource,
the ARM will return the resource's object reference along with the sharing lifetime.
There are two lifetime modes, permanent grant of access to an object or temporary. In
permanent mode, the server application grants the ownership of the object to the client
application as proposed by the Java Card 3.1 connected edition rewall [16]. In temporary
mode access is limited to individual sessions and ownership of the object is retained by the
server application.
7.3.4 Privilege Modication
The SP of a server application can modify the privileges of a client application by updating
the ACLs. The ARM of the server application veries the initiator's (SP's) identity and
credentials, before allowing the update of the ACL(s). The implementation of the privilege
modication is at the sole discretion of the SP. Such an update could be similar to ap-
plication update mechanisms already deployed, notably Over-The-Air updates in (U)SIM
application [6].
7.3.5 Application-Platform Communication
At the time of installation, an application establishes bidirectional resource sharing with the
platform. The application can access those platform APIs that are stipulated in the SP's
Application Lease Policy (ALP) discussed in section 3.4.6, and the platform obtains the
shared resources of the applications that are necessary to initiate the application execution.
The platform security context does not have global access in the UCTDs. This is to avoid
any possible exploitation of the platform that could lead to information leakage (data or
code) from an application. The resource-sharing delegation is disabled in the platform-
application communication and the rewall will deny such requests to avoid any illegal
access to the APIs by an application through resource sharing delegation.
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7.3.6 Cross-Device Application Sharing
In the Cross-Device Application Sharing (CDAS) architecture, a smart card acts like a
node that is registered with a centralised system. The centralised system in our proposal
is software running on a computer, mobile phone, or tablet, which is referred as Card
Application Management Software (CAMS) [32]. For a simplistic illustration, gure 7.5
shows two possibilities for the CDAS network.
In gure 7.5a, a mobile phone has three UCTDs and all of them are connected to a CAMS
hosted on the mobile phone. The CAMS can be hosted on an insecure platform and
it provides discoverability and interconnectivity to an individual UCTD connected to the
CAMS. By discoverability, we mean that a platform registers itself with the CAMS and thus
it becomes discoverable to all other platforms in the network. The interconnectivity deals
with the communication channel established between two (or more) UCTDs. Therefore,
gure 7.5a depicts a scenario in which multiple UCTDs are connected to a mobile phone,











(b) UCTDs attached to different Platforms
Cell Phone
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Figure 7.5: Cross-Device Application Sharing network
On the other hand, gure 7.5b shows a situation in which dierent computing devices
(e.g. computers, mobile phones, and tablets) are connected with each other through their
CAMS. Each individual device may have multiple UCTDs that are registered to their
respective CAMS. Although gure 7.5b depicts the situation as if there is a single cen-
tralised CAMS, this is incorrect, as each host device has its own CAMS and there are no
centralised CAMS. Therefore, if a particular device is not available, other devices can still
communicate with each other. In this scenario, a host device will discover and register
other computing devices. There are two possible situations. In the rst, each individual
host device advertises the connected smart cards to the entire network. In second case,
each host device only provides the details of its CAMS and not the smart cards registered
with it. For our proposed CDAM, we prefer the second arrangement as it provides better
privacy for individual smart cards.
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Encrypted and MACed using PBP Keys
Encrypted and MACed using ABP Keys
Sharing Request (Payload)Client SC-ID Client AIDServer AIDServer SC-ID
Figure 7.6: Cross-Device Application Sharing message
The provision of whether an application supports cross-device application sharing is at
the sole discretion of the respective SP. The UCTD architecture will provide two levels
of application sharing: a) localised sharing, and b) cross-device sharing. The rst option
restricts the application sharing to the smart card on which the application is installed.
Any client application that is not installed on it will not be able to access the shareable
resources of the server application. This scenario is implemented in traditional smart card
rewalls and supported by the UCTD. The second option allows application sharing with
a client application, whether or not it is installed on the same platform.
In a succinct manner, we can divide the CDAM process into four steps listed as below:
1. Registration: The rst step involves registration of individual applications with their
respective smart cards, and individual smart cards with their respective CAMS.
2. Platform Binding: A new smart card that is recently registered with the CAMS will
ask the CAMS to provide a list of available (registered) smart cards. The CAMS
provides the pseudo identities of other associated smart cards. Each smart card
then initiates a dialogue referred as platform binding with other smart cards in the
network and establishes a secure relationship (e.g. by means of a shared cryptographic
key) that is termed as platform binding key. The platform binding is similar to the
application binding discussed in section 7.3.2 but is between smart cards, rather than
applications. After the acknowledgement of the platform binding, each smart card
will register the other in its list of bound platforms.
3. Application Binding in CDAM: In the third step, client and server applications pro-
ceed with the application binding process that on its successful conclusion binds them
in a way that enables them to share resources in a secure and reliable manner.
4. Application Sharing in CDAM: The client application requests its host smart card
regarding the status of the server application's host smart card. If the server ap-
plication is in the network then it will proceed with the application sharing. The
application binding key is used to generate the session key to communicate with the
server application. The structure of the message is illustrated in gure 7.6.
The resource access can be based on two mechanisms: Java Card [28] or Multos [29] inter-
application communication architecture. These two mechanisms represent the synchronous
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and asynchronous application sharing respectively. Synchronous application sharing en-
ables two applications to communicate in real-time, and they can be considered as real-time
distributed systems. In case of the asynchronous application sharing the communication
between applications can occur when both are available (live in the network). Both schemes
have benets and drawbacks; therefore, it is at the sole discretion of the individual set of
client-server applications to decide which mode they will employ. For further explanation
and to provide a contrast between these two mechanisms consider the following examples.
Consider two applications, one of them provides access to certain internet services, and
the second application is an internet identity [193] that acts like a Single-Sign-On (SSO).
Every time a user logs on to the Internet services through the rst application, a connection
has to be established with the second application to provide the internet identity for user
authentication and authorisation. This access to the SSO application has to take place
when the rst application connects with the internet services. Such an access is termed as
synchronous access in the UCTD and is based on the Java Card architecture [186]. Such
an access can be based on the Java Card Remote Method Invocation (RMI) [28].
For asynchronous access, we also take an example of two applications. One application
provides electronic wallet functionality, and the second is a loyalty application. Every time
the electronic wallet application is used, the cardholder earns loyalty points. The loyalty
application does not have to be live. The electronic wallet application batches the loyalty
point update task and when the loyalty application becomes live, it can proceed with
updating it. For this purpose, a simple mechanism deployed by the Multos application
sharing would suce. The electronic wallet application batches the APDUs to update the
loyalty application. When the loyalty application comes online, all batched APDUs can
be communicated to it.
In the next section, we describe the goals and requirements of the proposed protocols to
establish application and platform binding, before we look into the details of Application
Binding Protocol  Local (ABPL) that focuses on the application binding between two
applications on the same UCTD. Later, we discuss the Platform Binding Protocol (PBP),
and Application Binding Protocol  Distributed (ABPD) that are proposed to support
the CDAM.
7.3.7 Minimum Goals and Requirements for the Proposed Protocols
The goals and requirements for the proposed protocols that facilitate the establishment of
application and platform binding are listed below. This list is an extension to the list in
section 6.2.3, with the exception of requirements SOG-17 to SOG-19. Later, we will revisit




















by the malicious user
Figure 7.7: Application masquerading and relay attack scenario
SOG-20 Application Masquerading. In this scenario, a malicious application can mas-
querade as a server or client application. For example, in Java Card when a client
application sends a request for application sharing it generates the request that con-
tains the server application's AID. Now if a malicious application is masquerading
as a server application, it only has to inform the rewall that it accepts the appli-
cation sharing request without validating that it has the knowledge of the shared
secret. Thus the client application thinks that it is accessing the shared resource
of the server application, whereas in fact it is communicating with a malicious
application. Now the fake server application can resend the application sharing
request message to a genuine server application on another smart card and gain
access to shared resources; this scenario is illustrated in gure 7.7.
SOG-21 Dierent User's Applications. Consider a scenario in which we have two users
and two applications. One is a malicious user Mu while the other is an authorised
user Au. The two applications are AppA (server application) and AppB (client
application) that have a client-server relationship. Both users are authorised to
download application AppA, however Mu is not authorised to download application
AppB. Now at some point, the Mu obtains the AppB's credentials for the Au and
manages to download AppB onto his or her smart card. The application sharing
between the Mu's AppA and the Au's AppB can be established. This can lead to
some nancial benets for the Mu to which he or she is not entitled.
Smart ard of Mu



















Figure 7.8: Application sharing among dierent user's applications
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Table 7.2: Protocol notation and terminology
Notation Description
SE Represents the server application.
CL Represents the client application.
TEM Represents the TEM on a smart card.
F Represents the UCTD rewall on a smart card.
KA−B Long term symmetric key shared between entity A and B.
KtS−C Session key generated by the TEM.
EK(Z) Represents symmetric encryption of the data Z with the key K
NX + num Random number of entity X is incremented by the value of num, where
num = 0, 1, 2, 3, .....
X|Y Represents the XOR binary operation on the data items X, Y.
IMAX Integrity Measurement Authorisation message generated by entity X.
V REX Application assurance validation response generated by the TEM for
entity X.
AP Represents the authentication process a server application requires from
the respective client application, when requesting the shareable re-
sources.
OR Represents the object reference to the server application's resource man-
ager (i.e. ARM).
7.3.8 Protocol Notation and Terminology
In this section, we list the notation used to describe the protocols in this chapter. The
notation listed in table 7.2 is an extension to the notation described in tables 4.2 and 6.1.
7.3.9 Enrolment Process
During the enrolment process, the SPs of a client and server application agree on the













Figure 7.9: Hierarchy of a client application's certicate
In this process, an SP of a client application provides assurance and validation from a
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third party evaluation [69] to an SP of a server application, and vice versa. If third party
evaluation is not available then both client and server application's SPs can decide on any
other adequate way of establishing trust in each other's application and its functionality.
During this process, they decide the details of the ABP, such as how to perform an on-card
verication and validation of applications. One possible way could be that the SP of a
server application issues a certicate to a client application, and vice versa.
The certicate hierarchy in the ABP is illustrated in gure 7.9. In the absence of CC
evaluation, the certicate hierarchy shown in gure 7.9 will not include Common Criteria
Certication Authority. The client application certicate has the hash value of the ap-
plication. Similar contents will also be included in the server application's certicate that
is issued by the SP of the client application. Basically, the enrolment process denes the
restrictions and mechanisms (i.e. certicates, and cryptographic algorithms, etc.) that a
client/server application's SPs agree on for the ABP.
7.4 Application Binding Protocol  Local
In this section, we begin the discussion by explaining the protocol prerequisite followed by
the protocol description.
7.4.1 Protocol Prerequisites
The prerequisites for the ABPL are listed below, and are an extension to the prerequisites
listed in sections 4.7.1, 6.3.1 and 6.5.2 with exception of prerequisites PPR-8 to PPR-13.
PPR-14 O-Card Relationship: The SPs of individual applications trust each other. The
roles of the server and client are predened along with the privilege each client
application is allocated.
PPR-15 Certicated Application State: A client application either has a certicate that is
issued by a third party evaluation authority or by the server application's SP. This
certicate has the hash value of the secure (trusted) state of the client application
as considered by the third party evaluation authority or the server application's
SP. A similar situation applies for the server application's certicate that is issued
by the client application's SP or third party evaluators.
PPR-16 Trustworthy TEM: Applications trust the TEM and they have established a long-
term shared secret key with it at the time of application installation (section 7.3.2).
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7.4.2 Protocol Description
The aim of the Application-Binding Protocol  Local (ABPL) is to facilitate both the
client and server applications on the same device to authenticate each other and verify their
current states to be secure. The ABPL also enables applications to establish the application
binding for future communications. The ABPL message description is as below:
ABPL-1. CL : IMACL = eKCL−TEM (CLi||SEi||NCL)
CL→ F : CLi||SEi||SignCL(CLi||SEi||NCL||IMACL)||CertSCL
The request message contains the identities of the client and server applications together
with a random number generated by the CL. In addition, the client application creates an
IMA message (section 7.3.2) for the TEM . The client application signs the message and
appends its certicate.
ABPL-2. F → SE : CLi||SEi||SignCL(CLi||SEi||NCL||IMACL)||CertSCL
The rewall F receives the application-binding request and it will query the SE. If the
server application wants to proceed with the ABPL, it forwards the message; otherwise, it
registers an exception.
ABPL-3. SE : IMASE = eKSE−TEM (SEi||CLi||NSE)
SE → TEM : CLi||SEi||IMACL||IMASE
The SE veries the client's signature. If successful, it generates an IMA message for the
CL. The SE then sends the message to the TEM that contains the identities and IMA
messages of both the CL and SE.
ABPL-4. TEM → SL : V RECL = eKCL−TEM (h(SE)||KtSE−CL||NCL + 1)
TEM → SE : V RESE = eKSE−TEM (h(CL)||KtSE−CL||NSE + 1)
The TEM veries the IMA messages from both the CL and SE. Then it will calculate
the hash value of the SE, encrypt it with the shared key KCL−TEM and send it to the CL.
Similarly, the TEM will calculate the hash value of the CL, encrypt it with the shared
key KSE−TEM and send it to the SE. The encrypted messages also contain a session key
generated by the TEM ; this key is valid only during the ABPL run.
ABPL-5. SE : skm = eKtSE−CL(eSE−CL||NCL + 2||NSE)
SE : au = eKSE−CL(AP ||OR||NCL||NSE)
SE : tc = SignSE(SEi||CLi||NSE ||au)
SE → CL : SEi||CLi||IMACL||skm||tc||CertSSE
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Following message four (ABPL-4); the SE veries the hash value of the CL to be the same
as the value listed either by the SE's SP or by a CC evaluation authority. It then generates
an application-binding key and encrypts it with the session key. In addition, the message
contains the object reference to the SE's shared resources and access permissions. The
CL directly calls the SE's shared resource in all subsequent requests, using the binding
key for authentication and authorisation.
ABPL-6. CL→ SE : CLi||SEi||eKSE−CL(AP ||(NCL|NSE) + 1)
This message gives the assurance to the SE that the CL also has the same key, thus
achieving mutual key conrmation (SOG-6: section 6.2.3).
7.5 Platform Binding Protocol
The Platform Binding Protocol (PBP) is executed between two smart cards that are listed
as SCA and SCB. Both smart cards can be part of the same CAMS or they may be
associated with two dierent CAMS and this is accommodated by the protocol described
in section 7.5.2.
7.5.1 Protocol Prerequisite
The protocol prerequisite for the PBP is fundamentally dierent from the ones discussed
before, as most of them focused on the smart card applications whereas the PBP is focused
on the smart card itself. The prerequisite for the PBP is listed below:
PPR-17 Syndicated Members: Both smart cards are registered with a CDAM network,
either directly to the same CAMS or two dierent CAMS on separate devices (e.g.
mobile phones, personal computers).
7.5.2 Protocol Description
The protocol can be initiated by any smart card; however, in this section we take SCA as
the initiator of the PBP.
PBP-1. SCA : SCAcm = h(NSCA||grSCA ||SCB′i)
SCA→ SCB : SCA′i||SCB′i||NSCA||SCAcm||SCASup
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The rst message (PBP-1) contains the pseudo identities of individual smart cards (e.g.
SCA and SCB), along with a random number generated by the SCA (NSCA). In addition,
the SCA will generate a Die-Hellman exponential grSCA but to prevent a possible partial
key chosen attack (see section 6.2.3) it does not send the grSCA . Instead, it sends a
commitment that is basically a hash generated on the grSCA , random number and the
recipient's pseudo identity.
PBP-2. SCB : SCBcm = h(NSCB||grSCB ||SCA′i)
SCB → SCA : SCB′i||SCA′i||NSCB||SCBcm||SCBSup
In response, the SCB will select a Die-Hellman group that it can support and include
the selection as SCBSup. The SCB will also generate its commitment (SCBcm) similar
to the SCA in the rst message, and sends it to the SCA including the SCBSup. The
commitments are made by both communicating entities and now in subsequent messages
they can send the generated Die-Hellman exponential.
PBP-3. SCA→ SCB : grSCA ||SCA′i||SCB′i||NSCA||NSCB
SCB : KDH = (grSCA)rSCB mod n
SCB : KSCA−SCB = fKDH (NSCA||NSCB||0)
SCB : mKSCA−SCB = fKDH (NSCB||NSCA||0)
The SCA will send the Die-Hellman exponential to the SCB along with pseudo-identities
and random numbers generated in previous messages.
On receipt, the SCB will generate the Die-Hellman secret (KDH). The SCB generates
the PBP master keys (eKSCA−SCB and mKSCA−SCB) that are used to generate session
keys for the current (e.g. kSCA−SCB and mkSCA−SCB) and all future sessions.
PBP-4. SCB : cfb = h(NSCA||grSCB ||grSCA)
SCB : mE = ekSCA−SCB (V R||SCA′i||SCBi||cfb||CertSSCB)
SCB → SCA : grSCB ||NSCB||mE||fmkSCA−SCB (mE)
In response, the SCB will ask the platform for assurance and validation proof (i.e. V R)
from the SCB. Furthermore, the pseudo identity of the SCA is appended with the true
identity of the SCB along with the commitment hash generated (cfb) by the SCA, Die-
Hellman exponential and cryptographic certicate of the SCB. The entire message, except
for the Die-Hellman Exponential and the generated random number, is encrypted and
MACed using the generated session keys.
On receipt of the message four (PBP-4), the SCA will also generate the Die-Hellman
secret along with session keys similar to the SCB. It will then verify the SCB's crypto-
graphic certicate. If both smart cards are being evaluated by the same laboratory then
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this process will be simple as SCA already trusts that particular evaluation laboratory.
Otherwise, it will request the CAMS to traverse the certicate chain to nd out whether
the SCA's evaluation laboratory is part of that certicate chain. Even if this fails, the SCA
can request its card manufacturer to decide whether it should proceed with the binding
or not depending upon the provided certicate. Therefore, only if SCA can successfully
ascertain the validity of the certicate provider of the SCB's certicate will it proceed
with the protocol.
PBP-5. SCA : cfa = h(grSCB ||grSCA ||NSCB||NSCA)
SCA : V alSCA = SignSCA(cfa||SCAi||SCBi||Ui)
SCA : mE = ekSCA−SCB (V R||V alSCA||CertSSCA)
SCA→ SCB : mE||fmkSCA−SCB (mE)
In response, the SCA will proceed with a platform assurance and validation mechanism
(section 4.4). On successful completion, the SCA will generate a message V alSCA. In the
message V alSCA, the SCA appends identities of both smart cards and user along with cfa.
The signed message (V alSCA) is appended by the certicate and encrypted and MACed
by the session keys.
The SCB veries the SCA's signature and then validates the CertSSCA. To verify the
certicate chain, the SCB will iteratively employ a similar procedure to SCA discussed
as part of the message four. The SCB will also verify the identity of the user of the SCA.
The SCB will record whether the user's identity is the same for both smart cards or not.
This information will be used by applications to decide whether they would like to establish
a communication link with an application installed on a dierent user's smart card.
PBP-6. SCB : V alSCB = SignSCB(cfb||SCA||SCB||Ui)
SCB : mE = ekSCA−SCB (V alSCB)
SCB → SCA : mE||fmkSCA−SCB (mE)
The SCB will initiate the platform assurance and validation mechanism which generates
the hash value of the critical components of the SCB. It will append the Die-Hellman
exponentials, random numbers and identities of communicating smart cards and the current
owner of the SCB. The entire message is signed by the SCB then encrypted and MACed
by the session keys.
7.6 Application Binding Protocol  Distributed
The Application Binding Protocol  Distributed (ABPD) is similar the ABP that we
discussed in section 7.4. The subtle dierence between these two protocols is that the
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ABPL uses symmetric cryptography to establish the keying material whereas the ABPD
uses asymmetric cryptography.
7.6.1 Protocol Prerequisite
The protocol prerequisite for the ABPD is an extension to the prerequisites of the ABPL
that are PPR-14 to PPR-16. The extension of the protocol prerequisite is listed below:
PPR-18 Platform Binding: A platform binding is established between the smart cards,
whose applications want to establish an application binding. This means that
both smart cards have executed the PBP, described in the previous section.
7.6.2 Protocol Description
The ABPD is executed between two applications that have an application sharing engage-
ment. The protocol listed in this section accommodates the ABP when the two applications
are installed on two distinct devices. In the protocol discussed below, the CL resides on
the SCA and SE on SCB.
ABPD-1. CL : au = fKSE→CL(CLi||SEi||SPCLi ||SPSEi ||grCL ||NCL)
CL→ SE : grCL ||NCL||au||DHGroup
SE : KDH = (grCL)rSE mod n
SE : KSE−CL = fKDH (NSCa ||NSCb ||1)
SE : mKSE−CL = fKDH (NSCa ||NSCb ||2)
The protocol is initiated by the CL, which generates a Die-Hellman exponential (grCL)
and a random number. In addition, the application CL also generates a keyed hash of
identities of the participating applications, and their respective SPs along with grCL and
NCL. The rationale behind the generation of the keyed hash value is to avoid a man-in-
the-middle attack on the rst message. To mount this attack, a malicious user has to gain
knowledge of identities of individual applications and associated SPs, and the secret key
(KSE→CL). This message cannot prevent replay attacks, which we deal with in subsequent
messages. The message is then appended with the DHGroup, which details the supported
Die-Hellman group used to generate the grCL .
On receipt of message one, the SE will verify the authentication credentials (i.e. keyed
hash) and on a successful outcome, it will continue with the protocol. The application
SE will generate a Die-Hellman exponential and a random number. The application SE
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will then generate the session keys and long-term encryption and MAC keys in a similar
manner to that used in message three of PBP (see section 7.5.2).
ABPD-2. SE : hSE = h(SEi||CLi||SPCLi ||SPSEi ||grSE ||grCL ||NCL||NSE)
SE : cfs = SignSE(CLi||SEi||hSE)
SE : mE = eKSE−CL(V R||ReqUserID||cfs||CertSSE)
SE → CL : grSE ||NSE ||mE||fmKSE−CL(mE)||DHGroupSel
The SE will generate a signature on the message containing the Die-Hellman exponential
generated by both the SE and CL, and their identities along with those of the respective
SP's concatenated with generated random numbers. The signed message is appended to the
SE's certicate along with a request for the CL's state validation and user authentication.
The user authentication is an optional parameter in the ABPD, which depends upon
whether a server application allows application sharing with client applications that are
issued to dierent users. If the SE allows application sharing with dierent user's CL then
the parameter can be omitted. Otherwise, ReqUserID will request the CL to provide the
details of the registered owner of the SCA. The message is then encrypted and MACed
using the session keys.
On receipt of message two (ABPD-2), the application CL will generate the session and
long-term encryption and MAC keys. After this, it will proceed with verifying the MAC
and decrypt message two. Subsequently, it will validate the certicate CertSSE and then
verify the signature.
ABPD-3. SCB : aub = SignSCA(h(CL)||SCAi||Ui||NCL||NSE)
CL : hCL = h(CLi||SEi||grCL ||grSE ||NCL||NSE)
CL : auc = SignCL(CLi||SEi||hCL)
CL : mE = eKSE−CL(V R||aub||auc||CertSCL||CertSSCB)
CL→ SE : mE||fmKSE−CL(mE)
The CL will then ask the host smart card (SCA) to provide a validation proof. The
SCA will generate the hash of the application and then sign it. The signed message
also includes the identities of the smart card and its owner (if requested by the SE in
message two), and random numbers generated by both applications. In addition, the CL
generates a signature on the message containing Die-Hellman exponentials generated by
communicating applications along with the identities of their respective SPs and generated
random numbers. The signing of the message by the smart card provides security assurance
and validation of the client application, and the signing of the message by the client
application provides entity authentication to the server application.
After the server application SE receives message three, it will rst verify whether the
generated hash of the application is the same as that certied by either the SP of the SE
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or by a third party evaluator. If successful, it will verify the signature generated by the
CL. In cases where the SE asks for the user's identity in message two it will also check
whether the user identity provided by the message three is as required.
ABPD-4. SCB : aua = SignSCB(h(SE)||SCAi||SCBi||Ui||NCL||NSC)
SE : mE = eKSE−CL(aua||CertSSCB||RL)
SE → CL : mE||fmKSE−CL(mE)
In the nal message of ABPD, the SE will ask the host smart card SCB to generate the
hash. The hash is appended with the identities of the smart cards and user (if required)
along with generated random numbers. The resource locator referred as RL provides a
handle to the shareable resources provided by the SE. The RL uniquely identies the
smart card on which the server application is installed, and the name of the resources that
are being shared (e.g. SIO or RMI object).
On receipt of the nal message, the CL will verify the state of the application SE and if
required it will verify the identity of the current owner of the SCB.
7.7 Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
In this section, we give details of an informal analysis, followed by mechanical formal
analysis based on the CasperFDR. Finally, we describe the test implementation experience
with performance measures.
7.7.1 Informal Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
In this section, we consider the proposed protocol and analyse it with respect to the protocol
requirements listed in section 7.3.7
• SOG-13: Although an application may have genuine credentials its current state might
be modied since it was last evaluated by SP(s) or the CC evaluation laboratory. To verify
whether the state of an application is secure enough to initiate application sharing, the
ABP requires the TEM to generate a hash of both applications and encrypt them with
the corresponding keys. The applications have no inuence on the outcome of the hash
generation; so they cannot fake their current state. If the current state is considered to
have deviated from the stated secure state in the application certicate [56], the recipient
can then decide whether to continue the protocol or not.
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• SOG-20: A malicious application can be installed with either a server or a client ap-
plication's AID. However, the ABP does not allow a malicious application to masquerade
as a server or client application because to prove the identity of an application, the ABP
does not rely on the AIDs. It has a dynamic mechanism with bi-directional exchanges
of messages that ascertain the entity and check its credentials (based on cryptographic
certicate and signature generation/verication). Therefore, it might be dicult for a
masquerading application to match the cryptographic hash (generated by the TEM) and
have the signature key of the genuine application.
A malicious user can relay the binding request messages, but when these messages are
forwarded to the TEM to generate the hash of the client and server application, a malicious
application's hash will not match the certied hash of the client and server application.
This is equivalent to violating the 2nd pre-image property of the hash functions [146].
In addition, IMA messages include random numbers that eectively prevent any replay
attacks.
The server and client applications authenticate one another. The authentication is achieved
through signing the messages along with communicating the application's certicate. The
authentication gives an assurance to each of the participant applications that the other
application is genuine (eectively avoiding masquerading).
• SOG-21: The application certicate contains details of the user to whom the application
was issued. Therefore, if a client application tries to establish an application sharing with
a server application, but their customer credential does not match, the request is denied.
This avoids application sharing between two applications from dierent users.
7.7.2 Revisiting the Requirements and Goals
In this section, we only discuss SOG-20 and SOG-21. For SOG-1 to SOG19 refer to sections
6.6.1 and 6.6.3.
All selected protocols for comparison can be adapted to support SOG-20 in the way dis-
cussed in section 7.7.1. Furthermore, the PBP does not support both SOG-19 and SOG-20
as it is a protocol designed for establishing a binding relationship between UCTDs, not
their applications, whereas, SOG-19 and SOG-20 focus on application binding rather than
platform binding. A point to note is that ABPL does not support a number of the SOGs,
for the reason that ABPL key generation is based on a symmetric cryptosystem. The
ABPL do uses signature algorithms for entity authentication, and they do not play any
role in key generation. Furthermore, the key generation in the ABPL is performed mainly
by the TEM and server application, without any input from other communicating entities.
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7.7 Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
7.7.3 CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocols
The intruder's capability modelled in the Casper scripts (appendices B.6, B.7, and B.8)
for the proposed protocol is shown below:
1. An intruder can masquerade as any entity in the network.
2. An intruder can read the messages transmitted by each entity in the network.
3. An intruder cannot inuence the internal process of an agent in the network.
The security specication for which the CasperFDR evaluates the network is shown below.
The listed specications are dened in the #Specication section of appendices B.6, B.7,
and B.8:
1. The protocol run is fresh and both applications/smart cards are alive.
2. The keys generated during the protocol run are known only to the authenticated
participants of the protocol and an adversary cannot retrieve the session keys.
3. Entities mutually authenticate each other and have mutual key assurance at the
conclusion of the protocol.
4. Long-term keys of communicating entities are not compromised.
The protocol description dened in the Casper scripts is a simplied representation of the
proposed protocols. The o-card agents like the SPs of client and server applications are
not modelled in the Casper script as they do not play an active role in the protocol run.
The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocol and did not nd any attack(s).
7.7.4 Implementation Results and Performance Measurements
The overall architecture of the test-bed is the same as the architecture discussed in section
4.8.3, consisting of a laptop and two Java Cards (e.g. C1 and C2). We executed individual
protocol for 1000 iterations to get the performance measurements.
Our implementation model for the ABPL is based on three applets taking the roles of
the TEM, client, and server application on a Java Card (16bit smart card) that take
in total 8938 bytes. At the time of testing, we did not have access to an SCOS that
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Table 7.4: Performance measurement (milliseconds) of the ABPL
Measures SSL TLS Kerberos
ABPL
C1 C2
Average Time 4200 4300 4240 2484 2726
Best Time NA NA NA 2243 2634
Worse Time NA NA NA 2554 2945
Standard Deviation NA NA NA 64.53 76.28
would have enabled us to implement the TEM at the underlying operating system level.
We implemented the TEM at the application level and considered that similar or better
performance can be attained if the TEM is implemented as part of the platform. Because
the application-level implementation of the TEM cannot have memory access to measure
the hash values of the client and server applications, we generated the hash of a xed array
of size 556 bytes to represent an application state. The performance of the hash algorithm
is based on the size of the input data and in real deployment of the protocol scenario it
will depend on the size of the applications. The performance measurements for the ABPL
are listed in table 7.4.
The protocols (PBP and ABP) were executed on 16-bit Java Cards, and the implementa-
tion took 9799 bytes for the PBP and 8374 bytes for the ABP. The performance measure-
ments were taken from two dierent sets of 16-bit Java Cards, and an average of recorded
measurements for each sets is listed in table 7.5.
Table 7.5: Performance measurement (milliseconds) of the PBP and ABPD
Measures
PBP ABPD
Set One (C1) Set Two (C2) Set One (C1) Set Two (C2)
Average Time 4436.23 4628.35 2998.71 3091.38
Best Time 4078 4235 2906 3031
Worse Time 5469 5875 3922 4344
Standard Deviation 127.89 133.48 96.32 117.71
Note: Set One (C1) means two Java Cards that are similar to the card C1 specication. Similarly, Set
Two (C2) refers to the set of C2 Java Cards.
The performance measurements in this section are only for reference our implementation,
as the actual performance will vary depending upon the size of the client and server ap-
plications (i.e. hash generation), and the performance of public key operation, symmetric




In this chapter, we discussed popular smart card-based rewall mechanisms and how they
work. Then we described the unique requirements of the UCTD and presented a rewall
mechanism extended from the Java Card rewall. Based on the proposed rewall architec-
ture, we proposed a protocol that establishes the binding between two applications residing
on the same smart card. Furthermore, we extended this rewall mechanism to accommo-
date cross-device application sharing in which two applications residing on dierent UCTDs
can still share their resources. To support cross-device application sharing, we proposed two
protocols, one for platform binding and the second for application binding: PBP and ABPD
respectively. We then informally analysed the proposed protocols and this analysis was
subsequently extended to mechanical formal analysis by the CasperFDR. Finally, we dis-
cussed the test implementation and performance measurements of the proposed protocols.
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In this chapter we discuss the User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD) execution
environment in which the downloaded applications will execute. We begin by describing the
Java Card runtime environment associated operations. Later on, we articulate the threat
model for the UCTD execution environment, along with how it is aggravated by the openness
of the UCTD. Subsequently, we look at counter-measures that can be deployed to provide a
secure and reliable execution platform. The discussed counter-measures are then compared




After an application is installed on to a smart card, it relies on the Smart Card Runtime
Environment (SCRT) for secure and reliable execution. An SCRT provides the platform
that facilitates the application execution and it contains a library of Application Program-
ming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs provide a secure and reliable interface between the
installed applications and on-card services. An SCRT's responsibility is to: 1) handle
communication between applications and external entities, 2) provide a secure and reli-
able program execution, 3) enforce execution isolation and access to memory locations,
and 4) provide an interface to access cryptographic algorithms.
Although they are clearly not the same, the distinction between a smart card operating
system and a runtime environment is often blurred. For example, Java Card is considered
as a platform that provides a runtime environment (i.e. JCRE, see gure 3.3); whereas,
Multos is a smart card operating system that also has a runtime environment (i.e. AAM,
see gure 3.2). In this chapter, we will refer to an SCRT that semantically encapsulates
both the JCRE and AAM. However, we will focus primarily on the JCRE.
An SCRT has to protect the platform and installed applications from malicious or ill-
formed applications. In the ICOM, such issues have limited impact because of the strict
controls on application installation [190, 194, 195]. This means that compatibility, security,
and reliability of an application with respect to an SCRT are evaluated before installing it.
Even if a smart card allows post-issuance installation of applications, centralised control
means that it is dicult to introduce a malicious application into a smart card, as the card
issuer will vet individual applications along with the associated application providers.
In the early days of smart card technology, an adversary could remove the smart card hard-
ware protection layer and access its various components [196]. However, the smart card
industry responded to this attack vector and implemented adequate protection, which
simply make such attacks more dicult to mount. On the other hand, it led to the mate-
rialisation of the side-channel analysis that provided an avenue to attack the smart card
platform, especially the cryptographic algorithms [197]. Nevertheless, most of the modern
smart cards employ both hardware and software mechanisms to counter side-channel anal-
ysis. During early 2000, fault attacks became the modus operandi of adversaries to subvert
the implemented security measures in the smart card industry. Since then the technology
has evolved to counter these threats to some extent. There has been a growing interest in
combining the software and fault injection [194, 198, 199] attacks to subvert the protection
mechanisms on a smart card, and such an attack vector is referred as combined attacks.
These attacks have signicance in the ICOM; nevertheless, the openness of the UCOM
exacerbates their eects. In this chapter, we analyse the attacks that target the SCRT and
provide counter-measures. During this chapter, we will constantly refer to the JCRE as
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compared to the Multos AAM. The rationale is that the JCRE has an open specication,
and new attacks mostly target Java Cards. Furthermore, we consider that Java Card is
more closely related to the UCTD proposal.
Structure of the Chapter: We begin the discussion with a brief introduction of the
SCRT and the combined attacks (i.e. software and fault attacks). In section 8.3, we provide
the motivation behind the runtime protection mechanism, which is a collective term used
to refer to the proposed counter-measures. Subsequently, we discuss attacker's capability,
and detail the runtime protection mechanism. In section 8.4, we analyse the proposed
counter-measures for their security, and performance.
8.2 Smart Card Runtime Environment
In this section, we open the discussion with a brief description of the Java Card Virtual
Machine (JCVM) with emphasis on those components that we will refer to in the rest of the
chapter. Subsequently, we discuss the threat landscape that targets the SCRTs followed
by a brief discussion on related work, and nally, we nish the section with the description
of fault attacks.
8.2.1 Java Card Virtual Machine
The concepts regarding the Java Card application development and runtime environment
are not exhaustively covered in this section. Nevertheless, the rationale for a brief intro-
duction is to make it easy to follow the subsequent discussion regarding the SCRTs.
The JCRE illustrated in gure 3.3 consists of APIs, system classes, Java Card Virtual
Machine (JCVM), and native methods. The architecture of the JCVM is more or less sim-
ilar between various version of Java Cards including the latest Java Card 3.0.1 Connected
Edition [16]. The main dierence is the support for various system classes and APIs. As
far as the core processes are concerned, JCVM for both Java Card 2.X or 3.0.1 Classic
Edition and Java Card 3.0.1 Connected Edition are similar, which is in adherence to the
Java virtual machine specication [200] (i.e. JCVM is a subset of the Java virtual machine
specication [16, 28]).
Before we delve into the details of the JCVM, we rst look at the development process of
a Java Card application, as illustrated in gure 8.1. An application is coded in a subset
of Java language that is supported by the JCVM, which is represented as a Java le in
gure 8.1. The application is then compiled into a class le, and it is packaged along with
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Figure 8.1: Java Card application development process
any resource les and supporting libraries into an installation package (e.g. CAP, or JAR
le [16, 28]) that can be downloaded to a Java Card. On the Java Card, the on-card
bytecode verier will analyse the downloaded application and validate that it conforms to
the stated Java language semantics.
The class le contains the bytecode representation of the program code, an example is
illustrated in gure 8.2. The statement if_scmplt 22, at line 08, of bytecode represen-
tation is the opcode for if-else statement. The opcode represents that if the statement is
true then proceed with next line otherwise jump to line 22. The JCVM for Java Card
3.0.1 has listed approximately 185 opcodes and each opcode (e.g. if_scmplt) has an as-
sociated byte value. For example, opcode if_scmplt is represented as byte values 0x6C
(in hexadecimal format). The SCRT interprets individual instructions (opcodes) during
the application execution.
00: if (a < b){
01:     c = a;
02: }else{
03:     c = a;
04: }
00: aload_0
01: getfield #14 <Check/CheckTww/a S>
04: aload_0
05: getfield #16 <Check/CheckTww/b S>
08: if_scmplt 22 (+14)
11: aload_0
12: aload_0
13: getfield #14 <Check/CheckTww/a S>
16: putfield #23 <Check/CheckTww/c S>
19: goto 30 (+11)
22: aload_0
23: aload_0
24: getfield #14 <Check/CheckTww/a S>
27: putfield #23 <Check/CheckTww/c S>
30: return
Compile
Java File Class File (Bytecode Representation)
Figure 8.2: Java source le to bytecode conversion
Figure 8.3 illustrates the architecture of a typical JCVM except for the modules in a dotted
circle (i.e. runtime security manager) which is part of our proposal discussed in section 8.3.
Various components and their functions are described subsequently with emphasis on how
they interact during the execution of an application.
The JCVM mainly deals with an abstract storage unit called word that is the smallest
storage unit that it can process. The actual size of a word is left to the JCVM implementers
and it depends upon the underlying hardware. However, the JCVM specication [16]
states that a word should be large enough to hold a value of byte, short, reference, or
returnAddress.
When an application is initiated, the bytecode representation of an application is loaded
to the JCVM memory by a class loader subsystem. The class loader is responsible for
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Figure 8.3: Architecture of the Java Card Virtual Machine
locating and loading the class onto the memory areas used by the JCVM. This memory
is divided into sub-areas, where each of them contains specic information regarding the
application. The JCVM memory area is termed as heap and all data/code related to an
application is loaded onto it. The three main storage structures dened on the heap that
we are going to discuss here are Program Counter (PC) registers, method area, and Java
stacks. These storage structures are briey discussed here as they are referred to in the
remaining chapter, when we discuss our proposed counter-measures.
The PC registers store the memory address of the bytecode instruction currently executing.
If the JCVM supports threading then each thread will have its own PC register.
The method area is a shared memory space among executing threads (if the JCVM supports
multiple threads) and it consists of structures that include runtime constant pool, eld and
method data, and code related to methods and constructors. The runtime constant pool
stores the constant eld values (e.g. numeric literals) and references to the memory address
related to methods and elds. The other two structures (e.g. eld and method data, and
code related to methods and constructors) store the data and code related to elds and
methods, etc.
A frame is created by the JCVM each time a method is invoked during the execution of
an application. A frame in a JCVM is a construct that stores data, partial results, return
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values, and dynamically resolved links, associated with a single method - not the related
class. These frames are stored on a last-in rst-out (LIFO) stack referred to as Java Stack.
For each thread, there will be a dierent Java Stack. For security reasons, Java Stacks are
not directly manipulated by individual applications. The JCVM can only issue the push
and pop instructions to Java Stacks. The data structures that reside on a frame include
an array of local variables, operand stack, and references to constant pool. The operand
stack is a LIFO stack and it is empty when a frame is created. During the execution of a
method, JCVM will load data values (of either constant or non-constant variables/elds)
onto the operand stack. The JCVM will operate on the values at the top of the operand
stack and push the results back on it.
JCVMs provide well-dened interfaces to access native methods; however, contrary to tra-
ditional Java virtual machines it does not allow user-dened native methods. Each JCVM
has an execution engine that is responsible for execution of the individual instructions
(opcodes) in an application code. The design of the execution engine is dependent on
the underlying hardware platform and in a simple way, it can be considered as a software
interface to the platform's processor.
8.2.2 Related Work
Earlier work on Java Cards was mainly related to the semantic and formal modelling of
the JCVM [?, 84, 201, 202], Java Card rewall mechanism [191, 203], and applets [204]
[206]. The assurance for the JCRE reliability against ill-formed applications was based on
bytecode verication [128, 161][163], which became a compulsory part of the Java Card
specication version 3 [16].
In the early 2000s, side channel analysis and fault attacks on smart card platforms were
mainly focussed on the cryptographic algorithms [197, 207][211]. However, in the second
half of the 2000s, logical and fault attacks were combined to target the JCRE [212][214].
The discussed attacks in this paragraph are purely logical attacks that use the bugs and
inecient implementation of the JCVM. In 2008, Mostowski and Poll [190] loaded an ill-
typed bytecode on various smart cards to test their security and reliability mechanisms.
In this work, they showed that on certain smart cards they were able to execute code
that should not be possible in the rst place (i.e. accessing byte array as short). However,
they also noted that smart cards that had an eective on-card bytecode verier were less
susceptible than others.
In 2009, Hogenboom and Mostowski [215] managed to read arbitrary contents of the mem-
ory. They performed this attack even in the presence of the Java Card rewall mechanism.
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As noted, the reason for the success was the buggy JCVM. Their results were based on
eight dierent smart cards and they only managed to attack one of them, as the other
smart cards had eective runtime protection mechanisms. Similar results were also shown
by Lanet and Iguchi-Cartigny [195]. Sere et al. [216] use the similar attack of modifying the
bytecodes to gain unauthorised access or skip security mechanism on a platform. However,
Sere et al. relied on fault attacks to modify the bytecodes rather than modifying them
o-card as done by [190, 195, 215]. This way, Sere et al. managed to bypass the on-card
bytecode verication. A countermeasure to this attack provided by Sere et al. relied on
tagging the bytecode instructions with integrity values (i.e. integrity bits) and during the
execution, the JCVM checks these bits and if it fails, the execution terminates.
In 2010, Barbu et al. [194] along with Vétillard and Ferrari [198] used a similar attack
methodology to Sere et al. [216] that later came to be known as combined attacks. Later,
the combined attack technique was extended to target various components of JCVM in
[217][220]. These attacks are signicant; nevertheless, they require the loading of an
application designed specically to accomplish the attack goals. Therefore, such attacks
are not practical to some extent in the ICOM; however, due to the open nature of the
UCOM such attacks become a real concern.
In this section we glanced over the attack techniques proposed in the literature that specif-
ically target the SCRT. The discussion is by no means exhaustive but it introduces the
challenges faced by the UCTD runtime environment. Before we move to discuss the pro-
tection mechanism, we rst discuss the fault attacks in some detail in next section.
8.2.2.1 Fault Attacks
The aim of an adversary during a fault attack is to disrupt the correct execution of an
application by introducing errors. These errors are usually introduced by physical pertur-
bation of the hardware platform on which the application is executing. By introducing
errors at a precise instruction, an adversary can circumvent the security measures imple-
mented by the runtime environment. Possible types of faults an adversary can produce are
described as below:
1. Precise bit error: In this scenario, an adversary has total control over the timing and
locations of bits that he wants to change.
2. Precise byte error: This scenario is similar to the previous one; however, an adversary
only has the ability to change the value of a byte rather than a bit.
3. Unknown byte error: An adversary has no control on the timing and byte that it
modies during the execution of an instruction.
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4. Unknown error: In this scenario, an adversary generates a fault but has no location
and timing control.
From the above list of fault models, the rst model adversary can be considered the most
powerful. However, for a smart card environment the second scenario (i.e. precise byte
error) is the most realistic one. Due to the advances in the smart card hardware and
counter-measures against fault attacks (i.e. especially for cryptographic algorithms) it is
dicult to have total control of timing and locations of bits to ip [216]. Furthermore, fault
attacks require knowledge of the underlying platform and application execution pattern
[191]. This is possible to achieve by side-channel analysis [197].
8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism
In this section, we provide the motivation behind the runtime protection mechanism, which
is followed by the description of the attacker's capability. Subsequently, we discuss the
runtime protection mechanism, how it provides a secure and reliable framework for the
UCTD runtime environment.
8.3.1 Motivation
During an application's lifetime, it mostly interacts with the runtime environment and
the application's security is dependent on the security of the runtime environment. This
means that an insecure runtime environment can in fact make a well-designed application
insecure. Although, as discussed in section 4.4, a UCTD is required to be certied by a
third party evaluation (e.g. CC evaluation); however, we still consider that the runtime en-
vironment should not rely only on static security mechanisms including security evaluation
and bytecode verications (both o- and on-card).
As discussed in section 8.2.2, a smart card runtime environment is increasingly facing
the convergence of various attack techniques (e.g. fault and logical attacks). Physical
protection mechanisms regarding fault attacks are proposed [221]; however, we consider
that the necessary software protection for the runtime environment cannot be understated.
The software protection can augment the hardware mechanism to protect against the
combined attacks, as a similar approach has yielded successful results in the secure design
of cryptographic algorithms for smart cards [222][224]. In this chapter, we will only focus
on the software protection mechanism, without detailing the hardware-based protection.
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In literature, several methods are described for software protection mechanism, including
application slicing in which an application is partitioned for performance [225, 226] or to
protect the intellectual property [227] of an application. Such partitioning can be used
to tag individual segments of an application with adequate security requirements. The
runtime environment can then take into account the security requirements, tagged with
individual segments during the execution; thus providing congurable runtime security
architecture. A similar approach is proposed by Java Card 3 [16] and as part of counter-
measures to combined attacks proposed by Sere et al. [220] and Bouard et al. [228].
These proposals are based on using Java annotations to tag segments of an application
with required security or reliability levels.
Developers can use Java annotations to provide information regarding an application (or
its segment), which is used by either the compiler, or runtime environment (i.e. JCVM).
Based on Java annotations, Bouard et al. [228] and Sere et al. [220] proposed mechanisms
to prevent control ow attacks. In addition, Loining et al. [229] used the Java annotations
to ensure a secure and reliable development of applications for embedded devices (e.g.
smart cards). Furthermore, Java Card 3 Connected Edition also makes provision for Java
annotations [16]. The dened annotations by Java Card 3 are integrity, condentiality, and
full (which mean apply both integrity and condentiality). In addition, the specication
also allows proprietary annotations that can be used to invoke specic protection mech-
anisms implemented by the respective card manufacturer. The Java Card 3 specication
does not detail what operations a JCVM should perform when encountering a particular
annotation, which are left to the discretion of the card manufacturers.
These proposals are useful, in a closed environment like the ICOM. However, in the UCOM
it is dicult to ascertain whether an application has proper (Java) annotations as it is
challenging to evaluate their correctness on a smart card. A malicious user can use the
annotations to his advantage in order to accomplish his malicious goals. However, if we have
an on-card analyser that checks the security and reliability requirements of an application,
validate the associated Java annotations (tags) with each segment of the application, and
modify the security annotations where adequate. In such a scenario, we may assume
that tagging segments of an application with security annotations might be useful in the
UCOM. Nevertheless, such an on-card analyser is not available on the smart cards and in
this chapter we will not explore its details. In this chapter, we solely focus on adequately
hardening of the runtime environment.
In our proposed framework, we tackle the problem from three aspects: application compi-
lation, runtime protection, and trusted component. The Java annotations are used to tag
properties of individual segments of an application. Runtime commands (opcodes) that
might be subverted to gain unauthorised access are hardened with additional protection
(security checks), and nally a trusted component is included to complement the runtime
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environment.
8.3.2 Attacker's Capability
Before we delve into the discussion of the proposed runtime protection mechanism, we rst
dene the capabilities of an attacker in the context of a UCOM environment. Due to the
advancement in the chip technology and hardware protection mechanisms [230], we have
taken a realistic approach in dening the attacker's capability, taking into consideration the
current state-of-the-art in attack methodologies for smart cards. The attacker's capabilities
taken into consideration for the proposed runtime protection mechanism are listed as below:
1. Has the knowledge of the underlying (hardware and software) architecture.
2. Has the ability to load a customised application onto a given UCTD.
3. Has the capability to induce a fault attack at a precise clock cycle.
4. Has the limited capability of changing a byte value to either 0x00 or 0xFF, or a
random value in between.
5. Can change values stored in a non-volatile memory permanently within the limits of
the capability four.
6. Has the ability to inject multiple faults; however, only in serial fashion (i.e. after in-
jecting a fault, he waits for the results before injecting the next fault). The adversary
cannot inject multiple faults in parallel  injecting two faults simultaneously.
Capability four restricts an adversary to induce a precise byte error rather than the precise
bit error (section 8.2.2.1). This restriction is based on the underlying smart card hardware
architecture. This is not to say that precise bit errors are not possible in smart cards. On
the contrary, they are technically possible but increasing density of packaging (i.e. chip
fabrication) makes it challenging to change a value of bit in comparison to changing the
value of a byte.
The rationale behind the choice of multiple fault attacks in serial fashion than parallel is
to give precise control and reproducibility of the attack. In fault attacks where a malicious
user injects multiple faults simultaneously (parallel), it is dicult to assess whether the rst
fault injection was successful; therefore, injecting the second fault may be less productive.
As it may not achieve the desired eect if the rst fault did not work.
In our proposed framework, we intend to protect the underlying runtime environment and
applications hosted on it. However, if an application is designed with an intention that
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it releases sensitive information associated with it or its users, such applications that are
designed to self-harm are dicult to protect. For example, if an application is designed in
a way that it reveals its user's private key (specic to the application - not related to the
platform or other applications); there is a limit to what a protection mechanism can do to
prevent such leakages.
8.3.3 Overview of the Runtime Protection Mechanism
The proposed architecture of the runtime protection mechanism is involved at various
stages of the application lifecycle - including the application compilation, on-card bytecode














Figure 8.4: Generic Overview of the runtime protection mechanism
During compilation/packaging process additional information regarding individual meth-
ods, classes, and objects of an application is generated as part of the property le, discussed
in section 8.3.4. The property le assists the runtime environment to provide a security and
reliability service during the execution of the application. The o-card bytecode verication
checks whether the downloaded application conforms to the (given) language's semantics.
The on-card bytecode verier can also request the TEM to validate the property le. Dur-
ing the application execution, the TEM will actively enforce the security and reliability
policy of the platform - taking into account the information included in the property le.
The proposed framework does not require that application developers perform security
assessment of their application(s) to adequately tag application segments. The framework
only requires that developers compile their applications in a way that it has a property le
that stores information related to the respective application. The second requirement of
the proposed framework is to adequately harden the UCTD runtime environment discussed
in section 8.3.5 along with introducing a trusted component (part of the TEM) that will
enforce the platform security policy (section 8.3.6).
In subsequent sections, we will extend the generic architecture discussed in this section
and explain how these dierent components come together to provide a robust and secure
runtime environment for UCTD.
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8.3.4 Application Compilation
It might be considered adequate to modify the Java virtual machine specication for the
smart card environment to provide an eective runtime protection mechanism; for example,
reducing the number of opcodes and removing opcode zero from opcode list. However, we
avoid it for the sake of simplicity. Instead we use the property les that include meta-data
about the respective application. The property le is downloaded to the smart card as part
of the application and veried by the respective TEM during the bytecode verication as
shown in gure 8.1.
A Java compiler will take a Java le and convert it to a (bytecode) class le. The class
le not only has opcodes, but it also includes information about various segments (e.g.
methods, and classes) of an application that is necessary for the JCVM to execute the ap-
plication. However, for our proposal we introduce a property le that includes additional
information about an application. If a JCVM knows how to process property les then it
will proceed with them; otherwise, it will silently ignore them. In our proposal a property
le is stored and used by the TEM during the execution of the associated application. In
order to integrate the TEM into the runtime environment, the JCVM is required to be mod-
ied so it can communicate with the TEM in order to safeguard the execution environment.
1 App l i c a t i on In f o {
2 App l i c a t i on_Iden t i f i e r App l i c a t i o n I d e n t i f i e r ;
3 Class In fo rmat ion C la s s In f o [ c lass_count ] ; }
4 Cla s s In f o {
5 Cla s s_ Id en t i f i e r C l a s s I d e n t i f i e r ;
6 MethodInformation MethodInfo [ method_count ] ; }
7 MethodInfo{
8 Method_Ident i f i er MethodIdent i f i e r ;
9 MethodIntegr i ty HashValue ;
10 ControlFlowGraph Graph [ jumps_count ] }
Listing 8.1: Structure of the property le of a Java Card application.
The property le contains security and reliability information concerning an application
that the runtime environment can utilise to execute an application. The structure of the
property le is illustrated in listing 8.1, which includes information regarding the control-
ow graph, and integrity matrix (hash values of the non-mutable part of the individual
methods in a class).
The ApplicationInfo data structure includes the application identier (e.g. AID) and an
array of classes that are part of the respective application. For each class in the appli-
cation, we have a ClassInfo structure that contains the MethodInformation array that
contains information regarding all methods associated with the given class. Each method
is represented by MethodInfo structure that includes the control-ow graphs that are gen-
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erated for each method. In the control-ow graphs, child nodes represent jumps to other
methods whether they are from the same application or from a dierent application. In a
way, combining the method graphs of all classes can give the complete control-ow graph
of the respective application. In addition to the control-ow graph, a MethodInfo also
contains the hash value (of non-mutable code) of the respective method. This hash value
can be generated at the compile time and added to the property le, or at the time of the
application installation: the TEM calculates the hash value and stores it in the property
le.
8.3.5 Execution Environment
The runtime environment of a UCTD platform is adequately modied to support the
inclusion of the TEM (i.e. runtime security manager) that is shown in gure 8.3. At the
time of application installation, the application bytecode is stored in the respective SP's
domain along with the associated property le. The property le is sealed1 by the TEM
so that neither the application nor an o-card entity (e.g. an SP or/and adversary) can
modify it. At the time of execution, the TEM will retrieve the le, verify the integrity of
the le, and then decrypt it. If an SP wants to update its application on a UCTD then
it will proceed with the update command2 that will notify the TEM of the update. At
the completion of the update, the TEM will verify the application security certicate (if
available), and update the property le.
8.3.6 Runtime Security Manager
The purpose of the runtime security manager is to enforce the security counter-measures
(section 8.3.7) dened by the respective platform. To enforce the security counter-measures,
the runtime security manager has the access to the heap area (e.g. method area, Java stacks)
and it can be implemented as either a serial or a parallel mode.
A serial runtime security manager will rely on the execution engine of the JCVM (gure
8.3) to perform the required tasks. This means that when an execution engine encounters
instructions that require an enforcement of the security policy, it will invoke the runtime
security manager that will then perform the checks. If successful the execution engine
continues with execution, otherwise, it will terminate. A parallel runtime security manager
will have its own dedicated hardware (i.e. processor) support that enables it to perform
1Sealed: The data is encrypted by the TEM storage key. The storage key is a symmetric key to encrypt
the sensitive data like property le so applications cannot change them
2Update Command: We do not propose any update command in this thesis but similar commands are
dened as part of the GlobalPlatform card specication. The update command enables an authorise entity
(e.g. SP) to modify an application.
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checks simultaneously while the execution engine is executing an application. Having
multiple processors on a smart card is technically possible [5]. The main question regarding
the choice is not the hardware, but the balance between the performance and latency.
Performance, as the name suggests is concerned with the computational speed. Whereas,
latency deals with the number of instructions executed between an injected-error to the
point it is detected. For example, if during the execution of an application `A', at in-
struction A4 a malicious user injects an error, which is detected by the platform security
mechanism at instruction A7 of the application, the latency is three (i.e. 4-7=3). A point
to note is that the lower the latency value the better the protection mechanism, as it will
catch the error quickly. Therefore, theoretically we can assume that a serial runtime secu-
rity manager will have the low performance but also low latency value, where for a parallel
runtime security manager it will have good performance measure but higher latency value.
We will return to this discussion later in section 8.4 where we provide test (simulated)
implementation results.
It is obvious that implementation of additional components like runtime security manager
will also incur additional economic costs (i.e. increase in the price of a UCTD); however,
in this thesis we are not concerned with the economic cost of UCTDs.
8.3.7 Runtime Security Counter-Measures
The runtime security manager along with the runtime environment would apply the re-
quired security counter-measures (as part of the runtime protection mechanism) that are
discussed in subsequent sections.
8.3.7.1 Operand Stack Integrity
As discussed in section 8.2.1, an operand stack is part of the Java stacks and they are
associated with individual Java frames (methods). During the execution of an application,
the runtime environment pushes and pops local variables, constant elds, and object refer-
ences to the operand stack. The instructions specied in an application can then process
the values at the top of the stack. Barbu et el. [217] showed that a fault injection that
changes the values stored on the operand stack could have adverse eect on an applica-
tion's security. Furthermore, they also provided three dierent counter-measures to the
proposed attack and their second-rened method (countermeasure) is closely related to our
protection mechanism.
The proposed countermeasure (second-rened method) of Barbu et al. [217] is based on the
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idea of operand stack integrity. They dene a variable α, and all values that are pushed on
or popped from the operand stack are XORed with the α. Therefore, α is the summation
of all the values that are on the operand stack at any point of an application execution. For
example, if values o1, o2, o3, and o4 are on a stack then the α will be α = o1⊕ o2⊕ o3⊕ o4,
which can be written as α = Σni=1oi where n=4.
According to Barbu et al. [217] on every jump instruction beyond the scope of the current
frame (method), the runtime environment XORs all the values stored on the operand and
compares the result with α. If they match then the integrity of the operand stack is veried.
Their proposal does not measure the integrity of the operand stack on instructions like if-
else or loops, which could be the target of the malicious user. In fact, Barbu et al. [217]
detail an attack that targets the conditional statement (e.g. if-else) and showed how a
malicious user can circumvent the PIN verication in their example application. However,
the second-rened method do not protect against such attacks. In their proposed counter-
measures they sacriced security and (to some extent) performance for the sake of memory
use, whereas our proposal focuses on security rather than saving the memory. A point to
note is that in a traditional smart card (in ICOM) memory is crucial as to keep the cost
of the smart card in a reasonable range; however, in the UCOM we focus on the security
- sacricing the (crucial) cost of the nal product (e.g. UCTD).
1 // Executed by runtime s e c u r i t y manager when a va lue i s pushed onto an
i n t e g r i t y s t a c k .
2 On_Stack_Push( pushedValue ) {
3 push ( InS [ top ] XOR pushedValue ) ;
4 }
5 // Executed by runtime s e c u r i t y manager when a va lue i s popped from an
operand s t a c k .
6 On_Stack_Pop( poppedValue ) {
7 i f ( pop ( InS ) XOR poppedValue := InS [ top ] ) {
8 } else {
9 terminateExecut ion ( ) ;
10 }
11 }
Listing 8.2: Operand stack integrity operations.
In our proposal, we use a Last In First Out (LIFO) stack referred as integrity stack that
can store values of a word size, which is the most elementary data structure dened in a
JCVM. As already mentioned, the actual size of the word is platform dependent and it is left
to the discretion of platform implementers. One thing to note is that JCVM knows the size
of the operand stack when it loads a frame (section 8.2.1); therefore, the runtime security
manager just creates an integrity stack of the size n where n is the size of the respective
operand stack (created by the JCVM). We refer to the integrity stack as InS in listing 8.2.
When a frame is loaded, the JCVM and runtime security manager will create an operand
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and integrity stack, respectively. Furthermore, the runtime security manager will also
generate a random number and stores it as Sr. The rationale for using the random number






























Push(VIns-1 = Sr⊕V1) 
Push(VIns-2 = VIns-1⊕V2) 
Push(VIns-3 = VIns-2⊕V3) 
Push(VIns-4 = VIns-3⊕V4) 
Push(VIns-5 = VIns-4⊕V5) 
Push(VIns-6 = VIns-5⊕V6) 
Push(VIns-7 = VIns-6⊕V7) 
Figure 8.5: Operand and integrity stack push operations
Consider there are seven values (V1, V2, V3 , ... , V7) that are going to be pushed onto an
operand stack. The operations performed at each push operation for these seven values are
shown in gure 8.5. When V1 is pushed onto the operand stack, the integrity stack does not
have any value. Therefore, at the beginning integrity stack will XOR V1 with the generated
random value Sr: it is the starting point of the integrity calculation. When an item is
pushed on to the operand stack, we XOR the pushed value with the value on the top of the
integrity stack. The result is pushed back on to the integrity stack. The push operation
can be represented as VIns-n=VIns-(n-1)⊕Vn, where n is index to the integrity stack, VIns-n
is the value stored on the integrity stack. Furthermore, the value on the top of an integrity
stack is VIns-n=Sr⊕Σni=1Vi. Therefore, if a card manufacturer wants to implement the α
as proposed by the Barbu et al. [217] then it can simply do it by α = Sr⊕VIns-n.
The rationale for using a random number is to avoid parallel fault injections that try to
change the values on both operand and integrity stack simultaneously. Such a parallel
fault injection will become dicult if an adversary cannot predict the values stored on the
integrity stack, as each value on the integrity stack will be chained with the generated
random number. One point to note is that, although the attacker's capability dened in
section 8.3.2 prohibits parallel fault injection but we still try to accommodate it in our
proposals; as such attacks might become realistic in future.
When a value is popped out of the operand stack, we also pop the integrity value from the
integrity stack, XOR it with the popped value from the operand stack and compare it with
the new top value on the integrity stack. If the values match then integrity of the popped
value from the operand stack is veried; otherwise, it has been corrupted and the runtime
security manager requests the JCVM to terminate the execution as shown in listing 8.2.
To explain it further, consider that we pop V7 from the operand stack in gure 8.5. The
runtime security manager will also pop VIns-7 from the integrity stack, calculate InsValue
= VIns-7⊕VIns-6 and compare the InsValue with the V7. If InsValue and V7 match, then
the JCVM will proceed with the execution; otherwise, it will abort the execution.
202
8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism
The runtime security manager will continuously monitor the integrity of the operand stack,
in comparison to the Barbu's proposal. Furthermore, in this proposal the validation does
not require the calculation of integrity value over the entire operand stack. If we take the
Barbu's proposal then for an operand stack of length `n', we have to perform n-1 XOR
operations every time we need to verify the state of the operand stack. However, in our
proposal we only need to perform one XOR operation. We sacrice the memory for the
sake of performance in our proposal. We consider that operand stacks are not large data
structures so even if we double the memory used by them, it will not have an adverse eect
on the overall memory usage.
8.3.7.2 Control Flow Analysis
Control ow analysis, monitors whether the jumps performed in a method are legal or
not. In our proposal, we are concerned with jumps that refer to external resources. The
term external resources in the context of control ow analysis means any jump that goes
beyond the scope of the current Java frame (i.e. method) while it is still on the Java stack.
Once a method completes its execution, the JCVM will remove the associated Java frame
from the Java stacks (gure 8.3). Examples of such jumps dened in Java virtual machine
specication [200] are invokeinterface, invokestatic, invokevirtual, areturn, etc.
1 byte B(byte inputValue ) {
2 byte a = 1 ;
3 i f ( inputValue != a ) {
4 C( inputValue ) ;
5 } else {
6 D( inputValue )
7 }
8 return SG( inputValue ) ;
9 }
Listing 8.3: Code for an example method B.
To explain the control ow analysis further, we consider an example method B that has
three jumps before it reaches the return statement that completes the execution of the
method. The control ow diagram of method B is shown in gure 8.6 and associated code
in listing 8.3. Each invocation of a method (e.g. C, D, and SG) shown in the control ow di-
agram in gure 8.6 is represented by a symbolic method name (i.e. alphanumeric form that
is easily readable/recognisable by humans) that has an associated unique byte sequence
referred as method identier in section 8.3.4. For example, unique method identier of
methods B, C, D, and SG are 0xF122, 0xF123, 0xF124, and 0xF125, respectively. For expla-
nation we have used method identiers that consist of two bytes. Along with the method
identier the property le also includes ControlFlowGraph, which is a set of legal control
ows sanctioned for the given method.
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Figure 8.6: Control ow diagram of an example method B
The ControlFlowGraph in the property le (listing 8.1) is simply constructed by taking into
account every possible (legal) execution ow of a method. Taking the example method B, as
shown in gure 8.6 the rst jump can either be to method C or D depending upon the input
to method B (inputValue in listing 8.3). The rst two possible jumps shown in gure 8.6
are B→C and B→D, where → represents the direction of the jump. The construction of the
ControlFlowGraph (set of legal jumps) is constructed by XORing the method identiers
of individual jumps (B→C and B→D). The rst legal jump in the ControlFlowGraph would
be either Jump1 = 0xF122 ⊕ 0xF123 (i.e. B→C) and Jump1 = 0xF122 ⊕ 0xF124 (i.e.
B→D). The next possible jumps in the method B can be either C→SG or D→SG that are
represented in the ControlFlowGraph as Jump3 = Jump1⊕ 0xF125 and Jump4 = Jump2⊕
0xF125, respectively. Finally, for the third jump illustrated in gure 8.6 is SG→Return
that returns the execution back to the method that initiated the method B. Therefore, the
ControlFlowGraph of method B would be Bcfa-Set = (Jump1, Jump2, Jump3, Jump4).
The control ow analysis requires that the runtime security manager have a control ow
analysis variable cfa that stores the path taken by an application as cfa = Σnj=1Cj .
Where Cj represents the jumps taken during execution of an application. During the
execution of a method, when the JCVM encounters a jump to another method the runtime
security manager XORs the method identier with the current value of cfa and lookup
the ControlFlowGraph of the given method in the associated property le. If it nds a
matching value, the JCVM will proceed with the execution; if not it will terminate the
execution. Taking our example of the method B, when the JCVM encounters the rst jump
B→C the runtime security manager will calculate the cfa = 0xF122 ⊕ 0xF123 and compare
it with the values in the respective ControlFlowGraph. As the cfa matches with the value
Jump1, the runtime execution manager assumes the jump B→C is legal (permitted).
A potential problem with this scheme might be loop instructions that contain jumps to
multiple methods depending upon the loop condition. For example, for an odd value of `i'
jump to method B and for even values jump to method C. The loop iterates through
the values of `i' until it meets the condition that might be based on runtime values
(i.e. unpredictable at the time of the compilation of the application). However, we con-
sider that this problem is intrinsically managed by the scheme. Consider a control ow
graph of four methods: A, B, C, and D. Methods B and C are part of a loop as dis-
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cussed before and illustrated in listing 8.4. The ControlFlowGraph set will be Acfa-Set =
{A⊕B, A⊕C, A⊕D, A⊕B⊕D, A⊕C⊕D, A⊕B⊕C⊕D}. Therefore, a potential execution
path might be A→B→C→B→C→B→C→D. Therefore, if we compute the cfa it would
be A⊕B⊕C⊕B⊕C⊕B⊕C⊕D that is eectively A⊕B⊕C⊕D, which is a member of the
ControlFlowGraph set Acfa-Set.
1 byte A(byte inputValue ) {
2 for (byte i =0; i<inputValue ; i++){
3 i f ( i % 2 == 0) {
4 C( inputValue ) ;
5 } else {
6 B( inputValue ) ;
7 }
8 }
9 return D( inputValue ) ;
10 }
Listing 8.4: Handling loop statements in the control ow analysis.
8.3.7.3 Bytecode Integrity
The property le associated with an application stores the hash values of individual meth-
ods. When the runtime environment fetches an application, the runtime security manager
will measure the integrity value of individual methods of the application and compare them
with the hash values in the property le. Therefore, any method that is loaded to the heap
goes through the integrity validation. This validation protects against the fault attacks on
an application stored while it is stored on a non-volatile memory.
8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protection Mechanism
In this section, we evaluate the proposed counter-measures for their suitability against
the attacks discussed in section 8.2.2 under the adversary's capability detailed in section
8.3.2. Furthermore, we provide the latency analysis and performance measurements for
both serial and parallel runtime security managers.
8.4.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss how the proposed counter-measures protect against the combined
attacks under the attacker's capability detailed in section 8.3.2.
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8.4.1.1 Operand Stack Integrity
Barbu et al. [217] proposed an attack in which values stored on the operand stacks were
manipulated by fault injections. They also proposed a countermeasure to this attack that
was based on calculating the integrity measurement of the whole of the operand stack,
every time the state of the stack was required to be veried. We rened their approach
and removed the need to perform integrity measurement of the entire operand stack on
each validation. In addition, we made the validation process continuous thus checking
the integrity of the operand stack on each pop and push operation. If a malicious user
changes values on the operand stack, the runtime security manager can not only detect the
modication but can also provide error correction service by providing the correct value
that was stored on the operand stand. This is possible because the integrity stack stores
values pushed on to the operand stack as individual components of the integrity chain (i.e.
VIns-n=Sr⊕Σni=1Vi). Furthermore, our proposal also protects against parallel fault injection
attacks that could target both operand and integrity stack simultaneously. The reasoning
behind this is based on the use of Sr (random number) that makes the values stored on
the integrity stack unpredictable over dierent execution sessions of the same application.
Thus making it dicult for an adversary to know the values stored on the integrity stack,
even if he has the knowledge of all values on the operand stack.
8.4.1.2 Control Flow Analysis
The control ow analysis performed by the runtime security manager during the execution
of an application eectively prevents control ow attacks. If an attacker has the capability
of multiple fault injections simultaneously, (which is beyond the stated capability of our at-
tacker in section 8.3.2) then he can in theory aect the runtime security manager execution.
Nevertheless, even with simultaneous injection the attacker may be able to skip a node in
the execution tree but the runtime security manager calculation on the subsequent nodes
will reveal an illegal path of execution. Therefore, even in the parallel injection model the
runtime security manager will detect the erroneous execution path, unless the attacker will
constantly keep on introducing injections for the whole execution of an application.
8.4.1.3 Bytecode Integrity
This countermeasure is proposed to prevent an adversary to change an application while
it is stored on a non-volatile memory (capability four of an adversary discussed in sec-
tion 8.3.2). To avoid such modications, the runtime security manager generates a hash
of individual methods that are requested by the JCVM. If the hash matches the value
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stored (MethodIntegrity in listing 8.1) in the respective property le, the JCVM will
proceed with execution of the method; otherwise, the runtime security manager will signal
the termination of the application (and possibly mark it malicious and up for deletion).
Furthermore, this protection mechanism can also safeguard the dynamic loading of appli-
cations/classes/routines as part of the web server or other applications, which are stored
on o-card storage.
8.4.2 Evaluation Context
For evaluation of proposed counter-measures, we have selected four sample applications.
Two of the applications selected are part of the Java Card development kit distribution:
Wallet and Java Purse. The other two applications are the implementation of our pro-
posed mechanisms that include the oine attestation algorithm (section 4.5) and STCPSP
protocol (section 6.3).
8.4.3 Latency Analysis
As discussed before, latency is the number of instructions executed after an adversary
mounts an attack and the system becomes aware of it. Therefore, in this section we
analyse the latency of proposed counter-measures under the concept of serial and parallel
runtime security managers that are listed in table 8.1 and discussed subsequently.





Operand Stack Integrity 0 + i 3 + i
Control Flow Analysis 0 3(Cn)
Bytecode Integrity 0 0
In case of the operand stack integrity, the serial runtime security manager nds the oc-
currence of an error (e.g. fault injection) with latency 0+i, where `i' is the number of
instructions executed before the manipulated value reaches the top of the operand stack.
For example, consider an operand stack with values V1, V2, V3, V4, and V5, where V5 is
the value on the top. If an adversary changes the value of V3 by physical perturbation, then
the runtime security manager will not nd out about his change until the value is popped
out of the stack. Therefore, the value of `i' depends upon the number of instructions that
will execute until the V3 reaches the top of the operand stack and JCVM pops it out.
Similarly, the latency value in case of the operand stack integrity for the parallel runtime
security manager is 3+i, where `3' is the number of instructions required to perform a
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comparison on pop operation (On_Stack_Pop(poppedValue) in listing 8.2). The latency
value of the parallel runtime security manager is higher than the serial. This has to do
with the fact that while parallel runtime security manager is applying the security checks
the JCVM does not need to stop the execution of subsequent instructions.
Regarding the control ow analysis, the serial runtime security manager has a latency of
zero where the parallel runtime security manager has latency value of 3(Cn), where the
value Cn represents the number of legal jumps in the respective ControlFlowGraph set. To
explain this further, consider the example shown in gure 8.6. The ControlFlowGraph of
method B has four possible values (Bcfa-Set in section 8.3.7.2). Thereby, the latency value
for a jump in the method B in the worse case is 3(4) = 12. The value `3' represents the
number of instructions required to execute individual comparison.
A notable point to mention here is that all latency measurements listed in the table 8.2 are
based on the worst-case conditions. Furthermore, it is apparent that it might be dicult
to implement a complete parallel runtime security manager. To explain our point, consider
two consecutive jump instructions in which the parallel runtime security manager has to
perform control ow analysis. In such situation, there might be a possibility that while
the runtime security manager is still evaluating the rst jump, the JCVM might initiate
the second jump instruction. Therefore, this might create a deadlock between the JCVM
and parallel runtime security manager - we consider that either JCVM should wait for the
runtime security manager to complete the verication, or for the sake of performance the
runtime security manager might skip certain verications. We opt for the parallel runtime
security manager that will switch to the serial runtime security manager mode - restricting
the JCVM to proceed with next instruction until the runtime security manager can apply
the security checks. This situation will be further explained during the discussion on the
performance measurements in the next section.
8.4.4 Performance Analysis
To evaluate the performance impact of the proposed counter-measures we developed an
abstract virtual machine that takes the bytecode of each Java Card applet and then com-
putes the computational overhead for individual countermeasure. When a Java application
is compiled the java compiler (javac) produces a class le as discussed in section 8.2.1.
The class le is Java bytecode representation, and there are two possible ways to read class
les. We can either use a hex editor (an editor that shows a le in hexadecimal format)
to read the Java bytecodes or better utilise the javap tool that comes with Java Develop-
ment Kit (JDK). In our practical implementation, we opted for the javap as it produces
the bytecode representation of a class le in human-readable mnemonics as represented
in the JVM specication [200]. We used the javap to produce the mnenomic bytecode
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representation; the abstract virtual machine takes the mnenomic bytecode representation
of an application and searches for push, pop, and jump (e.g. method invokes) opcodes.
Subsequently, we calculated the number of extra instructions required to be executed in
order to implement the counter-measures discussed in previous sections.
Table 8.2: Performance measurement (percentage increase in computational cost)





Java Purse 30.30% 25.82%
Oine Attestation 17.64% 12.93%
STCPSP 38.48% 33.23%
To compute the performance overhead, we counted the number of instructions an applica-
tion has and how long the application takes to execute on our test Java Cards (e.g. C1 and
C3). After this measurement, we have associated costs based on additional instructions
executed for each JCVM instruction and calculated as an (approximate) increase in the
percentage of computational overhead and listed in table 8.2. Furthermore, to measure the
cost of the hash generation  we used the hash generation performance measurements for
the test Java Cards illustrated in gure 6.2.
For each application, the counter-measures have dierent computational overhead value
because they depend upon how many times certain instructions that invoke the counter-
measures are executed. Therefore, the computational overhead measurements in table 8.2
can only give us a measure of how the performance is aected in individual cases - without
generalising for other applications.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter we discussed the smart card runtime environment by taking the Java
Card as a running example. The JCRE was described with its dierent data structures
that it uses during the execution of an application. Subsequently, we discussed various
attacks that target the smart card runtime environment and most of these attacks based
on perturbation of the values stored by the runtime environment. These perturbations
are called fault injection, which was dened and mapped to an adversary's capability in
this chapter. Based on these recent attacks on the smart card runtime environment, we
proposed an architecture that includes the provision of a runtime security manager. We also
proposed various counter-measures and provided the computational cost imposed by these
counter-measures. No doubt, counter-measures that do not change the core architecture
the Java virtual machine, will almost always incur extra computational cost. Therefore, we
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concluded in this chapter that a better way forward would be to change the architecture
of the Java virtual machine. However, in the context of this thesis we showed that current
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In this chapter we analyse the backup and migration mechanisms that allow a user to se-
curely backup, migrate, and restore her smart card contents. These mechanisms enable a
user to retain the same set of applications if she loses her smart card or wants to move
to a new smart card. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the application dele-





One of the main features of the UCOM is dynamic (wherever, whenever) acquisition of
applications by users. Therefore, the UCOM framework enables a user to have most if not
all of her applications on a single device. However, this also increases the potential damage
if the device is lost. To expedite the recovery process after theft or loss, customers should
be able to have their applications restored as quickly as possible to a new devices.
A backup mechanism enables a user to backup her smart card contents. In adverse circum-
stances, such as losing her smart card, she could retrieve and restore the contents onto a
new smart card. Furthermore, a similar mechanism referred to as a migration mechanism
can also be used if a user decides to upgrade to a new feature-rich UCTD.
There are some subtle challenges to backup and migration mechanisms in the UCOM, espe-
cially in the case of card-bound application leases (section 5.4.3) that restrict applications
to their host smart cards. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the remote location (e.g.
backup server) might not be tamper-proof and a malicious user could take advantage of it.
Therefore, it would be safe to assume that instead of transferring whole applications (i.e.
code and data), we should only transfer application download credentials. These creden-
tials can be considered as authorisation tokens that are issued by the respective SPs, so a
user could use them to acquire the application in future.
Finally, we discuss the last lifecycle stage of an application  application deletion. As the
UCOM allows a user to install and delete any application they desire, this privilege might
lead to feature interaction problems discussed as SCR8 and SPR9 in section 3.5. Feature
interaction problems arise from environments where two applications share resources and
later at some point one of the applications is deleted. The second application's depen-
dencies on the rst application might not be resolved, which leads to a situation where
the second application tries to access the rst application, which no longer exists on the
platform. Such scenarios may lead to possible security breaches in the UCTD environment.
We analyse the application deletion process in prominent smart card frameworks: Java
Card, GlobalPlatform, and Multos, focusing on how they resolve deadlock conditions. A
deadlock condition arises when a user tries to delete an application `A' which is sharing re-
sources with an application `B'. Deleting the application `A' might aect the operations of
the application `B', eventually leading to a feature interaction problem. To avoid such sce-
narios, we propose a framework that tries to resolve such deadlocks during the application
deletion process.
Structure of the Chapter: Section 9.2 begins with a discussion on smart card contents
backup and migration mechanisms, followed by the application deletion process in section
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9.3. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a discussion on the decommissioning process in
section 9.4.
9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
In this section, we describe two mechanisms: backup and migration. In the contents backup
process, a user archives her smart card's contents to a backup server and then restores it
to the destination smart card. In the migration process, there is no backup server and the
smart card contents are transferred between a source and a destination smart card.
9.2.1 Backup Mechanism
In this proposal, instead of backing up the applications (i.e. data and source code) as we
traditionally do in desktop computing environments. We only backup the authorisation
tokens issued by SPs. The backup package that consists of authorisation tokens should be
stored at a secure location, preferably accessible ubiquitously on demand. When a user
wants to restore the contents of her old smart card, she has to import the backup package;
then the individual applications will be requested from their respective SPs automatically
by the smart card using the authorisation tokens.
In our proposal, a secure o-site backup facility is provided by a secure third party referred
to as a backup server. We do not consider that a backup server has to be an SP and the
only requirement is that users trust the backup server. A backup framework overview is
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Figure 9.1: Overview of the credential backup mechanism
1. A smart card user registers herself to a backup server using the Secure and Trusted
Channel Protocols (STCPs) proposed in chapter 6. After the registration, the backup
& restoration manager (gure 4.1) has the user's credentials and details of how to
connect with the respective backup server. The backup & restoration manager and
backup server will generate a shared secret that they will use in future sessions.
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As this shared secret is bound to the specic smart card, it is only used for secure
communication and not sealing (encrypting) the backup tokens.
2. After an application is installed on a smart card, the application can initiate the
request for an authorisation token only if it is sanctioned by the appropriate SP. We
opted for two possible scenarios: restorable and non-restorable applications. These
types are inspired by the security policy related to key migration in the TPM spec-
ication [18]. For restorable applications, an SP will issue its application with an
authorisation token, and the (host) smart card would only migrate this token to the
destination smart card or a backup server: for non-restorable, the respective SP will
not issue any authorisation token.
3. An SP sends its installed application the authorisation token (if it opts for it) that
consists of two sections as shown in gure 9.2. The rst section is a public section
that is not encrypted and it contains the SP's URL (Universal Resource Locator),
authorisation token identier, and optional section. The URL would instruct a smart
card where to establish the connection to download the application. The authorisa-
tion token identier uniquely identies the token and associated cryptographic keys.
The optional segment is made available for the SP/backup-server to include any
housekeeping information if necessary. The second section consists of an encrypted
message that may contain proprietary information that would ensure that the token
is genuine and is generated by the SP. The second section is encrypted by the SP with
its token authorisation key and the selection of this key is at the sole discretion of the
SP. The contents of this section include an application identier, a user identier and
a lease identier. The application identier refers to the application that was issued
to the user indicated by the user identier. The lease identier uniquely identies
the smart card to which the application was leased, along with any associated data,
including cryptographic keys (if each instance of the application lease has dierent
cryptographic keys). The application will then give the authorisation token to the
on-card backup & restoration manager.
Application Management Server (AMS) URL
Authorisation Token Identifier Optional













Figure 9.2: Structure of authorisation tokens generated by respective SPs
4. The backup & restoration manager will encrypt the set of authorisation tokens with
a package sealing key that is based on some secret that is known to the user. It
could be a password, a passphrase or a biometric  something that the user could
provide at the time of restoration to prove that she is the genuine user that created
the backup package. This key would be generated once, unless the user decided to
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change her password or passphrase. The simplest way to generate the package-sealing
key is to base it on the user's input. The size of the key and password length is based
on the backup server choice; however, we consider that an adequate selection should
be made by the backup server to provide a secure service.
At the time of restoration, the user will provide the backup & restoration manager of the
new smart card with the credentials for the backup server. The backup & restoration
manager and backup server will establish a secure relationship using the proposed STCPs.
Subsequently, the backup & restoration manager will download the authorisation tokens
from the backup server. These authorisation tokens are sealed by an encryption key based
on the user's input. The backup & restoration manager will request the user for the
relevant input and decrypt the backup package. After decryption of the package, the
backup & restoration manager will retrieve one authorisation token at a time and use its
public section to connect with the SP. To establish a secure channel and authenticate the
user to the given SP, we modify the STCPSP (discussed in section 6.3). In the fourth
message of the STCPSP, we replace the UCre with the authorisation token issued by the
SP.
Before an SP issues a new lease to the user, it terminates the existing lease. This means
that although the lost smart card is still usable, a user cannot utilise the downloaded
application to access sanctioned services because of the Personal Identication Number
(PIN) verication (if implemented) and the SP's back oce systems. If an application
requires PIN verication before it executes, the usual protection mechanism that disables
a smart card (or application) if the user enters the wrong PIN multiple times will suce.
Furthermore, the SP can simply blacklist the application, eectively prohibiting it from
accessing the sanctioned services. If the application tries to access these services, the SP
can instruct the application to block itself and if possible delete all data related to the
particular lease and user. One point to note is that in the UCOM, an SP can only block
its application, not the whole of the smart card. Nevertheless, an adversary can still use
an application only if it does not require a PIN verication and connection with its SP
when it executes.
9.2.2 Migration Mechanism
In the previous section, we discussed the structure of an authorisation token and framework
for backup to a remote server (e.g. backup server). In this section, we use the same
authorisation tokens but this time for migrating contents from one smart card to another.
Similar to the key migration in the TPM specication [18], two smart cards establish a
secure connection with each other and then transfer authorisation tokens. When a user
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initiates an application migration process, the TEM of the source smart card establishes a
secure channel with the destination smart card using the Platform Binding Protocol dis-
cussed in section 7.5. The destination smart card then requests the transfer of the authori-
sation tokens from the source smart card. The migration process rst deletes applications
from the source smart card, then transfers the authorisation token to the destination smart
card. The applications will be downloaded on the destination smart card in a manner sim-
ilar to that discussed in the previous section (e.g. application restoration). This process is
similar to the TPM key migration, except we use a dierent protocol to the one specied
by the TPM specication [18].
9.2.3 Analysis of the Backup and Migration Mechanism
In the smart card industry, there are not many examples of contents backup or migration
mechanisms that we can compare with ours. An example is the backup mechanism for
phone-book contacts, but even this mechanism is not like the one discussed in this chapter.
The closest we can relate to our proposal to is the TPM key migration architecture [18]. The
application migration process is similar to the TPM key migration and the only dierence
is that instead of migrating keys, we migrate the authorisation tokens to the destination
smart cards. In the smart card industry such mechanisms are not required due to the
ICOM architecture.
The contents backup mechanism eectively prevents smart card cloning and intellectual
property theft. In smart card cloning, a malicious user tries to copy applications from
a smart card to another card, without the permission of the respective SPs. To prevent
cloning of an application, the relevant SP is given the ability to make its application either
restorable or non-restorable. Therefore, the choice of moving the application to a new
smart card is not with the user but with the SP. Furthermore, the backup or migration
mechanism does not move the application data or/and code. In fact, even when the SP
sanctions its application to be restorable, the mechanism still relies on the SP to issue an
authorisation token. Without this authorisation token, the application can not be part of
the backup or the migration mechanism.
Intellectual property theft refers to the scenario where a malicious user tries to obtain
the application code (along with data). To do so, the malicious user has to access the
application on a non tamper-resistant device with minimal protection. Such a scenario
can arise if we move the entire application (code and data) o-card during the backup or
migration mechanisms. Therefore, by using authorisation tokens the backup and migration
mechanism eectively prevent intellectual property theft.
In addition, the lease of the application to the destination smart card is at the sole discre-
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tion of the SP. Therefore, after evaluating the operational and security capabilities of the
destination smart card, the SP can continue and lease its application. Furthermore, the
SP could rst block the lease of the previous application before leasing to the new smart
card. Nevertheless, there are certain concerns in the contents backup mechanism that are
related to the key that encrypts/decrypts the backup packages. The framework requires
the user to input a secret value that could be a long PIN, password, or passphrase that
can be exploited by an adversary. To avoid the use of weak user passwords it is recom-
mended the backup servers should take adequate measures by requiring users to choose
strong passwords. Furthermore, before a user can download authorisation tokens from
the backup server there should be some oine authorisation (e.g. activation of restoration
process on a backup server over the internet or telephone).
The migration mechanism is similar to the backup mechanism, except for one detail. It does
not require a backup server, so it avoids the need for user password-based cryptographic
keys. We consider that the backup & restoration manager of a given smart card should
support both the backup and migration mechanisms.
9.3 Application Deletion
In this section, we discuss the last stage in the lifecycle of an application: deletion of an
application.
9.3.1 Existing Framework
In the ICOM, post-issuance application installation or deletion is rare. Nevertheless, appli-
cation deletion is detailed in all of the major smart card platforms and operating systems.
In Multos, the application deletion process is the same as application loading depicted in
gure 5.2. The only dierences are that in the deletion process, there is no application
load unit generator, and an application provider or a card issuer requests the Multos
Certication Authority for the application deletion certicate instead of the application
load certicate [97]. The on-card deletion process simply deletes the application data and
code. As applications on a Multos card do not have interdependencies, the deletion process
does not need to be concerned about the feature interaction problem (section 3.5.3). In
the application sharing mechanism of the Multos cards (section 7.2.2), a client application
may still make a delegation request. However, because it is just an APDU message, the
delegation mechanism can return an error that should be handled by the client application.
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The application deletion process in the GlobalPlatform card specication can be initiated
by any entity that has the privilege to execute a delete command. An application provider
or a card issuer (TSM) can issue a delete command that is accompanied by mandatory
authorisation parameters to authenticate to the respective smart card(s). The deletion
process is handled by the OPEN framework of the GlobalPlatform specication and it
performs several checks before proceeding with the deletion of an application. The checks
include verifying the deletion request (e.g. delete token [30]), conrming whether the ap-
plication requested for deletion is referenced by another application, and other optional
housekeeping checks. If these verications fail, the GlobalPlatform specication states that
the deletion process should be terminated. We have two concerns with the GlobalPlatform
deletion process. Firstly, how it can determine that an application is referenced, which is
generally part of the application sharing mechanism. As stated in the GlobalPlatform card
specication [30], the specication relies on the underlying platform implementation for the
application sharing mechanism. Therefore, this test the deletion process requires the sup-
port of the underlying platform's application sharing mechanism (section 7.2). Secondly, if
an application is referenced, then why terminate the deletion process? Instead, one could
resolve the interdependencies and then proceed with the deletion process. Unfortunately,
the GlobalPlatform card specication does not detail the resolution of interdependencies
among dierent applications on a smart card.
The Java Card 2.x and 3.x classic editions have similar schemes, as detailed in the Glob-
alPlatform card specication. The Java Card specication [28] stipulates that the Java
Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) should not attempt to delete an application if it is
being referenced from another application. However, the Java Card 3.x connected edition
extends the deletion framework and attempts to resolve the interdependencies among dif-
ferent applications. The Java Card 3.x connected edition's application deletion mechanism
is based on events and associated listeners. The events mechanism enables an application to
register/un-register itself for events generated by other applications, and also enables it to
generate similar events. The connected edition denes an event for application deletion as
an application instance deletion request event (event:///standard/app/deleted) [16].
By doing so, a client application can register itself to the deletion events of a server appli-
cation. Therefore, when the server application is requested to be deleted by an authorised
entity, the card manager of a Java Card will instruct the server application regarding the
deletion request that in return can signal the deletion event. The client application, on
receipt of such event, can perform the tasks needed to remove the dependencies on the
server application. The card manager will then proceed with checking whether there are
any applications that still have dependencies on the server application. If the dependencies
of such applications cannot be removed, the card manager will terminate the deletion pro-
cess. One thing to note is that it is optional for server and client applications to register,
signal and manage any events.
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The deletion mechanism for the Java Card 3.x connected edition is a positive step towards
provisioning an architecture where application installation and deletion will be more com-
mon than before. The deletion mechanism for the UCOM architecture is based on the Java
Card 3.x connected edition with compulsory components and includes the provision for a
cascade deletion process.
9.3.2 Application Deletion in the UCOM
The deletion process in the UCOM is based on the Java Card 3.x connected edition speci-
cation, which is extended by the cascade deletion mechanism. Cascade deletion enables a
smart card to proceed with the deletion of any dependent applications if their dependencies
cannot be resolved in a satisfactory manner. A smart card can only proceed with cascade
deletion if the cardholder explicitly sanctions it. The deletion process for the UCOM is
illustrated in gure 9.3 and described below:
In gure 9.3, the hard-bordered rectangles represent operations, the rhombus shapes rep-
resent the if-then-else conditional statement that is part of the operation that precedes it.
The quadrilaterals with curved vertical sides represent the data structures (e.g. les). The
dotted lines represent data read or write operations: if the arrowhead points to the data
structure then it is a write operation; otherwise, it is a read operation. During the descrip-
tion of the deletion process, we italicise individual operations (e.g. operation) and refer to
a data structure with double quotes (e.g. data structure). Most of the processes repre-
sented in the gure 9.3 are part of application installation & deletion manager illustrated
in gure 4.1.
On receipt of the application deletion request from either the user or the SP, the applica-
tion deletion will rst check whether the application is installed on the smart card. For
illustration, we call the application that is requested to be deleted AppD. If AppD is
present on the card, then it will be registered as an installed application in the registry
maintained by the application installation & deletion manager. In this case, when AppD
is present, the request is forwarded to the application deletion handler, which will retrieve
the application sharing record maintained by the smart card rewall and check whether
AppD has any dependent applications.
If the application does not have any dependent applications, the mark application gathers
the application-related information and records it in the le applications for deletion.
Next, it checks that the application is not part of any application-sharing tree  meaning
there are no application dependencies to resolve. In this scenario, it might seem a redundant
check but this step will become necessary when AppD has dependences. In the next step,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































authorises it, rst the remove dependencies removes any dependencies, which is followed
by the application removal. The application removal will rst notify the SP (notify SP),
which might perform some housekeeping tasks like depersonalisation of the application
or/and transfer of any log les. Depersonalisation of the application involves removal
of all user-related data along with any cryptographic material. Furthermore, transfer of
the application log les [231] to the SP that might contain the usage information of the
application, which might be necessary for fraud prevention or detection along with evidence
of certain activities. After the housekeeping is completed, the application removal requests
the card security manager (section 4.2.2) to delete the domain credentials and reclaim the
memory. After a successful outcome, the application removal checks whether there are any
more applications to delete. If not, then the deletion process will terminate.
In second case, if the application deletion handler nds dependencies, then it will generate
the dependent application list. The dependency resolver will take the list of applications
that are dependent and also ones that registered themselves as listeners to the deletion
request for AppD. The dependency resolver generates the deletion event for the AppD and
noties all applications that are registered to this event. If the applications can gracefully
resolve the dependency then it will record them in the resolvable dependency. For this
step, we rely on the dependent application's response, which might be malicious. If a
dependent application AppC might signals that it can remove the dependency, but does
not take any action regarding this, its aim might be to use the reference to the AppD for
some malicious purpose. However, we protect the platform from such eventualities: the
rewall mechanism will also remove the record that the AppC is authorised to access the
AppD reference (a memory reference to AppD's application resource manager: gure 7.3).
The rewall mechanism can eectively prevent the memory access; however, the main aim
of dependency resolution is to avoid any eventualities in which a dependent application
might not be able to execute reliably in the future.
The dependency resolver will keep on iterating through the dependent applications list
until it reaches the end of it. It will then check whether there are any unresolved de-
pendencies. If yes, then it moves to the cascade deletion handler; otherwise, it will check
whether it is at the last application in the applications for deletion. The cascade deletion
handler takes the list of unresolved dependencies list and iterates through it, signalling the
deletion of the respective applications. For each application, the dependency analysis is
performed. This process is iterated until the list of all applications required to be deleted
is compiled: applications for deletion. At this stage, the user is notied by the notify
user and the applications for deletion is communicated. If the user authorises the card to
go ahead with the deletion of the applications, the remove dependencies will rst remove
any dependencies. A point to note is that we leave the dependence removal process to the
end: if the respective user does not authorise the deletion, at least we will not delete any
application sharing instances. Therefore, before the user authorises the deletion, the entire
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process only tries to nd dependent applications and point out to the user the list of appli-
cations that cannot resolve their dependencies on AppD. The application removal process
will then iterate through the applications for deletion and delete them one at a time.
In cases where the deletion request was initiated by the SP of the AppD, and it requires
deletion of other applications that do not belong to the SP, the user will still be notied. If
the user opts for not deleting it, the SP can then proceed with blocking the AppD. In the
block state, an application is not accessible to the user; however, dependent applications
can still access it through the application sharing mechanism.
As discussed before, the UCOM deletion process only provides dependent applications
with an opportunity to gracefully resolve their dependencies. If an application does not
have such a mechanism, the UCOM deletion process marks that application for deletion.
Furthermore, during the deletion process the AppD's resource manager that maintains the
access to the application via the smart card rewall is removed. Thus, if a dependent
application tries to access AppD resources, the rewall mechanism will reject that request.
If the application does not gracefully proceed after the rewall rejects its request, the card
security manager can either block the application or mark it for deletion. Therefore, any
application that aects the reliability of the smart card platform will be removed or at
least blocked by the card security manager.
9.4 Decommissioning Process
The decommissioning process in the UCOM involves deletion of all applications from a
UCTD and removal of any user-specic data stored by the respective TEM or UCTD
platform managers (section 4.2). The decommissioning process is initiated by the user
in a manner similar to the ownership acquisition process (section 4.6.3). However, in the
decommissioning process the user requests a UCTD to delete all applications in a manner
similar to the one discussed in the previous section but this time the UCTD does not check
for dependencies. Once all applications are deleted, the card security manager will delete
the user-specic cryptographic keys (e.g. user signature key) and associated certicates.
It will then request the deletion of ownership credentials that the user has set during the
ownership acquisition process. After the decommissioning process is completed, the UCTD
reverts to the state it was in when the user acquired it from the card manufacturer (or




In this chapter, we began by describing the smart card contents backup and migration
mechanisms. Both of these mechanisms aim to provide a dynamic architecture to recover
from the loss of a UCTD or migration to a new UCTD. These mechanisms are in line with
the original statement of purpose for the UCOM environment. In subsequent sections,
we discussed the application deletion process in the existing smart card platforms, and
how they relate to the proposed deletion mechanism for the UCTD. Discussion on the
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions
The main goal of this thesis was to explore the viability of user ownership for a security
sensitive device whose architecture is based on smart card technology. The introduction
of this user ownership aects all stages of the smart card and application lifecycle, which
we analysed during the course of this thesis.
We began the discussion by mapping the security and privacy landscape from three dierent
computing elds: smart cards, mobiles and traditional computing environments. These
computing devices are used by individual users with an ever growing reliance on them, so
there needs to be a unied security and privacy-preserving architecture that can be easily
integrated to any of these computing devices. We consider that the User Centric Tamper-
Resistant Device (UCTD) has the potential to deliver such a unied (services) architecture.
We provided the rationale for the UCTD framework. To explain how we selected an
appropriate base architecture for the UCTDs, we provided a comparison between dierent
proposals that included TPM, AEGIS, ARM TrustZone, M-Shield, and GlobalPlatform's
TEE and the smart card architecture. This comparison gave us a clear indication that
the smart card architecture is the one most suited to be a UCTD that supports unied
security, trust, and privacy architecture for dierent computing devices. However, the
issue with smart card technology is its ownership architecture that is stringently under
a centralised authority. A possible solution is to delegate smart card ownership from a
centralised authority to its users.
Before we delved into the core of the thesis, we provided a detailed coverage of dierent own-
ership models that exist in the smart card ecosystem. We began with the centralised control
of smart cards provided by the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM), and
discussed its advantages and drawbacks. We then briey examined dierent proposals
that support the ICOM framework, including Java Card, Multos and GlobalPlatform. We
referred to these prominent ICOM frameworks throughout the thesis, comparing and con-
trasting our proposal with them. This short introduction to the ICOM frameworks was
provided to set the scenery and to help the reader understand the present characteristics
of dierent frameworks that support the ICOM.
Subsequently, we discussed the frameworks in the smart card industry that come close to
providing the user ownership. Unfortunately, the concept of ownership as described in our
proposal of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) is not close to any
of the existing proposals. The concept of ownership in UCOM has to do with freedom
of choice and not complete control of the smart card device as the card issuers have in
the ICOM. Therefore, the concept of freedom of choice can be considered a novel idea in
the context of the smart card technology. We identied dierent stakeholders and their
security and operational requirements. This discussion served as an introduction to the
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concept of the UCOM that enables a smart card to become a UCTD. The structure of the
rest of the thesis was closely aligned with the lifecycle stages of a smart card, including
manufacture, downloading applications, application execution, and nally the deletion of
the applications and decommissioning of the smart card.
As previous frameworks including GlobalPlatform, Java Card, and Multos mainly support
the ICOM initiative; therefore, we rst analysed whether these can support the user owner-
ship proposal. During the design of the UCOM-based smart card architecture, the strategy
that we opted for was to adopt, modify, and introduce new components where required to
existing ICOM-based smart card architectures in a way that supports the proposed user
ownership. This idea became the root of all of our proposals in this thesis.
We dened a short list of services, based on the GlobalPlatform architecture, which support
the user ownership, smart card, and application management operations. A major issue
introduced by the UCOM was decentralisation of the trust architecture that has been
deployed in the smart card industry. Traditionally, in the ICOM framework, the trust
resided in the card issuer and an application provider was only required to trust the card
issuer, and vice versa. Whereas, by giving the ownership of the smart cards to their
users we removed the card issuers altogether, leaving a vacuum in the traditional trust
architecture. We replaced the traditional trust architecture that relied on the card issuer,
and moved it to the smart card itself.
We proposed a security assurance and validation mechanism based on third party indepen-
dent security evaluation and a platform-independent trustworthy component on a smart
card. Both of these proposals enable a remote application provider (that we refer to as
Service Provider (SP) in the UCOM) to ascertain the security assurance of a smart card.
The platform-independent trustworthy component on a smart card is referred to as the
Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM), which is similar to the TPM. The
TEM provides an attestation mechanism that certies that the state of the smart card is
as it was at the time of evaluation (i.e. in a trustworthy state). To do so, we proposed two
attestation mechanisms termed as online and oine attestation mechanisms. To support
each type of the attestation mechanism we also proposed two self-test mechanisms based
on the Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) and Physical Unclonable functions
(PUFs). Furthermore, as the name suggests the online attestation mechanism requires
an entity to vouch for the trustworthiness of a smart card. In our proposal, it is the
card's manufacturer. Therefore, to support the online attestation mechanism we proposed
a protocol that we referred to as the attestation protocol.
Once a smart card is manufactured, evaluated, and acquired by a user, the framework that
comes next is the smart card management architecture. The management architecture
is responsible for establishing a relationship with SPs and acquiring their applications by
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giving the user authentication credentials for these SPs. We discuss the card manage-
ment architectures proposed by GlobalPlatform, and Multos. The rationale behind not
discussing the Java Card was to do with its support for the GlobalPlatform. We briey de-
scribed the shortfalls of both GlobalPlatform and Multos card management architectures.
Subsequently, we modied the architecture specied by GlobalPlatform in a way that sup-
ported the application installation mechanism of the UCOM. Later, we also proposed the
possible attacks that are unique to the UCOM proposal along with how a smart card can
adequately implement protection against them.
Based on the card management architecture, we proceeded with the application installation
process. The installation process rst requires a secure channel to be established between
a smart card and an SP. It also requires that an SP is able to ascertain the trustworthiness
of the smart card  to enable the SP to verify whether the given smart card supports the
SP's security policy for the application lease. For this purpose, we dened the security and
operational requirements for a Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (STCP) for UCOM-
based smart cards. We proposed three protocols that satisfy the UCOM requirements and
these protocols were subjected to the CasperFDR tool for a mechanical formal analysis. We
performed the mechanical formal analysis on the STCPs for the sake of completeness. In
addition to this, we provided performance results of test implementations and compared
them with existing protocols. Our proposed STCPs not only satised the security and
operational requirements of the UCOM but also provided an ecient performance. After
establishing a secure and trusted channel protocol, an SP may proceed with the application
download to the requesting smart card.
A downloaded application on a smart card may establish data and resource sharing with
other applications. Both Java Card and Multos support the application sharing mechanism;
however, their proposals take two opposite approaches. We discussed both approaches and
detailed the reasons why they fail the UCOM's requirements. Subsequently, we proposed a
smart card rewall mechanism based on the Java Card application sharing mechanism that
supports the UCOM's requirements. To support this proposal, a dynamic mechanism is
needed that not only authenticates the applications but also ascertains whether the current
states of the applications are secure. For this purpose, we proposed a symmetric key-based
protocol that a client and server application can use to authenticate and validate each
other's state. Later, we extended the application sharing mechanism that traditionally
only supports sharing between the applications on a single smart card, to one that allows
applications installed on dierent smart cards to share their data and resources. We
termed this extension as Cross-Device Application Sharing and to support this proposal
we detailed two protocols that establish relationships between individual smart cards and
applications. All proposed protocols were subjected to mechanical formal analysis by
CasperFDR and their test performance measures were provided along with comparisons
with other protocols. Once an application is installed and it has established any sharing
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with other applications (if required), the next lifecycle stage is the application execution.
The smart card runtime environment provides a secure and reliable platform for the exe-
cuting applications. From an adversary's point of view, attacking an application while it
is executing might yield desirable results, such as skipping any security checks (e.g. PIN
verication). To achieve this, the runtime environment is subjected to dierent types of
attacks, including fault injections. Most of the attacks proposed in the literature target an
open smart card on which an adversary can install his application, which is dicult in the
traditional ICOM framework. However, the open and dynamic nature of the UCOM allows
such a facility. This opens up the UCOM proposal to attacks that are specically designed
to target the reliable and safe execution of an application. We described the architecture
of the Java Card runtime environment, which was followed by a discussion on how an
adversary can aect the execution of an application. To harden the runtime environment
from adversarial perturbations, we proposed protection mechanisms. We proposed that the
TEM should take a vital role in providing dynamic protection by getting involved during
the execution of an application. These mechanisms were then analysed for their latency
and performance measurements. This discussion can be considered as a survey of the vul-
nerabilities of the smart card runtime environment that will have an adverse eect on the
UCOM proposal, along with the limitations of the proposed protection mechanisms. We
articulated that any protection mechanism built on top of the runtime environment would
inadvertently introduce a performance penalty. We concluded from this survey that at the
time when the Java Card virtual machine was designed, the focus was on reliability and
performance. Their design did not take into account the fault injection and combined at-
tacks. We recommend that a bottom-up approach should be taken  rather than putting
extra layers on top of the runtime environment, redesigning it might be a better option.
Finally, we discussed the last lifecycle state of a smart card and an application in the
UCOM framework. A user might lose and want to recover contents onto her new smart
card, or want to upgrade to a feature-rich smart card. We proposed contents backup
and migration mechanisms that support both of these scenarios without compromising the
SP's security requirements. Furthermore, we detailed the application deletion mechanism
deployed in both Java Card and Multos, illustrating that they may both be unsuitable
for the UCOM architecture. The main issue was that if application dependencies are not
resolvable, the application will not be deleted. To mitigate this, we proposed a cascade
deletion process that supports the deletion of dependent application, if authorised by the
user. This discussion completed the lifecycle for both a smart card and an application,
supporting a dynamic and open framework that allows a user to have the choice to install
or delete applications from their smart cards.
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Our intention in this work was to analyse the feasibility of giving the ownership of a
security- and reliability-critical device like a smart card to its user. We aimed to explore
the possibilities that it would bring, and new application scenarios that might open up
for the smart card-based services deployment. We have achieved our goals by providing a
pathway for UCTDs and user centric smart cards, which not only provides security and
reliability assurance to SPs but also give users freedom of choice. However, we consider
that there is a long journey ahead for the user centric smart card proposal and there are
many suggestions for possible improvements and directions for future research.
There can be possible improvements in the hardware protection and remote attestation
mechanism for the UCOM framework. An attestation mechanism that not only provides
the assurance that the current state of the smart card is secure as stated by the appropriate
evaluation authority, but also the uses hardware that will simplify the remote assurance
mechanism. Furthermore, we need to provide security and reliability characterisation,
classication, and formalisation of smart card / application services. We might employ
mechanisms similar to those implemented in service-oriented computing architecture, tak-
ing smart cards and applications as two services that need to ascertain whether they can
support each other's requirements. This work may lead to devising a language (semantics)
to describe the above mentioned features as is done in Web Service Description Language
(WSDL). Such a language can be used to create third party evaluation certicates, which
in our proposal is the CC authority.
An application tagging mechanism tags segments of an application with security and/or
reliability levels, which instruct the runtime environment to apply adequate checks during
the execution of the application. To support the application tagging mechanism in the
UCOM, we need to have an on-card mechanism that can verify the security and reliability
tags. Therefore, an adversary cannot take advantage of such a framework to subvert
a smart card's runtime protection. We refer to on-card analysis as on-card application
behavioural analysis, which is similar to bytecode analysis but is focused on the nature of
an application segment and its associated tag.
One of the major future research directions is the smart card runtime environment, and
its security and reliability in the presence of malicious applications, fault, and combined
attacks. As discussed above, we need to look into the design of the virtual machine and
build the protection from there, rather than implementing them in a piecemeal manner.
This requires the study of existing virtual machines and language architectures, to nd
out a balance between performance, and runtime-protection. This work may reduce the
number of opcodes assigned in the Java virtual machine, and/or redening the execution
structure.
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Finally, we should be able to gain assurance of feature independence, during the application
deletion process. A framework should be designed such that dependency resolutions should
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In this appendix, we discuss the selected protocols that are used for comparison with the our
proposed protocols in this thesis. The protocols are compared on the basis of a pre-dened set
of security and operation goals for the UCTD environment. The selection of the protocols
was intentionally kept broad to include well-known (studied) Internet protocols, along with
protocols designed for mobile and smart card environments. This selection provides a well-
balanced comparison with the proposed protocols in terms of pre-dened goals.
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A.1 Protocol Notation and Terminology
The notation used to describe protocols in this appendix is as below.
Table A.1: Protocol notation and terminology
Notation Description
SC Denotes a smart card (in context of this thesis).
T T P Denotes the trusted third party.
SP Denotes an SP (in context of this thesis).
Xi Indicates the identity of an entity X.
NX a random number generated by entity X.
gX Die-Hellman exponential generated by an entity X.
h(Z) The result of applying a hash algorithm (e.g. SHA-256) on data Z.
kX−Y Encryption key shared between entities X and Y.
mkX−Y MAC key for symmetric algorithms shared between entities X and Y.
BX Private decryption key associated with an entity X.
VX Public encryption key associated with an entity X.
fK(Z) Result of applying MAC algorithm on data Z with key K.
zKX(Z) Result of encrypting data Z using public key algorithm (e.g. RSA) with
key KX .
eK(Z) Result of encrypting data Z using symmetric key algorithm (e.g. AES)
with key K.
SignX(Z) Is the signature on data Z with the signature key belonging to the entity
X using a signature algorithm like DSA or based on the RSA function.
CertSX Is the certicate for the signature key belonging to the entity X.
CertEX Certicate for the public key belonging to the entity X.
X → Y : C Entity X sends a message to entity Y with contents C.
X||Y Represents the concatenation of data items X and Y.
A.2 Station-to-Station (STS) Protocol
The STS protocol provides a three-pass mutual entity authentication and mutual explicit
key authentication to two communicating parties [174]. The protocol described in this
section is from the Meneze et al. [146], which includes an encrypted certicate from the
smart card to provide privacy preservation.
STS-1. SC → SP : gSC
SP : kSC−SP = (gSC)SP
The smart card (SC) initiates the STS protocol by generating a Die-Hellman exponential
and communicating it to the server (SP). The SP will generate a shared secret by kSC−SP
from the shared public key of the SC (i.e. gSC) with the private key of the SP (i.e. NSP ).
STS-2. SP → SC : gSP ||ekSC−SP (SignSP (gSP ||gSC))||CertSSP
SC : kSC−SP = (gSP )SC
In response, the SP generates a public key (e.g. gSP ) along with encrypting the signature
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on the public keys generated by both communicating entities. The public key, encrypted
signature and the certicate for the SP is sent to the SC. The certicate is sent in
plaintext; therefore, in this protocol there is no privacy protection for the SP (i.e. which
is not necessary to have as most of the servers have public addresses: Internet addresses).
The SC will generate the shared secret key similar to the SP (in previous message). The
SC will decrypt the signature and then verify the signature on the public keys generated
by the both SP and SC. This is to avoid man-in-the-middle attack.
STS-3. SC → SP : ekSC−SP (SignSC(gSP ||gSC)||CertSSC)
The SC will sign the public keys generated by the SC and SP then append the certicate.
The entire message is then encrypted by the shared secret key kSC−SP . This message
provides mutual entity authentication, and mutual explicit key authentication along with
preventing the man-in-the-middle attack.
A.3 Aziz-Die (AD) Protocol
The AD protocol was proposed for the wireless local area networks [175] and unlike STS
it does not rely on the Die-Hellman exponentials to generate the shared secretes.
AD-1. SC → SP : CertESC ||CertSSC ||NSC
The AD protocol is started by the SC that generates a random number NSC , append it
with the SC encryption key pair certicate.
AD-2. SP → SC : zVSC(NSP )||CertESP ||CertSSP ||SignSP (zVSC(NSP )||NSC)
On receiving the rst message, the SP will generate a random number NSP and encrypt
it with the SC's public key. It then appends the signature key pair certicate along with
a signed message that includes the encrypted random number of the SP along with the
random number sent by the SC.
AD-3. SC → SP : zVSP (r′SC)||SignSC(zVSP (r′SC)||zVSC(NSP ))
SC, SP : kSC−SP = r′SC +NSP
The SC, on receiving the second message will rst decrypt the SP's random number and
then veries the signature. Subsequently, the SC generates another random number r′SC .
Now the SC can now generate the shared key kSC−SP by adding the r′SC with the SP's
random number.
The SC will encrypt the r′SC with the public key of the SP and generate a signature on
the encrypted random numbers from SC and SP. On receipt, the SP can also generate




The ASPeCT protocol is designed as part of the European Commission ACTS project
ASPeCT [232], which focuses on the mobile network environment for value-added trans-
actions. Earlier versions of the ASPeCT protocol is proposed in Martin et al. [176], and
Horn and Preneel [177]. However, in this section we describe the protocol as it is detailed
in the Horn et al. [168]. Additional notations required for the description of the ASPeCT
are as below:
IDT identier of the smart card's certication authority.
CertSt certied (static) public key agreement key (gSP ) of the SP.
h1, h2, h3 one-way hash functions, that are detailed in Horn and Preneel [177].
cd details of the charging data.
TS time stamp.
py payment conrmation.
ASPeCT-1. SC → SP : gSC ||IDT
SP : kSC−SP = h1(NSP ||(gSC)SP )
The SC generates a Die-Hellman exponential gSC and append it with the identity of the
smart card's certication authority (IDT ). On receipt of this message, the SP generates
the shared secret key by using the gSC , public key agreement key gSP along with a random
number generated by the SP .
ASPeCT-2. SP → SC : NSP ||h2(kSC−SP ||NSP ||Si)||CertSt
SC : kSC−SP = h1(NSP ||(gSP )SC)
SC : H = h3(gSC ||gSP ||NSP ||IDSP ||cd||TS||py)
In response, the SP adds the random number NSP appended with the hash generated by
the function h2 on the generated key (for key authentication), NSP , and identity of the
SP. Finally, appending the certicate of the public key agreement key (e.g. gSP ).
On reception of the second message, the SC retrieves the public key agreement key (gSP )
and then follow the similar steps like SP to generate the shared secret key. After generating
the kSC−SP , the SC will authenticate the shared key by generating the hash with function
h2 and match with the one received in the message 2. If it matches then SC got the key
authentication from the SP.
The SC will then generate the transaction that includes the several elements from the
rst two message along with the charging details associated with the particular SC, which
contains the time stamp and payment details (py). All these elements are then hashed
using the function h3 and the output is referred as H.
ASPeCT-3. SC → SP : ekSC−SP (SignSC(H)||CertSSC , py)
In response, the SC will sign the H (that is used as non-repudiation of the transaction).
It then appends the signature key certicate for the SC and payment details. The entire
message is then encrypted by the shared secret key.
234
A.5 Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) Protocol
The SP will decrypt the message and a successful decryption provides the key authenti-
cation. It then veries the signature and process the transaction.
A.5 Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) Protocol
Aiello et al. [178] proposed two variants of JFK protocol, with dierence based on who
initiate the protocol. In this thesis, we refer to JFKi that provides identity protection
for initiator (e.g. smart card) even against active attacks. In the JFKi, the smart card
initiates the session that is described below:
JFKi-1. SC → SP : h(NSC)||gSC ||IDS′
The initiator (SC) generates a random number (NSC) and sends its hash along with Die-
Hellman exponential (gSC) appended with requirement of the SC about authentication
information that the SP should use in subsequently messages. The requirement of the SC
is indicated by IDS′
JFKi-2. SP : SSP = SignSP (gSP ||grpinfoR)
SP : SID = fmkSP (gSP ||NSP ||h(NSC)||IPSC)
SP → SC : h(NSC)||NSP ||gSP ||grpinfoR||IDSP ||SSP ||SID
In response, the SP also generates a random number and Die-Hellman exponentials. The
SP then sends the h(NSC) along with the grpinfoR and IDSP . The grpinfoR indicates
to the SC the set of Die-Hellman groups supported by the SP. The IDSP provides the
authentication information of SP that was request by the SC in message one. Furthermore,
the SP generates a signature on the generated gSP and grpinfoR, and nally append the
session identier (SID) to safeguard against possible DoS attacks.
JFKi-3. SC : K = (gSP )SC
SC : kUS = fK(h(NSC)||NSP ||′′1′′)
SC : mkUS = fK(h(NSC)||NSP ||′′2′′)
SC : mE = ekUS (Ui||SignSC(h(NSC)||NR||g
SC ||gSP ||Si))
SC → SP : NSC ||NSP ||gSC ||gSP ||mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)||SID
The SC generates the session encryption and MAC keys from the shared secret (K). The SC
then generates a message including identities of communicating entities, random numbers
generated during the session, and Die-Hellman exponentials. The SC then signs this
message and later encrypts it. The encrypted message is then MACed and sent to the SP.
JFKi-4. SP : mE = ekUS (SignSP (h(NSC)||NR||g
SC ||gSP ||Ui))
SP → SC : mE||fmkSC−SP (mE)
In response the SP generates a signature that includes random numbers, Die-Hellman
exponentials and identity of the SC. The signed message is then encrypted and MACed
before sending it to the SC.
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A.6 Trusted Transport Layer Protocol (T2LS) Protocol
In this thesis, the T2LS protocol described by Gasmi et al. [165] is used that is described
in this section. The messages listed below are on top of the existing TLS protocol that we
do not detail in this section.
T2LS-1. SC → SP : NSC ||CertSSCbind ||CertSSCAIK
The SC initiates the protocol by sending a random number (NSC) along with associated
TPM's certicates (e.g. CertSSCbind and CertSSCAIK ). The TPM is part of the computing
platform that the SC is using to connect to the SP. This message initiates the TLS
protocol, the SC appends the ClientHello[ciphersuites,hell_ext_list,nonce]
In response, the SP sends the ServerHello[ciphersuites,hell_ext_list,nonce], fol-
lowed by key exchange message and completion of security parameter negotiations between
the SP and SC.
T2LS-2. SC → SP : zVSP (SessionKeySC ||CDSSC ||NSP )
The SC will verify the SP's TPM certicates (e.g. CertSSP bind and CertSSPAIK ). The
SC encrypts its generated session key along with conguration of TPM and TLS protocol
in CDSSC . The public encryption key of the SP is used to encrypt the message.
The SP decrypts the message and validates the CDSSC and the received random number
T2LS-3. SP → SC : zVSC(SessionKeySP ||CDSSP ||NSC)
The SP generates an attestation blob similar to the one generated by the SC in previous
message. On receipt of message three, the SC will verify the CDSSP and NSC .
The trust in the T2LS comes from the values of CDS and verication of the CDS values
by the communicating entities. If the CDS value of a client is satisfactory to the server,
then it can trust the state of the client, and vice versa.
Key Generation.
SC & SP : ms = PRF (NSC ||NSP ||SessionKeySC ||SessionKeySP )
SC & SP : kSC−SP = PRF (ms||CDSSC ||SDSSP )
On receipt of message three, both the SC and SP will proceed with generating the ses-
sion key kSC−SP . The notation of PRF listed above refers to the pseudorandom number
generator used by the SC and SP to generate the keys.
A.7 Secure Channel Protocol - 81 (SCP81) Protocol
The GlobalPlatform specication for the SCP81 [169] do not change the message structure
of the TLS protocol [100]. They provide a structure of how a smart card and a remote
administrator authority can use the TLS protocol for remote management of the smart
card contents. In this section, we suce by describing the TLS protocol, which is also
useful to the T2LS protocol as the messages discussed in section A.6 are ones that modify
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the traditional TLS protocol.
SCP81-1. SP → SC : SPi||NSP ||SID||PSP ||CertESP←TTP
The rst two messages are referred as the protocol handshake. The SP initiates the
protocol and generates a random number (NSP ), append it with the SP identity. The SP
also includes the session identier (SID) and preferred parameters for the TLS in PSP .
The SID is an arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the SP.
SCP81-2. SC → SP : NSC ||SID||PSC ||CertESC←TTP
In response, the SC sends a random number and PSC . On receipt of this message, the SP
generates a premaster-secret that can be Die-Hellman exponentials. For the description
of the TLS in this thesis, we use the Die-Hellman scheme as the session key generation
in the TLS.
SCP81-3. SP : SSP = SignSP (SPi||gSP ||N ′SP ||NSC)
SP : ESP = zVSP (gSP ||N ′SP )
SP → SC : ESP ||SSP ||CertSSP
The SP generates a Die-Hellman exponential, a new random number and append it with
a signed message (SSP ). The SSP is used to authenticate the SP to the SC. The SP also
includes the signature key and encryption key certicates, which are veried by the SC on
receipt of message three.
SCP81-4. SC : SSC = SignSC(gSC ||N ′SC ||N ′SP )
SC : ESC = zVSC(gSC ||N ′SC)
SC → SP : ESC ||SSC ||CertSSC
The SC will perform same operations as the SP has performed in message three. The
signed message from the SC authenticates it to the SP. After message four, both SC
and SP can generate the master-secret (KSC−SP ) from the generated random numbers
and premaster-secrets by using a pseudorandom number generator (PRF ). Subsequently,
session keys and MAC key are generated from the master-secret. Both SC and SP use
separate keys of encrypting data between them; meaning SC uses one key to send a message
to SP, where in response SP uses a dierent key.
Before proceeding with communications between the SC and SP for the purpose the TLS
session was establish, both entities will rst send nished message. The nished message
conrms all the details of agreed during the handshake and verify whether they are being
changed.
A.8 Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) Protocol
The MM protocol is based on the GlobalPlatform SCP10 [30]. Before we describe the
protocol, we introduces few new notations
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CertS certied (static) public key agreement key (gSP ) of the SP.
CertU certied (static) public key agreement key (gSC) of the SC.
{x, y, z} implies that items in the curly brackets represents an optional message.
MM-1. SP → SC : CertS||NSP ||{SPi||ReqtDC(SC)||ReqtPC(SC)||CertESP←TTP }
The SP will send a certied Die-Hellman public key agreement key (gSP ) along with
a random number. As optional part of the message, the SP can send SP's identity,
and cryptographic certicate for SP's public encryption key. Furthermore, the optional
message also contains requests for smart card's Die-Hellman certicate (ReqtDC(U)) and
public encryption key (ReqtPC(U)).
On receipt of the message one, the SP will verify the certicate and proceed with generating
a session key.
MM-2. SC : KSC−SP = h((gSP )SC)
SC → SP : EKSC−SP (NSP ||NSC)||zVSP (CertU ||CSN ||NSP )
The SC generates a session key and encrypts the generated random numbers by both
SC and SP. Subsequently, the SC encrypts its Die-Hellman certicate with card serial
number (CSN) and SP's random number, using SP's public encryption key.
On receipt of message two, the SP decrypts the Die-Hellman certicate and proceed
with generating the session key similar to the SC.
MM-3. SP → SC : EKSC−SP (NSC , SK,NSP )
In response the SP encrypts random numbers generated by the SP and SC along with an
optional symmetric key (SK). If the SP sends the SK that this indicates to the SC that
SP will use SK for to encrypt any future messages.
MM-4. SC → SP : ESK(NSP , optionalparameters)
In response the SC encrypts the SP's random number using the SK and if required add
any optional parameters. This message provide conrmation to the SP that the SC has
the same SK.
A.9 Sirett-Mayes-Markantonakis (SM) Protocol
The Sirett-Mayes-Markantonakis (SM) protocol is designed to install an applet on a SIM
card that is issued by a card issuer and currently deployed in the eld. The SM protocol
rst installs a MIDlet on a mobile phone and then proceeds with installing the application
on the smart card. Before we describe the SM protocol, we introduce new notations listed
below:
M represents a mobile phone.
A→ B → C A message send by entity A to entity B, which it relays to the entity C.
SM-1. SP →M : CertDPRC
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The SP sends the root certicate of the mobile phone's J2ME Operator domain. This
enables the SP to install its own MIDlet on the mobile phone that will assist it in the
applet installation on the SIM card (SC).
SM-2. SC →M→ SP : SCi||NSC
The SC will send its identity and a random number back to the SP via theM using the
Short Message Server (SMS). The SM protocol relies on the SMS to provide security to
certain messages.
On receipt, the SP use the SC identity to locate the long-term shared secret between the
SC and SP.
SM-3. SP →M : MIDletSP ||SignSP (MIDletSP )
The SP then encrypt and MAC the applet that it wants to install on the SC. The encrypted
and MACed applet is then embedded in the MIDletSP that the SP sends to theM that
installs it in the operator domain of the mobile phone. TheMIDletSP is signed by the SP
signature key that is certied by the root entity to the operator domain (i.e. CertDRPC).
SM-4. M→ SC : eKSC−SP (Applet)||fKSC−SP (Applet)
Once the MIDletSP is installed on theM it communicates with the SC and initiate the
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This appendix opens the discussion with a short introduction to the CasperFDR framework.
Subsequently, we present the Casper scripts for the protocols that we proposed in this thesis.
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B.1 Brief Introduction to the CasperFDR
For the sake of completeness, we subjected the proposed protocols in this thesis to for-
mal mechanical analysis based on the CasperFDR tool. The CasperFDR approach uses
the Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [143]; a mathematical framework for the
description and analysis of systems that consist of processes (sub-systems). The state of
a process in the CSP changes by engaging with (pre-dened) events. The CSP language
denes how dierent sub-processes can be constructed along with how to dene their in-
teractions. The Failures-Divergence Renement (FDR) [233] is a model-checking tool for
state machines that is rooted in the CSP framework. The FDR model-checking tool denes
and analyse a systems as described below:
1. All (honest) agents (entities) taking part in a system are modelled as the CSP (sub)
processes, along with the intruder that can interact with other agents in the protocol.
2. The resulting system is tested against the dened (desired) security properties. The
FDR searches the state space to investigate whether any insecure traces can be found.
3. If FDR nds an insecure trace, then the system does not satisfy the desired security
property and the protocol is considered to be insecure in relation to the given security
property.
Using the CSP to dene a system is tedious and painstaking, which is remarkably simplied
by the Casper framework. In Casper, a user species a protocol using abstract notations,
similar to the one that are used to describe protocols in academic literature. The Casper
takes these notations, convert them to CSP code, which is suitable to be analysed by the
FDR model checking tool. Therefore, CasperFDR represents an approach where a protocol
is dened in the Casper notations and then FDR tool is used to verify its suitability under
given security properties.
A Casper script can be divided into two main sections: protocol and system denition,
which are discussed as follow:
B.1.1 Protocol Denition
The protocol denition section of a Casper script denes the generic operations of a pro-
tocol. The protocol denition can be sub-divided into four components that are discussed
below:
Protocol Description: This section represented by #Protocol description in a Casper
script denes the message sequence of the protocol. The notations used in this section are
similar to the standard method of describing a protocol [142].
Free variables: The variables and functions that are used by the protocol denition are
dened in a section that is represented as #Free variables. The variables and functions
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dened in this section are not instantiated with actual value. The instantiation is done in
the system denition of a Casper script.
Processes: Each agent in the system is represented by a CSP process, which is dened
in the #Processes of a Casper script.
Specications: The security requirements against which the protocol is analysed by the
FDR tool are dened in the #Specification section of a Casper script.
B.1.2 System Denition
The system denition describes the actual system that is required to be analysed as part of
the protocol analysis by the FDR tool. The system denition contains four sub-components
that are discussed below:
Type Denition: The variable types that are going to be used in the actual systems are
instantiated in the #Actual variables section of a Casper script. The variables dened
in the #Free variables are instantiated in this section, and the FDR tool will use these
variables during the analysis.
Functions: Any functions dened in the #Free variables have to be dened under the
#Functions heading in a Casper script.
System Denition: The agents that would be present during the execution of the pro-
tocol as part of the FDR analysis are dened under the heading System in a Casper script.
The denition of the agents in this section corresponds to the denition of agents under
the heading Processes of a Casper script.
Intruder: Finally, in the #Intruder Information section of a Casper script we dene the
identity and capability of an intruder in the system againist which the security requirements
stipulated in #Specification are evaluated by the FDR tool.
B.2 Attestation Protocol
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the attestation protocol described in
section 4.7.
#Free variables
SC, CM : Agent
ns, nsp, nt, challenge, response : Nonce
SID1, SID2 : Num
VKey: Agent -> PublicKey
SKey: Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (sKey, sKey), (VKey, SKey)
#Protocol description
0. -> SC : CM
1. SC -> CM : SID1,{SC, ns, CM,}{sKey}
2. CM -> SC : {CM, ns, nm, challenge, SID2}{sKey}
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3. SC -> CM : {ns,nm,nsp,response}{sKey}
4. CM -> SC : {ns,{CM,SC,ns,nsp}{Skey{CM}}}{sKey}
#Actual variables
SmartCard, CardManufacturer, MAppl : Agent
Ns, Nsp, Nt, Nm, Challenge, Response : Nonce
SIDOne, SIDTwo : Num
#Processes
INITIATOR(SC, CM, ns, nsp, response) knows sKey, VKey
RESPONDER(CM, SC, nm, challenge) knows sKey, SKey(CM), VKey
#System
INITIATOR(SmartCard, CardManufacturer, Ns, Nsp, Response)












B.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol  Service Provider
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol
 Service Provider (STCPSP) described in section 6.3.
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num) unwinding 2
halfkeySP, halfkeyTPM, sessionKey : Field
SP, TPM : Agent
ns, nt, nm, scos, app : Nonce
s, t : Num
VKey: Agent -> PublicKey
SKey: Agent -> SecretKey
EKey: Agent -> PublicKey
DKey: Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (sessionKey, sessionKey),(VKey, SKey),(EKey, DKey),(Exp, Exp),(Gen, Gen)
#Protocol description
0. -> SP : TPM
1. SP -> TPM : SP, VKey(SP)
2. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, nt}{VKey(SP)}
2a. TPM -> SP : {Exp(Gen, t) % halfkeyTPM}{VKey(SP)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeyTPM, s)>
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3. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, ns}{EKey(TPM)}
3a. SP -> TPM : {Exp(Gen, s) % halfkeySP}{EKey(TPM)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeySP, t)>
4. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {scos (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
5. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, nt}{sessionKey}
6. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {app (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
#Actual variables
SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl : Agent
Nsp, Ntpm, Nm : Nonce
SCOS, APP : Nonce
S, T, M : Num
SCOperatingSys, SApplication : Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, TPM, ns, s, app, scos) knows SKey(SP), DKey(SP), VKey, EKey
RESPONDER(TPM, SP, nt, t, scos, app) knows SKey(TPM), DKey(TPM), VKey, EKey
#System
INITIATOR(SerPro, TruPlaMan, Nsp, S, APP, SCOS)
RESPONDER(TruPlaMan, SerPro, Ntpm, T, SCOS, APP)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey, EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MAppl









forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) = Exp(Exp (Gen, y), x)
B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol  Smart Card
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol
 Smart Card (STCPSC) described in section6.4.
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num) unwinding 2
halfkeySP, halfkeyTPM, sessionKey : Field
SP, TPM : Agent
ns, nt, nm, scos, app : Nonce
s, t : Num
VKey: Agent -> PublicKey
SKey: Agent -> SecretKey
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EKey: Agent -> PublicKey
DKey: Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (sessionKey, sessionKey),(VKey, SKey),(EKey, DKey),(Exp, Exp),\
(Gen, Gen)
#Protocol description
0. -> SP : TPM
1. SP -> TPM : SP, VKey(SP)
2. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, nt}{VKey(SP)}
2a. TPM -> SP : {Exp(Gen, t) % halfkeyTPM} {VKey(SP)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeyTPM, s)>
3. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, ns}{EKey(TPM)}
3a. SP -> TPM : {Exp(Gen, s) % halfkeySP} {EKey(TPM)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeySP, t)>
4. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {scos (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
5. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, nt}{sessionKey}
6. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {app (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
#Actual variables
SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl : Agent
Nsp, Ntpm, Nm : Nonce
SCOS, APP : Nonce
S, T, M : Num
SCOperatingSys, SApplication : Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, TPM, ns, s, app, scos) knows SKey(SP), DKey(SP), VKey, EKey
RESPONDER(TPM, SP, nt, t, scos, app) knows SKey(TPM), DKey(TPM), VKey, EKey
#System
INITIATOR(SerPro, TruPlaMan, Nsp, S, APP, SCOS)
RESPONDER(TruPlaMan, SerPro, Ntpm, T, SCOS, APP)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey, EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MAppl
IntruderKnowledge = {SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl, MAppl, Nm, DKey(MAppl),\








forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) = Exp(Exp (Gen, y), x)
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B.5 Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Pro-
tocol
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Application Acquisition and Contrac-
tual Agreement Protocol (STCPACA) described in section 6.5.
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num) unwinding 2
halfkeySP, halfkeySC, DHKey : Field
datatype ACAPKeys = MAC(Field, Num, Num) unwinding 2
EnKey, MaKey : ACAPKeys











TEKey, TAKey : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (VKey, SKey), (EnKey, EnKey), (MaKey, MaKey), (TEKey, TEKey),\
(TAKey, TAKey)
#Protocol description
0. -> SP : SC
[SC!=SP]
1. SP -> SC : nSP, Exp(Gen,gSP)%halfkeySP
[SC!=SP]
<DHKey:=Exp(halfkeySP,gSC);EnKey:=MAC(DHKey,nSP,nSC);MaKey:=MAC(DHKey, nSP, nSC)>
2. SC -> SP : nSC, Exp(Gen,gSC)%halfkeySC
[SP != SC]
<DHKey:=Exp(halfkeySC,gSP);EnKey:=MAC(DHKey,nSP,nSC);MaKey:=MAC(DHKey,nSP,nSC)>
3. SP -> SC: nSP, nSC
4. SC -> SP: {{{SCi, Useri, nSP, nSC}{SKey(User)}}{EnKey}}{MaKey}
5. SP -> SC : {{{SPi, Appi, nSC, nSP}{SKey(SP)}}{EnKey}}{MaKey}
6. SC -> SP : {{{f(SCOS)%saveHash, SCi, Useri, SPi, nSC, nSP}{SKey(SC)}}\
{EnKey}}{MaKey}
7. SP -> SC : {{App}{EnKey}}{MaKey}
8. SC -> SP : {{{f(App), SPi, Appi, SCi, Useri, nSP, nSC}{SKey(SC)}}\
{EnKey}}{MaKey}
9. SP -> SC : {{{saveHash%f(SCOS), f(App), SCi, Useri, SPi, nSP, nSC}\
{SKey(SP)}}{EnKey}}{MaKey}
10. SC -> TSM : CardID, {{TSMi, SCi, Useri, nSC, SeudoAppi}{TEKey}}{TAKey}
11. TSM -> SC : {{{TSMi, SCi, Useri, SeudoAppi, nTSM, nSC}{SKey(TSM)}}\
{TEKey}}{TAKey}
#Actual variables
SCard, SProvider, USER, TrustedSM, MaliciousEntity: Agent
ISCard, ISProvider, IUSER, ITrustedSM, IMaliciousEntity: AgentIdentities
GSC, GSP, GMalicious: Num
NSC, NSP, NTSM, NMalicious: Nonce
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TEKEY, TAKEY : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (TEKEY,TEKEY), (TAKEY,TAKEY)
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, SPi, SC, User, gSP, nSP, App, Appi)knows SKey(SP), VKey
RESPONDER(SC, SCi, SP, User, Useri, TSM, TSMi, SeudoAppi, CardID, SCOS, gSC, nSC,\
TEKey, TAKey) knows SKey(User), SKey(SC), VKey
SERVER(TSM,TSMi, SC, SCi, User, CardID, nTSM, TEKey, TAKey)knows SKey(TSM), VKey
#System
INITIATOR(SProvider, ISProvider, SCard, USER, GSP, NSP, APP, AppI)
RESPONDER(SCard, ISCard, SProvider, USER, IUSER, TrustedSM, ITrustedSM, SeudoAPPi,
CARDID, SmartCOS, GSC, NSC, TEKEY, TAKEY)





IntruderKnowledge = {SProvider, SCard, MaliciousEntity, IMaliciousEntity, \












forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) = Exp(Exp(Gen, y), x)
B.6 Application Binding Protocol  Local
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Application Binding Protocol  Local
(ABPL) described in section 7.4.
#Free variables
S, C, spS, spC : Agent
TPM : Server
nc, ns, nm : Nonce
ksc, abKsc : SessionKey
f : HashFunction
ServerKey : Agent -> ServerKeys
VKey : Agent -> Publickey
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SKey : Agent -> SecretKey
realAgent : Server -> Bool
{math}InverseKeys = (ksc, ksc), (abKsc, abKsc), (ServerKey, ServerKey),(VKey, SKey)
emph{}
#Actual variables
CApp, SApp, MAppl : Agent
TM : Server
Nc, Ns, Nm : Nonce
Ksc, ABKsc : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Ksc, Ksc), (ABKsc, ABKsc)
emph{}
#Processes
INITIATOR(C, TPM, S, nc) knows f(S), ServerKey(C), SKey(C), VKey
RESPONDER(S, TPM, C, ns, abKsc) knows f(C), ServerKey(S), SKey(S), VKey








0. -> C : S
1. C -> S : C, S, {C, S, nc, {C, S, nc}{ServerKey(C)} % mTPM}{SKey(C)}
2. S -> TPM : S, TPM, C, {S, C, ns}{ServerKey(S)}, mTPM % {C,S,nc}{ServerKey(C)}
[realAgent(TPM)]
3. TPM -> S : TPM, S, {f(S), ksc, nc}{ServerKey(C)} % tpmC
[realAgent(TPM)]
3a. TPM -> S : TPM, {f(C), ksc, ns}{ServerKey(S)}
4. S -> C : S, C, tpmC % {f(S), ksc, nc}{ServerKey(C)}
4a. S -> C : {abKsc, nc, ns}{ksc},{S, C, nc(+)ns}{abKsc}


















IntruderKnowledge = {CApp, SApp, MAppl, Nm, ServerKey(MAppl), SKey(MAppl),VKey}
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B.7 Platform Binding Protocol
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Platform Binding Protocol (PBP)
described in section 7.5.
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num) unwinding 2
halfkeySP, halfkeyTPM, sessionKey : Field
SP, TPM : Agent
ns, nt, nm, scos, app : Nonce
s, t : Num
VKey: Agent -> PublicKey
SKey: Agent -> SecretKey
EKey: Agent -> PublicKey
DKey: Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (sessionKey, sessionKey), (VKey, SKey),(EKey, DKey), (Exp, Exp), (Gen,
Gen)
#Protocol description
0. -> SP : TPM
1. SP -> TPM : SP, VKey(SP)
2. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, nt}{VKey(SP)}
2a. TPM -> SP : {Exp(Gen, t) % halfkeyTPM}{VKey(SP)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeyTPM, s)>
3. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, ns}{EKey(TPM)}
3a. SP -> TPM : {Exp(Gen, s) % halfkeySP}{EKey(TPM)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeySP, t)>
4. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {scos (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
5. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, nt}{sessionKey}
6. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {app (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
#Actual variables
SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl : Agent
Nsp, Ntpm, Nm : Nonce
SCOS, APP : Nonce
S, T, M : Num
SCOperatingSys, SApplication : Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, TPM, ns, s, app, scos) knows SKey(SP), DKey(SP), VKey, EKey
RESPONDER(TPM, SP, nt, t, scos, app) knows SKey(TPM), DKey(TPM), VKey, EKey
#System
INITIATOR(SerPro, TruPlaMan, Nsp, S, APP, SCOS)
RESPONDER(TruPlaMan, SerPro, Ntpm, T, SCOS, APP)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey, EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MAppl











forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) = Exp(Exp (Gen, y), x)
B.8 Application Binding Protocol  Distributed
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Application Binding Protocol 
Distributed (ABPD) described in section 7.6.
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num) unwinding 2
halfkeySP, halfkeyTPM, sessionKey : Field
SP, TPM : Agent
ns, nt, nm, scos, app : Nonce
s, t : Num
VKey: Agent -> PublicKey
SKey: Agent -> SecretKey
EKey: Agent -> PublicKey
DKey: Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (sessionKey, sessionKey), (VKey, SKey),(EKey, DKey), (Exp, Exp), (Gen,
Gen)
#Protocol description
0. -> SP : TPM
1. SP -> TPM : SP, VKey(SP)
2. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, nt}{VKey(SP)}
2a. TPM -> SP : {Exp(Gen, t) % halfkeyTPM}{VKey(SP)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeyTPM, s)>
3. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, ns}{EKey(TPM)}
3a. SP -> TPM : {Exp(Gen, s) % halfkeySP}{EKey(TPM)}
<sessionKey := Exp(halfkeySP, t)>
4. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {scos (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
5. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, nt}{sessionKey}
6. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {app (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
#Actual variables
SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl : Agent
Nsp, Ntpm, Nm : Nonce
SCOS, APP : Nonce
S, T, M : Num
SCOperatingSys, SApplication : Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, TPM, ns, s, app, scos) knows SKey(SP), DKey(SP), VKey, EKey
RESPONDER(TPM, SP, nt, t, scos, app) knows SKey(TPM), DKey(TPM), VKey, EKey
#System
INITIATOR(SerPro, TruPlaMan, Nsp, S, APP, SCOS)
RESPONDER(TruPlaMan, SerPro, Ntpm, T, SCOS, APP)
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#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey, EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MAppl
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism
In this section, we detail the Java Card implementation of the oine attestation mechanism
based on PRNG and PUF algorithms discussed in section 4.5.2 and 4.5.1, respectively.
C.1.1 Oine PRNG Algorithm
The Java Card implementation of the oine PRNG algorithm discussed in section 4.5.2.
1 package se l f t e s tOf f l inePRNG ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
21
22 public class S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e extends Applet implements ExtendedLength {
23 private stat ic byte [ ] MemoryContents = {
24 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte )
25 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x6b ,
26 (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xb2 ,
27 (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0xa4 ,
28 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x86 ,
29 (byte ) 0x8e , (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb ,
30 (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xf1 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xac ,
31 (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0xa3 ,
32 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0xf3 , (byte ) 0x61 ,
33 (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x4c ,
34 (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
35 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x07 ,
36 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x9a , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
37 (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x61 , (byte ) 0x3d ,
38 (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x29 ,
39 (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x36 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0 xfe ,
40 (byte ) 0xad , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x0e ,
41 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
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42 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xce ,
43 (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xaf ,
44 (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
45 (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
46 (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x1c ,
47 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xc7 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x93 , (byte ) 0x2f ,
48 (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0x5e ,
49 (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x7e , (byte ) 0x1f ,
50 (byte ) 0xe6 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x25 ,
51 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x57 ,
52 (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xc0 ,
53 (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xfd ,
54 (byte ) 0x6a , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
55 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0xae , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x18 ,
56 (byte ) 0x5a , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
57 (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0xee ,
58 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0x86 ,
59 (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xe4 ,
60 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0xfb , (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x6c , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
61 (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xd8 ,
62 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0x60 ,
63 (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x68 ,
64 (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0x8f , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0x3e ,
65 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x0f , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x64 ,
66 (byte ) 0xb1 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x6e , (byte ) 0x91 ,
67 (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0 xef , (byte ) 0x8b ,
68 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x1e , (byte ) 0xa7 ,
69 (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0xb7 ,
70 (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0xc5 ,
71 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
72 (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xbd ,
73 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
74 (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xd4 ,
75 (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xbd , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
76 (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xad ,
77 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xa2 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0x2d , (byte ) 0xe3 ,
78 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x9b , (byte ) 0x1f ,
79 (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xfb ,
80 (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0xeb , (byte ) 0xdb ,
81 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
82 (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 ,
83 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xb9 , (byte ) 0x92 ,
84 (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x0e , (byte ) 0xb8 ,
85 (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x2d ,
86 (byte ) 0x0c , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x06 ,
87 (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x09 ,
88 (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x1a ,
89 (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0x0a , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x45 ,
90 (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0x2e ,
91 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0x1e ,
92 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0 xcf , (byte ) 0xcc ,
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93 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0xf7 , (byte ) 0x3d , (byte ) 0x73 ,
94 (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0xe4 , (byte ) 0x75 ,
95 (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x2e ,
96 (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xaf ,
97 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xb1 ,
98 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0xb2 , (byte ) 0x66 ,
99 (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x15 ,
100 (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0xa3 , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x88 ,
101 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x24 ,
102 (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0xb0 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x8f ,
103 (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0x52 ,
104 (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x8b , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
105 (byte ) 0xe3 , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x03 ,
106 (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x0d , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x6a ,
107 (byte ) 0x20 , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xc9 ,
108 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xda , (byte ) 0x6f , (byte ) 0x7b ,
109 (byte ) 0xb8 , (byte ) 0x6d , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x57 , (byte ) 0xa8 ,
110 (byte ) 0xed , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0x05 ,
111 (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
112 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x87 ,
113 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xba ,
114 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x07 ,
115 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0xbf , } ;
116 byte [ ] tempSeed = {
117 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
118 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
119 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
120 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
121 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
122 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
123 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
124 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
125 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
126 f ina l stat ic byte s e l f t e s t = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
127 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
128 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
129 RandomData randomDataGen ;
130 Cipher pkCipher ;
131 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
132 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
133 short readCount = 0 ;
134 short rCount = 0 ;
135 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
136 MessageDigest SHA256 ;
137 AESKey cipherKey ;
138 Cipher syCipher ;
139 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
140 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
(byte ) 0x99 ,
141 (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte )
142 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
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143 Signature phSign ;
144 PrngSHA256 myPrngHMAC;
145
146 private S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e ( ) {
147 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se ) ;
148 phSCKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA, KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
149 cipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
150 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
151 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
152 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
153 fa l se ) ;
154 myPrngHmac = new PrngSHA256 ( ) ;
155 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
156 phSCKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
157 SHA256 = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256,
158 fa l se ) ;
159 }
160 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength )
161 throws ISOException {
162 new S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
163 }
164
165 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
166 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
167 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
168 this . i n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
169 return ;
170 }
171 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
172 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
173 }
174 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == s e l f t e s t ) {
175 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 84 ,
176 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
177 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
178 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
179 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
180 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
181 return ;
182 }
183 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
184 }
185
186 void s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) {
187 byte [ ] memoryWordRead = new byte [ 4 ] ;
188 byte rcount = (byte ) 0x00 ;
189 while ( rcount < MemoryContents . l ength ) {
190 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (MemoryContents ,
191 rcount , memoryWordRead , ( short ) 0 , memoryWordRead . l ength ) ;
192 generateSeed (memoryWordRead , tempSeed ) ;
193 rcount += (byte ) ( rcount+(short ) 4) ;
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194 }
195 i f ( seedZero ( ) ) {
196 generateMACPrng ( tempSeed , cipherKey ) ;
197 } else {




202 private void generateResponse ( ) {
203 copyPointer = 0 ;
204 s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) ;
205 phDecryption ( ) ;
206 getSignatureKey ( ) ;
207 }
208
209 void phDecryption ( ) {
210 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
211 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
212 syCipher . doFinal ( s ignatureKey , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength ,
s ignatureKey ,
213 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
214 }
215 void getSignatureKey ( ) {
216 RSAPrivateKey myPrivate = (RSAPrivateKey ) this . phSCKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ;
217 short kLen = myPrivate . getExponent ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
218 ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ) ;
219 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , kLen ) ;
220 copyPointer += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
221 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [6]++;
222 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag , ( short ) 0 ,
223 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer ) , ( short )
224 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
225 kLen = myPrivate . getModulus ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
226 ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ) ;
227 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , kLen ) ;
228 }
229
230 boolean seedZero ( ) {
231 for ( short i =0; i<tempSeed . l ength ; i++){
232 i f ( tempSeed [ i ] !=(byte ) 0x00 ) {
233 return true ;
234 }
235 }
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C.1.2 Oine PUF Algorithm
The Java Card implementation that emulates the oine PUF algorithm discussed in section
4.5.1.
1 package s e l f t e s tO f f l i n ePUF ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
21
22 public class S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e extends Applet implements ExtendedLength {
23 private stat ic byte [ ] MemoryContents = {
24 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte )
25 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x6b ,
26 (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xb2 ,
27 (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0xa4 ,
28 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x86 ,
29 (byte ) 0x8e , (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb ,
30 (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xf1 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xac ,
31 (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0xa3 ,
32 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0xf3 , (byte ) 0x61 ,
33 (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x4c ,
34 (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
35 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x07 ,
36 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x9a , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
37 (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x61 , (byte ) 0x3d ,
38 (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x29 ,
39 (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x36 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0 xfe ,
40 (byte ) 0xad , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x0e ,
41 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
42 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xce ,
43 (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xaf ,
44 (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
45 (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
46 (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x1c ,
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47 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xc7 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x93 , (byte ) 0x2f ,
48 (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0x5e ,
49 (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x7e , (byte ) 0x1f ,
50 (byte ) 0xe6 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x25 ,
51 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x57 ,
52 (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xc0 ,
53 (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xfd ,
54 (byte ) 0x6a , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
55 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0xae , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x18 ,
56 (byte ) 0x5a , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
57 (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0xee ,
58 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0x86 ,
59 (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xe4 ,
60 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0xfb , (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x6c , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
61 (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xd8 ,
62 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0x60 ,
63 (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x68 ,
64 (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0x8f , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0x3e ,
65 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x0f , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x64 ,
66 (byte ) 0xb1 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x6e , (byte ) 0x91 ,
67 (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0 xef , (byte ) 0x8b ,
68 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x1e , (byte ) 0xa7 ,
69 (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0xb7 ,
70 (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0xc5 ,
71 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
72 (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xbd ,
73 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
74 (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xd4 ,
75 (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xbd , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
76 (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xad ,
77 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xa2 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0x2d , (byte ) 0xe3 ,
78 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x9b , (byte ) 0x1f ,
79 (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xfb ,
80 (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0xeb , (byte ) 0xdb ,
81 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
82 (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 ,
83 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xb9 , (byte ) 0x92 ,
84 (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x0e , (byte ) 0xb8 ,
85 (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x2d ,
86 (byte ) 0x0c , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x06 ,
87 (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x09 ,
88 (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x1a ,
89 (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0x0a , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x45 ,
90 (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0x2e ,
91 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0x1e ,
92 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0 xcf , (byte ) 0xcc ,
93 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0xf7 , (byte ) 0x3d , (byte ) 0x73 ,
94 (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0xe4 , (byte ) 0x75 ,
95 (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x2e ,
96 (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xaf ,
97 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xb1 ,
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98 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0xb2 , (byte ) 0x66 ,
99 (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x15 ,
100 (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0xa3 , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x88 ,
101 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x24 ,
102 (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0xb0 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x8f ,
103 (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0x52 ,
104 (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x8b , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
105 (byte ) 0xe3 , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x03 ,
106 (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x0d , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x6a ,
107 (byte ) 0x20 , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xc9 ,
108 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xda , (byte ) 0x6f , (byte ) 0x7b ,
109 (byte ) 0xb8 , (byte ) 0x6d , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x57 , (byte ) 0xa8 ,
110 (byte ) 0xed , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0x05 ,
111 (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
112 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x87 ,
113 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xba ,
114 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x07 ,
115 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0xbf , } ;
116 byte [ ] tempSeed = {
117 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
118 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
119 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
120 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
121 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
122 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
123 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
124 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
125 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
126 f ina l stat ic byte s e l f t e s t = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
127 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
128 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
129 RandomData randomDataGen ;
130 Cipher pkCipher ;
131 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
132 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
133 short readCount = 0 ;
134 short rCount = 0 ;
135 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
136 MessageDigest SHA256 ;
137 AESKey cipherKey ;
138 Cipher syCipher ;
139 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
140 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
(byte ) 0x99 ,
141 (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte )
142 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
143 Signature phSign ;
144 PrngSHA256 myPrngHMAC;
145
146 private S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e ( ) {
147 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se ) ;
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148 phSCKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA, KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
149 cipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
150 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
151 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
152 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
153 fa l se ) ;
154 myPrngHmac = new PrngSHA256 ( ) ;
155 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
156 phSCKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
157 SHA256 = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256,
158 fa l se ) ;
159 }
160 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength )
161 throws ISOException {
162 new S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
163 }
164
165 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
166 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
167 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
168 this . i n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
169 return ;
170 }
171 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
172 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
173 }
174 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == s e l f t e s t ) {
175 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 84 ,
176 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
177 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
178 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
179 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
180 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
181 return ;
182 }
183 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
184 }
185
186 void s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) {
187 byte [ ] memoryWordRead = new byte [ 4 ] ;
188 byte rcount = (byte ) 0x00 ;
189 while ( rcount < MemoryContents . l ength ) {
190 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (MemoryContents ,
191 rcount , memoryWordRead , ( short ) 0 , memoryWordRead . l ength ) ;
192 generateSeed (memoryWordRead , tempSeed ) ;
193 rcount += (byte ) ( rcount+(short ) 4) ;
194 }
195 i f ( seedZero ( ) ) {
196 // PUF( tempSeed ) ; // This i s emulat ions
197 } else {
198 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
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202 boolean seedZero ( ) {
203 for ( short i =0; i<tempSeed . l ength ; i++){
204 i f ( tempSeed [ i ] !=(byte ) 0x00 ) {
205 return true ;
206 }
207 }
208 return fa l se ;
209 }
210
211 private void generateResponse ( ) {
212 copyPointer = 0 ;
213 s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) ;
214 phDecryption ( ) ;
215 getSignatureKey ( ) ;
216 }
217
218 void phDecryption ( ) {
219 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
220 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
221 syCipher . doFinal ( s ignatureKey , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength ,
s ignatureKey ,
222 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
223 }
224 void getSignatureKey ( ) {
225 RSAPrivateKey myPrivate = (RSAPrivateKey ) this . phSCKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ;
226 short kLen = myPrivate . getExponent ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
227 ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ) ;
228 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , kLen ) ;
229 copyPointer += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
230 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [6]++;
231 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag , ( short ) 0 ,
232 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer ) , ( short )
233 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
234 kLen = myPrivate . getModulus ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
235 ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ) ;
236 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , kLen ) ;
237 }
238 }
C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism
In this section, we detail the Java Card implementation of the online attestation mechanism
based on PRNG and PUF algorithms discussed in section 4.5.2 and 4.5.1, respectively.
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C.2.1 Online PRNG Algorithm
The Java Card implementation of the oine PRNG algorithm discussed in section 4.5.2.
1 package sel ftestOnlinePRNG ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
21
22 public class S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e extends Applet implements ExtendedLength {
23 private stat ic byte [ ] MemoryContents = {
24 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte )
25 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x6b ,
26 (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xb2 ,
27 (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0xa4 ,
28 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x86 ,
29 (byte ) 0x8e , (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb ,
30 (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xf1 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xac ,
31 (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0xa3 ,
32 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0xf3 , (byte ) 0x61 ,
33 (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x4c ,
34 (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
35 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x07 ,
36 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x9a , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
37 (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x61 , (byte ) 0x3d ,
38 (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x29 ,
39 (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x36 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0 xfe ,
40 (byte ) 0xad , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x0e ,
41 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
42 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xce ,
43 (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xaf ,
44 (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
45 (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
46 (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x1c ,
47 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xc7 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x93 , (byte ) 0x2f ,
48 (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0x5e ,
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49 (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x7e , (byte ) 0x1f ,
50 (byte ) 0xe6 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x25 ,
51 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x57 ,
52 (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xc0 ,
53 (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xfd ,
54 (byte ) 0x6a , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
55 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0xae , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x18 ,
56 (byte ) 0x5a , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
57 (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0xee ,
58 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0x86 ,
59 (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xe4 ,
60 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0xfb , (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x6c , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
61 (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xd8 ,
62 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0x60 ,
63 (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x68 ,
64 (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0x8f , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0x3e ,
65 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x0f , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x64 ,
66 (byte ) 0xb1 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x6e , (byte ) 0x91 ,
67 (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0 xef , (byte ) 0x8b ,
68 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x1e , (byte ) 0xa7 ,
69 (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0xb7 ,
70 (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0xc5 ,
71 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
72 (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xbd ,
73 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
74 (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xd4 ,
75 (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xbd , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
76 (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xad ,
77 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xa2 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0x2d , (byte ) 0xe3 ,
78 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x9b , (byte ) 0x1f ,
79 (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xfb ,
80 (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0xeb , (byte ) 0xdb ,
81 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
82 (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 ,
83 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xb9 , (byte ) 0x92 ,
84 (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x0e , (byte ) 0xb8 ,
85 (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x2d ,
86 (byte ) 0x0c , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x06 ,
87 (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x09 ,
88 (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x1a ,
89 (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0x0a , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x45 ,
90 (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0x2e ,
91 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0x1e ,
92 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0 xcf , (byte ) 0xcc ,
93 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0xf7 , (byte ) 0x3d , (byte ) 0x73 ,
94 (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0xe4 , (byte ) 0x75 ,
95 (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x2e ,
96 (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xaf ,
97 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xb1 ,
98 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0xb2 , (byte ) 0x66 ,
99 (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x15 ,
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100 (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0xa3 , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x88 ,
101 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x24 ,
102 (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0xb0 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x8f ,
103 (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0x52 ,
104 (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x8b , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
105 (byte ) 0xe3 , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x03 ,
106 (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x0d , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x6a ,
107 (byte ) 0x20 , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xc9 ,
108 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xda , (byte ) 0x6f , (byte ) 0x7b ,
109 (byte ) 0xb8 , (byte ) 0x6d , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x57 , (byte ) 0xa8 ,
110 (byte ) 0xed , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0x05 ,
111 (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
112 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x87 ,
113 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xba ,
114 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x07 ,
115 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0xbf , } ;
116 byte [ ] tempSeed = {
117 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
118 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
119 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
120 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
121 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
122 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
123 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
124 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
125 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
126 f ina l stat ic byte s e l f t e s t = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
127 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
128 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
129 RandomData randomDataGen ;
130 Cipher pkCipher ;
131 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
132 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
133 short readCount = 0 ;
134 short rCount = 0 ;
135 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
136 MessageDigest SHA128 ;
137 AESKey cipherKey ;
138 Cipher syCipher ;
139 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
140 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
(byte ) 0x99 ,
141 (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte )
142 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
143 Signature phSign ;
144 PrngSHA256 myPrngHMAC;
145
146 private S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e ( ) {
147 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se ) ;
148 phSCKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA, KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
149 cipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
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150 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
151 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
152 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
153 fa l se ) ;
154 myPrngHmac = new PrngSHA256 ( ) ;
155 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
156 phSCKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
157 SHA128 = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_128,
158 fa l se ) ;
159 byte [ ] r e sponseBu f f e r = null ;
160 }
161 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength )
162 throws ISOException {
163 new S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
164 }
165
166 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
167 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
168 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
169 this . i n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
170 return ;
171 }
172 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
173 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
174 }
175 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
176 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
177 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
178 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
179 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
180 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
181 rCount = 0 ;
182 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
183 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
184 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
185 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
186 }
187 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
188 try {
189 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
190 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
191 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
192 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
193 } catch ( Exception aE) {
194 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x7AAA) ;
195 }
196 }
197 r e sponseBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 256 ,
198 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
199 s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) ;
200 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
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201 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
202 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) r e sponseBu f f e r . l ength ) ;
203 apdu . sendBytesLong ( re sponseBuf f e r , ( short ) 0 ,
204 ( short ) r e sponseBu f f e r . l ength ) ;
205 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
206 }
207
208 void s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) {
209 byte [ ] memoryWordRead = new byte [ 4 ] ;
210 byte [ ] hashValue = new byte [ 3 2 ]
211 byte rcount = (byte ) 0x00 ;
212 byte seedRef = (byte ) 0x00 ;
213 while ( rcount < r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r . l ength ) {
214 seedRef=(short ) ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ rcount ] %
215 ( short ) (MemoryContents . length −1) ) ;
216 seedRef = (byte ) (myPrngHMAC. generateRandom ( seedRef ) . [ 0 ]
217 % (MemoryContents . length −16) )
218 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (MemoryContents ,
219 seedRef , hashValue , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 16) ;
220 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (mK,
221 ( short ) 0 , hashValue , ( short ) 16 , ( short ) 16) ;
222 SHA128 . doFinal ( hashValue , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) hashValue . length ,
223 hashValue , ( short ) 0) ;
224 for ( short i =0; i<re sponseBu f f e r . l ength ; i++){






C.2.2 Online PUF Algorithm
The Java Card implementation that emulates the oine PUF algorithm discussed in section
4.5.1.
1 package se l f t e s tOnl inePUF ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
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16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
21
22 public class S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e extends Applet implements ExtendedLength {
23 private stat ic byte [ ] MemoryContents = {
24 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte )
25 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x6b ,
26 (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xb2 ,
27 (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0xa4 ,
28 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x86 ,
29 (byte ) 0x8e , (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb ,
30 (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xf1 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xac ,
31 (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0xa3 ,
32 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0xf3 , (byte ) 0x61 ,
33 (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x4c ,
34 (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
35 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x07 ,
36 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x9a , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
37 (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x61 , (byte ) 0x3d ,
38 (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x29 ,
39 (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x36 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0 xfe ,
40 (byte ) 0xad , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x0e ,
41 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
42 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xce ,
43 (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xaf ,
44 (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
45 (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
46 (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x1c ,
47 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xc7 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x93 , (byte ) 0x2f ,
48 (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0x5e ,
49 (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x7e , (byte ) 0x1f ,
50 (byte ) 0xe6 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x25 ,
51 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x57 ,
52 (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xc0 ,
53 (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xfd ,
54 (byte ) 0x6a , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
55 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0xae , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x18 ,
56 (byte ) 0x5a , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
57 (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0xee ,
58 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0x86 ,
59 (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xe4 ,
60 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0xfb , (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x6c , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
61 (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xd8 ,
62 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0x60 ,
63 (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x68 ,
64 (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0x8f , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0x3e ,
65 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x0f , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x64 ,
66 (byte ) 0xb1 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x6e , (byte ) 0x91 ,
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67 (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0 xef , (byte ) 0x8b ,
68 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x1e , (byte ) 0xa7 ,
69 (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0xb7 ,
70 (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0xc5 ,
71 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
72 (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xbd ,
73 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
74 (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xd4 ,
75 (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xbd , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
76 (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xad ,
77 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xa2 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0x2d , (byte ) 0xe3 ,
78 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x9b , (byte ) 0x1f ,
79 (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xfb ,
80 (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0xeb , (byte ) 0xdb ,
81 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
82 (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 ,
83 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xb9 , (byte ) 0x92 ,
84 (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x0e , (byte ) 0xb8 ,
85 (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x2d ,
86 (byte ) 0x0c , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x06 ,
87 (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x09 ,
88 (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x1a ,
89 (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0x0a , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x45 ,
90 (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0x2e ,
91 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0x1e ,
92 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0 xcf , (byte ) 0xcc ,
93 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0xf7 , (byte ) 0x3d , (byte ) 0x73 ,
94 (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0xe4 , (byte ) 0x75 ,
95 (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x2e ,
96 (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xaf ,
97 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xb1 ,
98 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0xb2 , (byte ) 0x66 ,
99 (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x15 ,
100 (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0xa3 , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x88 ,
101 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x24 ,
102 (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0xb0 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x8f ,
103 (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0x52 ,
104 (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x8b , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
105 (byte ) 0xe3 , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x03 ,
106 (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x0d , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x6a ,
107 (byte ) 0x20 , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xc9 ,
108 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xda , (byte ) 0x6f , (byte ) 0x7b ,
109 (byte ) 0xb8 , (byte ) 0x6d , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x57 , (byte ) 0xa8 ,
110 (byte ) 0xed , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0x05 ,
111 (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
112 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x87 ,
113 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xba ,
114 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x07 ,
115 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0xbf , } ;
116 byte [ ] tempSeed = {
117 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
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118 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
119 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
120 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
121 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
122 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
123 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
124 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
125 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
126 f ina l stat ic byte s e l f t e s t = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
127 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
128 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
129 RandomData randomDataGen ;
130 Cipher pkCipher ;
131 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
132 byte [ ] c ha l l eng e = null ;
133 byte [ ] randomNumber = null ;
134 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
135 short readCount = 0 ;
136 short rCount = 0 ;
137 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
138 MessageDigest SHA128 ;
139 AESKey cipherKey ;
140 Cipher syCipher ;
141 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
142 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
(byte ) 0x99 ,
143 (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte )
144 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
145 Signature phSign ;
146 PrngSHA256 myPrngHMAC;
147
148 private S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e ( ) {
149 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se ) ;
150 phSCKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA, KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
151 cipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
152 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
153 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
154 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
155 fa l se ) ;
156 myPrngHmac = new PrngSHA256 ( ) ;
157 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
158 phSCKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
159 SHA128 = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_128,
160 fa l se ) ;
161 byte [ ] r e sponseBu f f e r = null ;
162 }
163 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength )
164 throws ISOException {
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168 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
169 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
170 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
171 this . i n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
172 return ;
173 }
174 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
175 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
176 }
177 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
178 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
179 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
180 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
181 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
182 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
183 rCount = 0 ;
184 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
185 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
186 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
187 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
188 }
189 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
190 try {
191 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
192 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
193 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
194 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
195 } catch ( Exception aE) {
196 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x7AAA) ;
197 }
198 }
199 byte [ ] c ha l l eng e = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 128 ,
200 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
201 byte [ ] randomnumber = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 128 ,
202 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
203 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
204 ( short ) 0 , cha l l enge , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 16) ;
205 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
206 ( short ) 16 , randomNumber , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 16) ;
207 r e sponseBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 128 ,
208 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
209 s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) ;
210 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
211 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
212 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) r e sponseBu f f e r . l ength ) ;
213 apdu . sendBytesLong ( re sponseBuf f e r , ( short ) 0 ,
214 ( short ) r e sponseBu f f e r . l ength ) ;
215 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
216 }
217
218 void s e l f t e s t P r o c e s s ( ) {
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219 byte [ ] memoryWordRead = new byte [ 4 ] ;
220 byte [ ] hashValue = new byte [ 3 2 ]
221 byte rcount = (byte ) 0x00 ;
222 byte seedRef = (byte ) 0x00 ;
223 //mK = runPUF( cha l l e n g e ) ;
224 while ( rcount < randomNumber . l ength ) {
225 seedRef=(short ) ( randomNumber [ rcount ] %
226 ( short ) (MemoryContents . length −1) ) ;
227 seedRef = (byte ) (myPrngHMAC. generateRandom ( seedRef ) . [ 0 ]
228 % (MemoryContents . length −16) )
229 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (MemoryContents ,
230 seedRef , hashValue , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 16) ;
231 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( re sponseBuf f e r ,
232 ( short ) 0 , hashValue , ( short ) 16 , ( short ) 16) ;
233 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (mK,
234 ( short ) 0 , hashValue , ( short ) 32 , ( short ) 16) ;
235 SHA128 . doFinal ( hashValue , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) hashValue . length ,
236 r e sponseBuf f e r , ( short ) 0) ;
237 i f ( ( short ) ( randomNumber . length−rcount )==1){







The Java Card implementation of the attestation protocol discussed in section 4.7 is listed
in subsequent sections.
C.3.1 Smart Card Implementation
Following is the smart card implementation of the attestation protocol and this implemen-
tation uses the helper function discussed in appendix C.11.3.
1 package protoco lAtte s ta t ionSC ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
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15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength {
21 private byte [ ] CMRandomNumberArray ;
22 private byte [ ] CMCookieArray ;
23 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberArray ;
24 private byte [ ] SCCer t i f i c a t e ;
25 private byte [ ] SCCMDHGeneratedValue= {
26 (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0x9A ,
27 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x56 ,
28 (byte ) 0x6E , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0x16 ,
29 (byte ) 0xA3 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x77 ,
30 (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0x6F , (byte ) 0x0C , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
31 (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xD4 ,
32 (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xC8 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0xB7 ,
33 (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
34 (byte ) 0x8E , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xE1 , (byte ) 0x83 ,
35 (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xDD,
36 (byte ) 0xD9 , (byte ) 0xE2 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xE4 , (byte ) 0x77 ,
37 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xA2 ,
38 (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0x7F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x2F , (byte ) 0xF3 ,
39 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0xE3 ,
40 (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xCD, (byte ) 0x56 ,
41 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xFB, (byte ) 0xB4
42 } ;
43 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
44 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
45 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
46 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
47 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
48 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
49 private byte [ ] CMRandomNumberTag = {
50 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
51 private byte [ ] CMCookieTag = {
52 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
53 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
54 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
55 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
56 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
57 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
58 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
59 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {
60 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x0C ,
61 (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
62 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
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63 (byte ) 0x11 } ;
64 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {
65 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
66 private byte [ ] CMCertif icateTag = {
67 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
68 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {
69 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
70 private byte [ ] SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag = {
71 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xB2} ;
72 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
73 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
74 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
75 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
76 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
77 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
78 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
79 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
80 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
81 RandomData randomDataGen ;
82 Cipher pkCipher ;
83 short messageNumber = 0 ;
84 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
85 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
86 short readCount = 0 ;
87 short rCount = 0 ;
88 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
89 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
90 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
91 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
92 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
93 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
94 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
95 AESKey phCipherKey ;
96 Cipher syCipher ;
97 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
98 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
(byte ) 0x99 ,
99 (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte )
100 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
101 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
102 Signature phMacGenerator ;
103 Signature phSign ;
104 KeyPair phSCKeyPair ;
105 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
106 RSAPublicKey CMVerif icationKey = null ;
107 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
108 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
109 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
110 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
111 phMacGenerator =
Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD,
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112 fa l se ) ;
113 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se ) ;
114 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
115 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
116 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
117 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
118 fa l se ) ;
119 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
120 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
121 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
122 }
123 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength )
124 throws ISOException {
125 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
126 }
127 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
128 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
129 CMRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
130 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
131 CMCookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
132 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
133 SCRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
134 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
135 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberTag , ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
136 this . SCRandomNumberArray , ( short )
137 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
138 this . SCRandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
139 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
140 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength − ( short )
141 PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
142 try {
143 CMVerif icationKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
144 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
145 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
146 } catch ( Exception cE) {
147 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
148 }
149 }
150 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
151 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
152 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
153 this . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
154 return ;
155 }
156 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
157 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
158 }
159 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
160 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
161 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
162 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
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163 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
164 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
165 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
166 return ;
167 }
168 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
169 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
170 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
171 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
172 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
173 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
174 rCount = 0 ;
175 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
176 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
177 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
178 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
179 }
180 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
181 try {
182 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
183 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
184 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
185 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
186 } catch ( Exception aE) {
187 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x7AAA) ;
188 }
189 }
190 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
191 try {
192 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
193 } catch ( Exception cE) {
194 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
195 }
196 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 600 ,
197 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
198 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
199 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
200 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
201 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
202 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
203 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
204 i f ( processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ) {
205 return ;
206 } else {
207 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
208 }
209 return ;
210 } else {
211 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
212 }




215 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
216 short childPM1 = 0 ;
217 short childPM2 = 0 ;
218 copyPointer = 0 ;
219 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
220 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopy ( this . SCProtoco l In i t iatorTag , ( short ) 0 ,
221 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
222 ( short )
223 this . SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag . l ength ) ;
224 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
225 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
226 childPM1 = copyPointer ;
227 copyPointer += 2 ;
228 phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
229 this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
230 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
231 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
232 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
233 return ;
234 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
235 keygenerator ( ) ;
236 childPM1 = ( short ) 6 ;
237 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
238 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
239 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo . l ength ) ;
240 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
241 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
242 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
243 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
244 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag , ( short )
245 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
246 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
247 copyPointer += 3 ;
248 childPM2 = ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 1) ;
249 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
250 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
251 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
252 short tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
( short ) 0 ,
253 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
254 copyPointer ) ;
255 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
256 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
( short )
257 2) , tempLength ) ;
258 copyPointer += tempLength ;
259 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCIdentityTag , ( short ) 0 ,
260 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
261 this . SCIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
277
C.3 Attestation Protocol
262 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
263 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
264 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
265 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
266 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
267 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . CMRandomNumberArray ,
268 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
269 this . CMRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
270 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
271 try {
272 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 + ( short )
273 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
274 ( short ) 1) ) , this . phSCKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
275 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
276 } catch ( Exception cE) {
277 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x3141 ) ;
278 }
279 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
280 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 0 ,
281 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
282 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
283 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
284 try {
285 this . messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 +
286 ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short )
287 ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
288 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
289 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
290 ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
291 }
292 this . macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ,
293 ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
( short ) 1) ) ,
294 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
295 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
296 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . CMCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
297 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
298 this . CMCookieArray . l ength ) ;
299 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
300 }
301 }
302 boolean processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
303 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
304 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray , ( short )
305 ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
306 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
307 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
308 try {
309 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
310 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . PTLVDataOffset +
311 ( short ) 168) ;
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312 inLength = 3 ;
313 CMVerif icationKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
314 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
315 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
316 CMVerif icationKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
317 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
318 inLength = ( short ) 84 ;
319 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
320 CMVerificationKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
321 return true ;
322 } else {
323 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
324 }
325 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
326 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xAB23) ;
327 }
328 return true ;
329 } else {
330 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
331 }
332 return fa l se ;
333 }
334 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
335 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1) ] ;
336 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
337 try {
338 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
339 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare (CMDHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
340 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
341 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . CMDHChanllengerArray ,
342 ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) this . CMDHChanllengerArray . l ength )
343 ;
344 po in t e r += ( short ) this . CMDHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
345 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this .CMRandomNumberTag , ( short ) 0 ,
346 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
347 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
348 this . CMRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 0 ,
349 ( short ) ( this . CMRandomNumberArray . l ength ) )
350 ;
351 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . CMRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
352 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . CMCookieTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
353 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
354 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . CMCookieArray ,
355 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
356 ( this . CMCookieArray . l ength ) ) ;
357 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . CMCookieArray . l ength ) ;
358 }
359 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
360 }
361 } catch ( Exception cE) {
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362 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) c h i l dL e f t ) ;
363 }
364 }
365 void protoco l Implementat ion ( ) {}
366 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
367 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
368 }
369 void keygenerator ( ) {
370 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
371 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
372 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
373 sessionGenKey . setKey (SCCMDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
374 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
375 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
376 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
377 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
378 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
379 short po in t e r = 0 ;
380 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . CMRandomNumberArray ,
381 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
382 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
383 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
384 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (SCCMDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 16 ,
385 keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
386 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
387 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
388 }
389 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
390 keyGenMacData . length , SCCMDHGeneratedValue ,
( short )
391 0) ;
392 this . phCipherKey . setKey (SCCMDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
393 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
394 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
395 }
396 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
397 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
398 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
399 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
400 keyGenMacData . length , SCCMDHGeneratedValue ,
( short )
401 0) ;
402 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey (SCCMDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
403 SCCMDHGeneratedValue = null ;
404 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
405 }
406 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
407 inbuf fLength ) {
408 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
409 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
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410 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , ( short )
411 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength ,
412 i nbu f f , i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
413 }
414 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short inbuf fLength )
415 {
416 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
417 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
418 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
419 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
420 }
421 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
422 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
423 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
424 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
425 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
426 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
427 try {
428 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag , ( short ) 0 ,
429 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
430 this .MACedDataTag . l ength ) ;
431 copyPointer += 2 ;
432 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
433 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
434 }
435 try {
436 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
437 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
438 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) ,
l ength ) ;
439 copyPointer += length ;
440 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
441 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0987 ) ;
442 }
443 return true ;
444 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
445 try {
446 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
447 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
448 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
449 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
450 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short )
451 ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbuf fLength +
452 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
453 } catch ( Exception cE) {
454 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xC1C2) ;
455 }
456 }
457 return fa l se ;
458 }
459 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
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460 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
461 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
462 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag , ( short ) 0 ,
463 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
464 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
465 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
466 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
467 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th ,
468 i nbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
469 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
( short )
470 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
471 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
472 return true ;
473 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
474 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
475 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
476 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
477 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
478 }
479 return fa l se ;
480 }
481 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
482 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
483 }
484 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
485 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ ( short )
486 ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
487 }
488 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
inShort )
489 {
490 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
( short )
491 0x0008 ) ;




C.3.2 Card Manufacturer Implementation
Following is the card manufacturer's implementation of the attestation protocol and to
accomplish its operations it uses helper functions detailed in appendices C.11.1 and C.11.2.
1 package j avacardte rmina l ;
2
3 import java . u t i l . Arrays ;
4 import java . s e c u r i t y . i n t e r f a c e s . RSAPublicKey ;
5 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . RSAPublicKeySpec ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
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7 import java . math . B ig Intege r ;
8 public class Protoco lHand le rAtte s ta t i on {
9 private byte [ ] CMIdentity = {
10 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 ,
(byte ) 0x0A ,
11 (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte )
12 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xD7} ;
13 private byte [ ] SCIP = {
14 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C} ;
15 private byte [ ] PlatformHashPreset = {
16 (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xE5 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x2C ,
(byte ) 0xA1 ,
17 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xAD, (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xDB, (byte )
18 0x5F , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xA5 , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x5A ,
19 (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte )
20 0xB4 , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCE, (byte ) 0x3F , (byte ) 0xE0 , (byte ) 0x99 ,
21 (byte ) 0xDC, (byte ) 0xE9 , (byte ) 0x3A , (byte ) 0x9D} ;
22 private byte [ ] SCDHStore = {
23 (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0x9A ,
24 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x56 ,
25 (byte ) 0x6E , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0x16 ,
26 (byte ) 0xA3 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x77 ,
27 (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0x6F , (byte ) 0x0C , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
28 (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xD4 ,
29 (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xC8 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0xB7 ,
30 (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
31 (byte ) 0x8E , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xE1 , (byte ) 0x83 ,
32 (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xDD,
33 (byte ) 0xD9 , (byte ) 0xE2 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xE4 , (byte ) 0x77 ,
34 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xA2 ,
35 (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0x7F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x2F , (byte ) 0xF3 ,
36 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0xE3 ,
37 (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xCD, (byte ) 0x56 ,
38 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xFB, (byte ) 0xB4
39 } ;
40 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {(byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA} ;
41 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {(byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB} ;
42 private byte [ ] CMIdentityTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
43 private byte [ ] CMSignatureCertTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0xF01 } ;
44 private byte [ ] CMSigVerif icationKeyTag = {(byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
45 private byte [ ] CMRandomNumberTag = {(byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
46 private byte [ ] CMCookieTag = {(byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
47 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {(byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
48 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {(byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
49 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {(byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
50 private byte [ ] PublicExponentTag = {(byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
51 private byte [ ] PublicModulusTag = {(byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
52 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {(byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
53 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
54 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
55 private byte [ ] PlatformHashTag = {(byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
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56 private byte [ ] UserIdent i tyTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
57 private byte [ ] SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag = {(byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xB2} ;
58 public ConstructedTLV MessageHandler = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
59 (MessageHandlerTagOne ) ;
60 private ConstructedTLV CMSignatureCert i f i cate =
61 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV (CMSignatureCertTag ) ;
62 private PrimitiveTLV CMIdentityTLV = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
63 ( CMIdentityTag , CMIdentity ) ;
64 private PrimitiveTLV CMSigVeri f icationKey = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
65 ( this . CMSigVerif icationKeyTag ) ;
66 private PrimitiveTLV CMRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
67 ( this .CMRandomNumberTag) ;
68 private PrimitiveTLV CMCookie = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
69 ( this . CMCookieTag) ;
70 private ConstructedTLV EncryptedData = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
71 ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
72 private PrimitiveTLV MACedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
73 ( this .MACedDataTag) ;
74 private PrimitiveTLV SignedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
75 ( this . SignedDataTag ) ;
76 private PrimitiveTLV PublicExponent = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
77 ( this . PublicExponentTag ) ;
78 private PrimitiveTLV PublicModulus = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
79 ( this . PublicModulusTag ) ;
80 private PrimitiveTLV SCRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
81 ( this . SCRandomNumberTag) ;
82 private PrimitiveTLV SCIdent ity = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
83 ( SCIdentityTag ) ;
84 private ConstructedTLV SCUserCer t i f i ca t e =
85 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( this . SCUserCert i f i cateTag ) ;
86 private ConstructedTLV SCCer t i f i c a t e = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
87 ( this . SCCert i f i cateTag ) ;
88 private PrimitiveTLV PlatformHash = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
89 ( this . PlatformHashTag ) ;
90 private PrimitiveTLV User Ident i ty = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
91 ( this . UserIdent ityTag ) ;
92 private PrimitiveTLV SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
93 ( this . SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag ) ;
94 private Protoco lHe lpe rClas s myProtocolHelperObject = new
95 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s ( ) ;
96 private byte [ ] mySessionEncryptionKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
97 private byte [ ] mySessionMacKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
98 private PublicKey SCUserVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
99 private PublicKey SCVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
100 public Protoco lHand le rAtte s ta t i on ( ) {
101 myProtocolHelperObject . p r o t o c o l I n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
102 RSAPublicKey tempKey = (RSAPublicKey )
103 myProtocolHelperObject . getPublicKey ( ) ;
104 byte [ ] tempExponent = tempKey . getPubl icExponent ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
105 this . PublicExponent . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicExponentTag ,
106 tempExponent . l ength ) ;
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107 this . PublicExponent . setTlvValues ( tempExponent ) ;
108 byte [ ] tempModulus = tempKey . getModulus ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
109 this . PublicModulus . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicModulusTag ,
110 ( tempModulus . l ength − 1) ) ;
111 this . PublicModulus . setTlvValues ( tempModulus , 1 , ( tempModulus . l ength −
112 1) ) ;
113 CMSignatureCert i f i cate . addPTLV( this . PublicExponent ) ;
114 CMSignatureCert i f i cate . addPTLV( this . PublicModulus ) ;
115 }
116 public byte [ ] outMessageProcess ing ( int Counter ) {
117 i f ( Counter == 1) {
118 try {
119 this .CMRandomNumber . setTlvValues
120 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . getRandomNumber ( ) ) ;
121 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this .CMRandomNumber) ;
122 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ ( this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( )
123 . l ength +
124 this .CMRandomNumber . getValueLength ( ) ) ] ;
125 System . arraycopy ( this .CMRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 , temp ,
126 0 , this .CMRandomNumber . getValueLength ( ) ) ;
127 System . arraycopy ( this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
temp ,
128 temp . l ength −
129 this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
130 this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( ) . l ength ) ;
131 byte [ ] r e s u l t = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
132 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac ( temp , 0 , temp . length ,
133 r e su l t , 0 , this . myProtocolHelperObject .myLongTermMacKey) ;
134 this . CMCookie . setTlvValues ( r e s u l t ) ;
135 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . CMCookie ) ;
136 } catch ( Exception cE) {
137 System . out . p r i n t l n (
138 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
139 }
140 } else i f ( Counter == 2) {
141 try {
142 this . EncryptedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
143 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . CMIdentityTLV) ;
144 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCIdent ity ) ;
145 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this .CMRandomNumber) ;
146 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCRandomNumber) ;
147 this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod
148 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
149 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
150 this . SignedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 , null ,
151 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_GENERATION) ;
152 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SignedData ) ;
153 this . EncryptedData .addCTLV( this . CMSignatureCert i f i cate ) ;
154 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateEncryption
155 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
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156 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
157 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
158 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
159 this .MACedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this .MACedDataTag , 16) ;
160 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
161 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
162 this . EncryptedData . getTagValueLength ( ) ,
163 this .MACedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 ,
164 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
165 this . MessageHandler . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ) ;
166 this . MessageHandler . addCTLV( EncryptedData ) ;
167 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this .MACedData) ;
168 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . CMCookie ) ;
169 } catch ( Exception cE) {
170 System . out . p r i n t l n (
171 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
172 }
173 } else {
174 System . out . p r i n t l n (
175 "Protoco l Stoped : I l l e g a l Message Value
( Protoco lHanlder . inMessageProcess ing ( ) " ) ;
176 }
177 return this . MessageHandler . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ;
178 }
179 public boolean inMessageProcess ing (byte [ ] inMessage , int Counter ) {
180 try {
181 i f ( Counter == 1) {
182 this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
183 22) ;
184 } else
185 i f ( Counter == 2) {
186 this . MessageHandler . r e s e t ( ) ;
187 this . EncryptedData . r e s e t ( ) ;
188 this . MessageHandler . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
189 inMessage . l ength − 2) ;
190 this . childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . MessageHandler ) ;
191 GenerateKeys ( this . SCDHStore . getValueBytes ( ) ) ;
192 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
193 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
194 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
195 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length , temp , 0 ,
196 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
197 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( this .MACedData . getValueBytes ( ) , temp) ) {}
198 else {
199 System . out . p r i n t l n (
200 " I n t e g r i t y Check Fa i l u r e : ERROR at
Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing \n" ) ;
201 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
202 }
203 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDecryption
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204 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
205 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
206 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
207 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
208 this . childExtractionFromCTLV (EncryptedData ) ;
209 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( PlatformHashPreset ,
210 this . PlatformHash . getValueBytes ( ) ) ) {}
211 else {
212 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Platform Digest Not Ve r i f i e d " ) ;
213 }
214 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . SCCer t i f i c a t e ) ;
215 Big Intege r SCpublicExponent = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
216 ( this . PublicExponent . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
217 Big Intege r SCpublicModulus = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
218 ( this . PublicModulus . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
219 KeyFactory f a c t o r y = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
220 SCVer i f i cat ionKey = ( PublicKey ) f a c t o r y . gene ra tePub l i c (new
221 RSAPublicKeySpec ( SCpublicModulus ,
222 SCpublicExponent ) ) ;
223 temp = new byte [ ( this . PlatformHash . getTagLength ( ) +
224 this . SCIdent ity . getTagLength ( ) +
225 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) +
226 this .CMRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) ) ] ;
227 System . arraycopy ( this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
7 ,
228 temp , 0 , temp . l ength ) ;
229 i f ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod ( temp , 0 ,
230 temp . length , this . SignedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
231 SCVeri f icat ionKey ,
Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) )
232 {}
233 else {
234 System . out . p r i n t l n (




238 } catch ( Exception cE) {
239 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error in Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing : "
240 + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
241 }
242 return true ;
243 }
244 public stat ic St r ing byteToStr ing (byte [ ] inArray ) {
245 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = {
246 (byte ) ' 0 ' , (byte ) ' 1 ' , (byte ) ' 2 ' , (byte ) ' 3 ' , (byte ) ' 4 ' , (byte ) ' 5 ' ,
247 (byte ) ' 6 ' , (byte ) ' 7 ' , (byte ) ' 8 ' , (byte ) ' 9 ' , (byte ) ' a ' , (byte ) 'b ' ,
248 (byte ) ' c ' , (byte ) 'd ' , (byte ) ' e ' , (byte ) ' f '
249 } ;
250 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l ength ] ;
251 int index = 0 ;
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252 for (byte b : inArray ) {
253 int v = b & 0xFF ;
254 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ;
255 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ;
256 }
257 try {
258 return new St r ing ( hex , "ASCII" ) ;
259 } catch ( Exception cE) {
260 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in bytesToStr ing : " +
cE . getMessage ( ) )
261 ;
262 }
263 return "Error " ;
264 }
265 void childExtractionFromCTLV (ConstructedTLV inCTLV) {
266 try {
267 int c h i l d s = inCTLV . getChildNumbers ( ) ;
268 PrimitiveTLV pTemp = null ;
269 ConstructedTLV cTemp = null ;
270 while ( c h i l d s > 0) {
271 switch (inCTLV . nextType ( ) ) {
272 case 1 :
273 pTemp = (PrimitiveTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
274 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
275 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
276 this . SCRandomNumber = pTemp ;
277 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
278 this .MACedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
279 this .MACedData = pTemp ;
280 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
281 this . CMCookie . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
282 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
283 this . CMCookie . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ) ) {}
284 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
285 this . SCIdent ity . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
286 this . SCIdent ity = pTemp ;
287 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
288 this . SignedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
289 this . SignedData = pTemp ;
290 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
291 this . PublicExponent . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
292 this . PublicExponent = pTemp ;
293 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
294 this . PublicModulus . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
295 this . PublicModulus = pTemp ;
296 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
297 this . PlatformHash . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
298 this . PlatformHash = pTemp ;
299 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
300 this . Use r Ident i ty . getTagName ( ) ) ) {





304 case 0 :
305 cTemp = (ConstructedTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
306 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
307 this . EncryptedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
308 this . EncryptedData = cTemp ;
309 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
310 SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
311 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e = cTemp ;
312 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
313 SCCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {




318 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error In Pars ing Input Message" ) ;
319 }
320 ch i l d s −−;
321 }
322 } catch ( Exception e ) {
323 System . out . p r i n t l n (
324 "Error in Protoco lHanlder . ChildExtractionMethod
: " + e . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
325 }
326 }
327 void GenerateKeys (byte [ ] i n bu f f ) {
328 byte [ ] DHSecretKey = null ;
329 try {
330 DHSecretKey =
331 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDHSessionKeyMaterial ( inbu f f ,
0 ,
332 i n bu f f . l ength ) ;
333 } catch ( Exception cE) {
334 System . out . p r i n t l n (
335 "Exception At Protoco lHe lpe rC las s . GenerateKeys :
" + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
336 }
337 byte [ ] keyGenKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
338 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 0 , keyGenKey , 0 , keyGenKey . l ength ) ;
339 byte [ ] macInputValue = new byte [ 6 4 ] ;
340 System . arraycopy ( this .CMRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
macInputValue ,
341 0 , 16) ;
342 System . arraycopy ( this . SCRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
macInputValue ,
343 16 , 16) ;
344 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 16 , macInputValue , 32 , 16) ;
345 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
346 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
347 }
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348 try {
349 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
350 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionEncryptionKey , 0 , keyGenKey ) ;
351 } catch ( Exception cE) {
352 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +
353 cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
354 }
355 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
356 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
357 }
358 try {
359 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
360 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionMacKey , 0 , keyGenKey ) ;
361 } catch ( Exception cE) {
362 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +




C.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol  Service Provider
The Java Card implementation of the STCPSP discussed in section 6.3 is listed in subse-
quent sections.
C.4.1 Smart Card Implementation
Following is the implementation of the smart card protocol handler that supports the
STCPSP.
1 package protocolSTCPSP ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength
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21 {
22 private byte [ ] SPDHChanllengerArray ;
23 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberArray ;
24 private byte [ ] SPCookieArray ;
25 private byte [ ] SCSPDHGeneratedValue ;
26 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberArray ;
27 private byte [ ] SCUserCer t i f i ca t e ;
28 private byte [ ] SCCer t i f i c a t e ;
29 private byte [ ] SPDHChallengeTag = {
30 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
31 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
32 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
33 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
34 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
35 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
36 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
37 private byte [ ] SPIdent i ty = null ;
38 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberTag = {
39 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
40 private byte [ ] SPCookieTag = {
41 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
42 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
43 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
44 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
45 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
46 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
47 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
48 private byte [ ] PlatformHash = {
49 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
50 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {
51 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
52 0x12 , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
53 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 ,
54 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xDB,
55 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
56 private byte [ ] Use r Ident i ty = {
57 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
58 0x14 , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
59 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xC9 ,
60 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xFC, (byte ) 0xDB,
61 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
62 private byte [ ] ExponentTag = {
63 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
64 private byte [ ] ModulusTag = {
65 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
66 private byte [ ] SCDHChalleneTag = {
67 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
68 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {
69 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
70 private byte [ ] SPCert i f i cateTag = {
71 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
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72 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {
73 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
74 private byte [ ] SCUserCert i f i cateTag = {
75 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
76 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
77 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
78 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
79 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
80 byte [ ] SCDHData ;
81 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
82 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
83 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
84 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
85 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
86 RandomData randomDataGen ;
87 Cipher pkCipher ;
88 short messageNumber = 0 ;
89 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
90 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
91 short readCount = 0 ;
92 short rCount = 0 ;
93 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
94 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
95 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
96 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
97 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
98 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
99 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
100 AESKey phCipherKey ;
101 Cipher syCipher ;
102 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
103 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte )
104 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
105 (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
106 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
107 Signature phMacGenerator ;
108 Signature phSign ;
109 KeyPair phSCKeyPair ;
110 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
111 RSAPublicKey SPVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
112 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
113 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
114 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
115 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
116 phMacGenerator = Signature . g e t In s tance
117 ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
118 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se )
119 ;
120 phSCKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
121 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
122 phUserKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
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123 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
124 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
125 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
126 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
127 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
128 fa l se ) ;
129 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance
130 (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
131 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
132 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
133 phSCKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
134 phUserKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
135 }
136 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte
137 bLength )throws ISOException {
138 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
139 }
140 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
141 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
142 SCDHData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
143 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + PTLVDataOffset ) ,
144 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
145 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCDHChalleneTag , ( short )
146 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . SCDHData , ( short ) 0 ,
147 ( short ) this . SCDHChalleneTag . l ength ) ;
148 this . shortToBytes (SCDHData , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
149 SCDHData . l ength − ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
150 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SCDHData , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
151 Protoco lHandler .GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION) ;
152 SPDHChanllengerArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) (
153 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
154 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
155 SPRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
156 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
157 SPCookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
158 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
159 SCRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
160 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
161 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberTag , ( short )
162 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
163 ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
164 this . SCRandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
165 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) (
166 ( short ) this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength − ( short )
167 PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
168 try {
169 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short )
170 86 , JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
171 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic
172 ( this . SCUserCert i f icateTag , ( short ) 0 ,
this . SCUserCert i f i cate ,
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173 ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) this . SCUserCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
174 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
175 ( this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
176 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
177 ( short ) 0 , this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
178 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
179 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
180 this . phUserKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
181 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate ,
182 ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
183 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
184 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
185 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
186 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
187 ( short ) 0 , this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) ,
188 ( short ) this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
189 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short )
190 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
191 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
192 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
193 this . SPIdent i ty = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 24 ,
194 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET) ;
195 SPVer i f i cat ionKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
196 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
197 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
198 } catch ( Exception cE) {
199 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xCCCC) ;
200 }
201 try {
202 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
203 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
204 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCCert i f icateTag ,
205 ( short ) 0 , this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )
206 this . SCCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
207 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
208 ( this . SCCer t i f i c a t e . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
209 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
210 ( short ) 0 , this . SCCert i f i ca t e ,
( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short )
211 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
212 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
213 this . phSCKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
214 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short )
215 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
216 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
217 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
218 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
219 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
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220 ( short ) 0 , this . SCCert i f i ca t e ,
( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) , ( short )
221 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
222 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short )
223 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
224 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
225 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
226 } catch ( Exception cE) {
227 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
228 }
229 }
230 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
231 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
232 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
233 return ;
234 }
235 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
236 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
237 }
238 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
239 this . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
240 return ;
241 }
242 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
243 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
244 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
245 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
246 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
247 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
248 rCount = 0 ;
249 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
250 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
251 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
252 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
253 }
254 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
255 try {
256 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
257 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
258 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
259 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
260 } catch ( Exception aE) {




265 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
266 } catch ( Exception cE) {
267 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
268 }
269 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
295
C.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol  Service Provider
270 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
271 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
272 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
273 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] ==
274 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
275 processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
276 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
277 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
278 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
279 } else {
280 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
281 }
282 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
283 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
284 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
285 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
286 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
287 }
288 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
289 short ch i ldPo interMessage = 6 ;
290 short enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = 0 ;
291 copyPointer = 0 ;
292 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
293 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
294 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
295 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SPDHChanllengerArray , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
296 Protoco lHandler .GEN_DHKEY) ;
297 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagOne ,
298 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
299 this . MessageHandlerTagOne . l ength ) ;
300 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCDHData , ( short ) 0 ,
301 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
302 this . SCDHData . l ength ) ;
303 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
304 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
305 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
306 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
307 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
308 keygenerator ( ) ;
309 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
310 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
311 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
312 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
313 short childEnMessage = ( short ) ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ;
314 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
315 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
316 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCIdentityTag ,
317 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
318 this . SCIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
319 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
320 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
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321 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
322 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
323 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
324 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
325 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
326 this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
327 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
328 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t ,
329 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
330 phUserKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
331 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
332 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
333 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate ,
334 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
335 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
336 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
337 messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t ,
338 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
339 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t −
340 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
341 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
342 macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
343 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
344 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
345 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
346 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPCookieArray ,
347 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
348 this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
349 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
350 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 4 , copyPointer ) ;
351 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
352 copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
353 short tempLength = ( short ) 0 ;
354 short mainChildPointer = ( short ) 6 ;
355 short mainLengthPointer = ( short ) 4 ;
356 short encryptedChi ldPointer = ( short ) 13 ;
357 short genera lLengthPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
358 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
359 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
360 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
361 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 7) ;
362 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
363 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
364 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
365 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
366 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
367 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . PlatformHash , ( short )
368 0 , r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
369 genera lLengthPointer = copyPointer ;
370 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
371 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
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372 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
373 tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
( short ) 0 ,
374 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length , r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
375 copyPointer ) ;
376 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
377 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , genera lLengthPointer ,
378 ( short ) ( tempLength ) ) ;
379 copyPointer += tempLength ;
380 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . User Ident i ty , ( short )
381 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
382 this . Use r Ident i ty . l ength ) ;
383 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
384 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPIdentity , ( short ) 0 ,
385 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
386 this . SPIdent i ty . l ength ) ;
387 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
388 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
389 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
390 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
391 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
392 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
393 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
394 this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
395 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
396 try {
397 this . s ignGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
398 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
399 phSCKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
400 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
401 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
402 } catch ( Exception cE) {
403 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
404 }
405 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e ,
406 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
407 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
408 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
409 try {
410 this . messageEncryption ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
411 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ,
412 ( short ) ( copyPointer −
413 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
414 } catch ( Exception cE) {
415 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer −
416 encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ;
417 }
418 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
419 ( encryptedChi ldPointer − ( short ) 2) , ( short )
420 ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer
421 + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
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422 this . macGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer
423 + ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
424 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ,
425 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
426 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
427 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPCookieArray ,
428 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
429 this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
430 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
431 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , mainLengthPointer ,
432 ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 7) ) ;
433 }
434 }
435 void platformHashGeneration (byte [ ] inArray , short i nO f f s e t ) {}
436 void processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
437 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset +
438 this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
439 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray ,
440 ( short ) ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
441 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
442 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
443 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
444 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , this . SPIdentity ,
445 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) this . SPIdent i ty . l ength )
446 ;
447 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) 151 ;
448 inLength = ( short ) 3 ;
449 SPVer i f i cat ionKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
450 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
451 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
452 SPVer i f i cat ionKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
453 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
454 inLength = ( short ) 68 ;
455 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
456 SPVeri f icat ionKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
457 return ;
458 } else {
459 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
460 }
461 } else {
462 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
463 }
464 }
465 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
466 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1)
467 ] ;
468 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
469 try {
470 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
471 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( SPDHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
472 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
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473 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . SPDHChanllengerArray ,
474 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
475 this . SPDHChanllengerArray . l ength ) ;
476 po in t e r += ( short ) this . SPDHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
477 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SPRandomNumberTag , ( short ) 0 ,
478 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
479 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
480 this . SPRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 0 ,
481 ( short )
482 ( this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ) ;
483 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
484 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SPCookieTag , ( short ) 0 ,
485 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
486 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
487 this . SPCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
488 ( short ) ( this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ) ;
489 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
490 }
491 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
492 }
493 } catch ( Exception cE) {
494 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) c h i l dL e f t ) ;
495 }
496 }
497 void protoco l Implementat ion ( ) {}
498 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
499 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
500 }
501 void dhKeyConGen(byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , byte Oper_Mode)
502 {
503 switch (Oper_Mode) {
504 case GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION: randomExponent =
505 JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
506 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
507 randomDataGen . generateData ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
508 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
509 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
510 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
511 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
512 pkCipher . doFinal (ClassDH . dhBase , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhBase . length , inbu f f ,




517 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
518 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
519 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
520 SCSPDHGeneratedValue = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
521 ( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
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522 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
523 pkCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , ( short ) ( ( short )
524 i n bu f f . l ength − ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset )
525 , SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
526 }
527 catch ( Exception cE) {




532 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x5FA1) ;
533 }
534 }
535 void keygenerator ( ) {
536 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
537 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
538 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
539 sessionGenKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
540 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
541 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
542 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
543 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
544 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
545 short po in t e r = 0 ;
546 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
547 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
548 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
549 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
550 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 16 ,
551 keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
552 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
553 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
554 }
555 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
556 keyGenMacData . length , SCSPDHGeneratedValue ,
557 ( short ) 0) ;
558 this . phCipherKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
559 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
560 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
561 }
562 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
563 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
564 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
565 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
566 keyGenMacData . length , SCSPDHGeneratedValue ,
567 ( short ) 0) ;
568 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
569 SCSPDHGeneratedValue = null ;
570 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
571 }
572 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
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573 inbuf fLength ) {
574 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT,
575 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
576 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
577 short temp ;
578 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , temp =
579 ( short ) syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
580 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
581 }
582 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
583 inbuf fLength ) {
584 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT,
585 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
586 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
587 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
588 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
589 }
590 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
591 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
592 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
593 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
594 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
595 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
596 try {
597 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag ,
598 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
599 this .MACedDataTag . l ength ) ;
600 copyPointer += 2 ;
601 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
602 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
603 }
604 try {
605 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn
606 ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
607 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
608 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) ,
609 l ength ) ;
610 copyPointer += length ;
611 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
612 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0987 ) ;
613 }
614 return true ;
615 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
616 try {
617 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
618 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
619 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
620 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
621 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t +
622 inbuf fLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
623 } catch ( Exception cE) {
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624 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xC1C2) ;
625 }
626 }
627 return fa l se ;
628 }
629 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
630 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
631 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
632 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag ,
633 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
634 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
635 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
636 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
637 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
638 i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
639 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
640 ( short ) 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
641 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
642 return true ;
643 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
644 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
645 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
646 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
647 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
648 }
649 return fa l se ;
650 }
651 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
652 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
653 }
654 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short
655 a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
656 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [
657 ( short ) ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
658 }
659 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short inShort ) {
660 Array [ 0 ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >> ( short )
661 0x0008 ) ;
662 Array [ 1 ] = (byte ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0x00FF) ;
663 }
664 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
665 inShort ) {
666 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
667 ( short ) 0x0008 ) ;
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C.4.2 Service Provider Implementation
In this section, we detail the SP's implementation of the STCPSP and the helper functions
utlised during the STCPSP are discussed in appendices C.11.1 and C.11.2.
1 package j avacardte rmina l ;
2
3 import java . math . B ig Intege r ;
4 import java . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
5 import java . s e c u r i t y . i n t e r f a c e s . RSAPublicKey ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . RSAPublicKeySpec ;
7 import java . u t i l . Arrays ;
8 import javax . crypto . ∗ ;
9 import javax . crypto . spec . SecretKeySpec ;
10 public class Protoco lHandler {
11 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
12 (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
13 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
14 (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
15 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
16 (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA} ;
17 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
18 (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB} ;
19 private byte [ ] PlatformHashPreset = {
20 (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xE5 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x2C , (byte )
21 0xA1 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xAD, (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xDB,
22 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xA5 , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0x85 ,
23 (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x56 ,
24 (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xB4 , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCE, (byte ) 0x3F ,
25 (byte ) 0xE0 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xDC, (byte ) 0xE9 , (byte ) 0x3A ,
26 (byte ) 0x9D} ;
27 private byte [ ] PlatformHashTag = {
28 (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
29 private byte [ ] PublicExponentTag = {
30 (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
31 private byte [ ] PublicModulusTag = {
32 (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
33 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {
34 (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
35 private byte [ ] SCDHChallengeTag = {
36 (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
37 private byte [ ] SCIP = {
38 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C} ;
39 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {
40 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
41 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {
42 (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
43 private byte [ ] SCUserCert i f i cateTag = {
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47 private PublicKey SCUserVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
48 private PublicKey SCVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
49 private byte [ ] SPCookieTag = {
50 (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
51 private byte [ ] SPDHChallengeTag = {
52 (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
53 private byte [ ] SPIdent i ty = {
54 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte )
55 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0x90 ,
56 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xD7 ,
57 (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C} ;
58 private byte [ ] SPIdentityTag = {
59 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
60 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberTag = {
61 (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
62 private byte [ ] SPSigVeri f icat ionKeyTag = {
63 (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
64 private byte [ ] SPSignatureCertTag = {
65 (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0xF01 } ;
66 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
67 (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
68 private byte [ ] UserIdent i tyTag = {
69 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
70 private PrimitiveTLV User Ident i ty = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
71 ( this . UserIdent ityTag ) ;
72 private PrimitiveTLV SignedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
73 ( this . SignedDataTag ) ;
74 private ConstructedTLV SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e =
75 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( SPSignatureCertTag ) ;
76 private PrimitiveTLV SPSigVer i f i cat ionKey =
77 PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV ( this . SPSigVer i f icat ionKeyTag ) ;
78 private PrimitiveTLV SPRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
79 ( this . SPRandomNumberTag) ;
80 private PrimitiveTLV SPIdentityTLV = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
81 ( SPIdentityTag , SPIdent i ty ) ;
82 private PrimitiveTLV SPDHChanllenger = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
83 ( this . SPDHChallengeTag ) ;
84 private PrimitiveTLV SPCookie = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
85 ( this . SPCookieTag ) ;
86 private ConstructedTLV SCUserCer t i f i ca t e =
87 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( this . SCUserCert i f i cateTag ) ;
88 private PrimitiveTLV SCRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
89 ( this . SCRandomNumberTag) ;
90 private PrimitiveTLV SCIdent ity = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
91 ( SCIdentityTag ) ;
92 private PrimitiveTLV SCDHChallenge = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
93 ( this . SCDHChallengeTag ) ;
94 private ConstructedTLV SCCer t i f i c a t e =
95 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( this . SCCert i f i cateTag ) ;
96 private PrimitiveTLV PublicModulus = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
97 ( this . PublicModulusTag ) ;
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98 private PrimitiveTLV PublicExponent = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
99 ( this . PublicExponentTag ) ;
100 private PrimitiveTLV PlatformHash = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
101 ( this . PlatformHashTag ) ;
102 public ConstructedTLV MessageHandler =
103 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV (MessageHandlerTagOne ) ;
104 private PrimitiveTLV MACedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
105 ( this .MACedDataTag) ;
106 private ConstructedTLV EncryptedData =
107 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
108 private Protoco lHe lpe rClas s myProtocolHelperObject = new
109 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s ( ) ;
110 private byte [ ] mySessionEncryptionKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
111 private byte [ ] mySessionMacKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
112 public Protoco lHandler ( ) {
113 myProtocolHelperObject . p r o t o c o l I n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
114 RSAPublicKey tempKey = (RSAPublicKey )
115 myProtocolHelperObject . getPublicKey ( ) ;
116 byte [ ] tempExponent = tempKey . getPubl icExponent ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
117 this . PublicExponent . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicExponentTag ,
118 tempExponent . l ength ) ;
119 this . PublicExponent . setTlvValues ( tempExponent ) ;
120 byte [ ] tempModulus = tempKey . getModulus ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
121 this . PublicModulus . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicModulusTag ,
122 ( tempModulus . l ength − 1) ) ;
123 this . PublicModulus . setTlvValues ( tempModulus , 1 ,
124 ( tempModulus . l ength − 1) ) ;
125 SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e . addPTLV( this . PublicExponent ) ;
126 SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e . addPTLV( this . PublicModulus ) ;
127 }
128 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
129 try {
130 this . SPDHChanllenger . setTlvValues
131 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDHPublicValue ( ) ) ;
132 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPDHChanllenger ) ;
133 } catch ( Exception cE) {
134 System . out . p r i n t l n (
135 "Error Protoco lHandler . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l Option
= 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
136 }
137 }
138 public byte [ ] outMessageProcess ing ( int Counter ) {
139 i f ( Counter == 1) {
140 try {
141 this . SPRandomNumber . setTlvValues
142 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . getRandomNumber ( ) ) ;
143 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPRandomNumber) ;
144 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ ( this . SCIP . l ength +
145 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( )
146 + this . SPRandomNumber . getValueLength ( )
147 ) ] ;
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148 System . arraycopy ( this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
149 temp , 0 , this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength
150 ( ) ) ;
151 System . arraycopy ( this . SPRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 , temp ,
152 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( ) ,
153 this . SPRandomNumber . getValueLength ( ) ) ;
154 System . arraycopy ( this . SCIP , 0 , temp , temp . l ength −
155 this . SCIP . length , this . SCIP . l ength ) ;
156 byte [ ] r e s u l t = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
157 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac ( temp , 0 , temp . length ,
158 r e su l t , 0 , this . myProtocolHelperObject .myLongTermMacKey) ;
159 this . SPCookie . setTlvValues ( r e s u l t ) ;
160 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPCookie ) ;
161 } catch ( Exception cE) {
162 System . out . p r i n t l n (
163 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
164 }
165 } else i f ( Counter == 2) {
166 try {
167 this . EncryptedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
168 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPIdentityTLV ) ;
169 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPRandomNumber) ;
170 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCRandomNumber) ;
171 this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod
172 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
173 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
174 this . SignedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 , null ,
175 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_GENERATION) ;
176 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SignedData ) ;
177 this . EncryptedData .addCTLV( this . SPS i gna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e ) ;
178 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateEncryption
179 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
180 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
181 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
182 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
183 this .MACedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this .MACedDataTag , 16) ;
184 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
185 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
186 this . EncryptedData . getTagValueLength ( ) ,
187 this .MACedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 ,
188 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
189 this . MessageHandler . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV
190 ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ) ;
191 this . MessageHandler . addCTLV( EncryptedData ) ;
192 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this .MACedData) ;
193 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPCookie ) ;
194 } catch ( Exception cE) {
195 System . out . p r i n t l n (
196 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
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197 }
198 } else {
199 System . out . p r i n t l n (
200 "Protoco l Stoped : I l l e g a l Message Value
( Protoco lHanlder . inMessageProcess ing ( ) " ) ;
201 }
202 return this . MessageHandler . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ;
203 }
204 public boolean inMessageProcess ing (byte [ ] inMessage , int Counter ) {
205 try {
206 i f ( Counter == 1) {
207 MessageHandler . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
208 ( inMessage . l ength − 2) ) ;
209 childExtractionFromCTLV (MessageHandler ) ;
210 GenerateKeys ( this . SCDHChallenge . getValueBytes ( ) ) ;
211 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
212 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
213 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
214 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length , temp , 0 ,
215 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
216 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( this .MACedData . getValueBytes ( ) , temp) ) {}
217 else {
218 System . out . p r i n t l n (
219 " I n t e g r i t y Check Fa i l u r e : ERROR at
Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing \n" ) ;
220 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
221 }
222 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDecryption
223 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
224 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
225 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
226 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
227 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . EncryptedData ) ;
228 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e ) ;
229 Big Intege r publicExponent = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
230 ( this . PublicExponent . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
231 Big Intege r publicModulus = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
232 ( this . PublicModulus . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
233 KeyFactory f a c t o r y = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
234 SCUserVer i f i cat ionKey = ( PublicKey ) f a c t o r y . gene ra tePub l i c (new
235 RSAPublicKeySpec ( publicModulus ,
236 publicExponent ) ) ;
237 temp = new byte [ ( this . SCIdent ity . getTagLength ( ) +
238 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) +
239 this . SPRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) ) ] ;
240 System . arraycopy ( this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion
241 ( ) , 7 , temp , 0 , temp . l ength ) ;
242 i f ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod ( temp , 0 ,
243 temp . length , this . SignedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
244 SCUserVeri f icat ionKey ,
245 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) ) {}
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246 else {
247 System . out . p r i n t l n (
248 " S ignature V e r i f i c a t i o n Fa i l ed . . . . . . Check
code" ) ;
249 }
250 } else i f ( Counter == 2) {
251 this . MessageHandler . r e s e t ( ) ;
252 this . EncryptedData . r e s e t ( ) ;
253 this . MessageHandler . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
254 inMessage . l ength − 2) ;
255 this . childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . MessageHandler ) ;
256 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
257 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
258 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
259 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length , temp , 0 ,
260 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
261 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( this .MACedData . getValueBytes ( ) , temp) ) {}
262 else {
263 System . out . p r i n t l n (
264 " I n t e g r i t y Check Fa i l u r e : ERROR at
Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing \n" ) ;
265 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
266 }
267 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDecryption
268 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
269 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
270 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
271 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
272 this . childExtractionFromCTLV (EncryptedData ) ;
273 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( PlatformHashPreset ,
274 this . PlatformHash . getValueBytes ( ) ) ) {}
275 else {
276 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Platform Digest Not Ve r i f i e d " ) ;
277 }
278 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . SCCer t i f i c a t e ) ;
279 Big Intege r SCpublicExponent = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
280 ( this . PublicExponent . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
281 Big Intege r SCpublicModulus = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
282 ( this . PublicModulus . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
283 KeyFactory f a c t o r y = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
284 SCVer i f i cat ionKey = ( PublicKey ) f a c t o r y . gene ra tePub l i c (new
285 RSAPublicKeySpec ( SCpublicModulus ,
286 SCpublicExponent ) ) ;
287 temp = new byte [ ( this . PlatformHash . getTagLength ( ) +
288 this . Use r Ident i ty . getTagLength ( ) +
289 this . SCIdent ity . getTagLength ( ) +
290 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) +
291 this . SPRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) ) ] ;
292 System . arraycopy ( this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion
293 ( ) , 7 , temp , 0 , temp . l ength ) ;
294 i f ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod ( temp , 0 ,
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295 temp . length , this . SignedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
296 SCVeri f icat ionKey ,
297 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) ) {}
298 else {
299 System . out . p r i n t l n (




303 } catch ( Exception cE) {
304 System . out . p r i n t l n (
305 "Error in Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing :
" + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
306 }
307 return true ;
308 }
309 public stat ic St r ing byteToStr ing (byte [ ] inArray ) {
310 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = {
311 (byte ) ' 0 ' , (byte ) ' 1 ' , (byte ) ' 2 ' , (byte ) ' 3 ' , (byte ) ' 4 ' , (byte )
312 ' 5 ' , (byte ) ' 6 ' , (byte ) ' 7 ' , (byte ) ' 8 ' , (byte ) ' 9 ' , (byte ) ' a ' ,
313 (byte ) 'b ' , (byte ) ' c ' , (byte ) 'd ' , (byte ) ' e ' , (byte ) ' f '
314 } ;
315 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l ength ] ;
316 int index = 0 ;
317 for (byte b : inArray ) {
318 int v = b & 0xFF ;
319 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ;
320 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ;
321 }
322 try {
323 return new St r ing ( hex , "ASCII" ) ;
324 } catch ( Exception cE) {
325 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in bytesToStr ing : " +
326 cE . getMessage ( ) ) ;
327 }
328 return "Error " ;
329 }
330 void childExtractionFromCTLV (ConstructedTLV inCTLV) {
331 try {
332 int c h i l d s = inCTLV . getChildNumbers ( ) ;
333 PrimitiveTLV pTemp = null ;
334 ConstructedTLV cTemp = null ;
335 while ( c h i l d s > 0) {
336 switch (inCTLV . nextType ( ) ) {
337 case 1 :
338 pTemp = (PrimitiveTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
339 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
340 this . SCDHChallenge . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
341 this . SCDHChallenge = pTemp ;
342 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
343 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
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344 this . SCRandomNumber = pTemp ;
345 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
346 this .MACedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
347 this .MACedData = pTemp ;
348 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
349 this . SPCookie . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
350 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
351 this . SPCookie . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ) ) {}
352 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
353 this . SCIdent ity . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
354 this . SCIdent ity = pTemp ;
355 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
356 this . SignedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
357 this . SignedData = pTemp ;
358 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
359 this . PublicExponent . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
360 this . PublicExponent = pTemp ;
361 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
362 this . PublicModulus . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
363 this . PublicModulus = pTemp ;
364 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
365 this . PlatformHash . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
366 this . PlatformHash = pTemp ;
367 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
368 this . Use r Ident i ty . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
369 this . Use r Ident i ty = pTemp ;
370 }
371 break ;
372 case 0 : cTemp = (ConstructedTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
373 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
374 this . EncryptedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
375 this . EncryptedData = cTemp ;
376 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
377 SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
378 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e = cTemp ;
379 }
380 else
381 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
382 SCCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {




387 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error In Pars ing Input Message" ) ;
388 }
389 ch i l d s −−;
390 }
391 } catch ( Exception e ) {
392 System . out . p r i n t l n (
393 "Error in Protoco lHanlder . ChildExtractionMethod
: " + e . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
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394 }
395 }
396 void GenerateKeys (byte [ ] i n bu f f ) {
397 byte [ ] DHSecretKey = null ;
398 try {
399 DHSecretKey =
400 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDHSessionKeyMaterial
401 ( inbu f f , 0 , i n bu f f . l ength ) ;
402 } catch ( Exception cE) {
403 System . out . p r i n t l n (
404 "Exception At Protoco lHe lpe rC las s . GenerateKeys :
" + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
405 }
406 byte [ ] keyGenKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
407 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 0 , keyGenKey , 0 , keyGenKey . l ength ) ;
408 byte [ ] macInputValue = new byte [ 6 4 ] ;
409 System . arraycopy ( this . SPRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
410 macInputValue , 0 , 16) ;
411 System . arraycopy ( this . SCRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
412 macInputValue , 16 , 16) ;
413 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 16 , macInputValue , 32 , 16) ;
414 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
415 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
416 }
417 try {
418 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
419 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionEncryptionKey , 0 ,
420 keyGenKey ) ;
421 } catch ( Exception cE) {
422 System . out . p r i n t l n (
423 "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +
cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
424 }
425 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
426 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
427 }
428 try {
429 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
430 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionMacKey , 0 , keyGenKey ) ;
431 } catch ( Exception cE) {
432 System . out . p r i n t l n (
433 "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +
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The Java Card implementation of the STCPSC discussed in section 6.4 is listed in subse-
quent sections.
C.5.1 Smart Card Implementation
In this section, we list the smart card implementation of the STCPSC, and the implemen-
tation is similar to the on discussed in section C.9.
1 package protocolSTCPSC ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength {
21 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberArray ;
22 private byte [ ] SPCookieArray ;
23 private byte [ ] SCSPDHGeneratedValue ;
24 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberArray ;
25 private byte [ ] SCCer t i f i c a t e ;
26 private byte [ ] SPDHChallengeTag = {
27 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
28 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
29 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
30 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
31 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
32 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
33 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
34 private byte [ ] SPIdent i ty = null ;
35 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberTag = {
36 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
37 private byte [ ] SPCookieTag = {
38 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
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39 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
40 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
41 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
42 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
43 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
44 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
45 private byte [ ] PlatformHash = {
46 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
47 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {
48 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x0C ,
49 (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
50 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
51 (byte ) 0x11 } ;
52 private byte [ ] ExponentTag = {
53 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
54 private byte [ ] ModulusTag = {
55 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
56 private byte [ ] SCDHChalleneTag = {
57 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
58 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {
59 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
60 private byte [ ] SPCert i f i cateTag = {
61 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
62 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {
63 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
64 private byte [ ] SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag = {
65 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xB2} ;
66 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
67 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
68 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
69 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
70 byte [ ] SCDHData ;
71 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
72 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
73 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
74 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
75 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
76 RandomData randomDataGen ;
77 Cipher pkCipher ;
78 short messageNumber = 0 ;
79 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
80 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
81 short readCount = 0 ;
82 short rCount = 0 ;
83 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
84 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
85 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
86 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
87 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
88 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
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89 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
90 AESKey phCipherKey ;
91 Cipher syCipher ;
92 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
93 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
(byte ) 0x99 ,
94 (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte )
95 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
96 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
97 Signature phMacGenerator ;
98 Signature phSign ;
99 KeyPair phSCKeyPair ;
100 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
101 RSAPublicKey SPVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
102 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
103 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
104 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
105 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
106 phMacGenerator =
Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD,
107 fa l se ) ;
108 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se ) ;
109 phSCKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA, KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
110 phUserKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512)
111 ;
112 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
113 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
114 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
115 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
116 fa l se ) ;
117 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
118 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
119 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
120 phSCKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
121 phUserKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
122 }
123 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength )
124 throws ISOException {
125 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
126 }
127 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
128 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
129 SCDHData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
130 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + PTLVDataOffset ) ,
131 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
132 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCDHChalleneTag , ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
133 this . SCDHData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
134 this . SCDHChalleneTag . l ength ) ;
135 this . shortToBytes (SCDHData , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )SCDHData . l ength −
136 ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
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137 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SCDHData , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
138 Protoco lHandler .GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION) ;
139 SPDHChanllengerArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
140 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
141 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
142 SPRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
143 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
144 SPCookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
145 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
146 SCRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
147 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
148 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberTag , ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
149 this . SCRandomNumberArray , ( short )
150 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
151 this . SCRandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
152 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
153 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength − ( short )
154 PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
155 try {
156 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
157 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
158 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCCert i f icateTag ,
159 ( short ) 0 , this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )
160 this . SCCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
161 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
162 ( this . SCCer t i f i c a t e . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
163 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag , ( short ) 0 ,
164 this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
( short ) 3) , ( short )
165 this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
166 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey ) this . phSCKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
167 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short )
168 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
169 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
170 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
171 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
172 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag , ( short ) 0 ,
173 this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) , ( short )
174 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
175 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short )
176 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
177 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
178 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
179 SPVer i f i cat ionKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
180 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
181 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
182 } catch ( Exception cE) {
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186 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
187 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
188 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
189 this . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
190 return ;
191 }
192 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
193 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
194 }
195 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
196 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
197 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
198 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
199 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
200 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
201 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
202 return ;
203 }
204 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
205 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
206 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
207 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
208 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
209 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
210 rCount = 0 ;
211 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
212 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
213 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
214 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
215 }
216 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
217 try {
218 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
219 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
220 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
221 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
222 } catch ( Exception aE) {
223 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x7AAA) ;
224 }
225 }
226 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
227 try {
228 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
229 } catch ( Exception cE) {
230 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
231 }
232 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 600 ,
233 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
234 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
235 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
236 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
317
C.5 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol  Smart Card
237 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
238 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
239 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
240 i f ( processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ) {
241 return ;
242 } else {
243 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
244 }
245 return ;
246 } else {
247 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
248 }
249 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
250 }
251 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
252 short childPM1 = 0 ;
253 short childPM2 = 0 ;
254 copyPointer = 0 ;
255 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
256 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopy ( this . SCProtoco l In i t iatorTag , ( short ) 0 ,
257 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
258 ( short )
259 this . SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag . l ength ) ;
260 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
261 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
262 childPM1 = copyPointer ;
263 copyPointer += 2 ;
264 phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
265 this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
266 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
267 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
268 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
269 short l ength = 0 ;
270 l ength = phMacGenerator . s i gn (SCDHData , ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset ,
271 ( short ) (SCDHData . l ength −
272 this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
273 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ) ;
274 copyPointer += length ;
275 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , childPM1 , l ength ) ;
276 return ;
277 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
278 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SPDHChanllengerArray , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
279 Protoco lHandler .GEN_DHKEY) ;
280 keygenerator ( ) ;
281 childPM1 = ( short ) 6 ;
282 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
283 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
284 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo . l ength ) ;
285 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCDHData , ( short ) 0 ,
286 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
287 this . SCDHData . l ength ) ;
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288 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
289 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
290 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
291 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
292 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
293 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag , ( short )
294 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
295 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
296 copyPointer += 3 ;
297 childPM2 = ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 1) ;
298 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
299 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . PlatformHash , ( short ) 0 ,
300 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
( short ) this . PlatformHash . l ength )
301 ;
302 copyPointer += 2 ;
303 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
304 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
305 short tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
( short ) 0 ,
306 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
307 copyPointer ) ;
308 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
309 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
( short )
310 2) , tempLength ) ;
311 copyPointer += tempLength ;
312 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCIdentityTag , ( short ) 0 ,
313 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
314 this . SCIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
315 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
316 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
317 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
318 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
319 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
320 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
321 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
322 this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
323 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
324 try {
325 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 + ( short )
326 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
327 ( short ) 1) ) , this . phSCKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
328 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
329 } catch ( Exception cE) {
330 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x3141 ) ;
331 }
332 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
333 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 0 ,
334 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
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335 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
336 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
337 try {
338 this . messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 +
339 ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short )
340 ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
341 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
342 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
343 ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
344 }
345 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 −
( short ) 2) ,
346 ( short ) ( copyPointer − childPM2 − ( short ) 1) ) ;
347 this . macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ,
348 ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
( short ) 1) ) ,
349 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
350 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
351 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
352 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
353 this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
354 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
355 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM1 −
( short ) 2) ,
356 ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 7) ) ;
357 }
358 }
359 boolean processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
360 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
361 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray , ( short )
362 ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
363 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
364 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
365 try {
366 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
367 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . PTLVDataOffset +
368 ( short ) 168) ;
369 inLength = 3 ;
370 SPVer i f i cat ionKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
371 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
372 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
373 SPVer i f i cat ionKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
374 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
375 inLength = ( short ) 84 ;
376 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
377 SPVeri f icat ionKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
378 return true ;
379 } else {
380 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
381 }
382 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
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383 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xAB23) ;
384 }
385 return true ;
386 } else {
387 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
388 }
389 return fa l se ;
390 }
391 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
392 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1) ] ;
393 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
394 try {
395 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
396 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( SPDHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
397 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
398 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . SPDHChanllengerArray ,
399 ( short ) 0 ,
( short ) this . SPDHChanllengerArray . l ength )
400 ;
401 po in t e r += ( short ) this . SPDHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
402 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SPRandomNumberTag , ( short ) 0 ,
403 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
404 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
405 this . SPRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 0 ,
406 ( short ) ( this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) )
407 ;
408 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
409 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SPCookieTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
410 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
411 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . SPCookieArray ,
412 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
413 ( this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ) ;
414 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
415 }
416 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
417 }
418 } catch ( Exception cE) {
419 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) c h i l dL e f t ) ;
420 }
421 }
422 void protoco l Implementat ion ( ) {}
423 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
424 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
425 }
426 void dhKeyConGen(byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , byte Oper_Mode) {
427 switch (Oper_Mode) {
428 case GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION:
429 randomExponent = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
430 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
431 randomDataGen . generateData ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
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432 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
433 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
434 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
435 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
436 pkCipher . doFinal (ClassDH . dhBase , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhBase . length , inbu f f ,




441 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
442 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
443 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
444 SCSPDHGeneratedValue = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short )
445 ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
446 pkCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , ( short ) ( ( short )
447 i n bu f f . l ength − ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
448 SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
449 }
450 catch ( Exception cE) {




455 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x5FA1) ;
456 }
457 }
458 void keygenerator ( ) {
459 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
460 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
461 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
462 sessionGenKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
463 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
464 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
465 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
466 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
467 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
468 short po in t e r = 0 ;
469 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
470 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
471 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
472 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
473 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 16 ,
474 keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
475 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
476 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
477 }
478 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
479 keyGenMacData . length , SCSPDHGeneratedValue ,
( short )
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480 0) ;
481 this . phCipherKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
482 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
483 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
484 }
485 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
486 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
487 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
488 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
489 keyGenMacData . length , SCSPDHGeneratedValue ,
( short )
490 0) ;
491 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
492 SCSPDHGeneratedValue = null ;
493 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
494 }
495 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
496 inbuf fLength ) {
497 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
498 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
499 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , ( short )
500 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength ,
501 i nbu f f , i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
502 }
503 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short inbuf fLength )
504 {
505 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
506 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
507 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
508 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
509 }
510 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
511 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
512 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
513 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
514 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
515 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
516 try {
517 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag , ( short ) 0 ,
518 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
519 this .MACedDataTag . l ength ) ;
520 copyPointer += 2 ;
521 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
522 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
523 }
524 try {
525 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
526 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
527 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) ,
l ength ) ;
528 copyPointer += length ;
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529 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
530 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0987 ) ;
531 }
532 return true ;
533 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
534 try {
535 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
536 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
537 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
538 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
539 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short )
540 ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbuf fLength +
541 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
542 } catch ( Exception cE) {
543 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xC1C2) ;
544 }
545 }
546 return fa l se ;
547 }
548 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
549 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
550 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
551 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag , ( short ) 0 ,
552 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
553 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
554 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
555 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
556 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th ,
557 i nbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
558 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
( short )
559 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
560 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
561 return true ;
562 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
563 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
564 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
565 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
566 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
567 }
568 return fa l se ;
569 }
570 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
571 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
572 }
573 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
574 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ ( short )
575 ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
576 }
577 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
inShort )
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578 {
579 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
( short )
580 0x0008 ) ;




C.5.2 Service Provider Implementation
Following is the implementation code for the protocol hander used by the SP during the
STCPSC.
1 package j avacardte rmina l ;
2
3 import java . u t i l . Arrays ;
4 import java . s e c u r i t y . i n t e r f a c e s . RSAPublicKey ;
5 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . RSAPublicKeySpec ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
7 import java . math . B ig Intege r ;
8 public class ProtocolHandlerSCIn {
9 private byte [ ] SPIdent i ty = {
10 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 ,
(byte ) 0x0A ,
11 (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte )
12 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xD7} ;
13 private byte [ ] SCIP = {
14 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C} ;
15 private byte [ ] PlatformHashPreset = {
16 (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xE5 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x2C ,
(byte ) 0xA1 ,
17 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xAD, (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xDB, (byte )
18 0x5F , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xA5 , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x5A ,
19 (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte )
20 0xB4 , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCE, (byte ) 0x3F , (byte ) 0xE0 , (byte ) 0x99 ,
21 (byte ) 0xDC, (byte ) 0xE9 , (byte ) 0x3A , (byte ) 0x9D} ;
22 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {(byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA} ;
23 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {(byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB} ;
24 private byte [ ] SPIdentityTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
25 private byte [ ] SPDHChallengeTag = {(byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
26 private byte [ ] SPSignatureCertTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0xF01 } ;
27 private byte [ ] SPSigVeri f icat ionKeyTag = {(byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
28 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberTag = {(byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
29 private byte [ ] SPCookieTag = {(byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
30 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {(byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
31 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {(byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
32 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {(byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
33 private byte [ ] PublicExponentTag = {(byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
34 private byte [ ] PublicModulusTag = {(byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
35 private byte [ ] SCDHChallengeTag = {(byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
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36 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {(byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
37 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
38 private byte [ ] SCUserCert i f i cateTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
39 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
40 private byte [ ] PlatformHashTag = {(byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
41 private byte [ ] UserIdent i tyTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
42 private byte [ ] SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag = {(byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xB2} ;
43 public ConstructedTLV MessageHandler = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
44 (MessageHandlerTagOne ) ;
45 private ConstructedTLV SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e =
46 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( SPSignatureCertTag ) ;
47 private PrimitiveTLV SPIdentityTLV = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
48 ( SPIdentityTag , SPIdent i ty ) ;
49 private PrimitiveTLV SPSigVer i f i cat ionKey = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
50 ( this . SPSigVer i f icat ionKeyTag ) ;
51 private PrimitiveTLV SPDHChanllenger = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
52 ( this . SPDHChallengeTag ) ;
53 private PrimitiveTLV SPRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
54 ( this . SPRandomNumberTag) ;
55 private PrimitiveTLV SPCookie = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
56 ( this . SPCookieTag ) ;
57 private ConstructedTLV EncryptedData = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
58 ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
59 private PrimitiveTLV MACedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
60 ( this .MACedDataTag) ;
61 private PrimitiveTLV SignedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
62 ( this . SignedDataTag ) ;
63 private PrimitiveTLV PublicExponent = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
64 ( this . PublicExponentTag ) ;
65 private PrimitiveTLV PublicModulus = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
66 ( this . PublicModulusTag ) ;
67 private PrimitiveTLV SCDHChallenge = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
68 ( this . SCDHChallengeTag ) ;
69 private PrimitiveTLV SCRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
70 ( this . SCRandomNumberTag) ;
71 private PrimitiveTLV SCIdent ity = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
72 ( SCIdentityTag ) ;
73 private ConstructedTLV SCUserCer t i f i ca t e =
74 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( this . SCUserCert i f i cateTag ) ;
75 private ConstructedTLV SCCer t i f i c a t e = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
76 ( this . SCCert i f i cateTag ) ;
77 private PrimitiveTLV PlatformHash = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
78 ( this . PlatformHashTag ) ;
79 private PrimitiveTLV User Ident i ty = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
80 ( this . UserIdent ityTag ) ;
81 private PrimitiveTLV SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
82 ( this . SCProtoco l In i t i a torTag ) ;
83 private Protoco lHe lpe rClas s myProtocolHelperObject = new
84 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s ( ) ;
85 private byte [ ] mySessionEncryptionKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
86 private byte [ ] mySessionMacKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
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87 private PublicKey SCUserVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
88 private PublicKey SCVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
89 public ProtocolHandlerSCIn ( ) {
90 myProtocolHelperObject . p r o t o c o l I n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
91 RSAPublicKey tempKey = (RSAPublicKey )
92 myProtocolHelperObject . getPublicKey ( ) ;
93 byte [ ] tempExponent = tempKey . getPubl icExponent ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
94 this . PublicExponent . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicExponentTag ,
95 tempExponent . l ength ) ;
96 this . PublicExponent . setTlvValues ( tempExponent ) ;
97 byte [ ] tempModulus = tempKey . getModulus ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
98 this . PublicModulus . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicModulusTag ,
99 ( tempModulus . l ength − 1) ) ;
100 this . PublicModulus . setTlvValues ( tempModulus , 1 , ( tempModulus . l ength −
101 1) ) ;
102 SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e . addPTLV( this . PublicExponent ) ;
103 SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e . addPTLV( this . PublicModulus ) ;
104 }
105 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
106 try {
107 this . SPDHChanllenger . setTlvValues
108 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDHPublicValue ( ) ) ;
109 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPDHChanllenger ) ;
110 } catch ( Exception cE) {
111 System . out . p r i n t l n (
112 "Error Protoco lHandler . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l Option
= 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
113 }
114 }
115 public byte [ ] outMessageProcess ing ( int Counter ) {
116 i f ( Counter == 1) {
117 try {
118 this . SPRandomNumber . setTlvValues
119 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . getRandomNumber ( ) ) ;
120 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPRandomNumber) ;
121 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ ( this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( )
122 . l ength +
123 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( ) +
124 this . SPRandomNumber . getValueLength ( ) ) ] ;
125 System . arraycopy ( this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 , temp , 0 ,
126 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( ) ) ;
127 System . arraycopy ( this . SPRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 , temp ,
128 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( ) ,
129 this . SPRandomNumber . getValueLength ( ) ) ;
130 System . arraycopy ( this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
temp ,
131 temp . l ength −
132 this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
133 this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . getValueBytes ( ) . l ength ) ;
134 byte [ ] r e s u l t = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
135 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac ( temp , 0 , temp . length ,
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136 r e su l t , 0 , this . myProtocolHelperObject .myLongTermMacKey) ;
137 this . SPCookie . setTlvValues ( r e s u l t ) ;
138 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPCookie ) ;
139 } catch ( Exception cE) {
140 System . out . p r i n t l n (
141 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
142 }
143 } else i f ( Counter == 2) {
144 try {
145 this . EncryptedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
146 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPIdentityTLV ) ;
147 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCIdent ity ) ;
148 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPRandomNumber) ;
149 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCRandomNumber) ;
150 this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod
151 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
152 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
153 this . SignedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 , null ,
154 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_GENERATION) ;
155 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SignedData ) ;
156 this . EncryptedData .addCTLV( this . SPS i gna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e ) ;
157 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateEncryption
158 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
159 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
160 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
161 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
162 this .MACedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this .MACedDataTag , 16) ;
163 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
164 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
165 this . EncryptedData . getTagValueLength ( ) ,
166 this .MACedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 ,
167 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
168 this . MessageHandler . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ) ;
169 this . MessageHandler . addCTLV( EncryptedData ) ;
170 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this .MACedData) ;
171 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPCookie ) ;
172 } catch ( Exception cE) {
173 System . out . p r i n t l n (
174 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
175 }
176 } else {
177 System . out . p r i n t l n (
178 "Protoco l Stoped : I l l e g a l Message Value
( Protoco lHanlder . inMessageProcess ing ( ) " ) ;
179 }
180 return this . MessageHandler . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ;
181 }
182 public boolean inMessageProcess ing (byte [ ] inMessage , int Counter ) {
183 try {
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184 i f ( Counter == 1) {
185 this . SCPro to co l I n i t i a t o r . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
186 22) ;
187 } else
188 i f ( Counter == 2) {
189 this . MessageHandler . r e s e t ( ) ;
190 this . EncryptedData . r e s e t ( ) ;
191 this . MessageHandler . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
192 inMessage . l ength − 2) ;
193 this . childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . MessageHandler ) ;
194 GenerateKeys ( this . SCDHChallenge . getValueBytes ( ) ) ;
195 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
196 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
197 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
198 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length , temp , 0 ,
199 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
200 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( this .MACedData . getValueBytes ( ) , temp) ) {}
201 else {
202 System . out . p r i n t l n (
203 " I n t e g r i t y Check Fa i l u r e : ERROR at
Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing \n" ) ;
204 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
205 }
206 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDecryption
207 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
208 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
209 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
210 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
211 this . childExtractionFromCTLV (EncryptedData ) ;
212 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( PlatformHashPreset ,
213 this . PlatformHash . getValueBytes ( ) ) ) {}
214 else {
215 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Platform Digest Not Ve r i f i e d " ) ;
216 }
217 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . SCCer t i f i c a t e ) ;
218 Big Intege r SCpublicExponent = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
219 ( this . PublicExponent . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
220 Big Intege r SCpublicModulus = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
221 ( this . PublicModulus . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
222 KeyFactory f a c t o r y = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
223 SCVer i f i cat ionKey = ( PublicKey ) f a c t o r y . gene ra tePub l i c (new
224 RSAPublicKeySpec ( SCpublicModulus ,
225 SCpublicExponent ) ) ;
226 temp = new byte [ ( this . PlatformHash . getTagLength ( ) +
227 this . SCIdent ity . getTagLength ( ) +
228 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) +
229 this . SPRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) ) ] ;
230 System . arraycopy ( this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
7 ,
231 temp , 0 , temp . l ength ) ;
232 i f ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod ( temp , 0 ,
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233 temp . length , this . SignedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
234 SCVeri f icat ionKey ,
Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) )
235 {}
236 else {
237 System . out . p r i n t l n (




241 } catch ( Exception cE) {
242 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error in Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing : "
243 + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
244 }
245 return true ;
246 }
247 public stat ic St r ing byteToStr ing (byte [ ] inArray ) {
248 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = {
249 (byte ) ' 0 ' , (byte ) ' 1 ' , (byte ) ' 2 ' , (byte ) ' 3 ' , (byte ) ' 4 ' , (byte ) ' 5 ' ,
250 (byte ) ' 6 ' , (byte ) ' 7 ' , (byte ) ' 8 ' , (byte ) ' 9 ' , (byte ) ' a ' , (byte ) 'b ' ,
251 (byte ) ' c ' , (byte ) 'd ' , (byte ) ' e ' , (byte ) ' f '
252 } ;
253 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l ength ] ;
254 int index = 0 ;
255 for (byte b : inArray ) {
256 int v = b & 0xFF ;
257 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ;
258 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ;
259 }
260 try {
261 return new St r ing ( hex , "ASCII" ) ;
262 } catch ( Exception cE) {
263 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in bytesToStr ing : " +
cE . getMessage ( ) )
264 ;
265 }
266 return "Error " ;
267 }
268 void childExtractionFromCTLV (ConstructedTLV inCTLV) {
269 try {
270 int c h i l d s = inCTLV . getChildNumbers ( ) ;
271 PrimitiveTLV pTemp = null ;
272 ConstructedTLV cTemp = null ;
273 while ( c h i l d s > 0) {
274 switch (inCTLV . nextType ( ) ) {
275 case 1 :
276 pTemp = (PrimitiveTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
277 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
278 this . SCDHChallenge . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
279 this . SCDHChallenge = pTemp ;
280 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
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281 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
282 this . SCRandomNumber = pTemp ;
283 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
284 this .MACedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
285 this .MACedData = pTemp ;
286 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
287 this . SPCookie . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
288 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
289 this . SPCookie . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ) ) {}
290 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
291 this . SCIdent ity . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
292 this . SCIdent ity = pTemp ;
293 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
294 this . SignedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
295 this . SignedData = pTemp ;
296 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
297 this . PublicExponent . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
298 this . PublicExponent = pTemp ;
299 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
300 this . PublicModulus . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
301 this . PublicModulus = pTemp ;
302 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
303 this . PlatformHash . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
304 this . PlatformHash = pTemp ;
305 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
306 this . Use r Ident i ty . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
307 this . Use r Ident i ty = pTemp ;
308 }
309 break ;
310 case 0 :
311 cTemp = (ConstructedTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
312 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
313 this . EncryptedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
314 this . EncryptedData = cTemp ;
315 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
316 SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
317 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e = cTemp ;
318 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
319 SCCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {




324 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error In Pars ing Input Message" ) ;
325 }
326 ch i l d s −−;
327 }
328 } catch ( Exception e ) {
329 System . out . p r i n t l n (
330 "Error in Protoco lHanlder . ChildExtractionMethod
: " + e . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
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331 }
332 }
333 void GenerateKeys (byte [ ] i n bu f f ) {
334 byte [ ] DHSecretKey = null ;
335 try {
336 DHSecretKey =
337 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDHSessionKeyMaterial ( inbu f f ,
0 ,
338 i n bu f f . l ength ) ;
339 } catch ( Exception cE) {
340 System . out . p r i n t l n (
341 "Exception At Protoco lHe lpe rC las s . GenerateKeys :
" + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
342 }
343 byte [ ] keyGenKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
344 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 0 , keyGenKey , 0 , keyGenKey . l ength ) ;
345 byte [ ] macInputValue = new byte [ 6 4 ] ;
346 System . arraycopy ( this . SPRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
macInputValue ,
347 0 , 16) ;
348 System . arraycopy ( this . SCRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
macInputValue ,
349 16 , 16) ;
350 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 16 , macInputValue , 32 , 16) ;
351 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
352 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
353 }
354 try {
355 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
356 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionEncryptionKey , 0 , keyGenKey ) ;
357 } catch ( Exception cE) {
358 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +
359 cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
360 }
361 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
362 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
363 }
364 try {
365 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
366 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionMacKey , 0 , keyGenKey ) ;
367 } catch ( Exception cE) {
368 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +
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C.6 Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Pro-
tocol
The Java Card implementation of the STCPACA discussed in section 6.5 is listed in sub-
sequent sections.
C.6.1 Smart Card Implementation
Following is the implementation of the smart card protocol handler that supports the
STCPACA.
1 package protocolACAP ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength {
21 private byte [ ] SPDHChanllengerArray ;
22 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberArray ;
23 private byte [ ] SPCookieArray ;
24 private byte [ ] SCSPDHGeneratedValue ;
25 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberArray ;
26 private byte [ ] SCUserCer t i f i ca t e ;
27 private byte [ ] SCCer t i f i c a t e ;
28 private byte [ ] SID ;
29 private byte [ ] SPDHChallengeTag = {
30 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
31 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
32 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
33 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
34 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
35 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
36 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
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37 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagThree = {
38 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
39 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
40 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagSCTSM = {
41 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x00 ,
42 (byte ) 0x00 } ;
43 private byte [ ] SPIdentityTag = {
44 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
45 private byte [ ] SPSignatureCertTag = {
46 (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0xF01 } ;
47 private byte [ ] SPSigVeri f icat ionKeyTag = {
48 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
49 private byte [ ] SPIdent i ty = null ;
50 private byte [ ] AppIdentity = null ;
51 private byte [ ] SPSignatureCert = null ;
52 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberTag = {
53 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
54 private byte [ ] SPCookieTag = {
55 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
56 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
57 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
58 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
59 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
60 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
61 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
62 private byte [ ] PlatformHash = {
63 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
64 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {
65 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x12 ,
66 (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
67 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
68 (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xDB, (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte )
69 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
70 private byte [ ] Use r Ident i ty = {
71 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x14 ,
72 (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
73 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
74 (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xFC, (byte ) 0xDB, (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte )
75 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
76 private byte [ ] TSMIdentity = {
77 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x12 ,
78 (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
79 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x69 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
80 (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xEf , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xfB , (byte ) 0xFe , (byte )
81 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
82 private byte [ ] CardID = {
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83 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
(byte ) 0x12 ,
84 (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
85 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
86 (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xEf , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xfB , (byte ) 0xFe , (byte )
87 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
88 private byte [ ] ExponentTag = {
89 (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
90 private byte [ ] ModulusTag = {
91 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
92 private byte [ ] SCDHChalleneTag = {
93 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
94 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {
95 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
96 private byte [ ] SPCert i f i cateTag = {
97 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
98 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {
99 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
100 private byte [ ] SCUserCert i f i cateTag = {
101 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
102 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
103 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
104 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
105 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
106 byte [ ] SCDHData ;
107 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
108 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
109 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0xF1 ;
110 private stat ic f ina l byte PhaseTwo = (byte ) 0xF2 ;
111 private stat ic f ina l byte PhaseThree = (byte ) 0xF3 ;
112 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
113 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
114 RandomData randomDataGen ;
115 Cipher pkCipher ;
116 short messageNumber = 0 ;
117 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
118 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
119 short readCount = 0 ;
120 short rCount = 0 ;
121 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
122 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
123 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
124 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
125 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
126 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
127 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
128 private byte [ ] myLongTermEncryptionKey = {
129 (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0xF3 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x8F ,
(byte ) 0xFD,
130 (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0x50 , (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte )
131 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
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132 private byte [ ] myLongTermMacKey = {
133 (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCF,
(byte ) 0xE4 ,
134 (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x4A , (byte )
135 0x4E , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0xF0 } ;
136 AESKey phCipherKey ;
137 Cipher syCipher ;
138 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
139 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
(byte ) 0x99 ,
140 (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte )
141 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
142 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
143 Signature phMacGenerator ;
144 Signature phSign ;
145 KeyPair phSCKeyPair ;
146 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
147 RSAPublicKey SPVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
148 RSAPublicKey TSMVerificationKey = null ;
149 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
150 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
151 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
152 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
153 phMacGenerator =
Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD,
154 fa l se ) ;
155 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se ) ;
156 phSCKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA, KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
157 phUserKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512)
158 ;
159 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
160 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
161 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
162 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
163 fa l se ) ;
164 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
165 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
166 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
167 phSCKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
168 phUserKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
169 }
170 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength )
171 throws ISOException {
172 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
173 }
174 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
175 SID = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 16 ,
176 JCSystem .CLEAR_ON_RESET) ;
177 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
178 SCDHData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
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179 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + PTLVDataOffset ) ,
180 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
181 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCDHChalleneTag , ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
182 this . SCDHData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
183 this . SCDHChalleneTag . l ength ) ;
184 this . shortToBytes (SCDHData , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )SCDHData . l ength −
185 ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
186 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SCDHData , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
187 Protoco lHandler .GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION) ;
188 SPDHChanllengerArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
189 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
190 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
191 SPRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
192 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
193 SPCookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
194 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
195 SCRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
196 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
197 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberTag , ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
198 this . SCRandomNumberArray , ( short )
199 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
200 this . SCRandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
201 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
202 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength − ( short )
203 PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
204 try {
205 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
206 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
207 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCUserCert i f icateTag ,
208 ( short ) 0 , this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
209 this . SCUserCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
210 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
211 ( this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
212 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag , ( short ) 0 ,
213 this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
( short ) 3) , ( short )
214 this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
215 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey ) this . phUserKeyPair
. ge tPub l i c ( )
216 ;
217 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short )
218 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
219 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
220 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
221 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
222 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag , ( short ) 0 ,
223 this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) ,
( short )
224 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
225 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , ( short )
226 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
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227 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
228 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
229 this . SPIdent i ty = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 24 ,
230 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET) ;
231 this . AppIdentity = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 28 ,
232 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET) ;
233 SPVer i f i cat ionKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
234 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
235 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
236 TSMVerificationKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
237 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
238 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
239 } catch ( Exception cE) {
240 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xCCCC) ;
241 }
242 try {
243 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
244 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
245 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCCert i f icateTag ,
246 ( short ) 0 , this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )
247 this . SCCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
248 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
249 ( this . SCCer t i f i c a t e . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
250 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag , ( short ) 0 ,
251 this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
( short ) 3) , ( short )
252 this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
253 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey ) this . phSCKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
254 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short )
255 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
256 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
257 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
258 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
259 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag , ( short ) 0 ,
260 this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) , ( short )
261 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
262 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short )
263 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
264 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
265 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
266 } catch ( Exception cE) {
267 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
268 }
269 }
270 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
271 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
272 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
273 return ;
274 }
275 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
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276 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
277 }
278 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
279 this . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
280 return ;
281 }
282 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == PhaseTwo) {
283 this . AppDownloadCompleted ( apdu ) ;
284 }
285 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == PhaseThree ) {
286 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
287 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
288 this . SCTSMChargeRequest ( apdu ) ;
289 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
290 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
291 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
292 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
293 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
294 return ;
295 }
296 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
297 i f ( byte sLe f t > 255) {
298 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
299 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
300 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
301 rCount = 0 ;
302 short bytesRead = 0 ;
303 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
304 try {
305 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short )
306 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
307 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
308 i f ( byte sLe f t != 0) {
309 readCount = apdu
. r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA)
310 ;
311 }
312 } catch ( Exception aE) {
313 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) bytesRead ) ;
314 }
315 }
316 } else {
317 try {
318 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
319 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
320 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ISO7816 .OFFSET_CDATA,
321 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
322 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r . l ength ) ;
323 } catch ( Exception cE) {
324 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) apduBuffer . l ength ) ;
325 }
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326 }
327 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
328 try {
329 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
330 } catch ( Exception cE) {
331 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
332 }
333 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
334 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
335 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
336 } else
337 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
338 processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
339 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
340 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
341 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
342 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagThree [ 3 ] )
{
343 processSPsThirdMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
344 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
345 return ;
346 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == (byte ) 0xF1) {
347 i f ( processTSMActAppMessage ( ) ) {
348 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
349 return ;
350 } else {
351 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
352 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
353 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r . l ength ) ;
354 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
355 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r . l ength ) ;
356 }
357 } else {
358 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
359 }
360 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
361 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
362 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
363 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
364 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
365 }
366 private void SCTSMChargeRequest (APDU apdu ) {
367 short ch i ldPo interMessage = 6 ;
368 short enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = 0 ;
369 short encryptedDataChild = 0 ;
370 short encrypt ionLength = 0 ;
371 copyPointer = 0 ;
372 try {
373 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagSCTSM ,
374 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
375 this . MessageHandlerTagSCTSM . length ) copyPointer =
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376 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . CardID , ( short ) 0 ,
377 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
( short ) this . CardID . l ength ) ;
378 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
379 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag , ( short )
380 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
381 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
382 encryptedDataChild = ( short ) ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ;
383 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
384 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
385 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
386 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCIdentityTag , ( short ) 0 ,
387 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
388 this . SCIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
389 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedDataChild ]++;
390 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . User Ident i ty , ( short ) 0 ,
391 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
( short ) this . Use r Ident i ty . l ength )
392 ;
393 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedDataChild ]++;
394 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . TSMIdentity , ( short ) 0 ,
395 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
( short ) this . TSMIdentity . l ength ) ;
396 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedDataChild ]++;
397 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
398 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
399 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
400 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
401 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
402 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedDataChild ]++;
403 encrypt ionLength = ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ;
404 this . phCipherKey . setKey ( this . myLongTermEncryptionKey , ( short ) 0) ;
405 messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
406 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
407 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t −
( short )
408 3) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
409 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( this .myLongTermMacKey , ( short ) 0) ;
410 macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
411 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
412 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
413 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
414 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
415 this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
416 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
417 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 4 , copyPointer ) ;
418 } catch ( Exception cE) {
419 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) encrypt ionLength ) ;
420 }
421 }
422 private void AppDownloadCompleted (APDU apdu ) {
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423 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
424 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
425 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
426 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
427 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
428 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
429 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
430 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
431 }
432 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
433 short ch i ldPo interMessage = 6 ;
434 short enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = 0 ;
435 copyPointer = 0 ;
436 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
437 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
438 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
439 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SPDHChanllengerArray , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
440 Protoco lHandler .GEN_DHKEY) ;
441 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagOne ,
442 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
443 this . MessageHandlerTagOne . l ength ) ;
444 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCDHData , ( short ) 0 ,
445 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) this . SCDHData . l ength ) ;
446 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
447 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
448 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
449 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
450 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
451 keygenerator ( ) ;
452 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag , ( short )
453 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
454 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
455 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
456 short childEnMessage = ( short ) ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ;
457 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
458 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
459 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCIdentityTag , ( short ) 0 ,
460 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
461 this . SCIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
462 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
463 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
464 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
465 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
466 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
467 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
468 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
469 this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
470 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
471 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
472 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) , phUserKeyPair
473 . g e tPr iva t e ( ) , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
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474 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
475 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCUserCert i f i cate ,
( short )
476 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
477 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
478 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
479 messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
480 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
481 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t −
( short )
482 3) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
483 macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
484 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
485 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
486 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
487 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
488 this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
489 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
490 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 4 , copyPointer ) ;
491 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
492 copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
493 short tempLength = ( short ) 0 ;
494 short mainChildPointer = ( short ) 6 ;
495 short mainLengthPointer = ( short ) 4 ;
496 short encryptedChi ldPointer = ( short ) 13 ;
497 short genera lLengthPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
498 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
499 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
500 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
501 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 7) ;
502 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
503 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag , ( short )
504 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
505 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
506 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
507 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . PlatformHash , ( short ) 0 ,
508 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
509 genera lLengthPointer = copyPointer ;
510 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
511 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
512 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
513 tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
( short ) 0 ,
514 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length , r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
515 copyPointer ) ;
516 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
517 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , genera lLengthPointer ,
( short )
518 ( tempLength ) ) ;
519 copyPointer += tempLength ;
520 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . User Ident i ty , ( short ) 0 ,
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521 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
( short ) this . Use r Ident i ty . l ength )
522 ;
523 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
524 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPIdentity , ( short ) 0 ,
525 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) this . SPIdent i ty . l ength ) ;
526 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
527 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
528 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
529 this . SCRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
530 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
531 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
532 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
533 this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
534 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
535 try {
536 this . s ignGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
537 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
538 phSCKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
539 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
540 } catch ( Exception cE) {
541 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
542 }
543 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCCert i f i ca t e , ( short ) 0 ,
544 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
545 this . SCCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
546 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
547 try {
548 this . messageEncryption ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
549 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ,
( short )
550 ( copyPointer − ( encryptedChi ldPointer +
551 ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
552 } catch ( Exception cE) {
553 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer − encryptedChi ldPointer +
554 ( short ) 1) ) ;
555 }
556 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
557 ( encryptedChi ldPointer − ( short ) 2) , ( short )
558 ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer +
559 ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
560 this . macGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer +
561 ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
562 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ,
563 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
564 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
565 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
566 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
567 this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
568 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
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569 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , mainLengthPointer , ( short )
570 ( copyPointer − ( short ) 7) ) ;
571 }
572 }
573 void platformHashGeneration (byte [ ] inArray , short i nO f f s e t ) {}
574 void processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
575 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) 14 ;
576 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray , ( short )
577 11) ) ;
578 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
579 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
580 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
581 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , this . SPIdentity ,
( short ) 0 ,
582 ( short ) this . SPIdent i ty . l ength ) ;
583 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inArray , ( short ) ( i nO f f s e t + ( short )
584 this . SPIdent i ty . l ength ) , this . AppIdentity ,
585 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) this . AppIdentity . l ength ) ;
586 } else {
587 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
588 }
589 }
590 boolean processTSMActAppMessage ( ) {
591 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
592 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
593 ( short ) ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
594 i f ( this . macGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
595 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
596 this . phDecryption ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
597 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) 225 ;
598 inLength = ( short ) 3 ;
599 TSMVerificationKey . setExponent ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
600 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
601 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
602 TSMVerificationKey . setModulus ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
603 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
604 inLength = ( short ) 142 ;
605 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) i nOf f s e t , ( short )
606 inLength , TSMVerificationKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
607 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 224 ,
608 this . SPCookieArray , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
609 this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
610 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( this .myLongTermMacKey , ( short ) 0) ;
611 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
612 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
613 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
614 phMacGenerator . s i gn ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 14 , ( short ) 96 ,
615 this . SID , ( short ) 0) ;
616 return true ;
617 } else {
618 return fa l se ;
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619 }
620 } else {
621 return fa l se ;
622 }
623 }
624 void processSPsThirdMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
625 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
626 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray , ( short )
627 ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
628 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
629 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
630 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
631 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , this . SPIdentity ,
( short ) 0 ,
632 ( short ) this . SPIdent i ty . l ength ) ;
633 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) 151 ;
634 inLength = ( short ) 3 ;
635 SPVer i f i cat ionKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
636 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
637 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
638 SPVer i f i cat ionKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
639 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
640 inLength = ( short ) 68 ;
641 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
SPVeri f icat ionKey ,
642 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
643 return ;
644 } else {
645 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
646 }
647 } else {
648 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
649 }
650 }
651 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
652 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1) ] ;
653 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
654 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
655 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( SPDHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r , po inter ,
656 ( short ) 4) == 0) {
657 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . SPDHChanllengerArray ,
658 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) this . SPDHChanllengerArray . l ength ) ;
659 po in t e r += ( short ) this . SPDHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
660 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SPRandomNumberTag , ( short ) 0 ,
661 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
662 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
663 this . SPRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )
664 ( this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ) ;
665 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SPRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
666 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SPCookieTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
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667 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
668 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . SPCookieArray ,
669 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
670 ( this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ) ;
671 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SPCookieArray . l ength ) ;
672 }
673 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
674 }
675 }
676 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
677 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
678 }
679 void dhKeyConGen(byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , byte Oper_Mode) {
680 switch (Oper_Mode) {
681 case GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION:
682 randomExponent = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
683 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
684 randomDataGen . generateData ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
685 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
686 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
687 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
688 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
689 pkCipher . doFinal (ClassDH . dhBase , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhBase . length , inbu f f ,
690 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
691 break ;
692 case GEN_DHKEY:
693 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
694 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
695 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
696 SCSPDHGeneratedValue = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short )
697 ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
698 pkCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , ( short ) ( ( short )
699 i n bu f f . l ength − ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
700 SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
701 break ;
702 default :
703 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x5FA1) ;
704 }
705 }
706 void keygenerator ( ) {
707 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
708 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
709 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
710 sessionGenKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
711 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
712 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
713 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
714 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
347
C.6 Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Protocol
715 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
716 short po in t e r = 0 ;
717 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SPRandomNumberArray ,
718 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
719 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCRandomNumberArray ,
720 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
721 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 16 ,
722 keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
723 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
724 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
725 }
726 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
727 keyGenMacData . length , SCSPDHGeneratedValue ,
( short )
728 0) ;
729 this . phCipherKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
730 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
731 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
732 }
733 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
734 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
735 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
736 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
737 keyGenMacData . length , SCSPDHGeneratedValue ,
( short )
738 0) ;
739 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey (SCSPDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
740 SCSPDHGeneratedValue = null ;
741 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
742 }
743 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
744 inbuf fLength ) {
745 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
746 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
747 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , ( short ) syCipher
748 . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
749 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
750 }
751 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short inbuf fLength )
752 {
753 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT, I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ,
754 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
755 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
756 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
757 }
758 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
759 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
760 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
761 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
762 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
763 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
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764 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag , ( short ) 0 ,
765 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ,
( short ) this .MACedDataTag . l ength )
766 ;
767 copyPointer += 2 ;
768 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
769 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
770 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) , l ength ) ;
771 copyPointer += length ;
772 return true ;
773 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
774 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
775 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
776 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
777 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
778 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short )
779 ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbuf fLength +
780 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
781 }
782 return fa l se ;
783 }
784 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
785 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
786 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
787 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag , ( short ) 0 ,
788 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
789 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
790 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
791 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
792 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th ,
793 i nbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
794 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
( short )
795 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
796 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
797 return true ;
798 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
799 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
800 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
801 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
802 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
803 }
804 return fa l se ;
805 }
806 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
807 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
808 }
809 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
810 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ ( short )
811 ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
812 }
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813 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
inShort )
814 {
815 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
( short )
816 0x0008 ) ;




C.6.2 Service Provider Implementation
In this section, we detail the SP's implementation of the STCPACA and the helper functions
utlised during the STCPSP are discussed in appendices C.11.1 and C.11.2.
1 package ACAPTerminal ;
2
3 import java . u t i l . Arrays ;
4 import java . s e c u r i t y . i n t e r f a c e s . RSAPublicKey ;
5 import javax . crypto . spec . SecretKeySpec ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . RSAPublicKeySpec ;
7 import javax . crypto . ∗ ;
8 import java . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
9 import java . math . B ig Intege r ;
10 public class Serv i ceProv ide rProtoco lHand le r {
11 private byte [ ] SPIdent i ty = {
12 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 ,
13 (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x5E ,
14 (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A ,
15 (byte ) 0xD7 , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C} ;
16 private byte [ ] AppIdentity = {
17 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 ,
(byte ) 0x0A ,
18 (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte )
19 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xD7 , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
20 (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xD7} ;
21 private byte [ ] SCIP = {
22 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C} ;
23 private byte [ ] PlatformHashPreset = {
24 (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xE5 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x2C ,
(byte ) 0xA1 ,
25 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xAD, (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xDB, (byte )
26 0x5F , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0xA5 , (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x5A ,
27 (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte )
28 0xB4 , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCE, (byte ) 0x3F , (byte ) 0xE0 , (byte ) 0x99 ,
29 (byte ) 0xDC, (byte ) 0xE9 , (byte ) 0x3A , (byte ) 0x9D} ;
30 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {(byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA} ;
31 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {(byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB} ;
32 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagThree = {(byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0xCC} ;
33 private byte [ ] SPIdentityTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
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34 private byte [ ] AppIdentityTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x0E } ;
35 private byte [ ] SPDHChallengeTag = {(byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
36 private byte [ ] SPSignatureCertTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0xF01 } ;
37 private byte [ ] SPSigVeri f icat ionKeyTag = {(byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
38 private byte [ ] SPRandomNumberTag = {(byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
39 private byte [ ] SPCookieTag = {(byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
40 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {(byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
41 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {(byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
42 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {(byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
43 private byte [ ] PublicExponentTag = {(byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
44 private byte [ ] PublicModulusTag = {(byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
45 private byte [ ] SCDHChallengeTag = {(byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
46 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {(byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
47 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
48 private byte [ ] SCUserCert i f i cateTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
49 private byte [ ] SCCert i f i cateTag = {(byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
50 private byte [ ] PlatformHashTag = {(byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
51 private byte [ ] UserIdent i tyTag = {(byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
52 public ConstructedTLV MessageHandler = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
53 (MessageHandlerTagOne ) ;
54 private ConstructedTLV SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e =
55 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( SPSignatureCertTag ) ;
56 private PrimitiveTLV SPIdentityTLV = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
57 ( SPIdentityTag , SPIdent i ty ) ;
58 private PrimitiveTLV AppIdentityTLV = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
59 ( AppIdentityTag , AppIdentity ) ;
60 private PrimitiveTLV SPSigVer i f i cat ionKey = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
61 ( this . SPSigVer i f icat ionKeyTag ) ;
62 private PrimitiveTLV SPDHChanllenger = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
63 ( this . SPDHChallengeTag ) ;
64 private PrimitiveTLV SPRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
65 ( this . SPRandomNumberTag) ;
66 private PrimitiveTLV SPCookie = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
67 ( this . SPCookieTag ) ;
68 private ConstructedTLV EncryptedData = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
69 ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
70 private PrimitiveTLV MACedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
71 ( this .MACedDataTag) ;
72 private PrimitiveTLV SignedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
73 ( this . SignedDataTag ) ;
74 private PrimitiveTLV PublicExponent = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
75 ( this . PublicExponentTag ) ;
76 private PrimitiveTLV PublicModulus = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
77 ( this . PublicModulusTag ) ;
78 private PrimitiveTLV SCDHChallenge = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
79 ( this . SCDHChallengeTag ) ;
80 private PrimitiveTLV SCRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
81 ( this . SCRandomNumberTag) ;
82 private PrimitiveTLV SCIdent ity = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
83 ( SCIdentityTag ) ;
84 private ConstructedTLV SCUserCer t i f i ca t e =
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85 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( this . SCUserCert i f i cateTag ) ;
86 private ConstructedTLV SCCer t i f i c a t e = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV
87 ( this . SCCert i f i cateTag ) ;
88 private PrimitiveTLV PlatformHash = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
89 ( this . PlatformHashTag ) ;
90 private PrimitiveTLV User Ident i ty = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
91 ( this . UserIdent ityTag ) ;
92 private Protoco lHe lpe rClas s myProtocolHelperObject = new
93 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s ( ) ;
94 private byte [ ] mySessionEncryptionKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
95 private byte [ ] mySessionMacKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
96 private PublicKey SCUserVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
97 private PublicKey SCVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
98 public Serv i ceProv ide rProtoco lHand le r ( ) {
99 myProtocolHelperObject . p r o t o c o l I n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
100 RSAPublicKey tempKey = (RSAPublicKey )
101 myProtocolHelperObject . getPublicKey ( ) ;
102 byte [ ] tempExponent = tempKey . getPubl icExponent ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
103 this . PublicExponent . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicExponentTag ,
104 tempExponent . l ength ) ;
105 this . PublicExponent . setTlvValues ( tempExponent ) ;
106 byte [ ] tempModulus = tempKey . getModulus ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
107 this . PublicModulus . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicModulusTag ,
108 ( tempModulus . l ength − 1) ) ;
109 this . PublicModulus . setTlvValues ( tempModulus , 1 , ( tempModulus . l ength −
110 1) ) ;
111 SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e . addPTLV( this . PublicExponent ) ;
112 SPS igna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e . addPTLV( this . PublicModulus ) ;
113 }
114 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
115 try {
116 this . SPDHChanllenger . setTlvValues
117 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDHPublicValue ( ) ) ;
118 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPDHChanllenger ) ;
119 } catch ( Exception cE) {
120 System . out . p r i n t l n (
121 "Error Protoco lHandler . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l Option
= 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
122 }
123 }
124 public byte [ ] outMessageProcess ing ( int Counter ) {
125 i f ( Counter == 1) {
126 try {
127 this . SPRandomNumber . setTlvValues
128 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . getRandomNumber ( ) ) ;
129 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPRandomNumber) ;
130 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ ( this . SCIP . l ength +
131 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( ) +
132 this . SPRandomNumber . getValueLength ( ) ) ] ;
133 System . arraycopy ( this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 , temp , 0 ,
134 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( ) ) ;
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135 System . arraycopy ( this . SPRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 , temp ,
136 this . SPDHChanllenger . getValueLength ( ) ,
137 this . SPRandomNumber . getValueLength ( ) ) ;
138 System . arraycopy ( this . SCIP , 0 , temp , temp . l ength −
139 this . SCIP . length , this . SCIP . l ength ) ;
140 byte [ ] r e s u l t = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
141 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac ( temp , 0 , temp . length ,
142 r e su l t , 0 , this . myProtocolHelperObject .myLongTermMacKey) ;
143 this . SPCookie . setTlvValues ( r e s u l t ) ;
144 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPCookie ) ;
145 } catch ( Exception cE) {
146 System . out . p r i n t l n (
147 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 2 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
148 }
149 } else i f ( Counter == 2) {
150 try {
151 this . EncryptedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
152 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPIdentityTLV ) ;
153 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . AppIdentityTLV ) ;
154 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPRandomNumber) ;
155 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCRandomNumber) ;
156 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateEncryption
157 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
158 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
159 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
160 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
161 this .MACedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this .MACedDataTag , 16) ;
162 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
163 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
164 this . EncryptedData . getTagValueLength ( ) ,
165 this .MACedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 ,
166 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
167 this . MessageHandler . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ) ;
168 this . MessageHandler . addCTLV( EncryptedData ) ;
169 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this .MACedData) ;
170 } catch ( Exception cE) {
171 System . out . p r i n t l n (
172 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 3 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
173 }
174 } else i f ( Counter == 3) {
175 try {
176 this . EncryptedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
177 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPIdentityTLV ) ;
178 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SPRandomNumber) ;
179 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCRandomNumber) ;
180 this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod
181 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
182 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
183 this . SignedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 , null ,
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184 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_GENERATION) ;
185 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SignedData ) ;
186 this . EncryptedData .addCTLV( this . SPS i gna tu r eCe r t i f i c a t e ) ;
187 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateEncryption
188 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
189 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
190 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
191 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
192 this .MACedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this .MACedDataTag , 16) ;
193 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
194 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
195 this . EncryptedData . getTagValueLength ( ) ,
196 this .MACedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 ,
197 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
198 this . MessageHandler . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . MessageHandlerTagThree )
199 ;
200 this . MessageHandler . addCTLV( EncryptedData ) ;
201 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this .MACedData) ;
202 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this . SPCookie ) ;
203 } catch ( Exception cE) {
204 System . out . p r i n t l n (
205 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
206 }
207 } else {
208 System . out . p r i n t l n (
209 "Protoco l Stoped : I l l e g a l Message Value
( Protoco lHanlder . inMessageProcess ing ( ) " ) ;
210 }
211 return this . MessageHandler . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ;
212 }
213 public boolean inMessageProcess ing (byte [ ] inMessage , int Counter ) {
214 try {
215 i f ( Counter == 1) {
216 MessageHandler . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
217 ( inMessage . l ength − 2) ) ;
218 childExtractionFromCTLV (MessageHandler ) ;
219 GenerateKeys ( this . SCDHChallenge . getValueBytes ( ) ) ;
220 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
221 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
222 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
223 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length , temp , 0 ,
224 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
225 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( this .MACedData . getValueBytes ( ) , temp) ) {}
226 else {
227 System . out . p r i n t l n (
228 " I n t e g r i t y Check Fa i l u r e : ERROR at
Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing \n" ) ;
229 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
230 }
231 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDecryption
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232 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
233 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
234 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
235 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
236 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . EncryptedData ) ;
237 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e ) ;
238 Big Intege r publicExponent = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
239 ( this . PublicExponent . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
240 Big Intege r publicModulus = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
241 ( this . PublicModulus . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
242 KeyFactory f a c t o r y = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
243 SCUserVer i f i cat ionKey = ( PublicKey ) f a c t o r y . gene ra tePub l i c (new
244 RSAPublicKeySpec ( publicModulus ,
245 publicExponent ) ) ;
246 temp = new byte [ ( this . SCIdent ity . getTagLength ( ) +
247 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) +
248 this . SPRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) ) ] ;
249 System . arraycopy ( this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
7 ,
250 temp , 0 , temp . l ength ) ;
251 i f ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod ( temp , 0 ,
252 temp . length , this . SignedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
253 SCUserVeri f icat ionKey ,
254 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) ) {}
255 else {
256 System . out . p r i n t l n (
257 " S ignature V e r i f i c a t i o n Fa i l ed . . . . . . Check
code" ) ;
258 }
259 } else i f ( Counter == 2) {
260 this . MessageHandler . r e s e t ( ) ;
261 this . EncryptedData . r e s e t ( ) ;
262 this . MessageHandler . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
263 inMessage . l ength − 2) ;
264 this . childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . MessageHandler ) ;
265 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
266 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
267 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
268 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length , temp , 0 ,
269 this . mySessionMacKey ) ;
270 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( this .MACedData . getValueBytes ( ) , temp) ) {}
271 else {
272 System . out . p r i n t l n (
273 " I n t e g r i t y Check Fa i l u r e : ERROR at
Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing \n" ) ;
274 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
275 }
276 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDecryption
277 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
278 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
279 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
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280 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ;
281 this . childExtractionFromCTLV (EncryptedData ) ;
282 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( PlatformHashPreset ,
283 this . PlatformHash . getValueBytes ( ) ) ) {}
284 else {
285 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Platform Digest Not Ve r i f i e d " ) ;
286 }
287 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . SCCer t i f i c a t e ) ;
288 Big Intege r SCpublicExponent = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
289 ( this . PublicExponent . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
290 Big Intege r SCpublicModulus = new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
291 ( this . PublicModulus . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ;
292 KeyFactory f a c t o r y = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" ) ;
293 SCVer i f i cat ionKey = ( PublicKey ) f a c t o r y . gene ra tePub l i c (new
294 RSAPublicKeySpec ( SCpublicModulus ,
295 SCpublicExponent ) ) ;
296 temp = new byte [ ( this . PlatformHash . getTagLength ( ) +
297 this . Use r Ident i ty . getTagLength ( ) +
298 this . SCIdent ity . getTagLength ( ) +
299 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) +
300 this . SPRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) ) ] ;
301 System . arraycopy ( this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
7 ,
302 temp , 0 , temp . l ength ) ;
303 i f ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod ( temp , 0 ,
304 temp . length , this . SignedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
305 SCVeri f icat ionKey ,
Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) )
306 {}
307 else {
308 System . out . p r i n t l n (




312 } catch ( Exception cE) {
313 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error in Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing : "
314 + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
315 }
316 return true ;
317 }
318 public stat ic St r ing byteToStr ing (byte [ ] inArray ) {
319 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = {
320 (byte ) ' 0 ' , (byte ) ' 1 ' , (byte ) ' 2 ' , (byte ) ' 3 ' , (byte ) ' 4 ' , (byte ) ' 5 ' ,
321 (byte ) ' 6 ' , (byte ) ' 7 ' , (byte ) ' 8 ' , (byte ) ' 9 ' , (byte ) ' a ' , (byte ) 'b ' ,
322 (byte ) ' c ' , (byte ) 'd ' , (byte ) ' e ' , (byte ) ' f '
323 } ;
324 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l ength ] ;
325 int index = 0 ;
326 for (byte b : inArray ) {
327 int v = b & 0xFF ;
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328 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ;
329 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ;
330 }
331 try {
332 return new St r ing ( hex , "ASCII" ) ;
333 } catch ( Exception cE) {
334 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in bytesToStr ing : " +
cE . getMessage ( ) )
335 ;
336 }
337 return "Error " ;
338 }
339 void childExtractionFromCTLV (ConstructedTLV inCTLV) {
340 try {
341 int c h i l d s = inCTLV . getChildNumbers ( ) ;
342 PrimitiveTLV pTemp = null ;
343 ConstructedTLV cTemp = null ;
344 while ( c h i l d s > 0) {
345 switch (inCTLV . nextType ( ) ) {
346 case 1 :
347 pTemp = (PrimitiveTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
348 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
349 this . SCDHChallenge . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
350 this . SCDHChallenge = pTemp ;
351 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
352 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
353 this . SCRandomNumber = pTemp ;
354 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
355 this .MACedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
356 this .MACedData = pTemp ;
357 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
358 this . SPCookie . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
359 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ,
360 this . SPCookie . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ) ) {}
361 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
362 this . SCIdent ity . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
363 this . SCIdent ity = pTemp ;
364 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
365 this . SignedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
366 this . SignedData = pTemp ;
367 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
368 this . PublicExponent . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
369 this . PublicExponent = pTemp ;
370 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
371 this . PublicModulus . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
372 this . PublicModulus = pTemp ;
373 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
374 this . PlatformHash . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
375 this . PlatformHash = pTemp ;
376 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
377 this . Use r Ident i ty . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
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378 this . Use r Ident i ty = pTemp ;
379 }
380 break ;
381 case 0 :
382 cTemp = (ConstructedTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
383 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
384 this . EncryptedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
385 this . EncryptedData = cTemp ;
386 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
387 SCUserCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
388 this . SCUserCer t i f i c a t e = cTemp ;
389 } else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
390 SCCer t i f i c a t e . getTagName ( ) ) ) {




395 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error In Pars ing Input Message" ) ;
396 }
397 ch i l d s −−;
398 }
399 } catch ( Exception e ) {
400 System . out . p r i n t l n (
401 "Error in Protoco lHanlder . ChildExtractionMethod
: " + e . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
402 }
403 }
404 void GenerateKeys (byte [ ] i n bu f f ) {
405 byte [ ] DHSecretKey = null ;
406 try {
407 DHSecretKey =
408 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDHSessionKeyMaterial ( inbu f f ,
0 ,
409 i n bu f f . l ength ) ;
410 } catch ( Exception cE) {
411 System . out . p r i n t l n (
412 "Exception At Protoco lHe lpe rC las s . GenerateKeys :
" + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
413 }
414 byte [ ] keyGenKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
415 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 0 , keyGenKey , 0 , keyGenKey . l ength ) ;
416 byte [ ] macInputValue = new byte [ 6 4 ] ;
417 System . arraycopy ( this . SPRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
macInputValue ,
418 0 , 16) ;
419 System . arraycopy ( this . SCRandomNumber . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
macInputValue ,
420 16 , 16) ;
421 System . arraycopy (DHSecretKey , 16 , macInputValue , 32 , 16) ;
422 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
423 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
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424 }
425 try {
426 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
427 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionEncryptionKey , 0 , keyGenKey ) ;
428 } catch ( Exception cE) {
429 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +
430 cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
431 }
432 for ( int i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
433 macInputValue [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
434 }
435 try {
436 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (macInputValue , 0 ,
437 macInputValue . length , this . mySessionMacKey , 0 , keyGenKey ) ;
438 } catch ( Exception cE) {
439 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception at Protoco lHandler . GenerateKeys : " +




C.6.3 Administrative Authority Implementation
Below is the code related to the administrative authority's implementation for the STCPACA.
1 package ACAPTerminal ;
2
3 import java . math . B ig Intege r ;
4 import java . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
5 import java . s e c u r i t y . i n t e r f a c e s . RSAPublicKey ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . RSAPublicKeySpec ;
7 import java . u t i l . Arrays ;
8 public class TSMProtocolHandler {
9 private byte [ ] AppAct = {
10 (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
11 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x69 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
12 (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x07 ,
13 (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x69 , } ;
14 private byte [ ] AppActTag = {
15 (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0x9B} ;
16 private byte [ ] CardIDTag = {
17 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x05 } ;
18 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
19 (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
20 private byte [ ] LongTermEncryptionKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
21 private byte [ ] LongTermMacKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
22 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
23 (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
24 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTSMSC = {
25 (byte ) 0xF1 , (byte ) 0xF1 } ;
26 private byte [ ] PublicExponentTag = {
27 (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
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28 private byte [ ] PublicModulusTag = {
29 (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
30 private byte [ ] SCIdentityTag = {
31 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
32 private byte [ ] SCRandomNumberTag = {
33 (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
34 private byte [ ] SIDTag = {
35 (byte ) 0x9B , (byte ) 0x9D} ;
36 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
37 (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
38 private byte [ ] TSMIDTag = {
39 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x04 } ;
40 private byte [ ] TSMIdentity = {
41 (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte )
42 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x69 , (byte ) 0x8D ,
43 (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xEf , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xfB , (byte ) 0xFe ,
44 (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
45 private byte [ ] TSMRandomNumberTag = {
46 (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x04 } ;
47 private byte [ ] TSMSignatureCertTag = {
48 (byte ) 0xF9 , (byte ) 0xF9 } ;
49 private byte [ ] TempTag = {
50 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
51 private byte [ ] UserIdent i tyTag = {
52 (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
53 private byte [ ] myLongTermEncryptionKey = {
54 (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0xF3 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x8F , (byte )
55 0xFD, (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0x50 , (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE,
56 (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
57 private byte [ ] myLongTermMacKey = {
58 (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCF, (byte )
59 0xE4 , (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x4A ,
60 (byte ) 0x4E , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0xF0 } ;
61 private PrimitiveTLV User Ident i ty = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
62 ( this . UserIdent ityTag ) ;
63 private ConstructedTLV TSMSignatureCert i f i cate =
64 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV (TSMSignatureCertTag ) ;
65 private PrimitiveTLV TSMRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
66 ( this .TSMRandomNumberTag , 16) ;
67 private PrimitiveTLV TSMID = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV (TSMIDTag,
68 TSMIdentity ) ;
69 private PrimitiveTLV SignedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
70 ( this . SignedDataTag , 64) ;
71 private PrimitiveTLV SID = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV (SIDTag , 16) ;
72 private PrimitiveTLV SCRandomNumber = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
73 ( this . SCRandomNumberTag) ;
74 private PrimitiveTLV SCIdent ity = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
75 ( SCIdentityTag ) ;
76 private PrimitiveTLV PublicModulus = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
77 ( this . PublicModulusTag ) ;
78 private PrimitiveTLV PublicExponent = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
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79 ( this . PublicExponentTag ) ;
80 private ConstructedTLV MessageHandler =
81 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV (TempTag) ;
82 private PrimitiveTLV MACedData = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
83 ( this .MACedDataTag) ;
84 private ConstructedTLV EncryptedData =
85 ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
86 private PrimitiveTLV CardID = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
87 (CardIDTag ) ;
88 private PrimitiveTLV AppActTLV = PrimitiveTLV . getPrimitiveTLV
89 ( this . AppActTag , this . AppAct) ;
90 private Protoco lHe lpe rClas s myProtocolHelperObject = new
91 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s ( ) ;
92 public TSMProtocolHandler ( ) {
93 myProtocolHelperObject . p r o t o c o l I n i t i a l i s e ( ) ;
94 RSAPublicKey tempKey = (RSAPublicKey )
95 myProtocolHelperObject . getPublicKey ( ) ;
96 byte [ ] tempExponent = tempKey . getPubl icExponent ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
97 this . PublicExponent . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicExponentTag ,
98 tempExponent . l ength ) ;
99 this . PublicExponent . setTlvValues ( tempExponent ) ;
100 byte [ ] tempModulus = tempKey . getModulus ( ) . toByteArray ( ) ;
101 this . PublicModulus . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this . PublicModulusTag ,
102 ( tempModulus . l ength − 1) ) ;
103 this . PublicModulus . setTlvValues ( tempModulus , 1 ,
104 ( tempModulus . l ength − 1) ) ;
105 TSMSignatureCert i f i cate . addPTLV( this . PublicExponent ) ;
106 TSMSignatureCert i f i cate . addPTLV( this . PublicModulus ) ;
107 }
108 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
109 try{}
110 catch ( Exception cE) {
111 System . out . p r i n t l n (
112 "Error Protoco lHandler . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l Option
= 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
113 }
114 }
115 public byte [ ] outMessageProcess ing ( ) {
116 try {
117 this . EncryptedData . r e s e t ( ) ;
118 this . EncryptedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . EncryptedDataTag ) ;
119 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this .TSMID) ;
120 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCIdent ity ) ;
121 this .TSMRandomNumber . setTlvValues
122 ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . getRandomNumber ( ) ) ;
123 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this .TSMRandomNumber) ;
124 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SCRandomNumber) ;
125 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . Use r Ident i ty ) ;
126 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this .AppActTLV) ;
127 this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod
128 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
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129 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
130 this . SignedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 , null ,
131 Protoco lHe lpe rClas s .SIGN_MODE_GENERATION) ;
132 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV( this . SignedData ) ;
133 this . EncryptedData .addCTLV( this . TSMSignatureCert i f i cate ) ;
134 ConstructedTLV Temp = ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV (TempTag) ;
135 Temp.addPTLV( this .TSMID) ;
136 Temp.addPTLV( this . SCIdent ity ) ;
137 Temp.addPTLV( this . SCRandomNumber) ;
138 Temp.addPTLV( this .TSMRandomNumber) ;
139 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (Temp. getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
140 Temp. getTagValueLength ( ) ,
141 this . CardID . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 ,
142 this .myLongTermMacKey) ;
143 Temp.addPTLV( this . CardID ) ;
144 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac (Temp. getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
145 Temp. getTagValueLength ( ) ,
this . SID . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( )
146 , 6 , this .myLongTermMacKey) ;
147 this . EncryptedData . addPTLV(SID) ;
148 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateEncryption
149 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
150 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
151 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
152 this . myLongTermEncryptionKey ) ;
153 this .MACedData . i n i t i a l i s a t i onPTLV ( this .MACedDataTag , 16) ;
154 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
155 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
156 this . EncryptedData . getTagValueLength ( ) ,
157 this .MACedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 6 ,
158 this .myLongTermMacKey) ;
159 this . MessageHandler . r e s e t ( ) ;
160 this . MessageHandler . i n i t i a l i s a t i onCTLV ( this . MessageHandlerTSMSC)
161 ;
162 this . MessageHandler . addCTLV( EncryptedData ) ;
163 this . MessageHandler . addPTLV( this .MACedData) ;
164 } catch ( Exception cE) {
165 System . out . p r i n t l n (
166 "Error Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing
Option = 1 , : " + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
167 }
168 return this . MessageHandler . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) ;
169 }
170 public boolean inMessageProcess ing (byte [ ] inMessage ) {
171 try {
172 this . MessageHandler . r e s e t ( ) ;
173 this . EncryptedData . r e s e t ( ) ;
174 MessageHandler . s e tBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( inMessage , 0 ,
175 ( inMessage . l ength − 2) ) ;
176 childExtractionFromCTLV (MessageHandler ) ;
177 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
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178 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateMac
179 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
180 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length , temp , 0 ,
181 this .myLongTermMacKey) ;
182 i f ( Arrays . equa l s ( this .MACedData . getValueBytes ( ) , temp) ) {}
183 else {
184 System . out . p r i n t l n (
185 " I n t e g r i t y Check Fa i l u r e : ERROR at
Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing \n" ) ;
186 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
187 }
188 this . myProtocolHelperObject . GenerateDecryption
189 ( this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 ,
190 this . EncryptedData . getValueBytes ( ) . length ,
191 this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentat ion ( ) , 7 ,
192 this . myLongTermEncryptionKey ) ;
193 this . childExtractionFromCTLV (EncryptedData ) ;
194 } catch ( Exception cE) {
195 System . out . p r i n t l n (
196 "Error in Protoco lHandler . inMessageProcess ing :
" + cE . ge tC la s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
197 }
198 return true ;
199 }
200 public stat ic St r ing byteToStr ing (byte [ ] inArray ) {
201 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = {
202 (byte ) ' 0 ' , (byte ) ' 1 ' , (byte ) ' 2 ' , (byte ) ' 3 ' , (byte ) ' 4 ' , (byte )
203 ' 5 ' , (byte ) ' 6 ' , (byte ) ' 7 ' , (byte ) ' 8 ' , (byte ) ' 9 ' , (byte ) ' a ' ,
204 (byte ) 'b ' , (byte ) ' c ' , (byte ) 'd ' , (byte ) ' e ' , (byte ) ' f '
205 } ;
206 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l ength ] ;
207 int index = 0 ;
208 for (byte b : inArray ) {
209 int v = b & 0xFF ;
210 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ;
211 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ;
212 }
213 try {
214 return new St r ing ( hex , "ASCII" ) ;
215 } catch ( Exception cE) {
216 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in bytesToStr ing : " +
217 cE . getMessage ( ) + "\n" + cE . getStackTrace ( )
218 . t oS t r i ng ( ) ) ;
219 }
220 return "Error " ;
221 }
222 void childExtractionFromCTLV (ConstructedTLV inCTLV) {
223 try {
224 int c h i l d s = inCTLV . getChildNumbers ( ) ;
225 PrimitiveTLV pTemp = null ;
226 ConstructedTLV cTemp = null ;
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227 while ( c h i l d s > 0) {
228 switch (inCTLV . nextType ( ) ) {
229 case 1 :
230 pTemp = (PrimitiveTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
231 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
232 this . CardID . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
233 this . CardID = pTemp ;
234 }
235 else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
236 this . SCIdent ity . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
237 this . SCIdent ity = pTemp ;
238 }
239 else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
240 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
241 this . SCRandomNumber = pTemp ;
242 }
243 else i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
244 this .MACedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
245 this .MACedData = pTemp ;
246 }
247 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
248 this . Use r Ident i ty . getTagName ( ) ) ) {
249 this . Use r Ident i ty = pTemp ;
250 }
251 break ;
252 case 0 : cTemp = (ConstructedTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ;
253 i f ( Arrays . equa l s (cTemp . getTagName ( ) ,
254 this . EncryptedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) {




259 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error In Pars ing Input Message" ) ;
260 }
261 ch i l d s −−;
262 }
263 } catch ( Exception e ) {
264 System . out . p r i n t l n (
265 "Error in Protoco lHanlder . ChildExtractionMethod




C.7 Application Binding Protocol - Local
The Java Card implementation of the ABPL discussed in section 7.4 is listed in subsequent
sections.
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C.7.1 Client Application
Implementation of a client application that request for the application binding in the
UCOM rewall mechanism is listed as below:
1 package AppBindingProt ;
2
3 import javacard . framework . ∗ ;
4 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
5 import javacardx . crypto . ∗ ;
6 public class ClientApp {
7 byte [ ] C l i e n t I d en t i t y = {
8 (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 } ;
9 byte [ ] S e rve rDige s t = new byte [ 3 2 ] ;
10 byte [ ] S e r v e r I d en t i t y = {
11 (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xd1 } ;
12 byte [ ] TokenValue = {
13 (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb } ;
14 byte [ ] c l i en tR = {
15 (byte ) 0x4D , (byte ) 0xAB, (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x8B , (byte )
16 0x11 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xA9 , (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0xD7 , (byte ) 0x4F ,
17 (byte ) 0x3A , (byte ) 0xD8 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xF1 , (byte ) 0x61 } ;
18 Cipher AESCipher ;
19 RandomData clientPRNG ;
20 AESKey clientTPMKey ;
21 private KeyPair c l ient_SignKeyPair ;
22 short encrypt ionLength ;
23 AESKey myClientAppServerKey ;
24 Cipher myClientAppSignature ;
25 ScTPM mySCTPMRef ;
26 ServerApp myServerAppRef ;
27 byte [ ] pMessage ;
28 PublicKey s e rv e rVe r i f i c a t i onKey ;
29 protected ClientApp ( ) {
30 clientPRNG = RandomData . g e t In s tance (RandomData .ALG_PSEUDO_RANDOM) ;
31 c l ient_SignKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA_CRT,
32 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
33 myClientAppServerKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
34 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES,
35 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
36 clientTPMKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES,
37 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
38 AESCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
39 fa l se ) ;
40 myClientAppSignature = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD,
41 fa l se ) ;
42 }
43 public stat ic ClientApp objectGenerator ( ) {
44 return new ClientApp ( ) ;
45 }
46 public void ob j e c t I n s t a n t i a t i o n ( ) {
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47 c l ient_SignKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
48 clientPRNG . generateData ( c l i entR , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) c l i en tR . l ength ) ;
49 clientTPMKey . setKey ( c l i entR , ( short ) 0) ;
50 }
51 public void c l i entUpdate (ScTPM obSCTPM, ServerApp obServerApp ) {
52 mySCTPMRef = obSCTPM;
53 myServerAppRef = obServerApp ;
54 myServerAppRef . c l i e n tS i gnVe r i f i c a t i onUpda t e
55 ( c l ient_SignKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ) ;
56 obSCTPM. clientTPMKeyAgreement ( clientTPMKey ) ;
57 }
58 public void s e rv e rS i gnVe r i f i c a t i onUpdat e ( PublicKey s i g nV e r i f i c a t i o n )
59 {
60 s e r v e rVe r i f i c a t i onKey = s i g nV e r i f i c a t i o n ;
61 }
62 public void digestUpdate (byte [ ] spServe rDiges t ) {
63 ServerDige s t = spServe rDige s t ;
64 }
65 public byte [ ] s t a r tP r o t o c o l ( ) {
66 pMessage = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 256 ,
67 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
68 short i n i t i a lTab = 4 ;
69 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) i n i t i a lTab ;
70 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( C l i en t Id en t i t y ,
71 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , i n i t i a lTab , ( short )
72 Cl i e n t I d en t i t y . l ength ) ;
73 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( Se rve r Ident i ty ,
74 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short )
75 Se rv e r I d en t i t y . l ength ) ;
76 clientPRNG . generateData ( c l i entR , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) c l i en tR . l ength ) ;
77 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( c l i entR , ( short ) 0 ,
78 pMessage , pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short ) c l i en tR . l ength ) ;
79 generateEncryptionData ( clientTPMKey ) ;
80 for ( short i = ( short ) ( ( short ) 58+(short ) i n i t i a lTab ) ; i < ( short )
81 (64+ i n i t i a lTab ) ; i++) {
82 pMessage [ i ] = (byte ) 0xCC;
83 }
84 generateS ignatureData ( ) ;
85 try {
86 myServerAppRef . protocolManager ( ( short ) 1 , pMessage ) ;
87 } catch ( Exception e ) {
88 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xB001 ) ;
89 }
90 AESKey sess ionKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
91 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES,
92 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
93 generatedDecryptedData ( ( short ) 4 , ( short ) 64 , clientTPMKey ) ;
94 sess ionKey . setKey ( pMessage , ( short ) 36) ;
95 try {
96 generatedDecryptedData ( ( short ) 68 , ( short ) 48 , sess ionKey ) ;
97 myClientAppServerKey . setKey ( pMessage , ( short ) 68) ;
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98 } catch ( Exception e ) {
99 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0001 ) ;
100 }
101 try {
102 ver i fyS ignedData ( ( short ) 116 , ( short ) 64) ;
103 } catch ( Exception e ) {
104 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0002 ) ;
105 }
106 try {
107 generatedDecryptedData ( ( short ) 116 , ( short ) 32 ,
108 myClientAppServerKey ) ;
109 } catch ( Exception e ) {
110 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0003 ) ;
111 }
112 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) 116 , TokenValue , ( short )
113 0 , ( short ) TokenValue . l ength ) ;
114 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( C l i en t Id en t i t y ,
115 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , i n i t i a lTab , ( short )
116 Cl i e n t I d en t i t y . l ength ) ;
117 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( Se rve r Ident i ty ,
118 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short )
119 Se rv e r I d en t i t y . l ength ) ;
120 pMessage [ 2 ] = pMessage [ 0 ] ;
121 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (TokenValue , ( short ) 0 ,
122 pMessage , pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short ) TokenValue . l ength ) ;
123 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( c l i entR , ( short ) 0 ,
124 pMessage , pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short ) c l i en tR . l ength ) ;
125 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) ( pMessage [ 0 ] − pMessage [ 2 ] ) ;
126 try {
127 encryptData ( ( short ) 4 , ( short ) 30 , myClientAppServerKey ) ;
128 } catch ( Exception e ) {
129 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0004 ) ;
130 }
131 try {
132 myServerAppRef . protocolManager ( ( short ) 2 , pMessage ) ;
133 } catch ( Exception e ) {
134 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x00A5) ;
135 }
136 return TokenValue ;
137 }
138 public void protocolManager (byte [ ] pMessage ) {}
139 protected void generateEncryptionData (AESKey Key) {
140 pMessage [ 3 ] += ( short ) ( pMessage [ 0 ] − 4) ;
141 AESCipher . i n i t (Key , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
142 short paddingbytes = ( short ) (16−(( pMessage [ 0 ] % 16) − ( short ) 4) ) ;
143 i f ( paddingbytes != 0) {
144 for ( short i = 0 ; i < paddingbytes ; i++) {
145 pMessage [ ( short ) ( pMessage [ 0 ] + i ) ] = (byte ) 0xFF ;
146 }
147 }
148 pMessage [ 0 ] += (byte ) paddingbytes ;
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149 byte [ ] temp = new byte [ pMessage [ 0 ] ] ;
150 pMessage [ 1 ] = (byte )AESCipher . doFinal ( pMessage , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
151 ( pMessage [ 0 ] − 4) , temp , ( short ) 0) ;
152 pMessage [ 3 ] += pMessage [ 1 ] ;
153 pMessage [ 0 ] −= (byte ) paddingbytes ;
154 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( temp , ( short ) 0 , pMessage , pMessage [ 0 ] ,
155 ( short ) pMessage [ 1 ] ) ;
156 }
157 protected void encryptData ( short s ta r t , short l ength , AESKey Key) {
158 short paddingbytes = 0 ;
159 i f ( ( short ) ( l ength % 16) != 0) {
160 paddingbytes = ( short ) (16−( l ength % 16) ) ;
161 }
162 byte [ ] temp = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( l ength +
163 paddingbytes ) , JCSystem .CLEAR_ON_DESELECT) ;
164 AESCipher . i n i t (Key , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
165 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) s ta r t , temp , ( short ) 0 ,
166 ( short ) l ength ) ;
167 i f ( paddingbytes != 0) {
168 for ( short i = 0 ; i < paddingbytes ; i++, l ength++) {
169 temp [ ( short ) ( l ength ) ] = (byte ) 0xFF ;
170 }
171 }
172 AESCipher . doFinal ( temp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) length , pMessage , ( short )
173 s t a r t ) ;
174 }
175 protected void generateS ignatureData ( ) {
176 byte [ ] s i gBu f f = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 256 ,
177 JCSystem .CLEAR_ON_DESELECT) ;
178 short s igLen = 0 ;
179 myClientAppSignature . i n i t ( c l ient_SignKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
180 Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
181 s igLen = myClientAppSignature . doFinal ( pMessage , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
182 64 , s i gBuf f , ( short ) 0) ;
183 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( s i gBuf f , ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) 4 ,
184 s igLen ) ;
185 pMessage [ 2 ] = (byte ) s igLen ;
186 }
187 protected void generatedDecryptedData ( short s ta r t , short l ength ,
188 AESKey Key) {
189 byte [ ] tempBuff = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( length ,
190 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
191 AESCipher . i n i t (Key , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT) ;
192 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , s t a r t , tempBuff , ( short ) 0 ,
193 ( short ) l ength ) ;
194 AESCipher . doFinal ( tempBuff , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) length , pMessage ,
195 ( short ) s t a r t ) ;
196 }
197 protected boolean ver i fyS ignedData ( short s ta r t , short l ength ) {
198 myClientAppSignature . i n i t ( s e rv e rVe r i f i c a t i onKey ,
199 Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT) ;
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200 byte [ ] tempBuff = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 256 ,
201 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
202 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) s ta r t , tempBuff , ( short )
203 0 , ( short ) l ength ) ;
204 myClientAppSignature . doFinal ( tempBuff , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) length ,
205 pMessage , ( short ) s t a r t ) ;




Implementation of a server application that responds to the application binding request in
the UCOM rewall mechanism is listed as below:
1 package AppBindingProt ;
2
3 import javacard . framework . ∗ ;
4 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
5 import javacardx . crypto . ∗ ;
6 public class ServerApp {
7 byte [ ] C l i en tD ige s t = new byte [ 3 2 ] ;
8 byte [ ] C l i e n t I d en t i t y = {
9 (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 } ;
10 byte [ ] RandomNumberClient = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
11 byte [ ] RandomNumberServer = {
12 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0x4F , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte )
13 0x9A , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x2C , (byte ) 0x3D , (byte ) 0x79 ,
14 (byte ) 0xFA, (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0xAB, (byte ) 0x2D , (byte ) 0x5F } ;
15 byte [ ] S e r v e r I d en t i t y = {
16 (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xd1 } ;
17 byte [ ] TokenValue = {
18 (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xbc } ;
19 RandomData myServerAppRandomData = RandomData . g e t In s tance
20 (RandomData .ALG_PSEUDO_RANDOM) ;
21 KeyPair server_SignKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA_CRT,
22 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
23 AESKey SerTpmKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES,
24 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
25 Cipher AESCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance
26 ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
27 ClientApp myClientAppRef ;
28 PublicKey myCl ientVer i f i cat ionKey ;
29 Cipher myServerAppSignature ;
30 AESKey myServerClientAppKey ;
31 ScTPM myTPMRef ;
32 byte [ ] pMessage ;
33 AESKey sess ionKey ;
34 protected ServerApp ( ) {
35 myServerAppSignature = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD,
36 fa l se ) ;
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37 }
38 public stat ic ServerApp objectGenerator ( ) {
39 return new ServerApp ( ) ;
40 }
41 public void ob j e c t I n s t a n t i a t i o n ( ) {
42 server_SignKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
43 SerTpmKey . setKey (RandomNumberServer , ( short ) 0) ;
44 }
45 public void serverUpdate (ScTPM obScTPM, ClientApp obClientApp ) {
46 myTPMRef = obScTPM;
47 myClientAppRef = obClientApp ;
48 myClientAppRef . s e rv e rS i gnVe r i f i c a t i onUpdat e
49 ( server_SignKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ) ;
50 obScTPM. serverTPMKeyAgreement (SerTpmKey) ;
51 }
52 public void c l i e n tS i gnVe r i f i c a t i onUpda t e ( PublicKey s i g nV e r i f i c a t i o n )
53 {
54 myCl ientVer i f i cat ionKey = s i g nV e r i f i c a t i o n ;
55 }
56 public void digestUpdate (byte [ ] s pC l i en tD ige s t ) {
57 Cl i en tD ige s t = spCl i en tD ige s t ;
58 }
59 public void protocolManager ( short stage , byte [ ] p_Message ) {
60 this . pMessage = p_Message ;
61 i f ( s tage == 1) {
62 pMessage [ 3 ] = (byte ) 64 ;
63 ver i fyS ignedData ( ) ;
64 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) (4
65 +Cl i e n t I d en t i t y . l ength +
66 Se rv e r I d en t i t y . l ength ) ,
67 RandomNumberClient , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
68 RandomNumberClient . l ength ) ;
69 pMessage [ 3 ] = (byte ) 68 ;
70 pMessage [ 2 ] = pMessage [ 3 ] ;
71 pMessage [ 3 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( Se rve r Ident i ty ,
72 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) pMessage [ 3 ] , ( short )
73 Se rv e r Id en t i t y . l ength ) ;
74 pMessage [ 3 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( C l i en t Id en t i t y ,
75 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) pMessage [ 3 ] , ( short )
76 Cl i e n t I d en t i t y . l ength ) ;
77 myServerAppRandomData . generateData (RandomNumberServer , ( short ) 0 ,
78 ( short )RandomNumberServer . l ength ) ;
79 pMessage [ 3 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (RandomNumberServer ,
80 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) pMessage [ 3 ] , ( short )
81 RandomNumberServer . l ength ) ;
82 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) ( C l i e n t I d en t i t y . l ength +
83 Se rv e r Id en t i t y . l ength +
84 RandomNumberServer . l ength ) ;
85 for ( short i = 0 ; i < 6 ; i++) {
86 pMessage [ ( short ) ( pMessage [ 3 ] + i ) ] = (byte ) 0xCA;
87 }
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88 pMessage [ 2 ] = (byte ) 32 ;
89 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) 68 ;
90 generateEncryptedData ( ( short ) pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short ) pMessage [ 2 ] ,
91 SerTpmKey) ;
92 myTPMRef . v a l i d a t eApp l i c a t i on s ( pMessage ) ;
93 generatedDecryptedData ( ( short ) 68 , ( short ) 64 , SerTpmKey) ;
94 sess ionKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES,
95 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
96 sess ionKey . setKey ( pMessage , ( short ) (100) ) ;
97 myServerClientAppKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
98 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES,
99 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
100 byte [ ] keyGenerationArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
101 ( short ) 16 , JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
102 myServerAppRandomData . generateData ( keyGenerationArray , ( short ) 0 ,
103 ( short ) keyGenerationArray . l ength ) ;
104 myServerClientAppKey . setKey ( keyGenerationArray , ( short ) 0) ;
105 for ( short i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i++) {
106 RandomNumberClient [ i ] = (byte ) 0xFF ;
107 }
108 myServerClientAppKey . getKey ( pMessage , ( short ) 68) ;
109 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (RandomNumberClient , ( short ) 0 , p_Message ,
110 ( short ) 84 , ( short )
111 RandomNumberClient . l ength ) ;
112 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (RandomNumberServer , ( short ) 0 , p_Message ,
113 ( short ) 100 , ( short )
114 RandomNumberServer . l ength ) ;
115 generateEncryptedData ( ( short ) 68 , ( short ) 48 , sess ionKey ) ;
116 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (TokenValue , ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short )
117 116 , ( short ) TokenValue . l ength ) ;
118 xorRandomNumberCS ( ( short ) 120) ;
119 generateEncryptedData ( ( short ) 116 , ( short ) 20 ,
120 myServerClientAppKey ) ;
121 generateS ignatureData ( ( short ) 116 , ( short ) 32) ;
122 return ;
123 }
124 i f ( s tage == 2) {
125 generatedDecryptedData ( ( short ) 4 , ( short ) 32 ,
126 myServerClientAppKey ) ;
127 i f ( (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCompare (TokenValue , ( short ) 0 , pMessage ,
128 ( short ) 14 , ( short ) 4) == (byte ) 0) {
129 return ;
130 } else {
131 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFFFF) ;
132 }
133 } else {
134 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6300 ) ;
135 }
136 }
137 protected void xorRandomNumberCS( short s t a r t ) {
138 for ( short i = 0 ; i < ( short ) 16 ; i++, s t a r t++) {
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139 pMessage [ s t a r t ] = (byte ) (RandomNumberServer [ i ] |
140 RandomNumberClient [ i ] ) ;
141 }
142 }
143 protected void generateEncryptedData ( short s ta r t , short l ength ,
144 AESKey Key) {
145 short paddingbytes = 0 ;
146 i f ( ( short ) ( l ength % 16) != 0) {
147 paddingbytes = ( short ) (16−( l ength % 16) ) ;
148 }
149 byte [ ] temp = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( l ength +
150 paddingbytes ) , JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
151 AESCipher . i n i t (Key , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
152 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) s ta r t , temp , ( short ) 0 ,
153 ( short ) l ength ) ;
154 i f ( paddingbytes != 0) {
155 for ( short i = 0 ; i < paddingbytes ; i++, l ength++) {
156 temp [ ( short ) ( l ength ) ] = (byte ) 0xFF ;
157 }
158 }
159 AESCipher . doFinal ( temp , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) length , pMessage , ( short )
160 s t a r t ) ;
161 }
162 protected void generatedDecryptedData ( short s ta r t , short l ength ,
163 AESKey Key) {
164 byte [ ] tempBuff = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( length ,
165 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
166 AESCipher . i n i t (Key , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT) ;
167 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , s t a r t , tempBuff , ( short ) 0 ,
168 ( short ) l ength ) ;
169 AESCipher . doFinal ( tempBuff , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) length , pMessage ,
170 ( short ) s t a r t ) ;
171 }
172 protected void generateS ignatureData ( short s ta r t , short l ength ) {
173 byte [ ] s i gBu f f = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) (64+2) ,
174 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
175 myServerAppSignature . i n i t ( server_SignKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
176 Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
177 i f ( l ength < 64) {
178 for ( short i = 0 ; i < ( short ) 32 ; i++) {
179 pMessage [ ( short ) ( s t a r t + length + i ) ] = (byte ) 0x5A ;
180 }
181 }
182 myServerAppSignature . doFinal ( pMessage , ( short ) s ta r t , ( short ) 64 ,
183 s i gBuf f , ( short ) 0) ;
184 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( s i gBuf f , ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) s ta r t ,
185 ( short ) 64) ;
186 }
187 protected boolean ver i fyS ignedData ( ) {
188 myServerAppSignature . i n i t ( myCl ientVer i f i cat ionKey ,
189 Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT) ;
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190 byte [ ] tempBuff = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 256 ,
191 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
192 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) 4 , tempBuff , ( short ) 0 ,
193 ( short ) 64) ;
194 myServerAppSignature . doFinal ( tempBuff , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) 64 ,
195 pMessage , ( short ) 4) ;




Implementation of TEM handler that generates the state proof of individual applications
in the UCOM rewall mechanism is listed as below:
1 package AppBindingProt ;
2
3 import javacard . framework . ∗ ;
4 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
5 import javacardx . crypto . ∗ ;
6 public class ScTPM {
7 private stat ic byte [ ] AppDataFile = {
8 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte )
9 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x6b ,
10 (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xb2 ,
11 (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0xa4 ,
12 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x86 ,
13 (byte ) 0x8e , (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb ,
14 (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xf1 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xac ,
15 (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0xa3 ,
16 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0xf3 , (byte ) 0x61 ,
17 (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x4c ,
18 (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
19 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xd6 , (byte ) 0x07 ,
20 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x9a , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
21 (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x61 , (byte ) 0x3d ,
22 (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x29 ,
23 (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x36 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0 xfe ,
24 (byte ) 0xad , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x0e ,
25 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
26 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xce ,
27 (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xaf ,
28 (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
29 (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
30 (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x1c ,
31 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xc7 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x93 , (byte ) 0x2f ,
32 (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0x5e ,
33 (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x7e , (byte ) 0x1f ,
34 (byte ) 0xe6 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x25 ,
35 (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x57 ,
36 (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xc0 ,
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37 (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xfd ,
38 (byte ) 0x6a , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
39 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0xae , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x18 ,
40 (byte ) 0x5a , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xa1 ,
41 (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0xee ,
42 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0x86 ,
43 (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xe4 ,
44 (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0xfb , (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x6c , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
45 (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xd8 ,
46 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd1 , (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0x60 ,
47 (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x68 ,
48 (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0x8f , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0x3e ,
49 (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x0f , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x64 ,
50 (byte ) 0xb1 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x6e , (byte ) 0x91 ,
51 (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0 xef , (byte ) 0x8b ,
52 (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x1e , (byte ) 0xa7 ,
53 (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0xb7 ,
54 (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0xc5 ,
55 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
56 (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xbd ,
57 (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
58 (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xd4 ,
59 (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xbd , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x9d ,
60 (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xad ,
61 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0xa2 , (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0x2d , (byte ) 0xe3 ,
62 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x9b , (byte ) 0x1f ,
63 (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xfb ,
64 (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0xeb , (byte ) 0xdb ,
65 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
66 (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0xb7 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 ,
67 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xb9 , (byte ) 0x92 ,
68 (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x0e , (byte ) 0xb8 ,
69 (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x2d ,
70 (byte ) 0x0c , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x06 ,
71 (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x09 ,
72 (byte ) 0 xfc , (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x1a ,
73 (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0x0a , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x45 ,
74 (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0x2e ,
75 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0x1e ,
76 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0 xcf , (byte ) 0xcc ,
77 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0xf7 , (byte ) 0x3d , (byte ) 0x73 ,
78 (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0xe4 , (byte ) 0x75 ,
79 (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x2e ,
80 (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xaf ,
81 (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xb1 ,
82 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0xb2 , (byte ) 0x66 ,
83 (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x15 ,
84 (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0xa3 , (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x88 ,
85 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x24 ,
86 (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0xb0 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x8f ,
87 (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0x52 ,
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88 (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x8b , (byte ) 0xf2 ,
89 (byte ) 0xe3 , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0x03 ,
90 (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x0d , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x6a ,
91 (byte ) 0x20 , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0xc9 ,
92 (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0xda , (byte ) 0x6f , (byte ) 0x7b ,
93 (byte ) 0xb8 , (byte ) 0x6d , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x57 , (byte ) 0xa8 ,
94 (byte ) 0xed , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0x05 ,
95 (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0x38 ,
96 (byte ) 0xa8 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x87 ,
97 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xba ,
98 (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x07 ,
99 (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0xe1 , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0xbf ,
100 (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x7a , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x2a ,
101 (byte ) 0x61 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0x06 ,
102 (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xaa , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x79 ,
103 (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xe7 , (byte ) 0xe5 , (byte ) 0x6d , (byte ) 0xae ,
104 (byte ) 0x16 , (byte ) 0x6d , (byte ) 0xa9 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x39 ,
105 (byte ) 0x0e , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0x42 ,
106 (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0xac , (byte ) 0xc1 , (byte ) 0x1b , (byte ) 0x6c ,
107 (byte ) 0x3b , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x3b , (byte ) 0x52 ,
108 (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0x3f ,
109 (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0xf3 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xfb , (byte ) 0xf6 ,
110 (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0x49 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x56 ,
111 (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0x8c , (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x84 ,
112 (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x3b ,
113 (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x60 } ;
114 public byte [ ] C l i e n t I d en t i t y = {
115 (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0xea , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0x94 } ;
116 public byte [ ] S e r v e r I d en t i t y = {
117 (byte ) 0x4f , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xd1 } ;
118 byte [ ] scTPMDigestBuffer = new byte [ ( short ) 3 2 ] ;
119 MessageDigest tpmDigestGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
120 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
121 byte [ ] ServerRandomNumber = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short )
122 16 , JCSystem .CLEAR_ON_RESET) ;
123 byte [ ] ClientRandomNumber = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short )
124 16 , JCSystem .CLEAR_ON_RESET) ;
125 Cipher AESCipher ;
126 AESKey TpmClientApp , TpmServerApp ;
127 ClientApp myClientAppRef ;
128 ServerApp myServerAppRef ;
129 byte [ ] pMessage ;
130 protected ScTPM() {}
131 public void i n s t an t i a t eOb j e c t ( ) {
132 tpmDigestGen . doFinal ( AppDataFile , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
133 AppDataFile . length , scTPMDigestBuffer ,
134 ( short ) 0) ;
135 AESCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
136 fa l se ) ;
137 }
138 public stat ic ScTPM objectGenerator ( ) {
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139 return new ScTPM() ;
140 }
141 public void ScTPMUpdate( ServerApp obServerApp , ClientApp
142 obClientApp ) {
143 myServerAppRef = obServerApp ;
144 myClientAppRef = obClientApp ;
145 myServerAppRef . d igestUpdate ( scTPMDigestBuffer ) ;
146 myClientAppRef . d igestUpdate ( scTPMDigestBuffer ) ;
147 }
148 public void clientTPMKeyAgreement (AESKey TPMClient ) {
149 TpmClientApp = TPMClient ;
150 }
151 public void serverTPMKeyAgreement (AESKey TPMServer ) {
152 TpmServerApp = TPMServer ;
153 }
154 public void va l i d a t eApp l i c a t i on s (byte [ ] p_Message ) {
155 pMessage = p_Message ;
156 generateDecryt ion ( ( short ) 30 , ( short ) 32 , TpmClientApp ) ;
157 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) ( pMessage [ 0 ] +
158 Cl i e n t I d en t i t y . l ength +
159 Se rv e r I d en t i t y . l ength ) ,
160 ClientRandomNumber , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
161 ClientRandomNumber . l ength ) ;
162 generateDecryt ion ( ( short ) 68 , ( short ) 32 , TpmServerApp) ;
163 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) ( pMessage [ 0 ] +
164 Cl i e n t I d en t i t y . l ength +
165 Se rv e r I d en t i t y . l ength ) ,
166 ServerRandomNumber , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
167 ServerRandomNumber . l ength ) ;
168 tpmDigestGen . doFinal ( AppDataFile , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
169 AppDataFile . length , scTPMDigestBuffer ,
170 ( short ) 0) ;
171 tpmDigestGen . doFinal ( AppDataFile , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
172 AppDataFile . length , scTPMDigestBuffer ,
173 ( short ) 0) ;
174 AESKey sess ionKey ;
175 byte [ ] tempDebugSessionKey = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
176 ( short ) 16 , JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
177 sess ionKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES,
178 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
179 RandomData tpmKeyGenPRNG = RandomData . g e t In s tance
180 (RandomData .ALG_PSEUDO_RANDOM) ;
181 tpmKeyGenPRNG. generateData ( tempDebugSessionKey , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
182 tempDebugSessionKey . l ength ) ;
183 sess ionKey . setKey ( tempDebugSessionKey , ( short ) 0) ;
184 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( scTPMDigestBuffer ,
185 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
186 scTPMDigestBuffer . l ength ) ;
187 pMessage [ 0 ] += (byte ) sess ionKey . getKey ( pMessage , ( short )
188 ( pMessage [ 0 ] ) ) ;
189 ClientRandomNumber [ 1 5 ] = (byte ) (ClientRandomNumber [ 1 5 ] | (byte )
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190 0x01 ) ;
191 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (ClientRandomNumber ,
192 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short )
193 ClientRandomNumber . l ength ) ;
194 generateEncrypt ion ( ( short ) 4 , ( short ) 64 , TpmClientApp ) ;
195 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( scTPMDigestBuffer ,
196 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) 68 , ( short )
197 scTPMDigestBuffer . l ength ) ;
198 pMessage [ 0 ] += (byte ) sess ionKey . getKey ( pMessage , ( short )
199 pMessage [ 0 ] ) ;
200 ServerRandomNumber [ 1 5 ] = (byte ) ( ServerRandomNumber [ 1 5 ] + (byte ) 1) ;
201 pMessage [ 0 ] = (byte ) Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (ServerRandomNumber ,
202 ( short ) 0 , pMessage , ( short ) pMessage [ 0 ] , ( short )
203 ServerRandomNumber . l ength ) ;
204 generateEncrypt ion ( ( short ) 68 , ( short ) 64 , TpmServerApp) ;
205 }
206 public void generateDecryt ion ( short s ta r t , short l ength , AESKey Key)
207 {
208 byte [ ] tempBuff = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( length ,
209 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
210 AESCipher . i n i t (Key , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT) ;
211 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , ( short ) s ta r t , tempBuff , ( short )
212 0 , ( short ) l ength ) ;
213 AESCipher . doFinal ( tempBuff , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) length , pMessage ,
214 ( short ) s t a r t ) ;
215 }
216 public void generateEncrypt ion ( short s ta r t , short l ength , AESKey
217 Key) {
218 AESCipher . i n i t (Key , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
219 short paddingbytes = ( short ) ( l ength % 16) ;
220 byte [ ] temp = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( l ength +
221 paddingbytes ) , JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
222 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( pMessage , s t a r t , temp , ( short ) 0 , l ength ) ;
223 i f ( paddingbytes != 0) {
224 for ( short i = 0 ; i < paddingbytes ; i++, l ength++) {
225 temp [ l ength ] = (byte ) 0xFF ;
226 }
227 }
228 pMessage [ 1 ] = (byte )AESCipher . doFinal ( temp , ( short ) 0 , length ,
229 pMessage , s t a r t ) ;
230 }
231 }
C.8 Application Binding Protocol - Distributed
The Java Card implementation of the ABPD discussed in section 7.6 is listed in subsequent
sections.
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C.8.1 Client Application
Implementation of a client application that request for the application binding in the
CDAM rewall mechanism is listed as below:
1 package protocolABPDClient ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength
21 {
22 private byte [ ] ServerAppDHChanllengerArray ;
23 private byte [ ] ServerAppRandomNumberArray ;
24 private byte [ ] ServerAppCookieArray ;
25 private byte [ ] ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue ;
26 private byte [ ] ClientAppRandomNumberArray ;
27 private byte [ ] C l i en tAppUserCer t i f i c a t e ;
28 private byte [ ] C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e ;
29 private byte [ ] ServerAppDHChallengeTag = {
30 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
31 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
32 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
33 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
34 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
35 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
36 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
37 private byte [ ] ServerAppIdent i ty = null ;
38 private byte [ ] ServerAppRandomNumberTag = {
39 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
40 private byte [ ] ServerAppCookieTag = {
41 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
42 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
43 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
44 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
45 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
46 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
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47 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
48 private byte [ ] PlatformHash = {
49 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
50 private byte [ ] Cl ientAppIdentityTag = {
51 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
52 0x12 , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
53 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 ,
54 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xDB,
55 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
56 private byte [ ] Use r Ident i ty = {
57 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
58 0x14 , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
59 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xC9 ,
60 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xFC, (byte ) 0xDB,
61 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
62 private byte [ ] ExponentTag = {
63 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
64 private byte [ ] ModulusTag = {
65 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
66 private byte [ ] ClientAppDHChalleneTag = {
67 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
68 private byte [ ] ClientAppRandomNumberTag = {
69 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
70 private byte [ ] ServerAppCert i f i cateTag = {
71 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
72 private byte [ ] C l i entAppCert i f i cateTag = {
73 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
74 private byte [ ] C l i entAppUserCert i f i cateTag = {
75 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
76 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
77 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
78 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
79 byte [ ] ClientAppDHData ;
80 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
81 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
82 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
83 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
84 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
85 RandomData randomDataGen ;
86 Cipher pkCipher ;
87 short messageNumber = 0 ;
88 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
89 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
90 short readCount = 0 ;
91 short rCount = 0 ;
92 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
93 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
94 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
95 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
96 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
97 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
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98 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
99 AESKey phCipherKey ;
100 Cipher syCipher ;
101 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
102 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte )
103 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
104 (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
105 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
106 Signature phMacGenerator ;
107 Signature phSign ;
108 KeyPair phClientAppKeyPair ;
109 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
110 RSAPublicKey ServerAppVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
111 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
112 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
113 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
114 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
115 phMacGenerator = Signature . g e t In s tance
116 ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
117 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se )
118 ;
119 phClientAppKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
120 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
121 phUserKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
122 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
123 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
124 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
125 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
126 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
127 fa l se ) ;
128 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance
129 (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
130 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
131 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
132 phClientAppKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
133 phUserKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
134 }
135 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte
136 bLength )throws ISOException {
137 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
138 }
139 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
140 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
141 ClientAppDHData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
142 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + PTLVDataOffset ) ,
143 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
144 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppDHChalleneTag , ( short )
145 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . ClientAppDHData ,
( short ) 0 ,
146 ( short ) this . ClientAppDHChalleneTag . l ength ) ;
147 this . shortToBytes (ClientAppDHData , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
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148 ClientAppDHData . l ength − ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
149 this . dhKeyConGen( this . ClientAppDHData , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
150 Protoco lHandler .GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION) ;
151 ServerAppDHChanllengerArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) (
152 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
153 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
154 ServerAppRandomNumberArray =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
155 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
156 ServerAppCookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
157 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
158 ClientAppRandomNumberArray =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
159 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
160 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberTag , ( short )
161 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
162 ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
163 this . ClientAppRandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
164 this . shortToBytes ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) (
165 ( short ) this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray . l ength −
166 ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
167 try {
168 this . C l i en tAppUse rCer t i f i c a t e = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
169 ( short ) 86 , JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
170 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic
171 ( this . C l i entAppUserCert i f i cateTag , ( short ) 0 ,
172 this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )
173 this . C l i entAppUserCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
174 this . shortToBytes ( this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
175 ( this . C l i en tAppUse rCer t i f i c a t e . l ength −
( short ) 7) ) ;
176 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
177 ( short ) 0 , this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
178 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
179 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
180 this . phUserKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
181 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te ,
182 ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
183 this . shortToBytes ( this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
kLen )
184 ;
185 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
186 this . C l i en tAppUse rCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
187 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
188 ( short ) 0 , this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) ,
189 ( short ) this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
190 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te , ( short )
191 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
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192 this . shortToBytes ( this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
kLen )
193 ;
194 this . C l i en tAppUse rCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
195 this . ServerAppIdent i ty = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 24 ,
196 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET) ;
197 ServerAppVer i f i cat ionKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
198 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
199 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
200 } catch ( Exception cE) {
201 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xCCCC) ;
202 }
203 try {
204 this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
205 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
206 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . C l i entAppCert i f i cateTag ,
207 ( short ) 0 , this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
208 this . C l i entAppCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
209 this . shortToBytes ( this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
210 ( this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
211 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
212 ( short ) 0 , this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
213 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
214 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
215 this . phClientAppKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
216 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , ( short )
217 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
218 this . shortToBytes ( this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
219 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
220 this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
221 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
222 ( short ) 0 , this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) ,
223 ( short ) this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
224 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , ( short )
225 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
226 this . shortToBytes ( this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
227 this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
228 } catch ( Exception cE) {
229 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
230 }
231 }
232 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
233 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
234 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
235 return ;
236 }
237 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
238 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
239 }
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240 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
241 this . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
242 return ;
243 }
244 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
245 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
246 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
247 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
248 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
249 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
250 rCount = 0 ;
251 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
252 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
253 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
254 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
255 }
256 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
257 try {
258 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
259 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
260 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
261 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
262 } catch ( Exception aE) {




267 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
268 } catch ( Exception cE) {
269 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
270 }
271 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
272 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
273 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
274 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
275 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] ==
276 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
277 processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
278 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
279 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
280 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
281 } else {
282 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
283 }
284 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
285 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
286 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
287 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
288 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
289 }
290 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
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291 short ch i ldPo interMessage = 6 ;
292 short enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = 0 ;
293 copyPointer = 0 ;
294 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
295 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
296 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
297 this . dhKeyConGen( this . ServerAppDHChanllengerArray ,
298 this . PTLVDataOffset , Protoco lHandler .GEN_DHKEY)
299 ;
300 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagOne ,
301 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
302 this . MessageHandlerTagOne . l ength ) ;
303 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppDHData ,
( short ) 0 ,
304 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
305 this . ClientAppDHData . l ength ) ;
306 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
307 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
308 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
309 this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
310 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
311 keygenerator ( ) ;
312 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
313 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
314 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
315 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
316 short childEnMessage = ( short ) ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ;
317 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
318 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
319 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . Cl ientAppIdentityTag ,
320 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
321 this . Cl ientAppIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
322 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
323 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
324 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
325 this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
326 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
327 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
328 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
329 this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
330 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
331 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t ,
332 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
333 phUserKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
334 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
335 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
336 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . C l i entAppUserCer t i f i ca te ,
337 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
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338 this . C l i en tAppUse rCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
339 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
340 messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t ,
341 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
342 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t −
343 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
344 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
345 macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
346 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
347 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
348 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
349 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppCookieArray ,
350 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
351 this . ServerAppCookieArray . l ength ) ;
352 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
353 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 4 , copyPointer ) ;
354 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
355 copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
356 short tempLength = ( short ) 0 ;
357 short mainChildPointer = ( short ) 6 ;
358 short mainLengthPointer = ( short ) 4 ;
359 short encryptedChi ldPointer = ( short ) 13 ;
360 short genera lLengthPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
361 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
362 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
363 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
364 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 7) ;
365 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
366 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
367 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
368 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
369 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
370 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . PlatformHash , ( short )
371 0 , r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
372 genera lLengthPointer = copyPointer ;
373 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
374 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
375 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
376 tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
( short ) 0 ,
377 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length , r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
378 copyPointer ) ;
379 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
380 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , genera lLengthPointer ,
381 ( short ) ( tempLength ) ) ;
382 copyPointer += tempLength ;
383 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . User Ident i ty , ( short )
384 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
385 this . Use r Ident i ty . l ength ) ;
386 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
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387 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppIdent ity ,
( short )
388 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
389 this . ServerAppIdent i ty . l ength ) ;
390 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
391 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
392 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
393 this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
394 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
395 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
396 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
397 this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
398 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
399 try {
400 this . s ignGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
401 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
402 phClientAppKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
403 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
404 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
405 } catch ( Exception cE) {
406 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
407 }
408 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e ,
409 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
410 this . C l i en tAppCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
411 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
412 try {
413 this . messageEncryption ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
414 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ,
415 ( short ) ( copyPointer −
416 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
417 } catch ( Exception cE) {
418 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer −
419 encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ;
420 }
421 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
422 ( encryptedChi ldPointer − ( short ) 2) , ( short )
423 ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer
424 + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
425 this . macGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer
426 + ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
427 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ,
428 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
429 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
430 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppCookieArray ,
431 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
432 this . ServerAppCookieArray . l ength ) ;
433 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
434 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , mainLengthPointer ,
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435 ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 7) ) ;
436 }
437 }
438 void platformHashGeneration (byte [ ] inArray , short i nO f f s e t ) {}
439 void processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
440 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset +
441 this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
442 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray ,
443 ( short ) ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
444 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
445 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
446 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
447 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , this . ServerAppIdent ity ,
448 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
449 this . ServerAppIdent i ty . l ength ) ;
450 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) 151 ;
451 inLength = ( short ) 3 ;
452 ServerAppVer i f i cat ionKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
453 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
454 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
455 ServerAppVer i f i cat ionKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
456 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
457 inLength = ( short ) 68 ;
458 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
459 ServerAppVer i f icat ionKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
460 return ;
461 } else {
462 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
463 }
464 } else {
465 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
466 }
467 }
468 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
469 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1)
470 ] ;
471 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
472 try {
473 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
474 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( ServerAppDHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
475 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
476 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
477 this . ServerAppDHChanllengerArray , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )
478 this . ServerAppDHChanllengerArray . l ength ) ;
479 po in t e r += ( short ) this . ServerAppDHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
480 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberTag ,
( short )
481 0 , inBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
482 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
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483 this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
( short ) 0 ,
484 ( short )
485 ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ) ;
486 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
487 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . ServerAppCookieTag , ( short ) 0 ,
488 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
489 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
490 this . ServerAppCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
491 ( short ) ( this . ServerAppCookieArray . l ength ) )
492 ;
493 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . ServerAppCookieArray . l ength ) ;
494 }
495 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
496 }
497 } catch ( Exception cE) {
498 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) c h i l dL e f t ) ;
499 }
500 }
501 void protoco l Implementat ion ( ) {}
502 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
503 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
504 }
505 void dhKeyConGen(byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , byte Oper_Mode)
506 {
507 switch (Oper_Mode) {
508 case GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION: randomExponent =
509 JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
510 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
511 randomDataGen . generateData ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
512 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
513 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
514 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
515 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
516 pkCipher . doFinal (ClassDH . dhBase , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhBase . length , inbu f f ,




521 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
522 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
523 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
524 ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
525 ( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
526 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
527 pkCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , ( short ) ( ( short )
528 i n bu f f . l ength − ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset )
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529 , ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue ,
( short ) 0) ;
530 }
531 catch ( Exception cE) {




536 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x5FA1) ;
537 }
538 }
539 void keygenerator ( ) {
540 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
541 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
542 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
543 sessionGenKey . setKey ( ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
544 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
545 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
546 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
547 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
548 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
549 short po in t e r = 0 ;
550 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
551 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
552 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
553 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
554 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue ,
( short )
555 16 , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
556 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
557 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
558 }
559 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
560 keyGenMacData . length ,
ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue ,
561 ( short ) 0) ;
562 this . phCipherKey . setKey ( ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
563 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
564 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
565 }
566 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
567 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
568 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
569 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
570 keyGenMacData . length ,
ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue ,
571 ( short ) 0) ;
572 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue ,
( short ) 0) ;
573 ClientAppServerAppDHGeneratedValue = null ;
574 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
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575 }
576 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
577 inbuf fLength ) {
578 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT,
579 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
580 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
581 short temp ;
582 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , temp =
583 ( short ) syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
584 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
585 }
586 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
587 inbuf fLength ) {
588 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT,
589 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
590 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
591 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
592 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
593 }
594 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
595 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
596 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
597 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
598 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
599 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
600 try {
601 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag ,
602 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
603 this .MACedDataTag . l ength ) ;
604 copyPointer += 2 ;
605 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
606 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
607 }
608 try {
609 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn
610 ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
611 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
612 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) ,
613 l ength ) ;
614 copyPointer += length ;
615 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
616 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0987 ) ;
617 }
618 return true ;
619 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
620 try {
621 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
622 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
623 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
624 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
625 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t +
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626 inbuf fLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
627 } catch ( Exception cE) {
628 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xC1C2) ;
629 }
630 }
631 return fa l se ;
632 }
633 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
634 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
635 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
636 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag ,
637 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
638 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
639 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
640 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
641 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
642 i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
643 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
644 ( short ) 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
645 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
646 return true ;
647 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
648 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
649 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
650 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
651 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
652 }
653 return fa l se ;
654 }
655 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
656 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
657 }
658 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short
659 a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
660 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [
661 ( short ) ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
662 }
663 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short inShort ) {
664 Array [ 0 ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >> ( short )
665 0x0008 ) ;
666 Array [ 1 ] = (byte ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0x00FF) ;
667 }
668 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
669 inShort ) {
670 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
671 ( short ) 0x0008 ) ;
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C.8.2 Server Application
Implementation of a server application that responds to the application binding request in
the CDAM rewall mechanism is listed as below:
1 package protocolABPDServerApp ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength
21 {
22 private byte [ ] ClientAppRandomNumberArray ;
23 private byte [ ] ClientAppCookieArray ;
24 private byte [ ] ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue ;
25 private byte [ ] ServerAppRandomNumberArray ;
26 private byte [ ] S e rve rAppCer t i f i c a t e ;
27 private byte [ ] ClientAppDHChallengeTag = {
28 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
29 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
30 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
31 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
32 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
33 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
34 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
35 private byte [ ] C l i entAppIdent i ty = null ;
36 private byte [ ] ClientAppRandomNumberTag = {
37 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
38 private byte [ ] ClientAppCookieTag = {
39 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
40 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
41 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
42 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
43 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
44 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
45 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
46 private byte [ ] PlatformHash = {
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47 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
48 private byte [ ] ServerAppIdentityTag = {
49 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
50 0x0C , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
51 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 ,
52 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x11 } ;
53 private byte [ ] ExponentTag = {
54 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
55 private byte [ ] ModulusTag = {
56 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
57 private byte [ ] ServerAppDHChalleneTag = {
58 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
59 private byte [ ] ServerAppRandomNumberTag = {
60 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
61 private byte [ ] C l i entAppCert i f i cateTag = {
62 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
63 private byte [ ] ServerAppCert i f i cateTag = {
64 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
65 private byte [ ] Se rverAppProtoco l In i t i a torTag = {
66 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xB2} ;
67 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
68 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
69 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
70 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
71 byte [ ] ServerAppDHData ;
72 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
73 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
74 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
75 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
76 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
77 RandomData randomDataGen ;
78 Cipher pkCipher ;
79 short messageNumber = 0 ;
80 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
81 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
82 short readCount = 0 ;
83 short rCount = 0 ;
84 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
85 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
86 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
87 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
88 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
89 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
90 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
91 AESKey phCipherKey ;
92 Cipher syCipher ;
93 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
94 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte )
95 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
96 (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
97 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
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98 Signature phMacGenerator ;
99 Signature phSign ;
100 KeyPair phServerAppKeyPair ;
101 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
102 RSAPublicKey Cl ientAppVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
103 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
104 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
105 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
106 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
107 phMacGenerator = Signature . g e t In s tance
108 ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
109 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se )
110 ;
111 phServerAppKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
112 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
113 phUserKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
114 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
115 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
116 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
117 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
118 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
119 fa l se ) ;
120 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance
121 (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
122 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
123 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
124 phServerAppKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
125 phUserKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
126 }
127 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte
128 bLength )throws ISOException {
129 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
130 }
131 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
132 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
133 ServerAppDHData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
134 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + PTLVDataOffset ) ,
135 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
136 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppDHChalleneTag , ( short )
137 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . ServerAppDHData ,
( short ) 0 ,
138 ( short ) this . ServerAppDHChalleneTag . l ength ) ;
139 this . shortToBytes ( ServerAppDHData , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
140 ServerAppDHData . l ength − ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
141 this . dhKeyConGen( this . ServerAppDHData , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
142 Protoco lHandler .GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION) ;
143 ClientAppDHChanllengerArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) (
144 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
145 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
146 ClientAppRandomNumberArray =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
394
C.8 Application Binding Protocol - Distributed
147 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
148 ClientAppCookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
149 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
150 ServerAppRandomNumberArray =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
151 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
152 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberTag , ( short )
153 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ,
this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
154 ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
155 this . ServerAppRandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
156 this . shortToBytes ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) (
157 ( short ) this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray . l ength −
( short )
158 PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
159 try {
160 this . S e rve rAppCer t i f i c a t e =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
161 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
162 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppCert i f i cateTag ,
163 ( short ) 0 , this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te ,
( short ) 0 , ( short )
164 this . ServerAppCert i f i cateTag . l ength ) ;
165 this . shortToBytes ( this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
166 ( this . S e rve rAppCer t i f i c a t e . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
167 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
168 ( short ) 0 , this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te ,
( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short )
169 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
170 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
171 this . phServerAppKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
172 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te , ( short )
173 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
174 this . shortToBytes ( this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
175 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
176 this . S e rve rAppCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
177 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
178 ( short ) 0 , this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te ,
( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) , ( short )
179 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
180 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te , ( short )
181 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
182 this . shortToBytes ( this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
183 this . S e rve rAppCer t i f i c a t e [6]++;
184 Cl ientAppVer i f i cat ionKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
185 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
186 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
187 } catch ( Exception cE) {
188 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
189 }
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190 }
191 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
192 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
193 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
194 this . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
195 return ;
196 }
197 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
198 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
199 }
200 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
201 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
202 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
203 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
204 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
205 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
206 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
207 copyPointer ) ;
208 return ;
209 }
210 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
211 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
212 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
213 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
214 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
215 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
216 rCount = 0 ;
217 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
218 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
219 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
220 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
221 }
222 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
223 try {
224 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
225 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
226 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
227 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
228 } catch ( Exception aE) {
229 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x7AAA) ;
230 }
231 }
232 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
233 try {
234 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
235 } catch ( Exception cE) {
236 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
237 }
238 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 600 ,
239 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
240 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
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241 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
242 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
243 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
244 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
245 copyPointer ) ;
246 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] ==
247 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
248 i f ( processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ) {
249 return ;
250 } else {
251 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
252 }
253 return ;
254 } else {
255 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
256 }
257 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
258 }
259 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
260 short childPM1 = 0 ;
261 short childPM2 = 0 ;
262 copyPointer = 0 ;
263 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
264 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopy ( this . ServerAppProtoco l In i t ia torTag ,
265 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
266 copyPointer , ( short )
267 this . Se rverAppProtoco l In i t i a torTag . l ength )
268 ;
269 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
270 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
271 childPM1 = copyPointer ;
272 copyPointer += 2 ;
273 phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
274 this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
275 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
276 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
277 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
278 short l ength = 0 ;
279 l ength = phMacGenerator . s i gn (ServerAppDHData , ( short )
280 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short )
281 ( ServerAppDHData . l ength −
282 this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
283 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ) ;
284 copyPointer += length ;
285 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , childPM1 , l ength ) ;
286 return ;
287 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
288 this . dhKeyConGen( this . ClientAppDHChanllengerArray ,
this . PTLVDataOffset ,
289 Protoco lHandler .GEN_DHKEY) ;
290 keygenerator ( ) ;
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291 childPM1 = ( short ) 6 ;
292 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
293 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
294 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo . l ength ) ;
295 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppDHData ,
( short ) 0 ,
296 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
297 this . ServerAppDHData . l ength ) ;
298 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
299 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
300 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
301 this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
302 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
303 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
304 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
305 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
306 copyPointer += 3 ;
307 childPM2 = ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 1) ;
308 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
309 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . PlatformHash , ( short )
310 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
311 this . PlatformHash . l ength ) ;
312 copyPointer += 2 ;
313 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
314 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
315 short tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
316 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
317 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ) ;
318 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
319 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
320 ( short ) 2) , tempLength ) ;
321 copyPointer += tempLength ;
322 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppIdentityTag ,
323 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
324 this . ServerAppIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
325 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
326 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
327 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
328 this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
329 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
330 copyPointer =
Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
331 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
332 this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
333 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
334 try {
335 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 +
336 ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short )
337 ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) ,
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338 this . phServerAppKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
339 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
340 } catch ( Exception cE) {
341 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x3141 ) ;
342 }
343 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
344 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . Se rve rAppCert i f i ca te ,
345 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
346 this . S e rve rAppCer t i f i c a t e . l ength ) ;
347 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
348 try {
349 this . messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2
350 + ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
351 ( short ) ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
352 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
353 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
354 ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
355 }
356 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 −
357 ( short ) 2) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − childPM2 −
358 ( short ) 1) ) ;
359 this . macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 +
360 ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short )
361 ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
362 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
363 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppCookieArray ,
364 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
365 this . ClientAppCookieArray . l ength ) ;
366 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
367 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM1 −
368 ( short ) 2) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 7) ) ;
369 }
370 }
371 boolean processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
372 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset +
373 this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
374 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray ,
375 ( short ) ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
376 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
377 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
378 try {
379 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
380 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . PTLVDataOffset
381 + ( short ) 168) ;
382 inLength = 3 ;
383 Cl ientAppVer i f i cat ionKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
384 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
385 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
386 Cl ientAppVer i f i cat ionKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
387 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
388 inLength = ( short ) 84 ;
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389 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
390 ClientAppVer i f i cat ionKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
391 return true ;
392 } else {
393 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
394 }
395 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
396 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xAB23) ;
397 }
398 return true ;
399 } else {
400 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
401 }
402 return fa l se ;
403 }
404 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
405 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1)
406 ] ;
407 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
408 try {
409 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
410 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( ClientAppDHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
411 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
412 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
this . ClientAppDHChanllengerArray ,
413 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
414 this . ClientAppDHChanllengerArray . l ength ) ;
415 po in t e r += ( short ) this . ClientAppDHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
416 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberTag ,
( short ) 0 ,
417 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
418 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
419 this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
( short ) 0 ,
420 ( short )
421 ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ) ;
422 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
423 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . ClientAppCookieTag , ( short ) 0 ,
424 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
425 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
426 this . ClientAppCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
427 ( short ) ( this . ClientAppCookieArray . l ength ) ) ;
428 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . ClientAppCookieArray . l ength ) ;
429 }
430 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
431 }
432 } catch ( Exception cE) {
433 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) c h i l dL e f t ) ;
434 }
435 }
436 void protoco l Implementat ion ( ) {}
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437 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
438 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
439 }
440 void dhKeyConGen(byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , byte Oper_Mode)
441 {
442 switch (Oper_Mode) {
443 case GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION: randomExponent =
444 JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
445 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
446 randomDataGen . generateData ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
447 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
448 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
449 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
450 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
451 pkCipher . doFinal (ClassDH . dhBase , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhBase . length , inbu f f ,




456 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
457 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
458 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
459 ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue =
JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
460 ( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
461 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
462 pkCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , ( short ) ( ( short )
463 i n bu f f . l ength − ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset )
464 , ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue ,
( short ) 0) ;
465 }
466 catch ( Exception cE) {




471 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x5FA1) ;
472 }
473 }
474 void keygenerator ( ) {
475 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
476 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
477 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
478 sessionGenKey . setKey ( ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
479 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
480 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
481 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
482 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
483 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
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484 short po in t e r = 0 ;
485 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ClientAppRandomNumberArray ,
486 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
487 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ServerAppRandomNumberArray ,
488 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
489 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue ,
( short ) 16 ,
490 keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
491 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
492 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
493 }
494 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
495 keyGenMacData . length ,
ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue ,
496 ( short ) 0) ;
497 this . phCipherKey . setKey ( ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
498 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
499 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
500 }
501 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
502 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
503 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
504 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
505 keyGenMacData . length ,
ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue ,
506 ( short ) 0) ;
507 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue ,
( short ) 0) ;
508 ServerAppClientAppDHGeneratedValue = null ;
509 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
510 }
511 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
512 inbuf fLength ) {
513 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT,
514 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
515 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
516 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , ( short )
517 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
518 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
519 }
520 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
521 inbuf fLength ) {
522 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT,
523 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
524 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
525 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
526 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
527 }
528 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
529 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
530 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
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531 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
532 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
533 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
534 try {
535 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag ,
536 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
537 this .MACedDataTag . l ength ) ;
538 copyPointer += 2 ;
539 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
540 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
541 }
542 try {
543 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn
544 ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
545 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
546 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) ,
547 l ength ) ;
548 copyPointer += length ;
549 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
550 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0987 ) ;
551 }
552 return true ;
553 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
554 try {
555 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
556 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
557 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
558 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
559 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t +
560 inbuf fLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
561 } catch ( Exception cE) {
562 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xC1C2) ;
563 }
564 }
565 return fa l se ;
566 }
567 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
568 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
569 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
570 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag ,
571 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
572 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
573 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
574 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
575 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
576 i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
577 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
578 ( short ) 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
579 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
580 return true ;
581 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
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582 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
583 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
584 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
585 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
586 }
587 return fa l se ;
588 }
589 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
590 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
591 }
592 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short
593 a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
594 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [
595 ( short ) ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
596 }
597 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
598 inShort ) {
599 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
600 ( short ) 0x0008 ) ;




C.9 Platform Binding Protocol
The Java Card implementation of the PBP discussed in section 7.5 is listed in subsequent
sections.
C.9.1 Initiator Smart Card Implementation
Implementation of a initiator smart card that request for the platform binding in the
CDAM rewall mechanism is listed as below:
1 package protocolSCA ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
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17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength
21 {
22 private byte [ ] SCBDHChanllengerArray ;
23 private byte [ ] SCBRandomNumberArray ;
24 private byte [ ] SCBCookieArray ;
25 private byte [ ] SCASCBDHGeneratedValue ;
26 private byte [ ] SCARandomNumberArray ;
27 private byte [ ] SCAUserCert i f i cate ;
28 private byte [ ] SCACert i f i cate ;
29 private byte [ ] SCBDHChallengeTag = {
30 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
31 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
32 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
33 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
34 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
35 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
36 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
37 private byte [ ] SCBIdentity = null ;
38 private byte [ ] SCBRandomNumberTag = {
39 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
40 private byte [ ] SCBCookieTag = {
41 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
42 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
43 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
44 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
45 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
46 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
47 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
48 private byte [ ] PlatformHash = {
49 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
50 private byte [ ] SCAIdentityTag = {
51 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
52 0x12 , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
53 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 ,
54 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xDB,
55 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
56 private byte [ ] Use r Ident i ty = {
57 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
58 0x14 , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
59 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xC9 ,
60 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xFC, (byte ) 0xDB,
61 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C , (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C} ;
62 private byte [ ] ExponentTag = {
63 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
64 private byte [ ] ModulusTag = {
65 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
66 private byte [ ] SCADHChalleneTag = {
67 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
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68 private byte [ ] SCARandomNumberTag = {
69 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
70 private byte [ ] SCBCerti f icateTag = {
71 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
72 private byte [ ] SCACerti f icateTag = {
73 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
74 private byte [ ] SCAUserCerti f icateTag = {
75 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x03 } ;
76 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
77 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
78 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
79 byte [ ] SCADHData ;
80 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
81 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
82 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
83 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
84 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
85 RandomData randomDataGen ;
86 Cipher pkCipher ;
87 short messageNumber = 0 ;
88 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
89 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
90 short readCount = 0 ;
91 short rCount = 0 ;
92 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
93 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
94 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
95 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
96 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
97 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
98 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
99 AESKey phCipherKey ;
100 Cipher syCipher ;
101 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
102 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte )
103 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
104 (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
105 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
106 Signature phMacGenerator ;
107 Signature phSign ;
108 KeyPair phSCAKeyPair ;
109 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
110 RSAPublicKey SCBVeri f icationKey = null ;
111 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
112 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
113 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
114 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
115 phMacGenerator = Signature . g e t In s tance
116 ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
117 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se )
118 ;
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119 phSCAKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
120 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
121 phUserKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
122 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
123 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
124 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
125 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
126 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
127 fa l se ) ;
128 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance
129 (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
130 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
131 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
132 phSCAKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
133 phUserKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
134 }
135 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte
136 bLength )throws ISOException {
137 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
138 }
139 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
140 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
141 SCADHData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
142 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + PTLVDataOffset ) ,
143 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
144 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCADHChalleneTag , ( short )
145 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . SCADHData, ( short ) 0 ,
146 ( short ) this . SCADHChalleneTag . l ength ) ;
147 this . shortToBytes (SCADHData, ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
148 SCADHData . l ength − ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
149 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SCADHData, this . PTLVDataOffset ,
150 Protoco lHandler .GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION) ;
151 SCBDHChanllengerArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) (
152 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
153 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
154 SCBRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
155 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
156 SCBCookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
157 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
158 SCARandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
159 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
160 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCARandomNumberTag , ( short )
161 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
162 ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
163 this . SCARandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
164 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCARandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) (
165 ( short ) this . SCARandomNumberArray . l ength −
166 ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
167 try {
168 this . SCAUserCert i f i cate = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
169 ( short ) 86 , JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
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170 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic
171 ( this . SCAUserCerti f icateTag , ( short ) 0 ,
172 this . SCAUserCert i f icate , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
173 this . SCAUserCerti f icateTag . l ength ) ;
174 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCAUserCert i f icate , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
175 ( this . SCAUserCert i f i cate . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
176 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
177 ( short ) 0 , this . SCAUserCert i f icate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
178 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
179 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
180 this . phUserKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
181 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCAUserCert i f icate ,
182 ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
183 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCAUserCert i f icate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen )
184 ;
185 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
186 this . SCAUserCert i f i cate [6]++;
187 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
188 ( short ) 0 , this . SCAUserCert i f icate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) ,
189 ( short ) this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
190 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCAUserCert i f icate , ( short )
191 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
192 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCAUserCert i f icate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen )
193 ;
194 this . SCAUserCert i f i cate [6]++;
195 this . SCBIdentity = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 24 ,
196 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET) ;
197 SCBVerif icationKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
198 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
199 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
200 } catch ( Exception cE) {
201 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xCCCC) ;
202 }
203 try {
204 this . SCACert i f i cate = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
205 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
206 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCACertif icateTag ,
207 ( short ) 0 , this . SCACert i f icate , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
208 this . SCACerti f icateTag . l ength ) ;
209 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCACert i f icate , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
210 ( this . SCACert i f i cate . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
211 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
212 ( short ) 0 , this . SCACert i f icate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r +
213 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
214 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
215 this . phSCAKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
216 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCACert i f icate , ( short )
217 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
218 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCACert i f icate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
219 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
220 this . SCACert i f i cate [6]++;
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221 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
222 ( short ) 0 , this . SCACert i f icate , ( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) ,
223 ( short ) this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
224 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCACert i f icate , ( short )
225 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
226 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCACert i f icate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
227 this . SCACert i f i cate [6]++;
228 } catch ( Exception cE) {
229 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
230 }
231 }
232 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
233 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
234 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
235 return ;
236 }
237 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
238 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
239 }
240 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
241 this . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
242 return ;
243 }
244 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
245 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
246 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
247 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
248 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
249 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
250 rCount = 0 ;
251 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
252 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
253 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
254 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
255 }
256 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
257 try {
258 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
259 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
260 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
261 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
262 } catch ( Exception aE) {




267 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
268 } catch ( Exception cE) {
269 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
270 }
271 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
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272 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
273 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
274 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
275 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] ==
276 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
277 processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
278 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 568 ,
279 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
280 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
281 } else {
282 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
283 }
284 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
285 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
286 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
287 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
288 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
289 }
290 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
291 short ch i ldPo interMessage = 6 ;
292 short enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = 0 ;
293 copyPointer = 0 ;
294 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
295 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
296 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
297 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SCBDHChanllengerArray ,
298 this . PTLVDataOffset , Protoco lHandler .GEN_DHKEY)
299 ;
300 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagOne ,
301 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
302 this . MessageHandlerTagOne . l ength ) ;
303 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCADHData, ( short ) 0 ,
304 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
305 this . SCADHData . l ength ) ;
306 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
307 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
308 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
309 this . SCARandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
310 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
311 keygenerator ( ) ;
312 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
313 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
314 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
315 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
316 short childEnMessage = ( short ) ( copyPointer + ( short ) 2) ;
317 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
318 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
319 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCAIdentityTag ,
320 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
321 this . SCAIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
322 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
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323 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
324 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
325 this . SCARandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
326 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
327 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
328 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
329 this . SCBRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
330 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
331 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t ,
332 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
333 phUserKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
334 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
335 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
336 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCAUserCert i f icate ,
337 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
338 this . SCAUserCert i f i cate . l ength ) ;
339 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childEnMessage ]++;
340 messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t ,
341 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
342 this . shortToBytes ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t −
343 ( short ) 3) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
344 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ) ;
345 macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , enc rypt ionOf f s e t , ( short )
346 ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
347 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
348 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
349 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBCookieArray ,
350 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
351 this . SCBCookieArray . l ength ) ;
352 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ ch i ldPo interMessage ]++;
353 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 4 , copyPointer ) ;
354 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
355 copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
356 short tempLength = ( short ) 0 ;
357 short mainChildPointer = ( short ) 6 ;
358 short mainLengthPointer = ( short ) 4 ;
359 short encryptedChi ldPointer = ( short ) 13 ;
360 short genera lLengthPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
361 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
362 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ] = ( short ) 0 ;
363 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
364 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 7) ;
365 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
366 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
367 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
368 copyPointer += ( short ) 3 ;
369 enc ryp t i onOf f s e t = copyPointer ;
370 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . PlatformHash , ( short )
371 0 , r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short ) 4) ;
372 genera lLengthPointer = copyPointer ;
373 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
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374 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
375 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
376 tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
( short ) 0 ,
377 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length , r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
378 copyPointer ) ;
379 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
380 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , genera lLengthPointer ,
381 ( short ) ( tempLength ) ) ;
382 copyPointer += tempLength ;
383 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . User Ident i ty , ( short )
384 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
385 this . Use r Ident i ty . l ength ) ;
386 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
387 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBIdentity , ( short )
388 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
389 this . SCBIdentity . l ength ) ;
390 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
391 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
392 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
393 this . SCARandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
394 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
395 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
396 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
397 this . SCBRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
398 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
399 try {
400 this . s ignGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
401 ( short ) ( copyPointer − enc ryp t i onOf f s e t ) ,
402 phSCAKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
403 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
404 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
405 } catch ( Exception cE) {
406 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
407 }
408 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCACert i f icate ,
409 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
410 this . SCACert i f i cate . l ength ) ;
411 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ encryptedChi ldPointer ]++;
412 try {
413 this . messageEncryption ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
414 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ,
415 ( short ) ( copyPointer −
416 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
417 } catch ( Exception cE) {
418 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer −
419 encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ;
420 }
421 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short )
422 ( encryptedChi ldPointer − ( short ) 2) , ( short )
423 ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer
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424 + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
425 this . macGenerate ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( encryptedChi ldPointer
426 + ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
427 ( encryptedChi ldPointer + ( short ) 1) ) ,
428 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
429 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
430 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBCookieArray ,
431 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
432 this . SCBCookieArray . l ength ) ;
433 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ mainChi ldPointer ]++;
434 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , mainLengthPointer ,
435 ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 7) ) ;
436 }
437 }
438 void platformHashGeneration (byte [ ] inArray , short i nO f f s e t ) {}
439 void processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
440 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset +
441 this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
442 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray ,
443 ( short ) ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
444 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
445 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
446 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
447 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , this . SCBIdentity ,
448 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
449 this . SCBIdentity . l ength ) ;
450 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) 151 ;
451 inLength = ( short ) 3 ;
452 SCBVerif icationKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
453 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
454 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
455 SCBVerif icationKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
456 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
457 inLength = ( short ) 68 ;
458 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
459 SCBVerif icationKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
460 return ;
461 } else {
462 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
463 }
464 } else {
465 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
466 }
467 }
468 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
469 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1)
470 ] ;
471 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
472 try {
473 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
474 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare (SCBDHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
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475 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
476 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
477 this . SCBDHChanllengerArray , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
478 this . SCBDHChanllengerArray . l ength ) ;
479 po in t e r += ( short ) this . SCBDHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
480 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SCBRandomNumberTag , ( short )
481 0 , inBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
482 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
483 this . SCBRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 0 ,
484 ( short )
485 ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ) ;
486 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
487 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SCBCookieTag , ( short ) 0 ,
488 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
489 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
490 this . SCBCookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
491 ( short ) ( this . SCBCookieArray . l ength ) )
492 ;
493 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SCBCookieArray . l ength ) ;
494 }
495 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
496 }
497 } catch ( Exception cE) {
498 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) c h i l dL e f t ) ;
499 }
500 }
501 void protoco l Implementat ion ( ) {}
502 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
503 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
504 }
505 void dhKeyConGen(byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , byte Oper_Mode)
506 {
507 switch (Oper_Mode) {
508 case GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION: randomExponent =
509 JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
510 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
511 randomDataGen . generateData ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
512 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
513 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
514 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
515 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
516 pkCipher . doFinal (ClassDH . dhBase , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhBase . length , inbu f f ,




521 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
522 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
523 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
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524 SCASCBDHGeneratedValue = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
525 ( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
526 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
527 pkCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , ( short ) ( ( short )
528 i n bu f f . l ength − ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset )
529 , SCASCBDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
530 }
531 catch ( Exception cE) {




536 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x5FA1) ;
537 }
538 }
539 void keygenerator ( ) {
540 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
541 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
542 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
543 sessionGenKey . setKey (SCASCBDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
544 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
545 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
546 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
547 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
548 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
549 short po in t e r = 0 ;
550 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
551 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
552 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
553 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
554 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (SCASCBDHGeneratedValue , ( short )
555 16 , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
556 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
557 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
558 }
559 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
560 keyGenMacData . length , SCASCBDHGeneratedValue ,
561 ( short ) 0) ;
562 this . phCipherKey . setKey (SCASCBDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
563 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
564 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
565 }
566 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
567 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
568 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
569 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
570 keyGenMacData . length , SCASCBDHGeneratedValue ,
571 ( short ) 0) ;
572 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey (SCASCBDHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
573 SCASCBDHGeneratedValue = null ;
574 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
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575 }
576 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
577 inbuf fLength ) {
578 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT,
579 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
580 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
581 short temp ;
582 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , temp =
583 ( short ) syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
584 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
585 }
586 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
587 inbuf fLength ) {
588 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT,
589 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
590 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
591 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
592 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
593 }
594 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
595 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
596 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
597 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
598 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
599 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
600 try {
601 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag ,
602 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
603 this .MACedDataTag . l ength ) ;
604 copyPointer += 2 ;
605 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
606 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
607 }
608 try {
609 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn
610 ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
611 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
612 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) ,
613 l ength ) ;
614 copyPointer += length ;
615 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
616 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0987 ) ;
617 }
618 return true ;
619 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
620 try {
621 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
622 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
623 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
624 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
625 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t +
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626 inbuf fLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
627 } catch ( Exception cE) {
628 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xC1C2) ;
629 }
630 }
631 return fa l se ;
632 }
633 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
634 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
635 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
636 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag ,
637 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
638 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
639 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
640 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
641 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
642 i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
643 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
644 ( short ) 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
645 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
646 return true ;
647 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
648 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
649 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
650 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
651 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
652 }
653 return fa l se ;
654 }
655 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
656 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
657 }
658 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short
659 a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
660 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [
661 ( short ) ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
662 }
663 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short inShort ) {
664 Array [ 0 ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >> ( short )
665 0x0008 ) ;
666 Array [ 1 ] = (byte ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0x00FF) ;
667 }
668 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
669 inShort ) {
670 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
671 ( short ) 0x0008 ) ;
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C.9.2 Responder Smart Card Implementation
Implementation of a responder smart card that request for the platform binding in the
CDAM rewall mechanism is listed as below:
1 package protocolSCB ;
2
3 import javacard . framework .APDU;
4 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
8 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y .AESKey ;
10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ;
11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ;
12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ;
13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ;
15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ;
16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ;
17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S ignature ;
18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ;
19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ;
20 public class Protoco lHandler extends Applet implements ExtendedLength
21 {
22 private byte [ ] SCARandomNumberArray ;
23 private byte [ ] SCACookieArray ;
24 private byte [ ] SCBSCADHGeneratedValue ;
25 private byte [ ] SCBRandomNumberArray ;
26 private byte [ ] SCBCert i f i cate ;
27 private byte [ ] SCADHChallengeTag = {
28 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
29 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagOne = {
30 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0xAA, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
31 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
32 private byte [ ] MessageHandlerTagTwo = {
33 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
34 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 } ;
35 private byte [ ] SCAIdentity = null ;
36 private byte [ ] SCARandomNumberTag = {
37 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
38 private byte [ ] SCACookieTag = {
39 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
40 private byte [ ] EncryptedDataTag = {
41 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
42 private byte [ ] SignedDataTag = {
43 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
44 private byte [ ] MACedDataTag = {
45 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
46 private byte [ ] PlatformHash = {
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47 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5E , (byte ) 0xAF} ;
48 private byte [ ] SCBIdentityTag = {
49 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte )
50 0x0C , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 ,
51 (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 ,
52 (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x11 } ;
53 private byte [ ] ExponentTag = {
54 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x01 } ;
55 private byte [ ] ModulusTag = {
56 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xEE, (byte ) 0x02 } ;
57 private byte [ ] SCBDHChalleneTag = {
58 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
59 private byte [ ] SCBRandomNumberTag = {
60 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
61 private byte [ ] SCACerti f icateTag = {
62 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x01 } ;
63 private byte [ ] SCBCerti f icateTag = {
64 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xC0 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0x02 } ;
65 private byte [ ] SCBProtoco l In i t iatorTag = {
66 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xB2} ;
67 short PTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 6 ;
68 short CTLVDataOffset = ( short ) 7 ;
69 short TLVLengthOffset = ( short ) 4 ;
70 short copyPointer = ( short ) 0 ;
71 byte [ ] SCBDHData ;
72 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
73 f ina l stat ic byte Sta r tPro toco l = (byte ) 0x40 ;
74 f ina l stat ic byte I n i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l = (byte ) 0 x f f ;
75 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
76 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
77 RandomData randomDataGen ;
78 Cipher pkCipher ;
79 short messageNumber = 0 ;
80 byte [ ] r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
81 short byte sLe f t = 0 ;
82 short readCount = 0 ;
83 short rCount = 0 ;
84 short s i gn l eng th = 0 ;
85 private RSAPublicKey dhKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
86 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
87 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_2048, fa l se ) ;
88 private byte [ ] randomExponent ;
89 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION = 0x01 ;
90 f ina l stat ic byte GEN_DHKEY = 0x02 ;
91 AESKey phCipherKey ;
92 Cipher syCipher ;
93 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
94 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte )
95 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
96 (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
97 AESKey phMacGeneratorKey ;
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98 Signature phMacGenerator ;
99 Signature phSign ;
100 KeyPair phSCBKeyPair ;
101 KeyPair phUserKeyPair ;
102 RSAPublicKey SCAVerif icationKey = null ;
103 private Protoco lHandler ( ) {
104 phMacGeneratorKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
105 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
106 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
107 phMacGenerator = Signature . g e t In s tance
108 ( S ignature .ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
109 phSign = Signature . g e t In s tance ( S ignature .ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, fa l se )
110 ;
111 phSCBKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
112 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
113 phUserKeyPair = new KeyPair ( KeyPair .ALG_RSA,
114 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512) ;
115 phCipherKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
116 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
117 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
118 syCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD,
119 fa l se ) ;
120 randomDataGen = RandomData . g e t In s tance
121 (RandomData .ALG_SECURE_RANDOM) ;
122 pkCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( Cipher .ALG_RSA_NOPAD, fa l se ) ;
123 d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) ;
124 phSCBKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
125 phUserKeyPair . genKeyPair ( ) ;
126 }
127 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte
128 bLength )throws ISOException {
129 new Protoco lHandler ( ) . r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
130 }
131 public void i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) {
132 short i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = 0 ;
133 SCBDHData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) ( ( short )
134 this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + PTLVDataOffset ) ,
135 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
136 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBDHChalleneTag , ( short )
137 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . SCBDHData, ( short ) 0 ,
138 ( short ) this . SCBDHChalleneTag . l ength ) ;
139 this . shortToBytes (SCBDHData, ( short ) 4 , ( short ) ( ( short )
140 SCBDHData . l ength − ( short ) PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
141 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SCBDHData, this . PTLVDataOffset ,
142 Protoco lHandler .GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION) ;
143 SCADHChanllengerArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) (
144 ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
145 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
146 SCARandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
147 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
148 SCACookieArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
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149 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
150 SCBRandomNumberArray = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 22 ,
151 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
152 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBRandomNumberTag , ( short )
153 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
154 ( short ) i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , ( short )
155 this . SCBRandomNumberTag . l ength ) ;
156 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray , ( short ) 4 , ( short ) (
157 ( short ) this . SCBRandomNumberArray . l ength − ( short )
158 PTLVDataOffset ) ) ;
159 try {
160 this . SCBCert i f i cate = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 86 ,
161 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
162 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBCerti f icateTag ,
163 ( short ) 0 , this . SCBCert i f i cate , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )
164 this . SCBCerti f icateTag . l ength ) ;
165 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCBCert i f i cate , ( short ) 4 , ( short )
166 ( this . SCBCert i f i cate . l ength − ( short ) 7) ) ;
167 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ExponentTag ,
168 ( short ) 0 , this . SCBCert i f i cate ,
( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short )
169 3) , ( short ) this . ExponentTag . l ength ) ;
170 RSAPublicKey myPublic = (RSAPublicKey )
171 this . phSCBKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
172 short kLen = myPublic . getExponent ( this . SCBCert i f i cate , ( short )
173 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
174 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCBCert i f i cate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
175 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r += ( short ) ( kLen + ( short ) 2) ;
176 this . SCBCert i f i cate [6]++;
177 i n i t i a l P o i n t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . ModulusTag ,
178 ( short ) 0 , this . SCBCert i f i cate ,
( short ) ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r ) , ( short )
179 this . ModulusTag . l ength ) ;
180 kLen = myPublic . getModulus ( this . SCBCert i f i cate , ( short )
181 ( i n i t i a l P o i n t e r + ( short ) 2) ) ;
182 this . shortToBytes ( this . SCBCert i f i cate , i n i t i a l P o i n t e r , kLen ) ;
183 this . SCBCert i f i cate [6]++;
184 SCAVerif icationKey = (RSAPublicKey ) KeyBuilder . buildKey
185 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC,
186 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_RSA_512, fa l se ) ;
187 } catch ( Exception cE) {
188 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
189 }
190 }
191 public void proce s s (APDU apdu )throws ISOException {
192 byte [ ] apduBuffer = apdu . ge tBu f f e r ( ) ;
193 i f ( s e l e c t i n gApp l e t ( ) ) {
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197 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_CLA] != CLA) {
198 ISOException . throwIt (SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED) ;
199 }
200 i f ( apduBuffer [ ISO7816 .OFFSET_INS] == In i t i a t i o nP r o t o c o l ) {
201 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
202 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
203 generateResponse ( ( short ) 1) ;
204 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
205 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
206 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
207 copyPointer ) ;
208 return ;
209 }
210 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = null ;
211 byte sLe f t = 0 ;
212 byte sLe f t = apdu . getIncomingLength ( ) ;
213 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( bytesLe f t ,
214 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
215 readCount = ( short ) ( ( short ) apdu . setIncomingAndReceive ( ) ) ;
216 rCount = 0 ;
217 i f ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
218 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer ,
219 ISO7816 .OFFSET_EXT_CDATA, r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
220 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
221 }
222 while ( byte sLe f t > 0) {
223 try {
224 readCount = apdu . r e c e i v eByte s ( ( short ) 0) ;
225 rCount = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 ,
226 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , rCount , readCount ) ;
227 byte sLe f t −= readCount ;
228 } catch ( Exception aE) {
229 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x7AAA) ;
230 }
231 }
232 i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] == this . MessageHandlerTagOne [ 3 ] ) {
233 try {
234 parseMessage ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ;
235 } catch ( Exception cE) {
236 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xA112 ) ;
237 }
238 r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 600 ,
239 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
240 generateResponse ( ( short ) 2) ;
241 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
242 apdu . setOutgoing ( ) ;
243 apdu . setOutgoingLength ( ( short ) copyPointer ) ;
244 apdu . sendBytesLong ( r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
245 copyPointer ) ;
246 } else i f ( this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ 3 ] ==
247 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo [ 3 ] ) {
422
C.9 Platform Binding Protocol
248 i f ( processSecondMsg ( r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r ) ) {
249 return ;
250 } else {
251 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
252 }
253 return ;
254 } else {
255 ISOException . throwIt ( Protoco lHandler .SW_ERROR_INS) ;
256 }
257 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
258 }
259 private void generateResponse ( short msgNumber) {
260 short childPM1 = 0 ;
261 short childPM2 = 0 ;
262 copyPointer = 0 ;
263 i f (msgNumber == 1) {
264 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopy ( this . SCBProtocolInit iatorTag ,
265 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
266 copyPointer , ( short )
267 this . SCBProtoco l In i t iatorTag . l ength )
268 ;
269 randomDataGen . generateData ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
270 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short ) 16) ;
271 childPM1 = copyPointer ;
272 copyPointer += 2 ;
273 phMacGeneratorKey . setKey ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
274 this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
275 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
276 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
277 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
278 short l ength = 0 ;
279 l ength = phMacGenerator . s i gn (SCBDHData, ( short )
280 this . PTLVDataOffset , ( short )
281 (SCBDHData . l ength −
282 this . PTLVDataOffset ) ,
283 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ) ;
284 copyPointer += length ;
285 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , childPM1 , l ength ) ;
286 return ;
287 } else i f (msgNumber == 2) {
288 this . dhKeyConGen( this . SCADHChanllengerArray , this . PTLVDataOffset ,
289 Protoco lHandler .GEN_DHKEY) ;
290 keygenerator ( ) ;
291 childPM1 = ( short ) 6 ;
292 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . MessageHandlerTagTwo ,
293 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
294 this . MessageHandlerTagTwo . l ength ) ;
295 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBDHData, ( short ) 0 ,
296 this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
297 this . SCBDHData . l ength ) ;
298 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
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299 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
300 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
301 this . SCBRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
302 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
303 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . EncryptedDataTag ,
304 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
305 this . EncryptedDataTag . l ength ) ;
306 copyPointer += 3 ;
307 childPM2 = ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 1) ;
308 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
309 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . PlatformHash , ( short )
310 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
311 this . PlatformHash . l ength ) ;
312 copyPointer += 2 ;
313 MessageDigest myHashGen = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance
314 ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256, fa l se ) ;
315 short tempLength = ( short )myHashGen . doFinal ( this . ClassDH . dhModulus ,
316 ( short ) 0 , ( short ) this . ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
317 r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer ) ;
318 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
319 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
320 ( short ) 2) , tempLength ) ;
321 copyPointer += tempLength ;
322 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBIdentityTag ,
323 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
324 this . SCBIdentityTag . l ength ) ;
325 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
326 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
327 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
328 this . SCBRandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
329 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
330 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
331 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
332 this . SCARandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
333 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
334 try {
335 this . s ignGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 +
336 ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short )
337 ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) ,
338 this . phSCBKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ,
339 Signature .MODE_SIGN) ;
340 } catch ( Exception cE) {
341 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x3141 ) ;
342 }
343 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
344 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBCert i f i cate ,
345 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
346 this . SCBCert i f i cate . l ength ) ;
347 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM2]++;
348 try {
349 this . messageEncryption ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2
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350 + ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
351 ( short ) ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
352 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
353 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) ( childPM2 +
354 ( short ) 1) ) ) ;
355 }
356 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 −
357 ( short ) 2) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − childPM2 −
358 ( short ) 1) ) ;
359 this . macGenerate ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM2 +
360 ( short ) 1) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short )
361 ( childPM2 + ( short ) 1) ) , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
362 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
363 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCACookieArray ,
364 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) copyPointer , ( short )
365 this . SCACookieArray . l ength ) ;
366 this . r e c e i v i n gBu f f e r [ childPM1]++;
367 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( childPM1 −
368 ( short ) 2) , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 7) ) ;
369 }
370 }
371 boolean processSecondMsg (byte [ ] inArray ) {
372 short i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset +
373 this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
374 short inLength = ( short ) ( Protoco lHandler . bytesToShort ( inArray ,
375 ( short ) ( i nO f f s e t − ( short ) 3) ) ) ;
376 i f ( this . macGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
377 Signature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
378 try {
379 this . phDecryption ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
380 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . PTLVDataOffset
381 + ( short ) 168) ;
382 inLength = 3 ;
383 SCAVerif icationKey . setExponent ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
384 i nO f f s e t += ( short ) ( inLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) ;
385 inLength = ( short ) 64 ;
386 SCAVerif icationKey . setModulus ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ) ;
387 i nO f f s e t = ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset + this . CTLVDataOffset ) ;
388 inLength = ( short ) 84 ;
389 i f ( this . s ignGenerate ( inArray , i nOf f s e t , inLength ,
390 SCAVerif icationKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ) {
391 return true ;
392 } else {
393 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x6666 ) ;
394 }
395 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
396 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xAB23) ;
397 }
398 return true ;
399 } else {
400 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA18) ;
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401 }
402 return fa l se ;
403 }
404 void parseMessage (byte [ ] i nBu f f e r ) {
405 byte c h i l dL e f t = inBu f f e r [ ( short ) ( this . CTLVDataOffset − ( short ) 1)
406 ] ;
407 short po in t e r = ( short ) this . CTLVDataOffset ;
408 try {
409 while ( c h i l dL e f t > 0) {
410 i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare (SCADHChallengeTag , ( short ) 0 , inBuf f e r ,
411 pointer , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
412 Ut i l . arrayCopy ( inBuf f e r , po inter , this . SCADHChanllengerArray ,
413 ( short ) 0 , ( short )
414 this . SCADHChanllengerArray . l ength ) ;
415 po in t e r += ( short ) this . SCADHChanllengerArray . l ength ;
416 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SCARandomNumberTag , ( short ) 0 ,
417 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
418 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
419 this . SCARandomNumberArray , ( short ) 0 ,
420 ( short )
421 ( this . SCARandomNumberArray . l ength ) ) ;
422 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SCARandomNumberArray . l ength ) ;
423 } else i f ( Ut i l . arrayCompare ( this . SCACookieTag , ( short ) 0 ,
424 i nBuf f e r , po inter , ( short ) 4) == 0) {
425 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( inBuf f e r , po inter ,
426 this . SCACookieArray , ( short ) 0 ,
427 ( short ) ( this . SCACookieArray . l ength ) ) ;
428 po in t e r += ( short ) ( this . SCACookieArray . l ength ) ;
429 }
430 c h i l dL e f t −= ( short ) 1 ;
431 }
432 } catch ( Exception cE) {
433 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) c h i l dL e f t ) ;
434 }
435 }
436 void protoco l Implementat ion ( ) {}
437 void d h I n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( ) {
438 dhKey . setModulus (ClassDH . dhModulus , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . l ength ) ;
439 }
440 void dhKeyConGen(byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , byte Oper_Mode)
441 {
442 switch (Oper_Mode) {
443 case GEN_KEYCONTRIBUTION: randomExponent =
444 JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
445 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
446 randomDataGen . generateData ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
447 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
448 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
449 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
450 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
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451 pkCipher . doFinal (ClassDH . dhBase , ( short ) 0 ,
( short )ClassDH . dhBase . length , inbu f f ,




456 dhKey . setExponent ( randomExponent , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
457 randomExponent . l ength ) ;
458 pkCipher . i n i t (dhKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT) ;
459 SCBSCADHGeneratedValue = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray (
460 ( short )ClassDH . dhModulus . length ,
461 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
462 pkCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , ( short ) ( ( short )
463 i n bu f f . l ength − ( short ) this . PTLVDataOffset )
464 , SCBSCADHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
465 }
466 catch ( Exception cE) {




471 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x5FA1) ;
472 }
473 }
474 void keygenerator ( ) {
475 AESKey sessionGenKey = (AESKey) KeyBuilder . buildKey
476 ( KeyBuilder .TYPE_AES_TRANSIENT_DESELECT,
477 KeyBuilder .LENGTH_AES_128, fa l se ) ;
478 sessionGenKey . setKey (SCBSCADHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
479 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
480 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
481 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
482 byte [ ] keyGenMacData = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 64 ,
483 JCSystem .MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_DESELECT) ;
484 short po in t e r = 0 ;
485 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCARandomNumberArray ,
486 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
487 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SCBRandomNumberArray ,
488 this . PTLVDataOffset , keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
489 po in t e r = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic (SCBSCADHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 16 ,
490 keyGenMacData , ( short ) po inter , ( short ) 16) ;
491 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
492 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
493 }
494 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
495 keyGenMacData . length , SCBSCADHGeneratedValue ,
496 ( short ) 0) ;
497 this . phCipherKey . setKey (SCBSCADHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
498 for ( short i = 48 ; i < 64 ; i++) {
499 keyGenMacData [ i ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
500 }
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501 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( sessionGenKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
502 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
503 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
504 phMacGenerator . s i gn (keyGenMacData , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
505 keyGenMacData . length , SCBSCADHGeneratedValue ,
506 ( short ) 0) ;
507 this . phMacGeneratorKey . setKey (SCBSCADHGeneratedValue , ( short ) 0) ;
508 SCBSCADHGeneratedValue = null ;
509 JCSystem . r eques tObjec tDe l e t i on ( ) ;
510 }
511 void messageEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
512 inbuf fLength ) {
513 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_ENCRYPT,
514 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
515 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
516 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t − 3) , ( short )
517 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
518 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ) ;
519 }
520 void phDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
521 inbuf fLength ) {
522 syCipher . i n i t ( phCipherKey , Cipher .MODE_DECRYPT,
523 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
524 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
525 syCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f ,
526 i n bu f fO f f s e t ) ;
527 }
528 boolean macGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
529 inbuf fLength , short macMode) {
530 i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
531 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_SIGN,
532 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
533 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
534 try {
535 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this .MACedDataTag ,
536 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
537 this .MACedDataTag . l ength ) ;
538 copyPointer += 2 ;
539 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
540 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xFA17) ;
541 }
542 try {
543 short l ength = ( short ) phMacGenerator . s i gn
544 ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
545 inbuf fLength , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
546 this . shortToBytes ( inbu f f , ( short ) ( copyPointer − ( short ) 2) ,
547 l ength ) ;
548 copyPointer += length ;
549 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
550 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0x0987 ) ;
551 }
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552 return true ;
553 } else i f (macMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
554 try {
555 phMacGenerator . i n i t ( phMacGeneratorKey , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY,
556 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r , ( short ) 0 , ( short )
557 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r . l ength ) ;
558 return phMacGenerator . v e r i f y ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r ,
559 i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , inbu f f , ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t +
560 inbuf fLength + this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 16) ;
561 } catch ( Exception cE) {
562 ISOException . throwIt ( ( short ) 0xC1C2) ;
563 }
564 }
565 return fa l se ;
566 }
567 boolean s ignGenerate (byte [ ] i nbu f f , short i nbu f fO f f s e t , short
568 i nbu f f l eng th , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
569 i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_SIGN) {
570 copyPointer = Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag ,
571 ( short ) 0 , this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
572 this . SignedDataTag . l ength ) ;
573 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
574 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_SIGN) ;
575 s i gn l eng th = phSign . s i gn ( inbu f f , ( short ) i nbu f fO f f s e t ,
576 i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f , copyPointer ) ;
577 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i ngBu f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
578 ( short ) 2) , s i gn l eng th ) ;
579 copyPointer += s i gn l eng th ;
580 return true ;
581 } else i f ( signMode == Signature .MODE_VERIFY) {
582 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S ignature .MODE_VERIFY) ;
583 return phSign . v e r i f y ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , i nbu f f l eng th , inbu f f ,
584 ( short ) ( i n bu f fO f f s e t + inbu f f l e n g th +
585 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
586 }
587 return fa l se ;
588 }
589 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
590 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [ 1 ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
591 }
592 public stat ic short bytesToShort (byte [ ] ArrayBytes , short
593 a r r ayOf f s e t ) {
594 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] << 8) ) | ( ( ArrayBytes [
595 ( short ) ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] & 0 x f f ) ) ) ;
596 }
597 private void shortToBytes (byte [ ] Array , short ar rayOf f s e t , short
598 inShort ) {
599 Array [ a r r ayOf f s e t ] = (byte ) ( ( short ) ( inShort & ( short ) 0xFF00) >>
600 ( short ) 0x0008 ) ;
601 Array [ ( short ) ( a r r ayOf f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] = (byte ) ( inShort & ( short )
602 0x00FF) ;
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603 }
604 }
C.10 Abstract Virtual Machine
In this section, we illustrate the implementation of the abstract virtual machine that counts
the number of selected opcodes a Java Card application has and calculate the associated
cost for individual security mechanism.
1 package abstractVM ;
2
3 import java . i o . ∗ ;
4 import java . u t i l . I t e r a t o r ;
5 import org . apache . lucene . a n a l y s i s . Analyzer ;
6 import org . apache . lucene . a n a l y s i s . standard . StandardAnalyzer ;
7 import org . apache . lucene . document . Document ;
8 import org . apache . lucene . document . F i e ld ;
9 import org . apache . lucene . index . CorruptIndexException ;
10 import org . apache . lucene . index . IndexReader ;
11 import org . apache . lucene . index . IndexWriter ;
12 import org . apache . lucene . queryParser . ParseException ;
13 import org . apache . lucene . queryParser . QueryParser ;
14 import org . apache . lucene . search . Hit ;
15 import org . apache . lucene . search . Hits ;
16 import org . apache . lucene . search . IndexSearcher ;
17 import org . apache . lucene . search . Query ;
18 import org . apache . lucene . s t o r e . D i rec tory ;
19 import org . apache . lucene . s t o r e . FSDirectory ;
20 import org . apache . lucene . s t o r e . LockObtainFai ledException ;
21 public class abst ractVir tua lMach ine {
22 private St r ing inputClassFi leName = " eva l u a t i o nF i l e " ;
23 private St r ing mnemonicOutputFileName = inputClassFi leName + " . txt " ;
24 public stat ic f ina l St r ing FILES_TO_INDEX_DIRECTORY =
25 "D:\\ eva lua t i onFo lde r " ;
26 public stat ic f ina l St r ing INDEX_DIRECTORY =
27 "D:\\ eva lua t i onFo lde r \\ indexFolder " ;
28 public stat ic f ina l St r ing FIELD_PATH = "path" ;
29 public stat ic f ina l St r ing FIELD_CONTENTS = " contents " ;
30 public stat ic f ina l St r ing [ ] keywordList = {
31 " aaload " , " iand" , " aa s to r e " , " i a s t o r e " , " aconst_nul l " , " icmp" ,
32 " aload " , " iconst_0 " , "aload_0" , " iconst_1" , "aload_1" ,
33 " iconst_2" , "aload_2" , " iconst_3" , "aload_3" , " iconst_4 " ,
34 "anewarray" , " iconst_5" , " areturn " , " iconst_m1" , " ar ray l ength " ,
35 " i d i v " , " a s t o r e " , " if_acmpeq" , " astore_0" , "if_acmpeq_w" ,
36 "astore_1" , " if_acmpne" , " astore_2" , "if_acmpne_w" , " astore_3" ,
37 " if_scmpeq" , "athrow" , "if_scmpeq_w" , "baload" , " if_scmpge" ,
38 " bas tore " , "if_scmpge_w" , "bipush " , " if_scmpgt" , "bspush" ,
39 "if_scmpgt_w" , " checkcas t " , " i f_scmple " , "dup" , " if_scmple_w" ,
40 "dup_x" , " i f_scmplt " , "dup2" , " if_scmplt_w" , " g e t f i e l d_a " ,
41 " if_scmpne" , " ge t f i e l d_a_th i s " , "if_scmpne_w" , "getfield_a_w" ,
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42 " i f e q " , " ge t f i e l d_b " , " ifeq_w" , " ge t f i e ld_b_th i s " , " i f g e " ,
43 "getfield_b_w" , " ifge_w" , " g e t f i e l d_ i " , " i f g t " ,
44 " g e t f i e l d_ i_th i s " , " ifgt_w" , " get f ie ld_i_w" , " i f l e " ,
45 " g e t f i e l d_s " , " i f l e_w" , " g e t f i e l d_s_th i s " , " i f l t " ,
46 " getf ie ld_s_w" , " i f l t_w" , " ge t s ta t i c_a " , " i f n e " , " ge t s ta t i c_b " ,
47 " ifne_w" , " g e t s t a t i c_ i " , " i f n onnu l l " , " g e t s t a t i c_s " ,
48 " ifnonnull_w" , " goto " , " i f n u l l " , "goto_w" , " i fnul l_w" , " i2b " ,
49 " i i n c " , " i 2 s " , " iinc_w" , " iadd" , " i i pu sh " , " i a l o ad " , " i l o ad " ,
50 " i load_0" , " puts ta t i c_s " , " i load_1" , " r e t " , " i load_2" , " re turn " ,
51 " i load_3" , " s2b" , " i l ookupswi t ch " , " s 2 i " , " imul " , " sadd" ,
52 " ineg " , " sa load " , " i n s t an c e o f " , " sand" , " i n v ok e i n t e r f a c e " ,
53 " s a s t o r e " , " i n vok e sp e c i a l " , " sconst_0" , " i n v ok e s t a t i c " ,
54 " sconst_1" , " i nvok ev i r t u a l " , " sconst_2" , " i o r " , " sconst_3" ,
55 " irem" , " sconst_4" , " i r e t u r n " , " sconst_5" , " i s h l " , "sconst_m1" ,
56 " i s h r " , " sd iv " , " i s t o r e " , " s i n c " , " i s tore_0 " , "sinc_w" ,
57 " i s to re_1 " , " s ipush " , " i s to re_2 " , " s l oad " , " i s to re_3 " ,
58 " sload_0" , " i sub " , " sload_1" , " i t a b l e sw i t c h " , " sload_2" ,
59 " iu sh r " , " sload_3" , " i xo r " , " s lookupswitch " , " j s r " , "smul" ,
60 "new" , " sneg " , "newarray" , " so r " , "nop" , "srem" , "pop" ,
61 " s r e tu rn " , "pop2" , " s s h l " , " put f i e ld_a " , " s sh r " ,
62 " put f i e ld_a_th i s " , " sspush " , "putfield_a_w" , " s s t o r e " ,
63 " put f i e ld_b " , " sstore_0 " , " put f i e ld_b_this " , " sstore_1 " ,
64 "putfield_b_w" , " sstore_2 " , " pu t f i e l d_ i " , " sstore_3 " ,
65 " put f i e l d_ i_th i s " , " ssub" , "putfield_i_w" , " s t ab l e sw i t ch " ,
66 " put f i e l d_s " , " sushr " , " put f i e ld_s_th i s " , "swap_x" ,
67 "putfield_s_w" , " sxor " , " putstat i c_a " , " putstat ic_b " ,
68 " put s t a t i c_ i " ,
69 } ;
70 public stat ic void main ( St r ing [ ] a rgs ) {
71 abst ractVir tua lMach ine v i r tua lMachine = new
72 abst ractVir tua lMach ine ( ) ;
73 St r ing command = " javap −c " + virtua lMachine . inputClassFi leName ;
74 vi r tua lMachine . runCommand(command . s p l i t ( " " ) ) ;
75 c rea te Index ( ) ;
76 St r ing myFile = "D:\\ eva lua t i onFo lde r \\ Eva luat ionResu l t s . eva" ;
77 FileOutputStream outStream = new FileOutputStream (myFile ) ;
78 PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter ( outStream ) ;
79 int numberPresent = 0 ;
80 for ( int i = 0 ; i < keywordList . l ength ; i++) {
81 numberPresent = searchIndex ( keywordList [ i ] ) ;
82 out . p r i n t l n ( keywordList [ i ] + " : " + numberPresent + ) ;
83 }
84 out . c l o s e ( ) ;
85 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "========= END ============" ) ;
86 }
87 public void runCommand( St r ing [ ] inputCommandString ) {
88 int number = inputCommandString . l ength ;
89 try {
90 St r ing [ ] commands = new St r ing [ inputCommandString . l ength + 2 ] ;
91 commands [ 0 ] = "cmd . exe " ;
92 commands [ 1 ] = "/c" ;
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93 for ( int i = 0 ; i < number ; i++) {
94 commands [ i + 2 ] = inputCommandString [ i ] ;
95 }
96 System . out . p r i n t ( "Executing : " ) ;
97 for ( int i = 0 ; i < commands . l ength ; i++) {
98 System . out . p r i n t (commands [ i ] + " " ) ;
99 }
100 Runtime runtime = Runtime . getRuntime ( ) ;
101 Process p roce s s = runtime . exec (commands) ;
102 CheckStream cmdProcessInputStream = new CheckStream
103 ( p roce s s . getInputStream ( ) ) ;
104 CheckStream cmdProcessErrorStream = new CheckStream
105 ( p roce s s . getErrorStream ( ) ) ;
106 cmdProcessInputStream . s t a r t ( ) ;
107 cmdProcessErrorStream . s t a r t ( ) ;
108 System . out . p r i n t ( "Waiting . . . . . . . " ) ;
109 int done = proce s s . waitFor ( ) ;
110 proce s s . des t roy ( ) ;
111 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Conversion Completed . " ) ;
112 } catch ( Inter ruptedExcept ion i e ) {
113 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error Execution : " + i e . getMessage ( ) ) ;
114 } catch ( IOException i o e ) {
115 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error IO Operat ions : " + i o e . getMessage ( ) ) ;
116 }
117 }
118 public stat ic void c rea te Index ( ) throws CorruptIndexException ,
119 LockObtainFailedException ,
120 IOException {
121 F i l e f i l e D i r = new F i l e (FILES_TO_INDEX_DIRECTORY) ;
122 F i l e indexDir = new F i l e (INDEX_DIRECTORY) ;
123 Analyzer luceneAnalyzer = new StandardAnalyzer ( ) ;
124 IndexWriter indexWriter = new IndexWriter ( indexDir ,
125 luceneAnalyzer , true ) ;
126 F i l e [ ] t e x tF i l e s = f i l e D i r . l i s t F i l e s ( ) ;
127 long startTime = new Date ( ) . getTime ( ) ;
128 for ( int i = 0 ; i < t e x tF i l e s . l ength ; i++) {
129 i f ( t e x tF i l e s [ i ] . i s F i l e ( ) >> t e x tF i l e s [ i ] . getName ( ) . endsWith (
130 " . txt " ) ) {
131 System . out . p r i n t l n ( " F i l e " + t e x tF i l e s [ i ] . getCanonicalPath ( )
132 + " i s being indexed " ) ;
133 Reader textReader = new Fi leReader ( t e x tF i l e s [ i ] ) ;
134 Document document = new Document ( ) ;
135 document . add ( F i e ld . Text (FIELD_CONTENTS, textReader ) ) ;
136 document . add ( F i e ld . Text (FIELD_PATH, t e x tF i l e s [ i ] . getPath ( ) ) ) ;
137 indexWriter . addDocument ( document ) ;
138 }
139 }
140 indexWriter . opt imize ( ) ;
141 indexWriter . c l o s e ( ) ;
142 long endTime = new Date ( ) . getTime ( ) ;
143 System . out . p r i n t l n ( " I t took " + ( endTime − startTime ) +
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144 " m i l l i s e c ond s to c r e a t e an index f o r the f i l e s in
the d i r e c t o r y " + f i l e D i r . getPath ( ) ) ;
145 }
146 public stat ic int searchIndex ( St r ing s ea r chS t r i ng )throws
147 IOException , ParseException {
148 System . out . p r i n t l n ( " Search ing f o r ' " + sea r chS t r i ng + " ' " ) ;
149 Direc tory d i r e c t o r y = FSDirectory . g e tD i r e c to ry (INDEX_DIRECTORY) ;
150 IndexReader indexReader = IndexReader . open ( d i r e c t o r y ) ;
151 IndexSearcher indexSearcher = new IndexSearcher ( indexReader ) ;
152 Analyzer ana lyze r = new StandardAnalyzer ( ) ;
153 QueryParser queryParser = new QueryParser (FIELD_CONTENTS,
154 ana lyze r ) ;
155 Query query = queryParser . parse ( s e a r chS t r i ng ) ;
156 Hits h i t s = indexSearcher . s earch ( query ) ;
157 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Number o f h i t s : " + h i t s . l ength ( ) ) ;
158 return h i t s . l ength ( ) ;
159 }
160 class CheckStream extends Thread {
161 BufferedReader buf feredReader ;
162 St r ing l i n e r e ad = "" ;
163 CheckStream ( InputStream inputStream ) {
164 buf feredReader = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader
165 ( inputStream ) ) ;
166 }
167 public void run ( ) {
168 try {
169 Fi l eWr i t e r f i l eWr i t e r = new Fi l eWr i t e r (mnemonicOutputFileName )
170 ;
171 while ( ( l i n e r e ad = buf feredReader . readLine ( ) ) != null ) {
172 System . out . p r i n t l n ( l i n e r e ad ) ;
173 f i l eWr i t e r . wr i t e ( l i n e r e ad + "\n" ) ;
174 }
175 f i l eWr i t e r . c l o s e ( ) ;
176 } catch ( IOException i o e ) {





C.11 Implementation Helper Classes
In this section, we detail the helper classes that we implemented to overcome the limited
capability of our test bed.
C.11.1 Protocol Cryptographic Support
The helper function this section implements the support of cryptographic algorihtms that
an SP, card manufacturer or administrative authority uses during the respective protocol
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execution.
1 package j avacardte rmina l ;
2
3 import java . math . B ig Intege r ;
4 import java . n io . ByteBuffer ;
5 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . RSAPublicKeySpec ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . Inval idKeySpecExcept ion ;
7 import java . s e c u r i t y . i n t e r f a c e s . RSAPublicKey ;
8 import javax . crypto . spec . SecretKeySpec ;
9 import javax . crypto . spec . IvParameterSpec ;
10 import java . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
11 import javax . crypto . ∗ ;
12 import org . bouncycast l e . crypto . macs . CBCBlockCipherMac ;
13 import org . bouncycast l e . crypto . eng ines . AESEngine ;
14 import org . bouncycast l e . crypto . params . KeyParameter ;
15 import org . bouncycast l e . crypto . params . ParametersWithIV ;
16 public class Protoco lHe lpe rClas s {
17 byte [ ] ServiceProviderRandom = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
18 byte [ ] SmartCardRandom = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
19 Cipher rsaCipher = null ;
20 SecureRandom myRNG = null ;
21 PrivateKey mySignatureGenerationKey = null ;
22 PublicKey mySignatureVer i f i cat ionKey = null ;
23 Signature mySignature = null ;
24 public stat ic f ina l short SIGN_MODE_GENERATION = 1 ;
25 public stat ic f ina l short SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION = 2 ;
26 byte [ ] mySessionAESEnKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
27 SecretKeySpec myAESKey = null ;
28 Cipher myAESCipher = null ;
29 byte [ ] I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r = {
30 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte )
31 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
32 (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 } ;
33 byte [ ] myLongTermMacKey = {
34 (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x4F , (byte )
35 0x2D , (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0xF3 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
36 (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x8F , (byte ) 0xFD, (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0x50 } ;
37 byte [ ] mySessionMacKey = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
38 SecretKeySpec myMacKey = null ;
39 private RSAPublicKey myRSAPublicKey ;
40 private byte [ ] dhBase = {
41 (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x4F , (byte )
42 0x2D , (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0xF3 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
43 (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x8F , (byte ) 0xFD, (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0x50 ,
44 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
45 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x86 ,
46 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCF, (byte ) 0xE4 , (byte ) 0xFF ,
47 (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x4A , (byte ) 0x4E ,
48 (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0xDD,
49 (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA7 , (byte ) 0x0C ,
50 (byte ) 0x4A , (byte ) 0xFA, (byte ) 0xAB, (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x9D ,
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51 (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xC2 , (byte ) 0x9F , (byte ) 0x52 ,
52 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 ,
53 (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x5E ,
54 (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A ,
55 (byte ) 0xD7 , (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0x69 , (byte ) 0x10 ,
56 (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x4A , (byte ) 0xF4 ,
57 (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0xC1 ,
58 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x8B , (byte ) 0xB8 , (byte ) 0xA7 , (byte ) 0x62 ,
59 (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0x1B , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0x8A ,
60 (byte ) 0xE2 , (byte ) 0x47 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x22 ,
61 (byte ) 0xEA, (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0xD4 , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x93 ,
62 (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xDA, (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x60 ,
63 (byte ) 0xCD, (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0xC6 , (byte ) 0xB2 ,
64 (byte ) 0x50 , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0xF1 ,
65 (byte ) 0x80 , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0x8E ,
66 (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0x9A ,
67 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x56 ,
68 (byte ) 0x6E , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0x16 ,
69 (byte ) 0xA3 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x77 ,
70 (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0x6F , (byte ) 0x0C , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
71 (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xD4 ,
72 (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xC8 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0xB7 ,
73 (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
74 (byte ) 0x8E , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xE1 , (byte ) 0x83 ,
75 (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xDD,
76 (byte ) 0xD9 , (byte ) 0xE2 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xE4 , (byte ) 0x77 ,
77 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xA2 ,
78 (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0x7F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x2F , (byte ) 0xF3 ,
79 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0xE3 ,
80 (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xCD, (byte ) 0x56 ,
81 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xFB, (byte ) 0xB4 , (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x6C ,
82 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xE1 , (byte ) 0xBC,
83 (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0xB3 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x69 ,
84 (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x9B ,
85 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xA4 , (byte ) 0xBD, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x5A ,
86 (byte ) 0x0F , (byte ) 0x1C , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xCF, (byte ) 0xFF ,
87 (byte ) 0x4C , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xE1 ,
88 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0xEC, (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x81 ,
89 (byte ) 0xBC, (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0x7F , (byte ) 0x2A , (byte ) 0x70 ,
90 (byte ) 0x65 , (byte ) 0xB3 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0xB8 , (byte ) 0x90 ,
91 (byte ) 0xD3 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x2B , (byte ) 0xFA} ;








100 + "DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F" ;
101 private byte [ ] randomExponent = new byte [ 3 2 ] ;
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102 private byte [ ] DHContribution = new byte [ 5 1 2 ] ;
103 void p r o t o c o l I n i t i a l i s e ( ) {
104 try {
105 KeyPairGenerator myKeyGenerator = KeyPairGenerator . g e t In s tance (
106 "RSA" ) ;
107 myKeyGenerator . i n i t i a l i z e (512) ;
108 KeyPair myKeyPair = myKeyGenerator . genKeyPair ( ) ;
109 mySignatureGenerationKey = myKeyPair . g e tPr iva t e ( ) ;
110 mySignatureVer i f i cat ionKey = myKeyPair . ge tPub l i c ( ) ;
111 mySignature = Signature . g e t In s tance ( "SHA1withRSA" ) ;
112 } catch ( Exception cE) {
113 System . out . p r i n t l n (
114 "Protoco l Helper Class I n i t i a l i s a t i o n Fa i l ed : "
+ cE . getMessage ( ) ) ;
115 }
116 }
117 byte [ ] GenerateDHPublicValue ( ) throws NoSuchAlgorithmException ,
118 Inval idKeyException ,




123 Inval idKeySpecException {
124 rsaCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( "RSA/None/NoPadding" , "BC" ) ;
125 KeyFactory myKeyFactory = KeyFactory . g e t In s tance ( "RSA" , "BC" ) ;
126 myRNG = SecureRandom . ge t In s tance ( "SHA1PRNG" ) ;
127 myRNG. nextBytes ( randomExponent ) ;
128 RSAPublicKeySpec myPublicKeySpec = new RSAPublicKeySpec (new
129 Big Intege r ( dhModulus , 16) , new Big Intege r ( byteToStr ing
130 ( randomExponent ) , 16) ) ;
131 myRSAPublicKey = (RSAPublicKey )myKeyFactory . genera tePub l i c
132 (myPublicKeySpec ) ;
133 rsaCipher . i n i t ( Cipher .ENCRYPT_MODE, myRSAPublicKey) ;
134 DHContribution = rsaCipher . doFinal ( dhBase ) ;
135 return DHContribution ;
136 }
137 byte [ ] GenerateDHSessionKeyMaterial (byte [ ] i nbu f f , int o f f s e t , int
138 l ength )throws NoSuchAlgorithmException , Inval idKeyException ,
139 I l l e g a lB l o ckS i z eExcep t i on , NoSuchProviderException ,
140 BadPaddingException , NoSuchPaddingException ,
141 Inval idKeySpecException {
142 rsaCipher . i n i t ( Cipher .ENCRYPT_MODE, myRSAPublicKey) ;
143 return rsaCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , o f f s e t , l ength ) ;
144 }
145 void GenerateMac (byte [ ] i nbu f f , int i nbu f fO f f s e t , int inbuf fLength ,
146 byte [ ] outbuf f , int outbu f fO f f s e t , byte [ ] MacKey)
147 throws NoSuchAlgorithmException ,
148 Inval idKeyException , I l l e ga lB l o ckS i z eExc ep t i on ,
149 NoSuchProviderException , BadPaddingException ,
150 NoSuchPaddingException , Inval idKeySpecException {
151 AESEngine AESMacEngine = new AESEngine ( ) ;
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152 KeyParameter myMacKey = new KeyParameter (MacKey) ;
153 CBCBlockCipherMac myAESMac = new CBCBlockCipherMac (AESMacEngine ,
154 128) ;
155 ParametersWithIV ivparam = new ParametersWithIV (myMacKey ,
156 I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ) ;
157 myAESMac. i n i t ( ivparam ) ;
158 myAESMac. update ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength ) ;
159 myAESMac. doFinal ( outbuf f , ou tbu f fO f f s e t ) ;
160 }
161 boolean SignatureMethod (byte [ ] inBuf f , int i nBu f fO f f s e t , int
162 inBuffLength , byte [ ] outBuff , int
163 outBuf fOf f se t , Key inKey , short SIGN_MODE)
164 throws Inval idKeyException ,
165 SignatureExcept ion {
166 ByteBuffer myTempByteBuffer = ByteBuffer . wrap ( inBuff ,
167 i nBu f fO f f s e t , inBuffLength ) ;
168 i f ( inKey == null && SIGN_MODE == this .SIGN_MODE_GENERATION) {
169 inKey = (Key) this . mySignatureGenerationKey ;
170 } else i f ( inKey == null && SIGN_MODE ==
171 this .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) {
172 inKey = (Key) this . mySignatureVer i f i cat ionKey ;
173 }
174 switch (SIGN_MODE) {
175 case SIGN_MODE_GENERATION: mySignature . i n i t S i g n ( ( PrivateKey )
176 inKey ) ;
177 mySignature . update (myTempByteBuffer ) ;
178 mySignature . s i gn ( outBuff , outBuf fOf f s e t , 64) ;
179 return true ;
180 case SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION:
181 mySignature . i n i tV e r i f y ( ( PublicKey ) inKey ) ;
182 mySignature . update (myTempByteBuffer ) ;
183 return mySignature . v e r i f y ( outBuff , outBuf fOf f se t , 64) ;
184 default :
185 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "ERROR−−−−−−−−−−−−WRONG MODE SELECTION" ) ;
186 }
187 return fa l se ;
188 }
189 void GenerateDecryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , int i nbu f fO f f s e t , int
190 inbuf fLength , byte [ ] outbuf f , int
191 outbu f fO f f s e t , byte [ ] EnKey)throws
192 NoSuchAlgorithmException ,
193 Inval idKeyException ,
194 I l l e g a lB l o ckS i z eExcep t i on ,
195 NoSuchProviderException ,
196 BadPaddingException , NoSuchPaddingException ,
197 Inval idKeySpecException ,
198 ShortBuf ferExcept ion ,
199 Inval idAlgor ithmParameterExcept ion {
200 try {
201 IvParameterSpec ivS = new IvParameterSpec ( I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ) ;
202 myAESKey = new SecretKeySpec (EnKey , "AES" ) ;
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203 myAESCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( "AES/CBC/NoPadding" ) ;
204 myAESCipher . i n i t ( Cipher .DECRYPT_MODE, myAESKey, ivS ) ;
205 myAESCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , outbuf f ,
206 ou tbu f fO f f s e t ) ;
207 } catch ( I l l e g a lB l o ckS i z eExc ep t i on ce ) {
208 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error at l i k e n 140 : " + ce . getMessage ( ) +
209 "\nInput Length " + inbuf fLength ) ;
210 }
211 }
212 void GenerateEncryption (byte [ ] i nbu f f , int i nbu f fO f f s e t , int
213 inbuf fLength , byte [ ] outbuf f , int
214 outbu f fO f f s e t , byte [ ] EnKey)throws
215 NoSuchAlgorithmException ,
216 Inval idKeyException ,
217 I l l e g a lB l o ckS i z eExcep t i on ,
218 NoSuchProviderException ,
219 BadPaddingException , NoSuchPaddingException ,
220 Inval idKeySpecException ,
221 ShortBuf ferExcept ion ,
222 Inval idAlgor ithmParameterExcept ion {
223 IvParameterSpec ivS = new IvParameterSpec ( I n i t i a l i s a t i o nV e c t o r ) ;
224 myAESKey = new SecretKeySpec (EnKey , "AES" ) ;
225 myAESCipher = Cipher . g e t In s tance ( "AES/CBC/NoPadding" ) ;
226 myAESCipher . i n i t ( Cipher .ENCRYPT_MODE, myAESKey, ivS ) ;
227 myAESCipher . doFinal ( inbu f f , i nbu f fO f f s e t , inbuf fLength , outbuf f ,
228 ou tbu f fO f f s e t ) ;
229 }
230 public Protoco lHe lpe rClas s ( ) {
231 Secur i ty . addProvider (new
232 org . bouncycast l e . j c e . p rov ide r . BouncyCastleProvider ( ) ) ;
233 }
234 public PublicKey getPublicKey ( ) {
235 return this . mySignatureVer i f i cat ionKey ;
236 }
237 public byte [ ] getRandomNumber ( ) {
238 try {
239 myRNG = SecureRandom . ge t In s tance ( "SHA1PRNG" ) ;
240 myRNG. nextBytes ( this . ServiceProviderRandom ) ;
241 } catch ( Exception cE) {
242 System . out . p r i n t l n (
243 "Error ? : Protoco lHe lpe rC las s . getRandomNumber :
" + cE . getMessage ( ) ) ;
244 }
245 return this . ServiceProviderRandom ;
246 }
247 public stat ic St r ing byteToStr ing (byte [ ] inArray ) {
248 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = {
249 (byte ) ' 0 ' , (byte ) ' 1 ' , (byte ) ' 2 ' , (byte ) ' 3 ' , (byte ) ' 4 ' , (byte )
250 ' 5 ' , (byte ) ' 6 ' , (byte ) ' 7 ' , (byte ) ' 8 ' , (byte ) ' 9 ' , (byte ) ' a ' ,
251 (byte ) 'b ' , (byte ) ' c ' , (byte ) 'd ' , (byte ) ' e ' , (byte ) ' f '
252 } ;
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253 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l ength ] ;
254 int index = 0 ;
255 for (byte b : inArray ) {
256 int v = b & 0xFF ;
257 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ;
258 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ;
259 }
260 try {
261 return new St r ing ( hex , "ASCII" ) ;
262 } catch ( Exception cE) {
263 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in bytesToStr ing : " +
264 cE . getMessage ( ) ) ;
265 }




The implementation of the helper function discussed in this section provides the function-
ality of a Card Application Management System (CAMS) that provides an interface to the
smart card.
1 package j avacardte rmina l ;
2 import java . u t i l . ∗ ;
3 import javax . smartcard io . ∗ ;
4 import java . math . B ig Intege r ;
5 import java . i o . FileOutputStream ;
6 import java . i o . Pr intWriter ;
7 public class Terminal {
8 long protoco lStartTime = 0 ;
9 long protocolEndTime = 0 ;
10 TerminalFactory myTerminal = TerminalFactory . ge tDe fau l t ( ) ;
11 CardTerminals myCardTerminals = myTerminal . t e rm ina l s ( ) ;
12 L i s t < CardTerminal > l i s tTe rm ina l = null ;
13 Card myCard = null ;
14 CardChannel myCardChannel = null ;
15 CardTerminal myCardTerminal = null ;
16 Protoco lHandler myProtocolHandler = new Protoco lHandler ( ) ;
17 ProtocolHandlerSCIn myProtocolHanlderSCIn = new ProtocolHandlerSCIn ( ) ;
18 private stat ic f ina l int TimeOut = 10 ;
19 private stat ic f ina l int MAX_APDU_SIZE = 1028 ;
20 private ConstructedTLV messageIncoming =
ConstructedTLV . getConstructedTLV ( ) ;
21 private stat ic f ina l byte [ ] CMD_APPLICATION_SELECT = {
22 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xA4 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x09 ,
(byte ) 0xD0 ,
23 (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x02 ,
(byte ) 0x01 ,
24 (byte ) 0x0C , (byte ) 0x08 } ;
25 private stat ic f ina l byte [ ] CMD_APPLICATION_INITIALISATION = {
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26 (byte ) 0xB0 , (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x01 ,
(byte ) 0xAA} ;
27 private stat ic CommandAPDU SELECT_APDU = new CommandAPDU
28 (CMD_APPLICATION_SELECT) ;
29 private stat ic CommandAPDU Application_INITIALISATION = new CommandAPDU
30 (CMD_APPLICATION_INITIALISATION) ;
31 byte [ ] r e sponse ;
32 public Terminal ( ) {}
33 public void TerminalConnection ( ) {
34 try {
35 l i s tTe rm ina l = myCardTerminals . l i s t ( ) ;
36 } catch ( Exception e ) {
37 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error L i s t i n g Attached Terminals : " +
e . t oS t r i ng ( ) ) ;
38 }
39 L i s t I t e r a t o r t e rm i n a l I t e r a t o r = l i s tTe rm ina l . l i s t I t e r a t o r ( ) ;
40 while ( t e rm i n a l I t e r a t o r . hasNext ( ) ) {
41 t e rm i n a l I t e r a t o r . next ( ) ;
42 }




46 myCard = myCardTerminal . connect ( "T=1" ) ;
47 } catch ( Exception e ) {
48 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Terminal Disconnected " ) ;
49 }
50 myCardChannel = myCard . getBasicChannel ( ) ;
51 i f ( ResponseTest (myCardChannel . t ransmit (SELECT_APDU) ) ) {}
52 else {
53 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Appl i ca t ion Not Se l e c t ed " ) ;
54 }
55 } catch ( Exception eX) {
56 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error " + eX . ge tC la s s ( ) + "\n" +
eX . getMessage ( ) ) ;
57 }
58 }
59 private boolean ResponseTest (ResponseAPDU resAPDU) {
60 byte [ ] t e s tByte s = resAPDU . getBytes ( ) ;
61 return ( t e s tByte s [ t e s tByte s . l ength − 2 ] == (byte ) 0x90 &&
62 t e s tByte s [ t e s tByte s . l ength − 1 ] == (byte ) 0x00 ) ;
63 }
64 public stat ic St r ing byteToStr ing (byte [ ] inArray ) {
65 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = {
66 (byte ) ' 0 ' , (byte ) ' 1 ' , (byte ) ' 2 ' , (byte ) ' 3 ' , (byte ) ' 4 ' , (byte ) ' 5 ' ,
(byte )
67 ' 6 ' , (byte ) ' 7 ' , (byte ) ' 8 ' , (byte ) ' 9 ' , (byte ) ' a ' , (byte ) 'b ' ,
(byte ) ' c ' ,
68 (byte ) 'd ' , (byte ) ' e ' , (byte ) ' f '
69 } ;
70 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l ength ] ;
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71 int index = 0 ;
72 for (byte b : inArray ) {
73 int v = b & 0xFF ;
74 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ;
75 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ;
76 }
77 try {
78 return new St r ing ( hex , "ASCII" ) . r e p l a c eA l l ( " . ( ? ! $ ) . ( ? ! $ ) " , "$0 " ) ;
79 } catch ( Exception cE) {
80 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in bytesToStr ing : " +
cE . getMessage ( ) ) ;
81 }
82 return "Error " ;
83 }
84 public stat ic void main ( St r ing [ ] a rgs ) {
85 try {
86 St r ing myFile = "C:\\SCTP−SP_Data\\ Per formanceSPIn i t ia tor . txt " ;
87 FileOutputStream outStream = new FileOutputStream (myFile ) ;
88 PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter ( outStream ) ;
89 int i t e r a t o r = 1000 ;
90 int counter = 1 ;
91 while ( i t e r a t o r > 0) {
92 Terminal myTerminal = new Terminal ( ) ;
93 myTerminal . TerminalConnection ( ) ;
94 myTerminal . s t a r tP r o t o c o l SP In i t i a r o r ( ) ;
95 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "ITERATION NUMBER : " + counter + " SPEED : " +
96 (double ) ( ( myTerminal . protocolEndTime −
97 myTerminal . protoco lStartTime ) ) ) ;
98 i t e r a t o r −−;
99 counter++;
100 out . p r i n t l n ( (double ) ( ( myTerminal . protocolEndTime −
101 myTerminal . protoco lStartTime ) ) ) ;
102 myTerminal = null ;
103 }
104 out . c l o s e ( ) ;
105 } catch ( Exception cE) {
106 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error : Error " + cE . getMessage ( ) ) ;
107 }
108 }
109 public void cardTerminalCommunicator (CommandAPDU commandApduMsg) {
110 try {
111 re sponse = myCardChannel . t ransmit (commandApduMsg) . getBytes ( ) ;
112 } catch ( CardException cE) {
113 System . out . p r i n t l n ( cE . getMessage ( ) ) ;
114 }
115 }
116 public void s t a r tP r o t o c o l SC In i t i a t o r ( ) {
117 CommandAPDU commandApduMsg ;
118 this . myProtocolHanlderSCIn . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
119 try {
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120 re sponse =
myCardChannel . t ransmit (Application_INITIALISATION) . getBytes ( ) ;
121 protoco lStartTime = System . cur rentT imeMi l l i s ( ) ;
122 this . myProtocolHanlderSCIn . inMessageProcess ing ( response , 1) ;
123 commandApduMsg = new CommandAPDU(0xB0 , 0x44 , 0x00 , 0x00 ,
124 this . myProtocolHanlderSCIn . outMessageProcess ing (1 ) ) ;
125 cardTerminalCommunicator (commandApduMsg) ;
126 i f ( this . myProtocolHanlderSCIn . inMessageProcess ing ( response , 2) ) {
127 commandApduMsg = new CommandAPDU(0xB0 , 0x44 , 0x00 , 0x00 ,
128 this . myProtocolHanlderSCIn . outMessageProcess ing (2 ) ) ;
129 i f ( ResponseTest (myCardChannel . t ransmit (commandApduMsg) ) ) {}
130 else {
131 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error in Protoco l " ) ;
132 System . e x i t (0 ) ;
133 }
134 }
135 protocolEndTime = System . cur rentT imeMi l l i s ( ) ;
136 } catch ( Exception ce ) {
137 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Error in Terminal . s t a r tP r o t o c o l SC In i t i a t o r : " +
138 ce . getMessage ( ) ) ;
139 }
140 }
141 public void s t a r tP r o t o c o l SP In i t i a r o r ( ) {
142 CommandAPDU commandApduMsg ;
143 myProtocolHandler . i n i t i a l i s e P r o t o c o l ( ) ;
144 try {
145 myCardChannel . t ransmit (Application_INITIALISATION) ;
146 protoco lStartTime = System . cur rentT imeMi l l i s ( ) ;
147 commandApduMsg = new CommandAPDU(0xB0 , 0x44 , 0x00 , 0x00 ,
148 myProtocolHandler . outMessageProcess ing (
149 ( short ) 1) ) ;
150 cardTerminalCommunicator (commandApduMsg) ;
151 i f ( this . r e sponse [ 3 ] == (byte ) 0xAA) {
152 i f ( myProtocolHandler . inMessageProcess ing ( response , ( short ) 1) ) {
153 commandApduMsg = new CommandAPDU(0xB0 , 0x44 , 0x00 , 0x00 ,
154 myProtocolHandler . outMessageProcess ing ( ( short ) 2) ) ;
155 cardTerminalCommunicator (commandApduMsg) ;
156 }
157 }
158 i f ( this . r e sponse [ 3 ] == (byte ) 0xBB) {
159 i f ( myProtocolHandler . inMessageProcess ing ( response , ( short ) 2) ) {}
160 }
161 protocolEndTime = System . cur rentT imeMi l l i s ( ) ;
162 } catch ( Exception cE) {
163 System . out . p r i n t l n ( "Exception in Terminal . s t a r tP r o t o c o l : " +
cE . ge tC la s s
164 ( ) . getName ( ) ) ;
165 }
166 try {
167 myCard . d i s connec t ( true ) ;
168 } catch ( CardException cE) {
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The Die-Hellman group used by the SPs, and SCs in this thesis is listed as below:
1 package {Which ever p ro to co l i s us ing this DH group } ;
2
3 public class ClassDH
4 {
5 public byte [ ] dhBase = {(byte ) 0xAC,
6 (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x4F , (byte ) 0x2D ,
7 (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0xF3 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
8 (byte ) 0x5C , (byte ) 0x8F , (byte ) 0xFD, (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0x50 ,
9 (byte ) 0x6C , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x89 ,
10 (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x8C , (byte ) 0xAF, (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x86 ,
11 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xCF, (byte ) 0xE4 , (byte ) 0xFF ,
12 (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x4A , (byte ) 0x4E ,
13 (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0xF0 , (byte ) 0xDD,
14 (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA7 , (byte ) 0x0C ,
15 (byte ) 0x4A , (byte ) 0xFA, (byte ) 0xAB, (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x9D ,
16 (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xC2 , (byte ) 0x9F , (byte ) 0x52 ,
17 (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0xB1 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0x62 ,
18 (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x5E ,
19 (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x6A ,
20 (byte ) 0xD7 , (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x76 , (byte ) 0x69 , (byte ) 0x10 ,
21 (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x4A , (byte ) 0xF4 ,
22 (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0xC1 ,
23 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x8B , (byte ) 0xB8 , (byte ) 0xA7 , (byte ) 0x62 ,
24 (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0x1B , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0x8A ,
25 (byte ) 0xE2 , (byte ) 0x47 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x22 ,
26 (byte ) 0xEA, (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0xD4 , (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x93 ,
27 (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0xDA, (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x60 ,
28 (byte ) 0xCD, (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0xC6 , (byte ) 0xB2 ,
29 (byte ) 0x50 , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0x7C , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0xF1 ,
30 (byte ) 0x80 , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0x8E ,
31 (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0x9A ,
32 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x56 ,
33 (byte ) 0x6E , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0x16 ,
34 (byte ) 0xA3 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0xBB, (byte ) 0x77 ,
35 (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0x6F , (byte ) 0x0C , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xB1 ,
36 (byte ) 0x5B , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x1A , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xD4 ,
37 (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xC8 , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0xAC, (byte ) 0xB7 ,
38 (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
39 (byte ) 0x8E , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xE1 , (byte ) 0x83 ,
40 (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xDD,
41 (byte ) 0xD9 , (byte ) 0xE2 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xE4 , (byte ) 0x77 ,
42 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xA2 ,
43 (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0x7F , (byte ) 0x5F , (byte ) 0x2F , (byte ) 0xF3 ,
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44 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0xE3 ,
45 (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0xCD, (byte ) 0x56 ,
46 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xFB, (byte ) 0xB4 , (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x6C ,
47 (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xE1 , (byte ) 0xBC,
48 (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x94 , (byte ) 0xB3 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x69 ,
49 (byte ) 0xED, (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x9B ,
50 (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xA4 , (byte ) 0xBD, (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0x5A ,
51 (byte ) 0x0F , (byte ) 0x1C , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xCF, (byte ) 0xFF ,
52 (byte ) 0x4C , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xE1 ,
53 (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0xEC, (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x81 ,
54 (byte ) 0xBC, (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0x7F , (byte ) 0x2A , (byte ) 0x70 ,
55 (byte ) 0x65 , (byte ) 0xB3 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0xB8 , (byte ) 0x90 ,
56 (byte ) 0xD3 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x2B , (byte ) 0xFA} ;
57 public byte [ ] dhModulus = {(byte ) 0xAD,
58 (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0x7E , (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0x91 , (byte ) 0x23 ,
59 (byte ) 0xA9 , (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xD6 , (byte ) 0x60 , (byte ) 0xFA,
60 (byte ) 0xA7 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xC5 , (byte ) 0x1F ,
61 (byte ) 0xA2 , (byte ) 0x0D , (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0xE5 , (byte ) 0x68 ,
62 (byte ) 0x3B , (byte ) 0x9F , (byte ) 0xD1 , (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0x4B ,
63 (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte ) 0x1D , (byte ) 0x0A ,
64 (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0xE6 , (byte ) 0xFA, (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x1D ,
65 (byte ) 0xF9 , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0xDB, (byte ) 0xAF,
66 (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0x3C , (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x7B , (byte ) 0xA1 ,
67 (byte ) 0xDF, (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0xEB, (byte ) 0x3D , (byte ) 0x68 ,
68 (byte ) 0x8A , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x9C , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0x0E ,
69 (byte ) 0x1D , (byte ) 0xE6 , (byte ) 0xB8 , (byte ) 0x5A , (byte ) 0x12 ,
70 (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0xA0 , (byte ) 0xA6 , (byte ) 0x6D , (byte ) 0x3F ,
71 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xAD, (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0xC2 ,
72 (byte ) 0x12 , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xED,
73 (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0xDA, (byte ) 0x4D , (byte ) 0xF8 , (byte ) 0xD9 ,
74 (byte ) 0x1E , (byte ) 0x8F , (byte ) 0xEF , (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0xB7 ,
75 (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0x4B , (byte ) 0x7A , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xB7 ,
76 (byte ) 0xD0 , (byte ) 0xB6 , (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x07 ,
77 (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xF9 , (byte ) 0x8D , (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0xED,
78 (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0xDB, (byte ) 0xF6 , (byte ) 0xC6 , (byte ) 0xBA,
79 (byte ) 0x0B , (byte ) 0x2C , (byte ) 0x8B , (byte ) 0xBC, (byte ) 0x27 ,
80 (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x6A , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xE0 , (byte ) 0xA0 ,
81 (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x08 , (byte ) 0xB3 ,
82 (byte ) 0xBF, (byte ) 0x8A , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x91 ,
83 (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x36 , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0x61 ,
84 (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0xBC, (byte ) 0x89 , (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0xDB,
85 (byte ) 0x16 , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0xE7 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x41 ,
86 (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x93 , (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x82 ,
87 (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0xC7 , (byte ) 0xDE, (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0xEF ,
88 (byte ) 0xDC, (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xF7 , (byte ) 0x12 ,
89 (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0xD5 , (byte ) 0xA0 , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x15 ,
90 (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0x7D , (byte ) 0x9A , (byte ) 0xDC, (byte ) 0x0A ,
91 (byte ) 0x48 , (byte ) 0x6D , (byte ) 0xCD, (byte ) 0xF9 , (byte ) 0x3A ,
92 (byte ) 0xCC, (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x32 , (byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0x87 ,
93 (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0x5D , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0xE1 , (byte ) 0x98 ,
94 (byte ) 0xC6 , (byte ) 0x41 , (byte ) 0xA4 , (byte ) 0x80 , (byte ) 0xCD,
444
C.11 Implementation Helper Classes
95 (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0xA1 , (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0xE5 , (byte ) 0x87 ,
96 (byte ) 0xE8 , (byte ) 0xBE, (byte ) 0x60 , (byte ) 0xE6 , (byte ) 0x9C ,
97 (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xB2 , (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0xC5 ,
98 (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0xE4 , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x04 ,
99 (byte ) 0x2E , (byte ) 0x9B , (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0xF1 , (byte ) 0x0B ,
100 (byte ) 0x0E , (byte ) 0x16 , (byte ) 0xE7 , (byte ) 0x97 , (byte ) 0x63 ,
101 (byte ) 0xC9 , (byte ) 0xB5 , (byte ) 0x3D , (byte ) 0xCF, (byte ) 0x4B ,
102 (byte ) 0xA8 , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0xE3 , (byte ) 0xFB,
103 (byte ) 0x73 , (byte ) 0xC1 , (byte ) 0x6B , (byte ) 0x8E , (byte ) 0x75 ,
104 (byte ) 0xB9 , (byte ) 0x7E , (byte ) 0xF3 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0xE2 ,
105 (byte ) 0xFF , (byte ) 0xA3 , (byte ) 0x1F , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xCF,
106 (byte ) 0x9D , (byte ) 0xE5 , (byte ) 0x38 , (byte ) 0x4E , (byte ) 0x71 ,
107 (byte ) 0xB8 , (byte ) 0x1C , (byte ) 0x0A , (byte ) 0xC4 , (byte ) 0xDF,
108 (byte ) 0xFE , (byte ) 0x0C , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xE6 , (byte ) 0x4F } ;
109 }
C.11.4 SHA256 Pseudorandom Number Generator
The Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) algorithm used during the attestation
mechanism is based on the SHA 256 and its implementation is listed as below:
1 package prngSHA256 ;
2
3 import javacard . framework . Applet ;
4 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ;
5 import javacard . framework . ISOException ;
6 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ;
7 import javacard . framework . Ut i l ;
8 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ;
9 public class PrngSHA256 extends Applet {
10 private stat ic byte [ ] Cyc l i cSe edF i l e = {
11 (byte ) 0x49 , (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x8e , (byte ) 0x5f , (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte )
12 0x61 , (byte ) 0xc9 , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0xfa ,
13 (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0xcb , (byte ) 0x9f , (byte ) 0x93 , (byte ) 0x91 ,
14 (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x65 , (byte ) 0xd0 , (byte ) 0x0c ,
15 (byte ) 0x7c , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
16 (byte ) 0x47 , (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0xe1 ,
17 (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0xe8 ,
18 (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0x62 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0x10 ,
19 (byte ) 0x5d , (byte ) 0xf8 , (byte ) 0x66 , (byte ) 0x12 , (byte ) 0x12 ,
20 (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0x9d , (byte ) 0x83 , (byte ) 0xbf , (byte ) 0x74 ,
21 (byte ) 0xae , (byte ) 0xd2 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xf9 , (byte ) 0x01 ,
22 (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x39 , (byte ) 0xf8 ,
23 (byte ) 0xf0 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0x2f ,
24 (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0x38 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x79 ,
25 (byte ) 0x0d , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x12 ,
26 (byte ) 0xeb , (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0xee , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xde ,
27 (byte ) 0x9f , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0xb4 , (byte ) 0x1a ,
28 (byte ) 0xcb , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0x84 , (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0x28 ,
29 (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xa6 ,
30 (byte ) 0xcd , (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x07 ,
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31 (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0x04 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0xdd ,
32 (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0xf0 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
33 (byte ) 0xb9 , (byte ) 0x8e , (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x4d , (byte ) 0x36 ,
34 (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0 xef , (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0xa0 , (byte ) 0x66 ,
35 (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xcb , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xfa ,
36 (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0xda , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x7d ,
37 (byte ) 0xcd , (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0xd6 ,
38 (byte ) 0x50 , (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x67 ,
39 (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0 xef , (byte ) 0x34 , (byte ) 0x71 ,
40 (byte ) 0xb3 , (byte ) 0x9a , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0xa9 ,
41 (byte ) 0xe9 , (byte ) 0xc7 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0xb6 , (byte ) 0xfd ,
42 (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0x8d , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xde ,
43 (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0xf7 , (byte ) 0xd0 , (byte ) 0xd2 ,
44 (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0xac , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x2b ,
45 (byte ) 0xa4 , (byte ) 0x1a , (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x85 ,
46 (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0x5f , (byte ) 0x13 , (byte ) 0x27 , (byte ) 0x0d ,
47 (byte ) 0x78 , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0xab , (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0xd0 ,
48 (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0x1a , (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0x8f , (byte ) 0x6e ,
49 (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x0f , (byte ) 0x20 , (byte ) 0xec ,
50 (byte ) 0x61 , (byte ) 0x31 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0xd9 , (byte ) 0x36 ,
51 (byte ) 0x1c , (byte ) 0xa6 , (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0xdc ,
52 (byte ) 0x3a , (byte ) 0x9d , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0x77 ,
53 (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0xdf , (byte ) 0xe4 , (byte ) 0x0b ,
54 (byte ) 0x7d , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xd0 , (byte ) 0xc5 , (byte ) 0xe8 ,
55 (byte ) 0x29 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x8a , (byte ) 0x52 , (byte ) 0xf1 ,
56 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x9e , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x3b , (byte ) 0x73 ,
57 (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xdd , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0xe7 , (byte ) 0x7b ,
58 (byte ) 0xd3 , (byte ) 0xb6 , (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0x25 , (byte ) 0x33 ,
59 (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0xdb , (byte ) 0x49 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0xbe ,
60 (byte ) 0xd8 , (byte ) 0x38 , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0 xfe ,
61 (byte ) 0x7e , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0x9f , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x0b ,
62 (byte ) 0x05 , (byte ) 0x0a , (byte ) 0xcd , (byte ) 0x21 , (byte ) 0xfb ,
63 (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0x57 , (byte ) 0xb0 , (byte ) 0x12 ,
64 (byte ) 0xc2 , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0x8b , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x42 ,
65 (byte ) 0xf6 , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x43 , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0x96 ,
66 (byte ) 0x3a , (byte ) 0x37 , (byte ) 0xac , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x3a ,
67 (byte ) 0x6a , (byte ) 0xf0 , (byte ) 0x92 , (byte ) 0xf2 , (byte ) 0x48 ,
68 (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0x0c , (byte ) 0xe4 , (byte ) 0x1f , (byte ) 0x8c ,
69 (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0x58 , (byte ) 0x70 , (byte ) 0x00 , (byte ) 0x1b ,
70 (byte ) 0xb6 , (byte ) 0x0d , (byte ) 0x65 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x53 ,
71 (byte ) 0xcd , (byte ) 0xb6 , (byte ) 0xc4 , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0x63 ,
72 (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x5f , (byte ) 0x47 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x92 ,
73 (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x7b , (byte ) 0x59 , (byte ) 0x01 , (byte ) 0x8b ,
74 (byte ) 0x9a , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xe6 , (byte ) 0x61 ,
75 (byte ) 0xb2 , (byte ) 0x88 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0x4e , (byte ) 0x18 ,
76 (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xca , (byte ) 0xbd , (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x3e ,
77 (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xae ,
78 (byte ) 0x11 , (byte ) 0x9c , (byte ) 0x6c , (byte ) 0xae , (byte ) 0x97 ,
79 (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x55 , (byte ) 0x1c , (byte ) 0x16 , (byte ) 0x74 ,
80 (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0xf9 , (byte ) 0xfd , (byte ) 0xd6 ,
81 (byte ) 0xad , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0x35 , (byte ) 0xcc , (byte ) 0x69 ,
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82 (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0xc9 , (byte ) 0xe6 , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x4b ,
83 (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0x8f , (byte ) 0x60 ,
84 (byte ) 0x02 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x60 , (byte ) 0x5c ,
85 (byte ) 0x2b , (byte ) 0xe5 , (byte ) 0x2e , (byte ) 0x0a , (byte ) 0x49 ,
86 (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0x5e , (byte ) 0x75 , (byte ) 0x6a , (byte ) 0xde ,
87 (byte ) 0xd9 , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0xda , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xbd ,
88 (byte ) 0xcd , (byte ) 0xfb , (byte ) 0xbd , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x00 ,
89 (byte ) 0x4b , (byte ) 0xa9 , (byte ) 0x40 , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0x5a ,
90 (byte ) 0xa7 , (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0xbb , (byte ) 0x0a ,
91 (byte ) 0x28 , (byte ) 0xec , (byte ) 0x14 , (byte ) 0x5c , (byte ) 0xa6 ,
92 (byte ) 0x47 , (byte ) 0xd0 , (byte ) 0xf4 , (byte ) 0x42 , (byte ) 0xb5 ,
93 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0x20 , (byte ) 0x79 , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0x2b ,
94 (byte ) 0xe7 , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0x96 , (byte ) 0xe4 ,
95 (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xf1 , (byte ) 0x10 , (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0x12 ,
96 (byte ) 0 xcf , (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0x3a , (byte ) 0x99 , (byte ) 0x66 ,
97 (byte ) 0x8c , (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0xb6 , (byte ) 0x7c , (byte ) 0xab ,
98 (byte ) 0x38 , (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x72 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x14 ,
99 (byte ) 0x2d , (byte ) 0x4c , (byte ) 0x87 , (byte ) 0x86 , (byte ) 0x89 ,
100 (byte ) 0x8d , (byte ) 0xf5 , (byte ) 0x53 , (byte ) 0xa1 , (byte ) 0x02 ,
101 (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0xd4 , (byte ) 0xa3 , (byte ) 0xce , (byte ) 0x7b ,
102 (byte ) 0x56 , (byte ) 0x06 , (byte ) 0x19 , (byte ) 0x0b , (byte ) 0x4f ,
103 (byte ) 0x74 , (byte ) 0x03 , (byte ) 0x8d , (byte ) 0x51 , (byte ) 0x7a ,
104 (byte ) 0xb8 , (byte ) 0xe0 , (byte ) 0xdc , (byte ) 0x2a , (byte ) 0x26 ,
105 (byte ) 0xdd , (byte ) 0 x f f , (byte ) 0x3e , (byte ) 0x23 , (byte ) 0xe5 ,
106 (byte ) 0x9b , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xc8 , (byte ) 0x6c , (byte ) 0x25 ,
107 (byte ) 0x60 , (byte ) 0xd7 , (byte ) 0x33 , (byte ) 0x95 , (byte ) 0xca ,
108 (byte ) 0xaf , (byte ) 0x0c , (byte ) 0x7f , (byte ) 0x3f , (byte ) 0x95 ,
109 (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0xe8 , (byte ) 0xd5 , (byte ) 0x64 , (byte ) 0x8c ,
110 (byte ) 0x82 , (byte ) 0x12 , (byte ) 0x7e , (byte ) 0x68 , (byte ) 0x0e ,
111 (byte ) 0xb5 , (byte ) 0xd0 , (byte ) 0x15 , (byte ) 0x85 , (byte ) 0x72 ,
112 (byte ) 0x6b , (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0xc6 , (byte ) 0x17 , (byte ) 0x7a ,
113 (byte ) 0x3c , (byte ) 0x4a , (byte ) 0xba , (byte ) 0x71 , (byte ) 0xa4 ,
114 (byte ) 0x30 , (byte ) 0x26 , (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x1c , (byte ) 0x21 ,
115 (byte ) 0x44 , (byte ) 0x46 , (byte ) 0xbc , (byte ) 0x90 , (byte ) 0x15 ,
116 (byte ) 0x77 , (byte ) 0x22 , (byte ) 0x54 , (byte ) 0x60 , (byte ) 0x02 ,
117 (byte ) 0x81 , (byte ) 0xe2 , (byte ) 0x5b , (byte ) 0x98 , (byte ) 0x9f ,
118 (byte ) 0 xfe , (byte ) 0x18 , (byte ) 0xcd , (byte ) 0x3d , (byte ) 0x72 ,
119 (byte ) 0xc0 , (byte ) 0x67 , (byte ) 0x7b , (byte ) 0x7c , (byte ) 0x26 ,
120 (byte ) 0x09 , (byte ) 0x45 , (byte ) 0xa5 , (byte ) 0x2c , (byte ) 0x5f ,
121 (byte ) 0x63 , (byte ) 0x9f , (byte ) 0x2f , (byte ) 0xc3 , (byte ) 0x05 ,
122 (byte ) 0x07 , (byte ) 0xbe
123 } ;
124 private f ina l short FILE_SIZE = ( short ) 540 ;
125 private f ina l byte RECORD_SIZE = (byte ) 54 ;
126 private stat ic short Cycl icRecordReadPointer = 54 ;
127 private stat ic short Cycl icRecordWritePointer = 0 ;
128 f ina l stat ic byte CLA = (byte ) 0xB0 ;
129 f ina l stat ic byte GETRND = (byte ) 0x40 ;
130 f ina l stat ic short SW_CLASSNOTSUPPORTED = 0x6320 ;
131 f ina l stat ic short SW_ERROR_INS = 0x6300 ;
132 byte [ ] Bu f f e r = JCSystem . makeTransientByteArray ( ( short ) 32 ,
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133 JCSystem .CLEAR_ON_DESELECT) ;
134 MessageDigest SHA256 ;
135 void Xor (byte [ ] inputBuf fer , byte cond i t i on ) {
136 i f ( cond i t i on == 1) {
137 for ( short i = 1 , j = 0 ; i <= RECORD_SIZE + 1 ; i++) {
138 i nputBuf f e r [ i ] = (byte ) ( inputBuf f e r [ i ] ^ Buf f e r [ j ] ) ;
139 i f (++j >= ( short ) 32) {
140 j = 0 ;
141 }
142 }
143 } else {
144 for ( short i = 1 ; i <= RECORD_SIZE; i++) {
145 i nputBuf f e r [ ( short ) i ] = (byte ) ( inputBuf f e r [ ( short ) i ] ^




150 private void Cycl icSeedFi leRead (byte [ ] r eadBuf f e r ) {
151 i f ( Cycl icRecordReadPointer >= FILE_SIZE) {
152 Cycl icRecordReadPointer = 0 ;
153 } Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( Cyc l i cSeedF i l e , Cycl icRecordReadPointer ,
154 readBuf fer , ( short ) 1 , ( short )
155 (RECORD_SIZE + 1) ) ;
156 Cycl icRecordReadPointer = ( short ) ( ( short ) Cycl icRecordReadPointer
157 + RECORD_SIZE) ;
158 }
159 private void Cyc l i cSeedFi l eWr i te (byte [ ] w r i t eBu f f e r ) {
160 i f ( Cycl icRecordWritePointer >= FILE_SIZE) {
161 Cycl icRecordWritePointer = 0 ;
162 } Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( Cyc l i cSeedF i l e ,
163 Cycl icRecordWritePointer , wr i t eBuf f e r ,
164 ( short ) (RECORD_SIZE + 1) , RECORD_SIZE) ;
165 Xor ( wr i t eBuf f e r , (byte ) 0) ;
166 Ut i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( wr i t eBuf f e r , (byte ) 1 , Cyc l i cSeedFi l e ,
167 Cycl icRecordWritePointer , RECORD_SIZE) ;
168 Cycl icRecordWritePointer = ( short ) ( ( short )
169 Cycl icRecordWritePointer +
170 RECORD_SIZE) ;
171 }
172 private void Adjuster ( inputBuf f e r ) {
173 for ( short i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i++) {
174 i nputBuf f e r [ ( short ) i ] = (byte ) ( Buf f e r [ ( short ) i ] ^ Buf f e r [ ( short ) (31





180 private PrngSHA256(byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte bLength ) {
181 SHA256 = MessageDigest . g e t In s tance ( MessageDigest .ALG_SHA_256,
182 fa l se ) ;
183 r e g i s t e r ( ) ;
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184 }
185 public stat ic void i n s t a l l (byte bArray [ ] , short bOffset , byte
186 bLength ) {
187 new PrngSHA256( bArray , bOffset , bLength ) ;
188 }
189
190 byte [ ] generateMACPrng ( ) {
191 apduBuffer [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x02 ;
192 Cycl icSeedFi leRead ( apduBuffer ) ;
193 SHA256 . doFinal ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) (RECORD_SIZE + 1) ,
194 Buffer , ( short ) 0) ;
195 Xor ( apduBuffer , (byte ) 1) ;
196 apduBuffer [ 0 ] = (byte ) 0x03 ;
197 SHA256 . doFinal ( apduBuffer , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) (RECORD_SIZE + 1) ,
198 Buffer , ( short ) 0) ;
199 Xor ( apduBuffer , (byte ) 1) ;
200 Cyc l i cSeedFi l eWr i te ( apduBuffer ) ;
201 Adjuster ( ) ;
202 }
203 byte [ ] generateMACPrng (byte [ ] InputBuf f e r ) {
204 Cycl icSeedFi leRead ( InputBuf f e r ) ;
205 SHA256 . doFinal ( inputBuf fer , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) (RECORD_SIZE + 1) ,
206 Buffer , ( short ) 0) ;
207 Adjuster ( inputBuf fer , Bu f f e r ) ;
208 }
209
210 byte [ ] generateMACPrng (byte [ ] InputBuf fer , byte [ ] OutputBuffer ) {
211 Cycl icSeedFi leRead ( InputBuf f e r ) ;
212 SHA256 . doFinal ( inputBuf fer , ( short ) 0 , ( short ) (RECORD_SIZE + 1) ,
213 Buffer , ( short ) 0) ;
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